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Board of Directors is fiduciary for all stakeholders

- Responsible for maximizing value of estate
- Must navigate potentially competing interests of:
 - △ secured creditors
 - △ unsecured creditors
 - △ equity holders
 - △ other interested parties (e.g., unions, customers, regulators)

Board decisions are reviewed under same standards as outside Chapter 11

- Business judgment
- Entire fairness

But in Chapter 11 the Board's decisions might be subject to oversight in areas in which, outside of bankruptcy, no court is involved

- Compensation (severance and retention)
- Settlements (9019 review)
- Releases

And the scrutiny can be far more intense and less deferential

- Bankruptcy Court is forum for "real-time" review
- Decisions can be challenged by:
 - △ economic stakeholders (ad hoc committees)
 - △ official committees (co-fiduciaries)
 - △ government officials (United States Trustee)

Potential liability for directors is usually low

- Bankruptcy Court reviews and approves/disapproves non-ordinary course action before it is taken
- Directors usually released/exculpated in plan of reorganization for postpetition conduct

But directors must nevertheless be diligent in overseeing the debtor

- Reputation
- Minimize or avoid public second-guessing of decisions
- Potential litigation if debtor collapses (Chapter 7 trustee)

Three areas in which fiduciary issues can arise

- Appointment of equity committee
- Restructuring Support Agreement
- Conflicts between or among subsidiary-debtors and debtor-parent

Appointment of equity committee

- Not warranted if Debtor is "hopelessly insolvent."
 - △ How and when measured?
 - △ Does this mean Board no longer has fiduciary duty to shareholders?
- Board can "adequately represent" shareholders.
 - △ True in every case?
 - △ Does this put Board in conflict with creditors?

Restructuring Support Agreement (RSA)

- Binds creditors but not Debtor (fiduciary-out)
- Creditors often require Debtor to assume RSA
- Forces a mini-trial on plan of reorganization (Plan)
- What is the standard for scrutinizing Board decision to enter into RSA? Good faith? Business judgment? Entire fairness?

What if estates have claims against each other?

- Examples: tax claims; allocation of corporate overhead; intercompany loans/advances
- Who analyzes claims and determines whether to bring or settle them?
 Disinterested directors?
- What about Plan/strategy that affects subsidiaries differently?