# Cross-Border M&A Guide

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Cross-Border M&A Guide

I.

Introduction

Cross-border merger and acquisition ("M&A") transactions are a significant part of the global M&A landscape, representing approximately one-third of all deal activity annually in recent years. After a record-shattering year for M&A in 2021 and a reversion to mean M&A levels in 2022, the year 2023 experienced even greater tempering in the global M&A market. Worldwide M&A volume decreased to $2.9 trillion in 2023, from total volume of $3.6 trillion in 2022, $6.4 trillion in 2021 and an average of $4.5 trillion annually in the ten years prior (in 2023 dollars). This approximate 20% decline in volume from 2022 to 2023 took a particular toll on venture capital and private equity firms, which saw estimated volume declines of 39% and 35%, respectively, from 2022 to 2023, while strategic deals fell by an estimated 14%. This plunge in M&A activity reflects the impact of ongoing geopolitical tensions and the steepest monetary tightening in decades, which have contributed to challenging debt markets and an overall uncertain economic outlook. At the same time, an aggressive antitrust agenda in the United States deterred dealmakers from pursuing transactions that posed risks of a significant delay or litigation with the government.

Despite the challenges confronting dealmakers in 2023, cross-border deal volume remained close to 2022 levels, with total volume of approximately $950 billion in 2023 as compared to 2022 volume of approximately $1.0 trillion. The proportion of cross-border volume to total activity in 2023 (33%) aligned with the average proportion (35%) over the prior decade. Acquisitions of U.S. companies by non-U.S. acquirors constituted $165 billion in transaction volume and represented 17% of total 2023 cross-border M&A volume. Canadian, Irish, French, Swiss and British acquirors accounted for 42% of the volume of cross-border acquisitions of U.S. targets, while acquirors from China, India and other emerging economies accounted for about 9%. With proper planning and understanding of the relevant rules and considerations, cross-border transactions can continue to offer compelling opportunities for U.S. and foreign acquirors in 2024 and beyond.

* * *

Cross-border M&A transactions can be among the most complex and challenging to execute, but can also provide substantial benefits to companies seeking to enhance their competitive position in the global marketplace. The purpose of this Guide is to discuss certain U.S. legal considerations relating to cross-border M&A transactions. In particular, this Guide focuses on two common types of transactions:

- acquisitions of U.S. companies by non-U.S. companies; and
- acquisitions of non-U.S. companies.
Note in this regard that the second type of transaction above is not limited to acquisitions of non-U.S. target companies with securities listed in the United States, nor is it limited to cross-border transactions in which the acquiror is a U.S. company. Even a transaction in which both parties are neither incorporated nor listed in the United States can nonetheless implicate the U.S. federal securities laws. This illustrates a point that will become more evident throughout this Guide: The U.S. federal securities laws have expansive reach, more so than might be expected by transaction participants more accustomed to regulatory schemes outside the United States, which often apply only to companies that are organized or listed in the relevant jurisdiction.

While the U.S. federal securities laws can have significant extraterritorial application, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) has adopted rules that provide exemptions from certain U.S. federal securities law obligations. A core component of this system-wide relief for certain companies (or transactions involving them) is the concept of the “foreign private issuer,” or “FPI”: a foreign company that can potentially qualify for these exemptions.

In addition to the U.S. federal securities laws and the related U.S. securities exchange listing rules, this Guide also discusses the U.S. antitrust regime under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended (the “HSR Act”), administered by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and the national security regime administered by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”). This Guide also touches state corporate law matters relevant to acquisitions of U.S. companies, as well as on certain U.S. federal income tax considerations relevant to cross-border M&A. For a broader discussion of the legal, practical and tactical considerations for M&A involving U.S. target companies, please see the separate publication by our Firm, Takeover Law and Practice.

Section II of this Guide summarizes the general framework for U.S. laws applicable to cross-border transactions (including federal securities laws, state laws, listing requirements, tax considerations, and antitrust and national security considerations), as well as the considerations in the two types of cross-border M&A transactions mentioned above. It covers both those aspects that are applicable to the transaction itself and the post-transaction obligations that potentially can be imposed on foreign acquirors that issue securities as consideration in the transaction, and introduces the FPI concept, which is core to understanding the treatment of foreign companies under the U.S. federal securities laws. The remaining sections of this Guide address these topics in additional detail. Section III discusses acquisitions of U.S. companies, with a focus on U.S. regulation of tender offers and other business combinations, the proxy rules, the offering of securities in an M&A transaction and certain tax considerations. Section IV discusses the U.S. securities law aspects of acquisitions of non-U.S. companies, as well as certain tax considerations relating to acquisitions of non-U.S. companies by U.S. acquirors. Section V discusses U.S. antitrust and national security laws and regulations. Section VI discusses certain practical and tactical considerations in negotiation, due diligence and integration in a cross-border context. Section VII discusses the key ongoing obligations that can be imposed on a non-U.S. company that lists or registers securities issued as consideration in a cross-border...
transaction. Finally, Section VIII discusses the principal sources of liability for non-U.S. companies under U.S. laws, as well as how these obligations are enforced in practice.

This edition of the Guide reflects developments through May 2024.

As noted above, the purpose of this Guide is to discuss certain U.S. legal considerations relating to cross-border M&A transactions. For an additional checklist of certain legal, regulatory and political matters that should be considered in advance of any acquisition or strategic investment in the U.S., please refer to the memo attached as Appendix A hereto.
II.

Overview of U.S. Legal Considerations in Cross-Border Transactions

This Section II provides a general overview of U.S. legal considerations for cross-border transactions. These topics are discussed in greater detail in the subsequent sections of this Guide.

A. General Framework

1. The U.S. Federal Securities Acts and the SEC

The two principal sources of U.S. federal securities law are the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and the Securities Exchange of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). The Securities Act and the Exchange Act, as well as other statutes, empower the SEC to make and enforce securities regulations that implement specific provisions of the statutes. Using this power, the SEC has developed a complex body of rules and regulations under the U.S. federal securities laws that are designed to ensure full and fair disclosure to the market and the provision of sufficient information to allow investors to make informed investment decisions.

Securities Act of 1933

The Securities Act regulates offerings and sales of securities and establishes a disclosure system and rules of conduct for securities offerings. The regulations concerning offerings rest on a default rule that any issuer who wishes to offer or sell a security must either register the offer or sale with the SEC or find an exemption from such registration. The registration requirement applies to specific transactions in securities (not a whole class of securities), meaning additional registrations are required for future equity offerings and sales (although SEC rules do allow for a “shelf registration” that eases the process in certain circumstances).

Securities Exchange Act of 1934

The Exchange Act regulates the securities markets, including securities trading, business combinations and tender offers, and imposes ongoing reporting and other obligations on issuers with securities that are traded on a U.S. securities exchange or that are otherwise sufficiently widely held in the United States, as well as on the issuers’ directors, officers and significant shareholders. Some of the regulatory regimes discussed below, including tender offer regulation, proxy regulation and beneficial ownership reporting, arise under the Exchange Act.

Antifraud Rules

U.S. federal securities laws include several key antifraud rules that generally prohibit materially false or misleading statements. Most significantly, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder apply in connection with the purchase of any equity, debt or other security, regardless of whether it is registered under the Exchange Act.
or is the subject of an offering registered under the Securities Act and whether the purchase occurs by direct acquisition, tender offer or otherwise. As discussed in more detail below, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply to cross-border transactions, subject to certain limitations on their reach.

In addition, the Securities Act includes antifraud provisions that apply in connection with registered offerings of securities, and, as noted below, certain antifraud rules specifically apply in connection with tender offers.

2. **State Laws**

In addition to the U.S. federal securities laws, parties to a transaction involving a U.S. target company must also consider the law of its state of incorporation. State corporate law statutes and judicial doctrines cover a variety of significant matters relevant to the acquisition of a U.S. company, such as the corporate form of the company, the basic rights of shareholders, the mechanics of acquiring the company and the fiduciary duties of its directors.

3. **Listing Rules**

The parties to a cross-border transaction involving a non-U.S. acquiror may agree that the securities issued in the transaction will be listed on a U.S. securities exchange. A non-U.S. company that meets the listing criteria imposed by a U.S. exchange may either list such securities directly or issue and list American depositary receipts ("ADRs"). ADRs are negotiable certificates that evidence an ownership interest in American depositary shares ("ADSs"), which, in turn, represent an interest in the shares of a non-U.S. company that have been deposited with a U.S. bank. (The terms ADR and ADS are often used interchangeably by market participants.) ADRs and ADSs can facilitate trading in the non-U.S. company’s securities by U.S. investors.

The listing criteria for the New York Stock Exchange (the “NYSE”) and Nasdaq, which are found in the NYSE Listed Company Manual and the Nasdaq Stock Market Rules, respectively, comprise a set of (i) quantitative standards concerning an issuer’s financial situation and the market for the issuer’s securities and (ii) qualitative standards, mostly regarding corporate governance.

4. **Antitrust and National Security Considerations**

Any cross-border transaction involving a U.S. company (or a non-U.S. company with a U.S. business) could be subject to U.S. laws on antitrust and national security. These laws could require additional filings and coordination between the transaction parties themselves and the U.S. government and could lead to delays in the consummation of a transaction.

The HSR Act requires parties to transactions above a certain dollar value threshold to file notifications with the FTC and the DOJ. These notifications trigger a subsequent waiting period, which could then be extended if the applicable government agency
reviewing the transaction identifies competition concerns and requests additional information.

CFIUS is a federal interagency committee that reviews certain foreign investments in U.S. businesses for national security risks. CFIUS may conduct national security reviews of “covered transactions,” defined as proposed or completed mergers, acquisitions or takeovers that could result in “control” of an existing U.S. business by a non-U.S. person. As has occurred with respect to comparable regulatory entities in other countries, the reach of CFIUS has expanded over the past several years. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (“FIRRMA”) dramatically increased the scope of CFIUS’s jurisdiction to include non-passive, non-controlling foreign investments in U.S. businesses that deal in critical technology, operate critical infrastructure or collect or maintain sensitive personal data, each as defined in the CFIUS regulations (so-called “TID U.S. businesses”), and a mandatory filing requirement applicable to certain investments in critical technology companies or which result in the acquisition of a “substantial interest” (e.g., 49% or more) in a TID U.S. business by a foreign government-affiliated investor. While notification of a foreign investment to CFIUS remains largely voluntary, transactions that are not reviewed remain subject to potential CFIUS review in perpetuity. Thus, conducting a risk assessment for an acquisition of a U.S. company or investment early in the process is prudent to determine whether the investment will require a mandatory filing or may attract CFIUS attention.

5. **Tax Considerations**

Cross-border transactions can involve significant structuring and tax complexity. In addition to the “baseline” tax rules of the United States (and the other jurisdictions involved), cross-border deals may also implicate special tax regimes and rules that apply differently in a purely domestic context. For example, in mergers and other combinations involving a U.S. counterparty, the U.S. “anti-inversion” rules—some of the most complex provisions of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”)—must often be grappled with. The United States also has a robust controlled-foreign-corporation (“CFC”) regime, another set of special and complicated tax rules that will often be implicated in acquisitions or dispositions of non-U.S. companies by U.S. companies. These rules and their consequences for cross-border M&A are described in more detail throughout this Guide where relevant.

While beyond the scope of this Guide, cross-border M&A participants will also need to consider financial book-based global minimum tax systems recently adopted by many jurisdictions, including the United States, certain European Union member countries and others. These book minimum taxes apply on top of preexisting tax regimes and in many cases may override the tax consequences of an M&A transaction that would obtain under the “regular” tax rules.

**B. Acquisition of a U.S. Company**

In the acquisition of a U.S. company, the particular U.S. securities laws and rules that will apply to the transaction will largely depend on three key factors: (1) whether the target company is a public company or a private company; (2) whether the acquisition will
be effected by a merger or tender offer; and (3) whether the consideration to be provided in the acquisition will consist solely of cash or whether it will also include securities.

1. Public vs. Private Companies

An important distinction for understanding the methods of acquiring a U.S. company and related legal considerations is whether the U.S. company’s common shares are registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act. Several key aspects of the U.S. federal securities regulatory regime – including the proxy rules and the extent of applicable tender offer regulation – depend on whether the securities that are sought to be acquired are registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act.

Under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act, a company is required to register its common shares if they are listed on a U.S. securities exchange, such as the NYSE or Nasdaq. A company generally also is required to register its common shares under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act if: (a) the company has more than $10 million of total assets; and (b) such common shares are held of record by either 2,000 or more persons or 500 or more persons that are not accredited investors. This Guide generally refers to companies that have securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act as “public” companies.

2. Merger vs. Tender Offer

As discussed in more detail below, different types of transactions may implicate different requirements under U.S. federal securities laws.

There are two principal methods for acquiring a public U.S. company: a merger, which requires a vote of the target’s shareholders, and a two-step transaction in which a tender offer is followed by a merger to acquire all shares not purchased in the tender offer. A merger typically requires the approval of the shareholders of the target company, and the U.S. proxy rules contained in Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Regulation 14A thereunder regulate the solicitation of shareholder approval of a merger for a U.S. public company.

A separate set of rules under the U.S. federal securities law applies to tender offers. The Williams Act, which is codified in Sections 14(d) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act, and the rules promulgated thereunder regulate the conduct of tender offers and require offerors to disclose material information concerning their offers and to provide procedural protections to allow subject company shareholders sufficient opportunity to consider the offer and to participate on a level playing field with other shareholders.

Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act and Regulation 14D apply to any tender offer for equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, the acquisition of which would result in beneficial ownership of more than 5% of such class of equity securities. Regulation 14D primarily governs pre-commencement communications, tender offer documents, dissemination of tender offers to shareholders, equal treatment of shareholders, withdrawal rights, target board recommendations and communications to target shareholders, and offer extensions.
Regulation 14E applies to any tender offer, without regard to whether the subject securities are registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, whether equity securities are the subject of the tender offer, or the percentage of securities sought. Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act is a general antifraud provision that makes it unlawful for any person to make “any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.” Regulation 14E provides specific procedural obligations, notice requirements and restrictions on behavior with the objective of preventing such fraudulent practices prohibited by the Exchange Act. These rules impose requirements concerning minimum offer periods, prompt payments, notice of extensions, withdrawal rights, target responses to offers, purchases or sales using material information with respect to the offer, proration risk and purchases outside the offer.

3. **Form of Consideration**

The form of consideration to be paid to the target company’s shareholders will also affect the set of U.S. securities rules that apply to the transaction.

Acquisition of the target company’s securities solely for cash will generally subject the acquiror to fewer obligations under the U.S. federal securities laws. If an acquiror intends to issue securities to the target company’s shareholders for the acquisition, such issuance may trigger obligations under the Securities Act, which governs offers and sales of securities.

The registration requirements under the Securities Act can be burdensome, particularly for new issuers. Unlike the securities law regimes of some jurisdictions, which register a class of securities as a whole, registration under the Securities Act generally applies to specific transactions in securities. Accordingly, subsequent transactions may require additional registrations, even if they involve the same class of securities that was the subject of a prior Securities Act registration.

To register a transaction under the Securities Act, issuers must file a registration statement (of which there are several types, depending on the type of transaction and securities) with the SEC that discloses significant information about the issuer, including about the business, securities offered for sale, management team, financial condition and, in some cases, financial statements certified by public accountants. The SEC has the right to, and often does, review a registration statement and provide comments to the issuer, to which the issuer must respond in writing and, in most cases, amend its registration statement with another filing to make changes identified by the SEC. Although there is no standard timetable for these reviews, they are likely to take at least two and up to four or more months.
4. **Tax Considerations**

An acquisition of a U.S. public company for cash is often relatively straightforward from a U.S. tax perspective. For a variety of tax and non-tax reasons, structuring options are largely limited to a stock sale for tax purposes, and, accordingly, selling stockholders subject to U.S. tax recognize gain or loss in an amount equal to the difference between the amount of cash received and the tax basis in the stock surrendered, while the buyer obtains a cost basis in the purchased stock. However, the tax basis in the assets of the U.S. target company remains unchanged. If the U.S. company is privately owned, other structuring options—such as effecting the transaction as an asset sale for tax purposes in order to obtain an asset-level basis step-up—may be available.

U.S. tax considerations can be far more complex if the deal consideration includes stock of the non-U.S. acquirer. Under the baseline U.S. tax rules, it may be possible to structure an acquisition of a U.S. corporation so as to obtain tax deferral for selling U.S. shareholders in respect of any stock consideration received if at least 40% of the total consideration is stock (or less if a “double-dummy” or “top hat” structure is used to create a new holding company on top of both acquiror and target). However, in the cross-border context, special rules impose additional limitations on the ability of U.S. target shareholders to receive stock of a non-U.S. company tax-free. In addition, the Code’s anti-inversion provisions seek to deter U.S. companies from expatriating by imposing various adverse company-level tax consequences where historic U.S. target shareholders own specified amounts of the combined company post-transaction. These rules are discussed in greater detail in Section III.D.

C. **Acquisition of a Non-U.S. Company**

In the acquisition of a non-U.S. company, the particular U.S. laws and rules that will apply to the transaction will largely depend on three key factors: (1) whether the non-U.S. company qualifies as an FPI; (2) whether the acquisition will be effected by a tender offer for the securities of the non-U.S. company (and, if so, whether the securities are registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, as well as the level of U.S. shareholder ownership of the securities); and (3) whether the consideration to be provided in the acquisition will consist solely of cash or if it will also include securities.

1. **Foreign Private Issuers**

The concept of the FPI is central to understanding the specific application of the U.S. federal securities laws to cross-border transactions and the companies that engage in them: first, an acquiror of an FPI may be able to take advantage of certain exemptions from the tender offer rules and the Securities Act registration requirements; and second, a non-U.S. acquiror of an FPI that would otherwise become subject to ongoing obligations under the U.S. federal securities laws and stock exchange listing rules as a result of the registration or listing of securities in connection with a cross-border transaction may benefit from exemptions available to FPIs from certain of those obligations.

To qualify as an FPI, an entity must be a “foreign issuer,” meaning “any issuer which is a . . . national of any foreign country or a corporation or other organization
incorporated or organized under the laws of any foreign country,” for which either (a) more than 50% of its outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly held of record by residents outside the United States or (b) all of the following are true:

- the majority of the executive officers and directors of the foreign issuer are not U.S. citizens or residents;
- more than 50% of the assets of the foreign issuer are located outside of the United States; and
- the business of the foreign issuer is administered principally outside of the United States.

Under this rule, a foreign issuer need only satisfy one of the two prongs. Thus, even if more than 50% of a foreign issuer’s outstanding voting securities are held by U.S. residents, the foreign issuer would remain an FPI so long as it continued to satisfy each of the citizenship, asset and principal place of administration tests under prong (b).

To determine the percentage of a foreign issuer’s outstanding voting shares held “of record” by residents outside the United States under prong (a), a foreign issuer must look through custodians and clearing houses to identify the accounts of customer residents held by brokers, dealers, banks or other nominees located in the United States, in the company’s jurisdiction of incorporation, and in the jurisdiction that is the primary trading market for the company’s voting securities, if different from its jurisdiction of incorporation. Foreign issuers may rely in good faith on information as to the number of separate accounts supplied by all owners of the class of its securities that are supplied by brokers, dealers, banks or nominees of any of the foregoing. If after conducting a reasonable inquiry, a foreign issuer cannot obtain information on the shares represented by the separate accounts of customers resident in the United States, it may assume that the customers reside in the jurisdiction in which the nominee has its principal place of business.

Under prong (b), a foreign issuer must calculate the citizenship and residency status of its executive officers and directors separately to satisfy the citizenship test. To identify the location of its assets pursuant to the asset test, a foreign issuer must either use geographical segment information used in the preparation of the issuer’s financial statements or apply any other reasonable methodology. Lastly, the principal place of administration test requires a foreign issuer to “assess on a consolidated basis the location from which its officers . . . or managers primarily direct, control and coordinate” its activities. Certain SEC “no-action letters,” through which SEC staff respond to requests for guidance on specific facts and circumstances, clarify how an issuer can measure the location of such administration, including obvious factors, like the location of the shareholders’ meeting, the time executives spend in the U.S., the location of board meetings and the location of business division headquarters and less obvious factors, such as the percentage of revenues drawn from business activities outside the United States.
A foreign issuer registering with the SEC for the first time must evaluate its status as an FPI within 30 days prior to such new registrant’s filing of its initial registration statement under either the Securities Act or Exchange Act. After being qualified as an FPI, the foreign issuer need only reassess its status, under the foregoing criteria, once per year as of the last business day of its second fiscal quarter. Upon qualification, an FPI is immediately able to use the forms and rules designated for FPIs, and may continue to do so until the first day of the fiscal year following the date on which a foreign issuer determines it fails to qualify as an FPI. In other words, even if a foreign issuer that was an FPI fails to requalify, it may still use the forms and rules for FPIs until the first day of the next fiscal year. Additionally, when a foreign issuer fails to qualify, it remains unqualified unless and until it again meets the requirements for FPI status as of the last business day of its second fiscal quarter.

2. Tender Offer for Securities of a Non-U.S. Company

If the acquisition of a non-U.S. company involves a tender offer, then the tender offer rules under the Williams Act will apply to the transaction. The precise set of tender offer rules that will apply depends on: (1) whether the non-U.S. company’s common shares (or equivalent equity securities, such as ordinary shares) are registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act; (2) whether the non-U.S. company is an FPI; and (3) the level of U.S. shareholder ownership of the securities.

If the non-U.S. company’s common shares are registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, then Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act and Regulation 14D, discussed above in Section II.B.2, will generally apply to any tender offer for those securities, if the acquisition would result in beneficial ownership of more than 5% of such class of equity securities. Section 14(e) and Regulation 14E will apply to a tender offer for a non-U.S. company’s securities regardless of whether its common shares are registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act.

The SEC has adopted exemptions (referred to herein as the “Cross-Border Rules”) to the rules applicable to tender offers for the securities of an FPI, depending on the level of the FPI’s U.S. ownership:

- **Tier I.** If, among other conditions, U.S. holders hold 10% or less of a subject FPI’s securities, the “Tier I” exemptions apply, exempting the offeror from all of Section 14(d) and Regulation 14D and certain of the provisions of Regulation 14E.

- **Tier II.** If, among other conditions, U.S. holders hold more than 10% but not more than 40% of a subject target’s securities, “Tier II” applies, providing targeted relief from Regulations 14D and 14E so as to limit the conflict between U.S. and non-U.S. tender offer rules.

If the acquisition of the non-U.S. company is to be accomplished other than through a tender offer, then the tender offer rules will not apply. In addition, FPIs are exempt from
the proxy rules, and accordingly a vote by an FPI’s shareholders to approve the transaction would not be subject to Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act or Regulation 14A thereunder.

3. Form of Consideration

As with an acquisition of a U.S. public company as discussed above in Section II.B.3, the form of consideration to be paid to the target company’s shareholders will also affect the set of U.S. rules that apply to the transaction.

If an acquiror intends to issue securities to a target company’s shareholders to acquire its securities, such issuance may trigger obligations under the Securities Act, unless an exemption from registration is available.

In an acquisition of a non-U.S. company, the most commonly used exemptions from registration under the Securities Act are:

- Rule 802, which provides an exemption from registration similar to the Tier I exemptions from the tender offer rules, insofar as it applies when the target is an FPI and U.S. holders hold 10% or less of the subject FPI’s securities; and

- Section 3(a)(10), which provides an exemption from registration to issuers for offers and sales of securities in exchange transaction schemes where certain conditions are met, including, among others, that only securities are exchanged and there is a governmental approval of the fairness of the exchange’s terms. The Section 3(a)(10) exemption can sometimes be used in an acquisition of a non-U.S. company via a scheme of arrangement or similar court-approved transaction.

Depending on the circumstances, other exemptions or other means of avoiding registration, such as vendor placements or cashing out U.S. shareholders of the target, may be available.

4. Tax Considerations

The U.S. has a robust CFC regime that generally operates to tax 10% (or greater) U.S. shareholders of CFCs on a current basis with respect to income earned by such CFCs. It also modifies the U.S. tax consequences of M&A transactions that would generally obtain in a purely domestic context. Accordingly, acquisitions of non-U.S. companies from 10% (or greater) U.S. shareholders or by U.S. companies can raise complex U.S. tax issues, the full evaluation of which typically requires careful modeling. One question that will almost always need to be considered by both U.S. sellers and U.S. buyers of non-U.S. corporations is the desirability of making an election under Section 338(g) of the Code to treat the acquisition as an asset sale for U.S. tax purposes. U.S. buyers will also need to consider the go-forward U.S. tax consequences of owning the non-U.S. target given that the earnings of a CFC are potentially subject to current U.S. taxes at the U.S. shareholder level, even when no cash is brought back to the United States. The U.S. tax rules applicable to acquisitions of non-U.S. companies are discussed in greater detail in Section IV.D.
5. Negotiation, Diligence and Integration Considerations

In addition to the U.S. legal considerations, there are practical and tactical considerations with respect to structuring and executing a cross-border transaction. The potentially complex combination of local legal requirements and practices may be relevant not only in transaction structuring, but also in the due diligence, negotiation and integration phases of a transaction. When negotiating a cross-border transaction, it is important to understand the key players in the target company’s market, including institutional investors, hedge funds and proxy voting advisors, in addition to being mindful of local M&A customs and the possible impact of local takeover regulations and disclosure obligations. Cross-border transactions may also require additional due diligence focus in order to fully understand the risks associated with a potential acquisition, including with respect to risks related to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (“FCPA”) and international sanctions regimes.

6. Post-Transaction Securities Law Obligations

As noted above, the federal securities laws do not merely regulate transactions. They also can impose ongoing obligations on an FPI.

Incurring Ongoing Obligations

Generally speaking, an FPI can become subject to ongoing securities law obligations as a result of a cross-border transaction if it issues securities as consideration in the transaction and either (a) the securities are listed on a U.S. securities exchange (as may be the case if the acquiror issues listed ADRs to U.S. holders of the target’s shares), triggering a registration obligation under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act, or (b) the issuance is registered under the Securities Act (as may be the case if an exemption from registration is not available), triggering an obligation to file reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.

Moreover, if the FPI acquiror issues equity securities that are not listed on a U.S. securities exchange in a transaction that is not registered under the Securities Act, the acquiror may, as a technical matter, have to register the securities under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act if the securities are held by a sufficient number of U.S. holders. However, under Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2(b), the equity securities would be exempt from registration under Section 12(g) so long as the primary market for the FPI’s securities is on non-U.S. securities exchanges and the FPI makes certain information available in English in its primary trading market.

The Scope of Ongoing Obligations

An FPI required to register securities under Section 12—as well as its shareholders (including non-U.S. shareholders)—incurs a variety of other obligations under the Exchange Act. The Exchange Act requires disclosure of the company’s operations quarterly and annually and disclosures of material events shortly after they occur. Financial information, including audited financial statements, must also be periodically disclosed and accompanied by certifications from independent auditors and the company’s
management. U.S. federal securities laws and, if applicable, the listing rules of the national exchanges on which the FPI’s securities are listed also mandate certain governance requirements, such as those involving the composition of board committees and compensation disclosure requirements for directors and officers. Section VII of this Guide summarizes these requirements in detail.

The shareholder disclosure provisions of Sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Exchange Act are intended to give notice of significant acquisitions and potential changes of control to securities markets and other holders of the issuer’s securities. The reporting obligations turn on the percentage of the shareholder’s beneficial ownership of the issuer’s equity securities and are the shareholder’s responsibility.
III.

Acquisition of a U.S. Company

This Section III describes in greater detail the principal legal considerations under the U.S. federal securities laws for accomplishing an acquisition of a U.S. company by a non-U.S. company, and it also describes certain tax considerations.

A. Acquisition of a Private U.S. Company

Generally speaking, the acquisition of a private U.S. company—or more technically, as discussed above, a company that does not have a class of securities registered under Section 12(b) or 12(g) of the Exchange Act—is more straightforward from a U.S. securities law perspective than the acquisition of a public U.S. company. If the acquired company has only one or a handful of shareholders, it often can be accomplished by a direct purchase of the equity interests of the company, which implicates few federal securities law requirements other than the basic antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.

In some cases, the acquisition of a private company is effected by a merger, which is discussed in more detail below, rather than a direct purchase of equity interests. For example, the company may have a somewhat more dispersed shareholder base, but still is not “public” in the sense described above—such as a startup company that has grown through multiple investment rounds but has not yet had its initial public offering, or a private equity portfolio company in which management holds equity. A merger may also be preferable for tax or other reasons. In the case of an acquisition via merger, the target company’s shareholders must approve the merger by a vote or written consent, either at a majority or supermajority level, depending on the relevant state law and the company’s organizational documents. Because the company is private, the detailed process and disclosure requirements of the federal proxy rules would not apply. Instead, the process for obtaining shareholder approval of the merger would be governed by state law, which typically would involve only the minimal process requirements set forth in the state corporate law statute of the company’s jurisdiction of incorporation and its governing documents, and any disclosure obligations would be limited to basic antifraud and fiduciary duty principles.

In rare cases, an acquisition of a private company with numerous shareholders may involve a tender offer. As discussed in more detail below, such a tender offer would have to comply with the requirements of Regulation 14E, but not the more detailed requirements of Regulation 14D.

If securities are being issued as consideration in connection with the transaction, it will be necessary to consider whether the offering needs to be registered under the Securities Act or if an exemption would be available for the offering. Notably, the fact that an acquiror is a foreign entity does not itself exempt the offering from registration, although, as discussed below, it would allow the acquiror to use a different set of Securities Act forms for registration if required.
B. Acquisition of a Public U.S. Company

Generally speaking, the acquisition of a public U.S. company—or more technically, a company that has a class of securities registered under Section 12(b) or 12(g) of the Exchange Act—implicates additional U.S. securities law obligations as compared to an acquisition of a private U.S. company. The particular set of obligations will depend on the manner of acquisition—specifically, merger versus tender offer—and whether the target shareholders will receive securities as part of the consideration.

1. Mergers

In the United States, public companies often are acquired via merger. A merger is a business combination transaction conducted pursuant to the corporate law statute of the state in which the target company is organized. A typical form of merger involves the target company merging with another entity (typically, but not always, a newly formed subsidiary of the buyer). As a result of the merger, the securities of the target company are converted into the consideration specified in the merger agreement. The merger will require approval of the target company’s shareholders, usually by the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares, although some states require a higher threshold, and some companies provide for higher thresholds in their organizational documents. In certain cases, a vote may not be required; for example, Delaware permits a “short-form” merger without a vote if the acquiror owns at least 90% of the target company’s shares.

In addition, some acquisitions are effected in a two-step process, in which the acquiror first completes a tender offer for the target’s shares and then, assuming a sufficient percentage of the shares is acquired, acquires the shares not tendered through a so-called “back-end” merger. In Delaware, such a back-end merger does not require a vote if the buyer acquires in the first-step tender offer such percentage of the target company’s shares that would be sufficient to approve a merger via shareholder vote.

From a U.S. securities law perspective, a merger is not treated as a tender offer and therefore is not subject to the tender offer rules discussed below (although in a two-step transaction, the first-step tender offer would be subject to those rules). The solicitation of the shareholder vote to approve a public company merger, however, must comply with the federal proxy rules. This involves the preparation and filing of a proxy statement that must comply with Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Regulation 14A thereunder, including a series of specific disclosure requirements set forth in Schedule 14A. The SEC may review a proxy statement, although it often does not—in recent years, the SEC has been declining to review all-cash merger proxy statements with increasing frequency. If the SEC chooses to review an all-cash merger proxy, the review process often can be completed more quickly than a review of a Securities Act registration statement, which is discussed in Section III.C.

Once SEC review of the proxy statement is complete (or if the SEC declines to review the proxy statement), the target company will mail the proxy statement to its shareholders in advance of a shareholder meeting at which the merger agreement will be presented for a vote. The proxy rules require that the proxy statement be mailed at least 20 business days before the shareholder meeting, subject to certain exceptions. In some cases,
the target’s proxy solicitor may desire to have more than 20 business days in order to have
adequate time to solicit votes in favor of the merger.

2. Tender Offers

If the acquisition is structured as a tender offer, and the target company’s common
shares (or equivalent equity security, such as ordinary shares) are registered under
Section 12 of the Exchange Act, then Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act and Regulation
14D will apply to the tender offer. In addition, Section 14(e) and Regulation 14E apply to
all tender offers, whether or not they are made for equity securities registered under
Section 12 of the Exchange Act.

The Williams Act and the rules promulgated thereunder require the offeror in a
tender offer to disclose material information with respect to the offer and give shareholders
procedural protections in deciding whether to tender their securities. The tender offer rules
apply to third-party tender offers, as well as to tenders by a company or its affiliates for the
company’s equity securities, although this Guide will focus on third-party tender offers.²

The term “tender offer” is not defined in U.S. statutes and regulations. The term is
typically defined by a multifactor test first adopted by a decision of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York: (i) there is active and widespread solicitation of
shareholders; (ii) a solicitation was made for a substantial percentage of the issuer’s
securities; (iii) an offer to purchase was made at a premium; (iv) the terms of the offer are
firm rather than negotiable; (v) the offer is contingent on the tender of a fixed number of
securities; (vi) the offer is open only for a limited period of time; (vii) the offerees are
subjected to pressure to sell; and (viii) public announcements of a purchasing program
concerning the target precede or accompany rapid accumulation of large amounts of the
target’s securities.⁸ Not all of these factors need to be present in order for a tender offer to
be found. While in some circumstances there may be a question of whether a tender offer
may be involved, a publicly made offer to shareholders of a public company to purchase
any and all shares of the outstanding common shares of the company clearly is a tender
offer. By contrast, a merger is not a tender offer.

a. Section 14(e) and Regulation 14E

Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and Regulation 14E apply to any tender offer
for any securities and, significantly, are not limited to equity securities or securities that
are registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act. Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act
is a general antifraud provision applicable to tender offers. Regulation 14E provides
specific procedural obligations, notice requirements and restrictions on behavior with the
objective of preventing the fraudulent practices prohibited by the Exchange Act. The most
significant requirements under Regulation 14E include:

- Minimum Offer Period. The tender offer must remain open for at least
  20 business days from the date when such tender offer is first published or
  sent to shareholders.⁹
• **Prompt Payment.** Consideration must be paid or the target’s securities must be returned to shareholders promptly (generally, within two to three business days) after termination of the offer or the withdrawal of tendered securities.10

• **Notice of Extensions.** The tender offer must remain open at least 10 U.S. business days after any announcement of material changes in the information published, sent or given to shareholders that could affect their investment decisions.11 In addition, the SEC has stated, in an interpretive release, that a tender offer should remain open for at least 10 business days in response to a material change relating to the “price and share levels” and for at least five business days in respect of any other material change.12

• **Target’s Response to the Offer.** Within 10 business days of the commencement of its offer, the target must publish or otherwise deliver to its shareholders a statement recommending acceptance or rejection of the offer (or expressing neutrality or inability to take a position with respect to the offer). If there is any material change in the target’s recommendation after this publication, the target must promptly provide an update to its shareholders.13

• **Purchases or Sales Using Material Information with Respect to the Tender Offer.** Regulation 14E classifies the purchase or sale of the subject securities (or any securities convertible into the subject securities) as a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice under the Exchange Act if such transaction is undertaken by a person with material information relating to the tender offer that was obtained from the offeror, the target or an insider of either.14 Similarly, insiders are prohibited from disclosing such material information with respect to the tender, except when doing so in good faith.15

• **Proration Risk.** Shareholders are prohibited from hedging against the risk that not all the securities that the shareholders tender in the tender offer will be accepted by the offeror by tendering more securities than such shareholders actually owns. Shareholders are also prohibited from selling tendered securities before the proration deadline to another party that could then tender such sold securities.16

• **Purchases Outside the Tender Offer.** In the case of tender offers for equity securities, after the commencement of its offer, the offeror, its agents and any parties acting in concert may not purchase any target securities shares except pursuant to the offer, subject to expressly identified exceptions.17

Regulation 14E does not require any filings to be made with the SEC, nor does it include specific requirements as to the content of the offer documents or other communications disseminated by the offeror or the target to the shareholders (although such communications would be subject to the general antifraud rules of the Exchange Act).
b. Section 14(d) and Regulation 14D

Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act and Regulation 14D apply to all tender offers for equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, the acquisition of which would result in beneficial ownership of more than 5% of such class of equity securities. If the target’s equity securities are not registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, Regulation 14D does not apply. Furthermore, even if Regulation 14D is applicable, the Cross-Border Rules provide for exemptions, discussed below, that can separately provide relief from certain requirements of Regulation 14D.

The most significant requirements under Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act and Regulation 14D include:

- **Pre-Commencement Communications.** The bidder is required to file all communications prior to the commencement of a formal tender offer (which is 12:01 a.m. on the date when the offeror has first published, sent or given the means to tender to security holders) with the SEC.18

- **Tender Offer Documents.** The offeror is required to file specified tender offer documents in a prescribed form, “Schedule TO,” with the SEC. Schedule TO requires disclosure regarding the terms and conditions of the offer, the background of the transaction, the terms of offeror financing and other items.19

- **Dissemination of Tender Offers to Shareholders.** Depending on the type of consideration offered by the offeror in the tender offer, the offeror is required to communicate certain details with respect to the tender offer to subject shareholders by publication or dissemination.20

- **Equal Treatment.** The offeror is required to make the tender offer open to all target shareholders and to pay each shareholder the highest consideration paid to any other shareholder in the offer.21

- **Withdrawal Rights.** The offeror is required to grant certain rights to shareholders who have tendered securities pursuant to a tender offer to withdraw any such securities during the period such offer remains open.22 In addition, Section 14(d)(5) of the Exchange Act requires the offeror to allow tendered shares to be withdrawn by shareholders (i) at any time prior to the expiration of seven days after the time that copies of the offering documents are first published or sent or (ii) at any time after the 60th day following commencement of the offer (the latter are sometimes referred to as “back-end withdrawal rights”).

- **Target Board Recommendation and Communications to Target Shareholders.** Within 10 business days of the commencement of the offer by the offeror, the target is required to file a recommendation statement on Schedule 14D-9, which must include the recommendation of the target’s
board of directors to its shareholders regarding the offer (including the reasons therefor), with the SEC.23

- **Offer Extensions.** The offeror may elect to provide a subsequent offering period of at least three business days during which tenders will be accepted, so long as certain requirements are met.24

In some cases, the SEC may issue comments on tender offer materials filed by the offeror or target pursuant to Regulation 14D. If such comments are received, the parties would typically respond to the SEC’s comments by amending the tender offer materials or explaining to the SEC why they believe that amendments are not warranted. The SEC review process begins only after the offer is commenced (*i.e.*, there is no requirement to complete SEC review before launching the offer), and the SEC will often endeavor to provide comments in a timely fashion so as not to delay the consummation of the offer. As discussed below, this SEC review process differs from transactions that are subject to the proxy rules, in that the SEC must first be given the opportunity to review a proxy statement before it is mailed to target shareholders.

3. **Choice of Merger vs. Tender Offer**

A tender offer followed by a back-end merger can potentially be completed in less than five weeks after entering into a definitive transaction agreement. In contrast, it typically takes at least two to three months to receive shareholder approval of a voted merger under similar circumstances. In a situation in which the parties expect regulatory approval and the satisfaction of other conditions in a short timeframe, a tender offer therefore can significantly shorten the period between signing and closing. On the other hand, some transactions entail a long regulatory approval process. If the regulatory process is expected to take a substantial amount of time, a tender offer would need to remain open until regulatory approval has been received. In a one-step merger structure, however, the parties could obtain shareholder approval during the pendency of the regulatory process and then close the transaction promptly following receipt of regulatory approval. In this circumstance, acquirors often prefer the one-step merger structure because a target’s ability to accept an alternative proposal (or change its recommendation to shareholders) in a merger agreement typically terminates upon shareholder approval, while a tender offer remains subject to interloper risk so long as it remains open.

C. **Acquisition of a U.S. Company for Stock: Securities Law Considerations**

The inclusion of stock consideration in a cross-border transaction introduces significant additional requirements under the Securities Act. If the acquisition is accomplished via an exchange offer—*i.e.*, a tender offer in which the consideration includes securities—the transaction would be subject to the same tender offer rules of the Williams Act as apply to all-cash tender offers, as well as the requirements of the Securities Act.
1. Registration Requirements

Under Section 5 of the Securities Act, the offer or sale of securities must either be registered with the SEC or qualify for an exemption from registration. Securities offered pursuant to an exchange offer as well as other statutory business combination transactions are deemed to involve offers for this purpose.\(^\text{25}\) Therefore, absent an exemption under Section 5, any company, U.S. or non-U.S., that seeks to offer its securities as all or part of the consideration in an exchange offer or business combination, whether consensual or hostile, to investors in the United States must first file a registration statement with the SEC under the Securities Act.

To register a class of securities under the Securities Act pursuant to an exchange offer or business combination, an issuer must file a Form S-4 (for U.S. issuers) or F-4 (for FPIs) registration statement with the SEC. Forms S-4 and F-4 each comprise two parts: Part I is a proxy statement or prospectus, written in narrative form, that contains information regarding the acquiror, the target, the business combination or exchange offer, and, as applicable, certain information incorporated by reference from the parties’ reports under the Exchange Act. Part II includes information on the indemnification of directors and officers, exhibits, including the merger agreement, organizational documents of both parties, legal opinions, powers of attorney and the consents of experts, certain undertakings, such as incorporating, as applicable, annual and quarterly reports and subsequent Exchange Act reports by reference, and the signatures of the parties to the transaction. Only Part I must be delivered to target shareholders, but both parts become public when filed with the SEC.

Forms S-4 and F-4 include, among other items, disclosure with respect to the following matters:

- summaries of the parties, their business, their financial conditions, as well as the transaction, including its structure, information with respect to voting and other information;

- a letter from the chief executive officer or chairman of the target (and also the acquiror if the acquiror is required to vote or otherwise elects to do so) providing a brief description of the transaction, the consideration payable and the target board’s (and, if applicable, the acquiror board’s) recommendation, as well as encouraging the shareholders to vote;

- questions and answers regarding the fundamental questions that target (and, as applicable, acquiror) shareholders may have about the contemplated transaction, including what proposals will be voted on at the special meeting, what will happen as a result of the transaction, what consideration will be payable in the transaction and what shareholders need to do now, among others;
- notice of the meeting required to approve the transaction, including the date, time and location of the special meeting, as well as the purpose of the meeting and the key matters to be voted on;

- voting information concerning all the proposals submitted for a shareholder vote at the meeting, including the votes required for approval and determination of the votes, including how the votes are counted and the effect abstentions have on such count;

- risk factors associated with the parties, the transaction, the combined company and the securities being offered in the transaction;

- descriptions of the transaction and the parties to the transaction, including background to, and material terms of, the transaction, sufficient for shareholders to make informed investment decisions, and the parties’ businesses, operations and financial conditions;

- a description of important merger agreement provisions;

- selected financial information, including financial statements for the previous five fiscal years and pro forma financial statements that give effect to the business combination;

- management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations for each party; and

- comparison of rights of common shareholders, describing differences in the rights of the shareholders of the acquiror and the target.

In general, the financial statements of an FPI (whether it is the acquiror or the target) may be prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP, International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”), or local GAAP/non-IASB IFRS, while the financial statements of a U.S. domestic company (whether it is the acquiror or the target) must be presented in U.S. GAAP. An FPI that files using IFRS as issued by the IASB is not required to reconcile to U.S. GAAP.26 However, an FPI using another basis of reporting (e.g., local GAAP) is not eligible to omit the U.S. GAAP reconciliation.27 Presentation of pro forma financial statements follows the basis of the accounting presentation used by the issuer: An FPI issuer using IASB IFRS for its own financial statements should prepare and present pro formas in IASB IFRS (and no reconciliation to U.S. GAAP is required), while a domestic U.S. issuer must prepare and present pro formas in U.S. GAAP.28 That said, the SEC has generally not objected if an FPI issuer that otherwise would present its pro formas based on local GAAP with a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP elects to present the pro formas directly in U.S. GAAP.29 Note that an FPI issuer that will cease to qualify as such following completion of a merger remains eligible to use the forms and rules designated for FPIs (including the ability to use Form F-4 and foreign accounting standards) for the merger and potentially for a period thereafter, as it will only become required to use the forms and rules for U.S. domestic
issuers on the first day of the first fiscal year following a determination that it fails to qualify as an FPI.\textsuperscript{30}

The registration statements that issuers file on Forms S-4 and F-4 are subject to review by the SEC for compliance with applicable federal securities laws and accounting principles. Although there is no standard timetable for these reviews, if the SEC chooses to review, the review process is likely to take at least six weeks and up to four or more months. The SEC typically provides comment within 30 days of the initial filing of the first version of a registration statement. The SEC comments are in the form of a letter sent to the filer and publicly filed (a period of time after the review is complete), which references parts of a registration statement and identifies deficiencies or asks questions with respect to the content of the filing. Once comments are received from the SEC, it may take as long as two to four weeks for the parties to implement the changes required by the SEC to a registration statement or to research and respond to SEC inquiries. If the SEC comments relate to accounting matters, auditors and other advisors will need to be involved in addition to counsel, adding time and cost to the response period. When a prospective registrant has addressed the substance of the SEC comments and, if necessary, after communication with the SEC, an amendment to a registration statement is filed, along with a written response to the SEC’s initial comments. Thereafter, the process begins again with SEC review of and comment on the amendment to the registration statement. SEC comments on amendments to a registration statement often are returned in approximately 10 days, although it may take more or less time depending on the number and nature of the outstanding comments. Only after the SEC comments are exhausted, and any other applicable timing criteria are met, can a party request that the registration statement be declared effective and the securities eligible for offer or sale.

2. Listing of Securities Issued in an Acquisition

In some cases, the parties to a cross-border transaction involving a foreign acquiror may wish to list the securities being offered to target securityholders on a U.S. securities exchange. For example, the board of a U.S. target company may be unwilling to proceed with the transaction unless the foreign acquiror agrees to list the securities being offered to U.S. holders in the United States. A U.S. listing provides additional liquidity for U.S. shareholders, and may be a prerequisite for certain institutional investors to invest in a company’s securities. Listing can therefore enhance the attractiveness of a non-U.S. company’s shares in the U.S. capital market.

American Depositary Receipts

An acquiror may agree to issue listed ADRs to target securityholders. ADRs are negotiable certificates that evidence ownership interests in ADSs (which themselves represent interests in the underlying equity securities of a non-U.S. issuer held by a U.S. depository bank). ADRs allow U.S. investors to easily invest in non-U.S. issuers, and allow non-U.S. issuers to raise capital and establish a trading presence in the United States. ADRs trade in U.S. dollars and clear via U.S. settlement systems, which allows U.S. investors to avoid trading in non-U.S. currencies and the related risks. An ADR can represent any number of underlying securities of a non-U.S. issuer; that is, an ADR can
represent a fraction of an underlying share or multiple underlying shares. According to J.P. Morgan, one of the major depository banks in the U.S., as of March 2024, there are over 2,400 depository receipt programs, of which over 1,100 are sponsored.\textsuperscript{31}

ADRs are created when a non-U.S. issuer or an investor deposits the non-U.S. issuer’s securities that will underlie the ADRs in a U.S. depository bank. After receipt of the securities, the bank will bundle the securities into an ADS and issue the ADRs to the depositor. The depositor may then trade the ADRs, either on a U.S. securities exchange or over the counter. ADRs can be traded, settled and held as if they were regular securities of a U.S. issuer. Holders of ADRs may also remove the securities underlying the ADSs from the ADR program, at a conversion rate equal to the number of securities included in the ADS represented by the ADR.

ADRs are either “sponsored” or “unsponsored.” Sponsored ADRs result when a non-U.S. issuer enters into an agreement with a U.S. depository bank to hold the deposited ADRs and manage all aspects of such deposit, including, among others, recordkeeping, forwarding shareholder communications and paying dividends. Unsponsored ADRs result when an ADR is created without the assistance (or the consent) of the applicable non-U.S. issuer – the principal depositary banks will create unsponsored ADR programs in response to market demand for the underlying securities, for the purpose of establishing a U.S. trading market for the non-U.S. issuer’s securities. A depository bank may create an unsponsored ADR program only if the non-U.S. issuer is either subject to the reporting requirements under the Exchange Act or exempt from such requirements pursuant to Rule 12g3-2.

ADRs must be registered under the Securities Act with the SEC on a Form F-6. The disclosures required on Form F-6 include the contractual terms of deposit under the deposit agreement, including copies of the agreements, a form of ADR certificate and legal opinions. No information about the non-U.S. issuer is disclosed. To raise capital in the U.S., a non-U.S. issuer would need to file a separate registration statement under the Securities Act on Form F-1, F-3 or F-4, depending on the circumstances of the transaction. To list its ADRs on a U.S. securities exchange, the non-U.S. issuer must file a separate registration statement under the Exchange Act with the SEC on Form 20-F. Unlike Form F-6, the Form 20-F registration statement used to raise capital and list securities requires significant disclosures about the non-U.S. issuer, its business, its financial condition and, if applicable, the transaction in connection with the capital raise.

Additionally, ADRs are generally split into three “levels,” which depend on the degree to which the non-U.S. issuer has accessed U.S. markets:

- \textit{Level 1 ADRs}. Level 1 ADRs establish a trading presence in the United States but may not be used to raise capital. Only Level 1 ADRs may be unsponsored and therefore may only be traded on U.S. over-the-counter markets (\textit{i.e.}, not on a national exchange such as the NYSE or Nasdaq). Only a Form F-6 need be filed, and, as a result, no information about the non-U.S. issuer need be disclosed. No information about the non-U.S. issuer will be available on EDGAR. Importantly, the consent of the non-
• **Level 2 ADRs.** Level 2 ADRs establish a trading presence in the United States, generally through the listing of ADRs representing preexisting securities on a U.S. exchange. Like Level 1 ADRs, Level 2 ADRs may not be used to raise capital. The sponsoring bank and non-U.S. issuer must file Form F-6 and a registration statement on Form 20-F with the SEC, and, pursuant to such registration, the non-U.S. issuer becomes subject to the ongoing reporting requirements of the Exchange Act (including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Sarbanes-Oxley")), which include the requirement to file annual reports on Form 20-F.

• **Level 3 ADRs.** Level 3 ADRs establish a trading presence in the United States and allow the non-U.S. issuer to raise capital. Level 3 ADRs, like Level 2 ADRs, must be sponsored and therefore may be traded on either U.S. securities exchanges or U.S. over the counter markets. The sponsoring bank and non-U.S. issuer must file Form F-6 and a registration statement on Form F-1, Form F-3 or Form F-4 with the SEC, and, pursuant to such registration, the non-U.S. issuer becomes subject to the ongoing reporting requirements of the Exchange Act (including Sarbanes-Oxley), which include the requirement to file annual reports on Form 20-F.

An FPI that lists its Level 2 or Level 3 ADRs on a U.S. securities exchange is required to register under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act. Even if an FPI does not list its ADRs, an FPI may still be required to register pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act if it surpasses certain asset and shareholder thresholds, or may have obligations under Section 15(d) of the Securities Act, if it files a registration statement under the Securities Act in a public offering. When an FPI lists and registers under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act, it must comply with the reporting and other requirements of the Exchange Act and Sarbanes-Oxley as long as it has listed ADRs, and thereafter until it can suspend or terminate its reporting obligations. When an FPI registers under Section 12(g) or has obligations under Section 15(d), it must similarly comply with the Exchange Act and Sarbanes-Oxley (excluding sections of Sarbanes-Oxley pertaining only to listed issuers) until it is no longer subject to Section 12(g) (by, for example, meeting the requirements of Section 12g3-2(b), as discussed in Section VII.A) or Section 15(d).

**The Listing Process**

In order to list a class of securities (or ADRs) directly on a U.S. securities exchange, an issuer must apply for listing to the applicable exchange and comply with that exchange’s listing criteria. In a direct listing, an issuer lists its securities directly on an exchange, creating a public market for its securities. An issuer applies for a direct listing with an exchange’s staff and is required to provide certain supporting information, including organizational documents, financial statements, governance undertakings and other information about the issuer. The timeline for approval generally ranges from one to three months.
The NYSE provides two sets of initial listing criteria, the first of which covers U.S. domestic standards and the second of which contains alternative criteria for FPIs. FPIs may choose whether to apply under the U.S. domestic standards or the FPI standards. The quantitative criteria for continued listing on the NYSE is the same for U.S. domestic companies and FPIs. The U.S. domestic standards include the following:

- An issuer must meet one of the following financial standards:
  - **Earnings Test.** The issuer’s aggregate adjusted pretax income for the last three fiscal years is $10 million or more, the issuer’s adjusted pretax income for each of the two most recent fiscal years is $2 million or more and the issuer’s aggregate adjusted pretax income for each of the prior three fiscal years is greater than $0.
  - **Global Market Capitalization Test.** The issuer has a global market capitalization of $200 million or greater.

- An issuer must also meet all of the following distribution standards: 400 round lot shareholders; 1.1 million publicly held shares; $40 million market value of publicly held shares; and $4.00 minimum share price. For purposes of determining the number of shareholders and the trading volume, if the issuer is a company not organized under the laws of Canada, Mexico, or the U.S., the NYSE may, in its discretion, include holders and trading volume in the issuer’s home country or primary market outside the U.S. in applying these listing standards (if such market is a regulated stock exchange).

The second set of standards, only for FPIs, includes the following standards:

- An FPI must meet one of the following financial standards:
  - **Earnings Test.** The issuer’s aggregate adjusted pretax income for the last three fiscal years is $100 million or more and the issuer’s adjusted pretax income for each of the two most recent fiscal years is $25 million or more.
  - **Valuation/Revenue with Cash Flow Test.** Aggregate adjusted cash flows for the last three fiscal years is $100 million or more and adjusted cash flows for each of the two most recent fiscal years is $25 million or more; the issuer’s global market capitalization measured over the most recent six months of trading history is $500 million or more; and the issuer’s revenues in the most recent 12-month period were $100 million or more.
  - **Pure Valuation/Revenue Test.** The issuer’s global market capitalization over the most recent six months of trading history is $750 million or more and the issuer’s revenues in the most recent 12-month period were $75 million.
- Affiliated Company Test. The issuer’s global market capitalization over the most recent six months of trading history is $500 million or more and the issuer’s operating history is 12 months.

- An FPI must also meet all of the following distribution standards: 5,000 worldwide round lot shareholders; 2.5 million worldwide publicly held shares; $100 million worldwide market value of publicly held shares; and $4.0 minimum per share price. If the FPI’s parent or affiliate is a listed company in good standing which retains control of or is under common control with the FPI, the required worldwide market value of publicly held shares is decreased to $60 million.

The NYSE also contains separate financial standards for real estate investment trusts, closed-end management investment companies and business development companies. The earnings tests set forth above also allow for shorter two-year periods if an issuer is an “Emerging Growth Company” under the JOBS Act and has only filed two years of financial statements.32

Nasdaq provides three sets of standards, one for each of its three markets, Nasdaq Capital Market, Nasdaq Global Select Market and Nasdaq Global Market. An FPI may apply to be listed on any of Nasdaq’s three markets, although Nasdaq Capital Market is a frequent choice given that its criteria are the most lax of the three. Nasdaq Capital Market, for example, includes the following standards:

- An issuer must meet one of the following financial standards:

  o **Stockholders’ Equity.** The issuer’s stockholders’ equity is $5 million; the issuer’s publicly held shares have a market value of $15 million; and the issuer has an operating history of at least two years.

  o **Market Value.** The issuer’s stockholders’ equity is at least $4 million; the issuer’s publicly held shares have a market value of at least $15 million; and the issuer’s listed securities have a market value of $50 million.

  o **Net Income Standard.** The issuer’s stockholders’ equity is at least $4 million; the issuer’s net income is at least $750,000 in either the last fiscal year or two of the last three fiscal years; the issuer’s publicly held shares have a market value of at least $5 million.

- An issuer must also meet all of the following distribution standards: at least 300 round lot holders; at least one million publicly held shares; $4.00 minimum per share price (or as low as $2.00 in certain situations); and at least three registered and active market makers.

Additionally, issuers seeking to list on one of the Nasdaq markets which principally administer their business in a “Restrictive Market” jurisdiction (including China) are
subject to additional listing criteria. Nasdaq defines “Restrictive Market” jurisdictions as those which do not provide the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board with access to conduct inspections of public accounting firms that audit Nasdaq-listed companies.33

If an issuer, U.S. or non-U.S., is listed directly by either the NYSE or Nasdaq, it must also comply with certain enumerated quantitative maintenance standards or risk suspension or delisting from the exchange. These standards require issuers to maintain, among other requirements, a certain number of shareholders, publicly held shares, average closing price over a 30-day trading period, and minimum global market capitalization and stockholders’ equity values.

Registration under Exchange Act Section 12(b)

Securities listed on a national securities exchange in the United States are required to be registered under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act. Such registration of the securities of an FPI is typically accomplished by filing a registration statement on Form 20-F. If the offering of the securities was registered under the Securities Act (which will often be the case when listed securities are offered), certain content of the Form 20-F can generally be incorporated by reference or copied from the Securities Act registration statement.34 After the listing is approved, the securities are admitted for trading once the exchange certifies the listing with the SEC and the issuer’s registration of the securities under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act becomes effective.

Note that ADRs can either be listed or unlisted. If they are unlisted, they do not have to be registered under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act, although they may potentially have to be registered under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, unless an exemption (such as that afforded by Rule 12g3-2(b)) applies.

3. Post-Registration Obligations

A critical consideration in determining whether to issue securities in the acquisition of a U.S. public company is that, if the securities are listed on a U.S. securities exchange (or if the securities offering is registered under the Securities Act), the issuer of the securities will have certain post-transaction securities law obligations following the transaction, including those concerning periodic reporting requirements, the preparation of financial statements and corporate governance. FPIs enjoy certain exemptions from such obligations.

Additional information on the registration process, exemptions and post-transaction obligations is provided in Section VII.

D. Tax Considerations

The principal U.S. tax issues to be considered in connection with structuring an acquisition of a U.S. company will largely depend on the consideration mix and the nature of the U.S. company. In general, all-cash deals involving U.S. companies are more straightforward to structure and analyze than deals where a significant component of the consideration is stock of a non-U.S. entity.
1. Cash (and Other Taxable) Acquisitions

An all-cash (or other taxable) acquisition of a U.S. publicly traded target (or a privately held U.S. corporation with a dispersed shareholder base) is typically effected as a “reverse subsidiary merger” (which may or may not be preceded by a tender offer), pursuant to which a newly formed U.S. subsidiary of the acquiror is merged with and into the U.S. target, with the U.S. target surviving the merger as a wholly owned subsidiary of the acquiror. For U.S. federal income tax purposes, this structure is viewed as a taxable purchase of the stock of the U.S. target. As a result, U.S. shareholders of the U.S. target will recognize taxable gain or loss in an amount equal to the difference between the amount of the consideration received and the tax basis in the stock surrendered. Non-U.S. stockholders are typically not subject to U.S. income tax upon a sale of U.S. corporate stock unless they have certain connections to the United States or the target is a “U.S. real property holding corporation” (they may, of course, be subject to income tax in their home jurisdictions). On the buy-side, for U.S. federal income tax purposes the buyer will take cost basis in the U.S. target stock acquired, but the tax basis of the target’s assets will generally carry over—i.e., the transaction will not result in an asset-level tax basis step-up (or step-down) to fair market value.

A taxable acquisition of a U.S. public target would generally not, absent unusual circumstances or where the target is a real estate investment trust, be structured as a “forward merger” of the target into the buyer or its subsidiary pursuant to which the legal existence of the target ceases. This is because such a forward merger is viewed for U.S. federal income tax purposes as a taxable sale by the U.S. target of all of its assets, thus triggering taxable gain to the U.S. target at the corporate level, and then once again at the shareholder level. Although this structure would result in a step-up in the tax basis of the target’s assets if there is built-in gain, the additional depreciation benefit over time generally does not outweigh the up-front tax cost.

Where the acquisition involves a U.S. target that is privately held, the considerations described above also apply (except that, where there are few shareholders, a transaction will often be structured legally as a share purchase rather than a merger). There may be additional structuring options, however, if the seller is itself a U.S. corporation that files a consolidated U.S. income tax return with the U.S. target. Depending on the facts, it may be feasible for the parties to structure such a transaction as an asset sale for U.S. federal income tax purposes—either by effecting an actual asset sale or an acquisition of shares combined with an election under Section 338(h)(10) of the Code to treat the sale as an asset sale for U.S. tax purposes only. In the consolidated setting, a sale of a subsidiary’s assets generally does not result in double taxation, and an asset sale structure can often result in manageable incremental costs to the seller that do not outweigh the benefit of the asset basis step-up to the buyer. Finally, it should also be noted that an acquisition of a U.S. target that is treated as a partnership or a “disregarded entity” for U.S. federal income tax purposes is, under default U.S. federal income tax rules, generally treated as a sale of the assets of the target. Accordingly, in these cases the buyer will be able to obtain an asset basis step-up without the need for any additional structuring, and at the cost of only one level of tax to the sellers due to the “flow-through” nature of the target entity.
2. Business Combinations and Acquisitions Involving Stock Consideration

Compared to all-cash deals, cross-border acquisitions of U.S. companies that involve stock consideration can be far more complex to structure and analyze. The most significant issues typically arise in the context of a so-called “merger of equals” or business combinations where the post-transaction ownership of the combined company by the former shareholders of the U.S. counterparty is significant. In those cases, the threshold question is the desired jurisdiction of organization and tax residence of the combined company. This is usually a multi-faceted analysis that takes into account applicable legal, corporate, political and social, as well as tax, considerations. Tax considerations do, however, feature prominently, as the choice of parent company tax jurisdiction can have a significant impact on the financial results of the combined group going forward.

Historically, the U.S. was perceived as an undesirable holding company jurisdiction due to its relatively high corporate income tax rate and robust CFC regime, and a number of cross-border business combinations were structured as so-called “inversions,” or M&A transactions pursuant to which the U.S. counterparty becomes a subsidiary of a parent company organized (and tax resident) outside of the United States. However, the landscape has been significantly altered in recent years on account of, among other things, sweeping U.S. tax reform and the significant decrease in the U.S. corporate income tax rate. The preferred parent jurisdiction from a tax perspective will depend on the particular facts and circumstances, and will typically require careful modelling of the various alternatives.

Where the acquiring entity in a cross-border transaction is non-U.S. (and stock consideration is utilized), the U.S. anti-inversion rules must be considered. These rules are generally intended to discourage inversion transactions by imposing additional tax costs on the companies and U.S. shareholders involved. Specifically, Section 7874 of the Code may impose adverse tax consequences at the corporate level, while Section 367 of the Code may apply at the shareholder level. Whether these rules apply, and the consequences of their application, are generally a function of the post-transaction ownership of the combined company by the former shareholders of the U.S. counterparty/target.

a. Corporate-Level Considerations: Section 7874 of the Code

Under Section 7874 of the Code, a non-U.S. parent corporation will, regardless of its home jurisdiction, be treated as a U.S. corporation for U.S. tax purposes if: (1) the non-U.S. parent acquires, directly or indirectly, substantially all of the assets held by a U.S. corporation (which would include an acquisition of 100% of the stock of the U.S. corporation), (2) after the acquisition, the former shareholders of the acquired U.S. corporation hold, by reason of their ownership of shares of that U.S. corporation, 80% or more (by vote or value) of the stock of the non-U.S. parent, and (3) after the acquisition, the combined group does not have “substantial business activities” in the jurisdiction in which the non-U.S. parent is organized. If all three prongs of the test described above are present, the consequences are severe: the non-U.S. parent will be subject to U.S. tax just as if it actually were a U.S. corporation. This means, among other things, that the non-U.S. acquiror will be subject to U.S. corporate income taxes on its worldwide income (even if not sourced in the U.S.), as well as taxes imposed under the U.S. CFC regime with respect
to its non-U.S. subsidiaries. Moreover, distributions to non-U.S. shareholders of the non-U.S. parent will be subject to U.S. withholding tax. The U.S. tax regime will apply in addition to the tax regime of the non-U.S. parent’s home jurisdiction, creating potential for double taxation.

If the post-transaction ownership by former shareholders of the U.S. target is less than 80%, the United States will respect the non-U.S. acquiror’s status as a non-U.S. corporation for U.S. tax purposes. However, if the ownership percentage is 60% or more (by vote or value), a number of other adverse U.S. tax rules will apply to the combined group, including, among others, limitations on the utilization of U.S. tax attributes (such as net operating losses) against income recognized in connection with certain intragroup transactions. In addition, dividends paid by the non-U.S. parent will not be eligible for the preferential rates of U.S. taxation otherwise available for dividends received by non-corporate U.S. taxpayers (currently at a 20% rate, as compared to the top U.S. federal income tax rate of 37%).

A typical multinational group will rarely have “substantial business activities” in the parent jurisdiction that would allow it to avoid the application of Section 7874 of the Code on that basis. Accordingly, the analysis will in most cases hinge on the post-transaction percentage ownership of the non-U.S. parent by the former shareholders of the U.S. counterparty. Importantly, the rules require a number of adjustments that generally have the effect of increasing that percentage, making it more likely that Section 7874 of the Code will apply. For example, new equity raised by the foreign acquiror in connection with the transaction will generally be ignored, as will any “skinny down” special distributions that “shrink” the U.S. company. Special distributions for this purpose may include any cash consideration paid to the shareholders of the U.S. counterparty in the transaction if such cash is viewed as being directly or indirectly provided by the U.S. counterparty. These computations, and the rules generally, are highly complex. Given the potentially severe consequences associated with their application, careful diligence, analysis and structuring are required.

b. **Shareholder-Level Considerations: Section 367 of the Code**

Even if Section 7874 of the Code is not implicated, the non-U.S. status of an acquiror of a U.S. corporation in a deal that involves stock consideration can impede structuring the transaction in a tax-efficient manner to the shareholders of the U.S. target. Under the baseline U.S. federal income tax rules, in an acquisition of a U.S. corporation that involves meaningful stock consideration, there is the potential for such transaction to be structured as either a so-called “reorganization” under Section 368 of the Code or a contribution transaction under Section 351 of the Code, allowing the target shareholders to defer U.S. taxation with respect to the stock portion of the consideration. Specifically, if the transaction so qualifies, a selling U.S. shareholder will recognize no gain or loss if the only consideration received is acquiror stock. If the consideration also includes cash, a selling U.S. shareholder will recognize gain but not in excess of the amount of cash received.
Whether structuring the transaction in this manner is achievable is, among other factors, largely a function of the amount of stock involved and the legal structure utilized. For example, if the U.S. target is acquired by way of a reverse subsidiary merger (described above), stock must represent at least 80% of the total consideration for the transaction to qualify as a reorganization (assuming the other requirements for reorganization qualification are satisfied). However, a transaction can so qualify with stock consideration representing as little as 40% of the total consideration mix if it is structured as a forward merger of the U.S. target. Finally, holding company acquisition structures—e.g., so-called “top hat” or “double dummy” transactions in which a new holding company is formed to acquire, via merger or otherwise, both the target and the acquiror—can provide U.S. target shareholders with tax deferral with respect to the stock portion of the consideration without any overall minimum stock requirement. While these structures provide the most flexibility on the U.S. tax front, they can involve non-tax disadvantages, including shareholder vote and other requirements that may not otherwise apply on the acquiror side.

The foregoing rules, however, are subject to override in the cross-border context. The Code generally denies tax deferral where it would otherwise be available if the buyer is non-U.S. and the U.S. target is bigger than the buyer (by fair market value). If the U.S. target is smaller, there are yet additional requirements that must be satisfied, including that: (1) U.S. shareholders of the U.S. target receive no more than 50% of the stock of the foreign acquiror (by vote or value), (2) no more than 50% of the stock of the foreign acquiror may be held by certain U.S. insiders, and (3) the foreign acquiror must be engaged in an active trade or business outside of the United States for the preceding three years. Finally, even where all the general requirements are met, five-percent or greater shareholders of the U.S. target will still not be eligible for deferral unless they file a “gain recognition agreement” with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, generally agreeing to pay the tax that otherwise would have been payable at closing, together with an interest charge, upon certain subsequent “triggering events” (generally events involving a disposition of the U.S. target or its business by the foreign acquiror in the five years following the acquisition).

In determining the relative size of the U.S. target and the amount of stock received and held by the former shareholders of the U.S. counterparty for purposes of Section 367 of the Code, the same adjustments as those required under Section 7874 of the Code (described above) are required. As previously noted, these adjustments generally have the effect of increasing the size of the U.S. company and the U.S. ownership percentage, making it more likely that Section 367 of the Code will apply.
IV.

Acquisition of a Non-U.S. Company

This Section IV describes in greater detail the principal legal considerations under the U.S. federal securities laws for accomplishing an acquisition of a non-U.S. company. As noted above, the particular U.S. rules that will apply to an acquisition of a non-U.S. company will depend on whether: (1) the non-U.S. company qualifies as an FPI; (2) the transaction is structured as a tender offer for the securities of the non-U.S. company (and, if so, whether the securities are registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, as well as the level of U.S. shareholder ownership of the securities); and (3) whether securities will be included as part of the consideration to be offered to the target company’s shareholders. This Section IV discusses the rules that would apply if the non-U.S. target company qualifies as an FPI.

A. Acquisition of a Non-U.S. Company through a Tender Offer

1. Tender Offers and the Cross-Border Rules

If the acquisition is structured as a tender offer to acquire the non-U.S. company’s securities, then the set of U.S. rules that will apply to the transaction will depend on whether the non-U.S. company’s securities are registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act. As described in Section III.B.2, Section 14(d) and Regulation 14D apply if the tender offer is for securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, and Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and Regulation 14E apply to all tender offers regardless of whether the subject securities are registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act.

In response to the potential for conflicts between the U.S. tender offer rules and local legal requirements and concerns that bidders were intentionally excluding U.S. holders from participation in cross-border transactions to avoid compliance with U.S. federal securities laws, the SEC has promulgated a set of exemptions that can provide relief to certain of the tender offer rules in the context of a tender offer for securities of an FPI. The SEC codified prior guidance by adopting regulations under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act to address conflicts between U.S. and non-U.S. regulations in 1999. In 2008, the SEC revised these rules in part to address ongoing conflicts of law and facilitate participation by U.S. persons in the global capital markets. The resulting Cross-Border Rules provide for certain exemptions from compliance with the above tender offer rules. While the requirements for the exemptions are specific and detailed, the applicability of the rules is based generally on the level of U.S. interest in a transaction, measured by (i) the percentage of U.S. holders of the subject security in such transaction or (ii) where the acquirer cannot determine the residency of shareholders, a substitute test for ownership based on trading volume.

The Cross-Border Rules create a two-tier system of U.S. ownership applicable to U.S. tender offer rules. The Tier I exemptions apply where U.S. holders hold no more than 10% of an FPI target’s common shares. The Tier II exemptions apply where U.S. ownership is above 10% but not more than 40% of an FPI target’s common shares. If U.S.
ownership is above 40%, neither the Tier I nor Tier II exemptions apply, meaning the full set of tender offer rules are applicable.

a. Determining U.S. Ownership

Determining U.S. ownership of the subject securities requires evaluating the residency of security holders of the target to determine the percentage resident in the United States. The calculation requires specific analysis of the following:

- **Timing.** To determine the percentage of outstanding securities held by U.S. holders, the offeror must calculate the U.S. ownership as of a date no more than 60 days before and no more than 30 days after public announcement of the tender offer. If the offeror is unable to calculate ownership as of a date within this range, the calculation may be made as of the most recent practicable date before public announcement, but in no event earlier than 120 days before announcement.

- **Securities Counted.** The securities that underlie ADSs convertible or exchangeable into the subject securities, as well as those held by U.S. holders, but not other convertible or exchangeable securities such as warrants and options, should be counted in both the U.S. holder and total securities outstanding figures. Securities held by the offeror should also be excluded.

- **Residency Determination.** In determining whether a shareholder is a U.S. resident, the offeror should use the method of calculating record ownership in Rule 12g3-2(a), which is the rule used for calculating the number of holders for assessing FPI status, with some modification. The inquiry for determining U.S. holders under the Cross-Border Rules requires that an offeror “look through” record owner accounts (like brokers, dealers and banks) and attempt, by reasonable inquiry, to establish the residency of the customers behind those intermediary record owners or their nominees. The obligation to look through applies to securities held of record by intermediaries in the United States, the subject company’s jurisdiction of incorporation or the jurisdiction of each participant in a business combination and (if different than the subject company’s jurisdiction of incorporation) the jurisdiction that is the primary trading market for the subject securities. If, after reasonable inquiry, the offeror is unable to obtain information about the amount of securities represented by accounts of customers resident in the United States, the offeror may assume that the customers are residents of the jurisdiction in which the nominee has its principal place of business. If publicly filed reports of beneficial ownership or information otherwise provided to the offeror indicate that securities are held by U.S. residents, the offeror should count such securities as held by U.S. holders.
Depending on how a target’s home jurisdiction requires companies and intermediaries to record, and publish, residency data for the holders of the target’s securities, the look-through analysis may be difficult or impossible in some circumstances. At minimum, the offeror must review public filings and other information provided to the offeror. The determination can include extensive cooperation between target and acquiror (who share an interest in the applicability of an exemption under the Cross-Border Rules). This need for cooperation presents complications to ascertaining which, if any, exemptions apply in an unsolicited or hostile offer. Where the acquiror cannot determine the residency of shareholders pursuant to the instructions described above, the acquiror may presume that the percentage of shares held by U.S. holders is less than the 10% or 40% threshold level, as applicable, so long as there is a primary trading market for the shares outside the United States, unless one of several conditions exists:

- the average daily trading volume of the subject securities in the United States for a recent 12-month period ending on a date no more than 60 days before the public announcement of the tender offer exceeds the applicable threshold percentage of the average daily trading volume of that class of shares on a worldwide basis for the same period;

- the most recent annual report or annual information filed or submitted by the issuer with regulators of the home jurisdiction or with the SEC or any jurisdiction in which the shares trade before the public announcement of the offer indicates that U.S. holders hold more than the applicable threshold percentage of the outstanding subject class of shares; or

- the offeror knows or has reason to know, before the public announcement of the offer, that the level of U.S. ownership exceeds the applicable threshold percentage (such as from the target, from a reasonably reliable source or through public filings with the SEC or any regulatory body in the target’s jurisdiction of incorporation or jurisdiction in which the primary trading market for the subject securities is located).

b. Tier I Exemptions

The Tier I exemptions, applicable where U.S. ownership of the target company is not more than 10%, provide the broadest relief from the U.S. tender offer rules, including exempting the offeror from nearly all of Regulation 14D and most of Regulation 14E. However, the exemptions apply only in limited circumstances. To qualify, the tender offer must be for the securities of an FPI that is not an investment company registered or required to be registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended. In general, the offeror must permit U.S. holders of the subject securities to participate in the offer on terms at least as favorable as those offered to any other holder of the same class of securities that is the subject of the tender offer, subject to narrow exceptions to the equal treatment requirement. The offeror must also comply with applicable requirements to disseminate documents to U.S. holders (in English), including any document published in its home jurisdiction.
If an offer qualifies for the Tier I exemptions, it will be exempt as follows:42

- **Minimum Offer Period.** A Tier I offer need not remain open for 20 business days from the date such tender offer is first published or sent to security holders.

- **Notice of Extensions.** A Tier I offer need not comply with the requirement to provide notice of an extension to the length of a tender offer by press release or other public announcement.

- **Purchases Outside of the Tender Offer.** Purchases or arrangements to purchase by the offeror outside the offer are not prohibited, so long as specific conditions are met.43

- **Equal Treatment.** A tender offer need not be open to all target shareholders and holders are not all required to be offered the same consideration. However, U.S. security holders must be permitted to participate in the offer on terms at least as favorable as those offered to other security holders, subject to certain exceptions, such as substantially equivalent cash offers in lieu of stock.

- **Withdrawal Rights.** Withdrawal rights pursuant to Regulation 14D and Section 14(d)(5) of the Exchange Act, including back-end withdrawal rights, do not need to be extended to securities tendered in Tier I offers.

- **Filing Requirements.** There is no requirement to file a Schedule TO in Tier I offers, but English-language informational documents must be provided to U.S. shareholders on a basis comparable to that provided to shareholders in the subject FPI’s home jurisdiction.

- **Response of the Target Company.** Target companies need not give shareholders their positions with respect to Tier I offers.

- **Prompt Payment of Consideration/Return of Securities.** There are no prompt payment or return requirements in Tier I offers.

c. **Tier II Exemptions**

If U.S. holders hold more than 10% but not more than 40% of the subject FPI’s securities, the “Tier II” exemptions from the tender offer rules will apply. The rules applicable to Tier II offers include the following:44

- **Equal Treatment; Separate U.S. and Non-U.S. Offers.** The Tier II exemptions permit an offeror to separate a tender offer into multiple offers: the offeror may make one offer to U.S. holders, including all holders of ADSs representing interests in the subject securities, and one or more offers to all non-U.S. holders. The U.S. offer must be made on terms at least as
favorable as those offered any other holder of the same class of securities that is the subject of the tender offers. U.S. holders may be included in the non-U.S. offer(s) only where the laws of the jurisdiction governing such non-U.S. offer(s) expressly preclude the exclusion of U.S. holders from the non-U.S. offer(s) and where the offer materials distributed to U.S. holders fully and adequately disclose the risks of participating in the non-U.S. offer(s).

- **Notice of Extensions.** Notice of extensions may be made in accordance with the requirements of a subject FPI’s home jurisdiction law or practice will satisfy the requirements of Rule 14e-1(d), which otherwise requires offerors to announce the extension by press release or other public announcement no later than the earlier of (i) 9:00 a.m. Eastern time, on the next business day after the scheduled expiration date of the offer, and (ii) the first opening of the exchange on which the securities are traded on the next business day after the scheduled expiration date of the offer (if the class of securities which is the subject of the tender offer is registered on a national securities exchange).

- **Prompt Payment.** Payment made in accordance with the requirements of a subject FPI’s home jurisdiction law or practice will satisfy the requirements of the tender offer rules. If payment is not made on a more expedited basis under such home jurisdiction law or practice, payment for securities tendered during any subsequent offering period within 20 business days (determined with reference to the target’s home jurisdiction) of the date of tender will satisfy the prompt payment requirements.

- **Subsequent Offering Period and Withdrawal Rights.** An offeror may institute a subsequent offering period, and is not required to announce the results of the initial offering period by 9:00 a.m. Eastern time on the business day following the expiration of the initial offering period, so long as:
  
  o the offeror announces the results of the tender offer, including the approximate number of securities deposited to date, and pays for tendered securities in accordance with the requirements of the law or practice of the subject FPI’s home jurisdiction; and

  o the subsequent offering period commences immediately following such announcement.

If these conditions are satisfied, the offeror also does not need to extend withdrawal rights during the period from the closing of an initial offering period to commencement of the subsequent offering period, as could otherwise be required under Section 14(d)(5) of the Exchange Act.
• **Payment of Interest on Securities Tendered During Subsequent Offering Period.** The offeror may pay interest on securities tendered during a subsequent offering period, if required under applicable non-U.S. law.

• **Suspension of Withdrawal Rights During Counting of Tendered Securities.** Mandatory “back-end” withdrawal rights may interfere with an offeror’s ability to count tendered shares (i.e., centralize and tally definitively tenders received in accordance with non-U.S. law and practice) if such counting process takes place at the time when back-end withdrawal rights arise. To avoid this problem, in Tier II offers, an offeror may suspend withdrawal rights at the expiration of its offer and during the period that tendered securities are being counted, provided that:
  
  o the offer has been open (including withdrawal rights) for at least 20 U.S. business days;
  
  o at the time withdrawal rights are suspended, all conditions to the offer have been satisfied or waived, except to the extent that the bidder is in the process of determining whether a minimum acceptance condition included in the terms of the offer has been satisfied by counting tendered securities; and
  
  o withdrawal rights are suspended only during the period when tendered securities are being counted and are reinstated immediately thereafter, except to the extent that they are terminated through the acceptance of tendered securities.

• **Early Termination of an Initial Offering Period.** An offeror may terminate an initial offering period, including a voluntary extension of that period, if at the time the initial offering period and withdrawal rights terminate:
  
  o the initial offering period has been open for at least 20 U.S. business days;
  
  o the offeror has adequately discussed the possibility and impact of the early termination in the original offer materials;
  
  o the offeror provides a subsequent offering period after the termination of the initial offering period;
  
  o all offer conditions are satisfied as of the time the initial offering period ends; and
  
  o the offeror does not terminate the initial offering period or any extension of that period during any mandatory extension required under U.S. tender offer rules.
• **Purchases Outside of the Tender Offer.** The offeror may purchase or arrange to purchase subject company securities in compliance with the laws of the subject FPI’s home jurisdiction pursuant to a foreign offer(s) where the offeror seeks to acquire subject securities through a U.S. tender offer and a concurrent or substantially concurrent foreign offer(s), if the following conditions are satisfied:

  o the U.S. and foreign tender offer(s) meet the conditions for reliance on the Tier II cross-border exemptions;

  o the economic terms and consideration in the U.S. tender offer and foreign tender offer(s) are the same, provided that any cash consideration to be paid to U.S. security holders may be converted from the currency to be paid in the foreign tender offer(s) to U.S. dollars at an exchange rate disclosed in the U.S. offering documents;

  o the procedural terms of the U.S. tender offer are at least as favorable as the terms of the foreign tender offer(s);

  o the intention of the offeror to make purchases pursuant to the foreign tender offer(s) is disclosed in the U.S. offering documents; and

  o purchases by the offeror in the foreign tender offer(s) are made solely pursuant to the foreign tender offer(s) and not pursuant to an open market transaction(s), a private transaction(s), or other transaction(s).46

Purchases or arrangements to purchase by an affiliate of a financial advisor and an offeror and its affiliates that are permissible under and will be conducted in accordance with the applicable laws of the subject FPI’s home jurisdiction are also permissible under certain circumstances.47

2. **Avoiding U.S. Jurisdictional Means**

While the U.S. federal securities laws can extend to transactions with significant foreign involvement, their reach is not unlimited. As the SEC has stated:

“Whether U.S. tender offer rules apply in the context of a cross-border tender offer depends on whether the bidder triggers U.S. jurisdictional means in making a tender offer…. We have recognized that bidders who are not U.S. persons may structure a tender offer to avoid the use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce or any facility of a national securities exchange in making its offer and thus avoid triggering application of our rules. A bidder making a tender offer for target securities of a foreign private issuer may exclude U.S. target security holders if the offer is conducted outside the United States and U.S. jurisdictional means are not implicated. However, a bidder may implicate U.S. jurisdictional means if it fails to take adequate measures to prevent tenders by U.S. target holders while purporting to exclude them.”48
There are no bright-line rules—and no assurances for acquirors—as to how to successfully avoid U.S. jurisdictional means. The relevant principles have been developed through market practices informed by a limited number of court decisions and occasional SEC guidance, but have not been codified by regulation. Following the adoption of the Cross-Border Rules, the SEC stated that there would be fewer circumstances warranting exclusionary offers because the Cross-Border Rules would make it easier for acquirors to balance the regulatory requirements of foreign and U.S. rules. In particular, the SEC stated that it would view with skepticism exclusionary offers with a close nexus between the target securities and the United States, including where the target securities are registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, listed on a U.S. exchange or held by a large number of U.S. holders, particularly where the participation of U.S. holders is necessary to meet the minimum acceptance condition in the offer. The SEC has, however, recognized the need for exclusion in transactions where U.S. holders hold only a small percentage of target securities.

In the context of a tender offer for securities of a non-U.S. company, an acquiror may seek to avoid the territorial scope of the U.S. federal securities laws, including the tender offer rules under the Exchange Act, by “taking reasonable measures to keep the offer out of the United States.” In practice, this requires implementing controls to ensure that (i) offer materials (and the website where they are posted, if any) include a legend clearly stating that the offer is not available to U.S. holders; (ii) offer materials are not distributed in the United States; (iii) tenders are not accepted from, nor securities issued (in the case of an exchange offer) to, U.S. holders, which may require the acquiror to obtain adequate information, such as representations, to identify U.S. holders; and (iv) U.S. holders do not receive the offer consideration. A legend or disclaimer stating that the offer is not being made in the United States, or that the offer materials may not be distributed there, is not likely to be sufficient without other indications of the absence of jurisdictional connection to the United States. If the bidder wants to support a claim that the offer has no jurisdictional connection to the United States, it will generally be prudent to take special precautions to prevent sales to or tenders from U.S. target holders.

The same general principles apply with respect to tender offer materials posted on the Internet. The SEC has said that such materials will not result in an offer taking place in the United States where such offer is “reasonably designed to ensure that [it is] not targeted to persons in the United States or to U.S. persons.” In the case of a non-U.S. acquiror, a reasonably designed offer would include prominent disclaimers on any website related to the offer that clearly state that no securities are being offered to any persons in the United States or any U.S. persons, and controls reasonably designed to guard against sales of securities to any U.S. persons. In the case of a U.S. acquiror, due to existing contacts with the United States, additional precautions are required. The acquiror would also need to implement password-type controls reasonably designed to ensure that only non-U.S. persons can access the offer. Under this procedure, persons seeking access to the Internet offer would have to demonstrate to the issuer or intermediary that they are not U.S. persons before obtaining the password for the site.

In some cases, it may be difficult to successfully avoid the use of jurisdictional means—where, for example, applicable foreign law prohibits the exclusion of any target
security holders in a tender offer for all outstanding securities of a subject class. In addition, avoiding the use of jurisdictional means in the context of mergers and other business combinations where equity is automatically converted into transaction consideration or that require the dissemination of transaction documentation to or the solicitation of votes from all shareholders presents additional complexities. This could pose an issue for acquirors that must complete a second-step merger or other business combination to consummate a transaction. The ability to avoid U.S. jurisdictional means by excluding U.S. holders must therefore be examined on a case-by-case basis, including with respect to whether the intended actions are achievable and permissible under local laws and market practices.

B. Acquisition of a Non-U.S. Company by Means Other Than a Tender Offer

It may be possible or advisable to acquire a non-U.S. company by means other than a tender offer. If the target is an FPI, the methods available for acquiring the company will depend on the laws of its jurisdiction of incorporation and the structure chosen will often depend on many factors, including tax, finance, shareholder approvals required and regulatory considerations. Although mergers are less common outside of the United States, many jurisdictions provide for similar business combination transaction structures, such as an amalgamation or a plan or scheme of arrangement.

Such a transaction not involving a tender offer would not be subject to the tender offer rules, and any target shareholder vote would not be subject to the proxy rules because FPIs are exempt from the proxy rules. Acquisitions of non-U.S. companies may also occur through a two-step tender offer followed by a “squeeze-out” merger, plan or scheme of arrangement or another business combination structure. Any two-step transaction that includes a tender offer would be potentially subject to U.S. federal securities laws, as described in Section IV.A.1 of this Guide.

C. Securities Law Considerations with Respect to Stock Used in Acquisition of Non-U.S. Companies

The U.S. securities law rules governing the acquisition of a non-U.S. company for stock consideration are largely the same as the rules applicable in the acquisition of a U.S. company for stock consideration described in Section III.C. Namely, the issuance of the stock to the target company’s shareholders will need to be registered under the Securities Act unless an exemption from registration is available. The principal exemptions for the acquisition of a non-U.S. company are discussed below.59

1. Securities Act Registration

Pursuant to Section 5 of the Securities Act, offerings of securities require registration with the SEC, unless an exemption from the registration requirements is available.
a. Rule 802

A key exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act is found in Rule 802 of the Securities Act, promulgated by the SEC as a part of the Cross-Border Rules. Like the Tier I exemptions to the tender offer rules, Rule 802 applies where U.S. holders hold no more than 10% of the outstanding subject securities of an FPI. Specifically, Rule 802 provides an exemption from registration, if certain conditions are met, for offers and sales in:

- any exchange offer for a class of securities of an FPI; or
- any exchange of securities for the securities of an FPI in any business combination.

The Rule 802 exemption is available to any issuer in such a transaction, whether it is a U.S. issuer or a non-U.S. issuer.

Rule 800 defines “exchange offer” as a “tender offer in which securities are issued as consideration”;60 and “business combination” as a “statutory amalgamation, merger, arrangement or other reorganization requiring the vote of security holders of one or more of the participating companies,” including statutory short-form mergers that do not require such a vote.61 In a business combination in which the securities are to be issued by a successor registrant, U.S. holders may hold no more than 10% of the class of securities of the successor registrant, as if measured immediately after completion of the business combination.62 The percentage of U.S. holders is determined in the same way as such holders are determined in connection with the calculations for determining Tier I and Tier II relief under the Williams Act, as described in Section IV.A.1 of this Guide.

The issuer must permit U.S. holders to participate in the transaction on terms at least as favorable as those offered any other holder of the subject securities. The issuer need not either extend the offer to shareholders in jurisdictions that require registration or qualification or extend the same consideration to all shareholders. The issuer may, for example, offer shareholders in such jurisdictions cash consideration instead of stock consideration in the exchange offer or business combination. If, however, the issuer offers shareholders in such jurisdictions cash consideration, the offeror must offer the same cash alternative to all shareholders.63

Although there is no specific disclosure requirement under Rule 802, if the issuer publishes or otherwise disseminates any information document to holders of subject securities, it must furnish such information document in English to the SEC on Form CB. Form CB submissions are not considered to be information filed with the SEC, but must be submitted no later than the first business day after publication or dissemination. If the issuer is a non-U.S. company, it must also file a Form F-X along with the initial Form CB submission to appoint an agent for service of process in the United States. The issuer must disseminate any informational documents to U.S. holders, in English, on a comparable basis as the offeror furnishes the documents to holders in the FPI’s home jurisdiction, including by publication.64 Significantly, financial statements prepared in accordance with
local GAAP which are submitted on Form CB are exempt from the general requirement for reconciliation with U.S. GAAP.

Lastly, Rule 802 also requires the following legend or an equivalent statement, in clear, plain language, to be displayed prominently on the informational document published or disseminated to U.S. holders:65

This exchange offer or business combination is made for the securities of a foreign company. The offer is subject to disclosure requirements of a foreign country that are different from those of the United States. Financial statements included in the document, if any, have been prepared in accordance with foreign accounting standards that may not be comparable to the financial statements of United States companies.

It may be difficult for you to enforce your rights and any claim you may have arising under the federal securities laws, since the issuer is located in a foreign country, and some or all of its officers and directors may be residents of a foreign country. You may not be able to sue a foreign company or its officers or directors in a foreign court for violations of the U.S. securities laws. It may be difficult to compel a foreign company and its affiliates to subject themselves to a U.S. court’s judgment.

You should be aware that the issuer may purchase securities otherwise than under the exchange offer, such as in open market or privately negotiated purchases.

b. Section 3(a)(10)

Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act provides an exemption from registration under the Securities Act for offers and sales of securities in specified exchange transactions.66 The section is available to both U.S. issuers and non-U.S. issuers without any action on the part of the SEC. An issuer must meet the following conditions to be eligible for an exemption under Section 3(a)(10):67

• the securities must be issued in exchange for “securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such exchange and partly for cash”;

• the fairness of the exchange’s terms and conditions must be approved by a court or authorized government entity;

• the court or authorized government entity must: (i) find, before approving the transaction, that the exchange’s terms and conditions are fair to those who will be issued securities, and (ii) be advised before the hearing that the issuer will rely on the Section 3(a)(10) exemption based on the court’s or authorized governmental entity’s approval of the transaction;

• the court or authorized government entity must hold a hearing before approving the fairness of the terms and conditions of the transaction;
• a governmental entity must be expressly authorized by law to hold the hearing, although it is not necessary that the law require a hearing;

• the fairness hearing must be open to everyone to whom securities would be issued in the proposed exchange;

• adequate notice must be given to all such people; and

• there cannot be any improper impediments to the appearance by such people at the hearing.

Securities issued in a scheme of arrangement, which is a common means of acquisition in jurisdictions such as the U.K., Ireland, the Cayman Islands, Bermuda and elsewhere, typically can qualify for the Section 3(a)(10) exemption.

Note that an acquisition of an FPI pursuant to a scheme of arrangement where Section 3(a)(10) applies generally would not require either a registration statement or a proxy statement in the United States for either the acquiror (unless the acquiror is listed on a U.S. securities exchange, is issuing 20% or more of its outstanding shares in the transaction and is not itself an FPI, in which case a vote under securities exchange listing rules and an associated proxy statement would be required) or the target.

c. Vendor Placements

Another potential means of avoiding Securities Act registration in certain cross-border exchange offers is a vendor placement. As described by the SEC, “[a] vendor placement in a cross-border exchange offer occurs when a bidder offers securities to foreign target holders in an offer, but establishes an arrangement whereby securities that would be issued to tendering U.S. target holders are sold offshore by third parties. The bidder (or the third party) remits the proceeds of the sale (minus expenses) to tendering U.S. target holders.” In a vendor placement, U.S. holders are not excluded from participating in the offer, but they participate on terms different from those afforded other target security holders. Where permissible, the vendor placement procedure thus allows a bidder in a cross-border exchange offer to extend the offer into the United States without registering the issuance of the securities offered under Section 5 of the Securities Act.

The SEC has identified the following factors as relevant when contemplating the use of a vendor placement procedure, and whether Securities Act registration is required:

• the level of U.S. ownership in the target company;

• the number of bidder securities to be issued in the business combination transaction as a whole as compared to the amount of bidder securities outstanding before the offer;

• the amount of bidder securities to be issued to tendering U.S. holders and subject to the vendor placement, as compared to the amount of bidder securities outstanding before the offer;
the liquidity and general trading market for the bidder’s securities;

- the likelihood that the vendor placement can be effected within a very short period of time after the termination of the offer and the bidder’s acceptance of shares tendered in the offer;

- the likelihood that the bidder plans to disclose material information around the time of the vendor placement sales; and

- the process used to effect the vendor placement sales.

Accordingly, the SEC has stated that, “[u]nless the market for the bidder’s securities to be sold through the vendor placement process is highly liquid and robust and the number of bidder securities to be issued for the benefit of U.S. target holders relatively small compared to the total number of bidder securities outstanding, a vendor placement arrangement in a cross-border exchange offer would in our view be subject to Securities Act registration.”

In addition to the above factors, the SEC has indicated that it is relevant (a) whether sales of a bidder’s securities in the vendor placement process are accomplished within a few business days of the close of the offer and whether the bidder announces material information, such as earning results, forecasts or other financial or operating information, before the sales process is complete, and (b) whether the vendor placement involves special selling efforts by brokers or others acting on behalf of the bidder, as these factors indicate whether the market price which U.S. investors will receive when the bidder’s securities are sold on their behalf is representative, and may ensure that U.S. investors are not effectively making an investment decision with respect to a purchase of securities (which would require registration under the Securities Act), but rather are making a decision to tender their target securities in exchange for an amount of cash that can be readily determined and estimated based on historic trading prices.

Bidders may continue to use the vendor placement procedures in compliance with the guidance discussed above, and avoid the need for registration of the bidder securities sold on behalf of U.S. holders under Section 5. The SEC, however, has indicated that it “generally believes that cross-border tender offers eligible to be conducted under the Tier I exemption represent the appropriate circumstances under which bidders may provide cash to U.S. target holders while offering securities to foreign target holders,” and, accordingly, it does not intend to issue vendor placement no-action letters regarding the registration requirements of Section 5.

d. Foreign Spin-Offs

A spin-off transaction in which a non-U.S. company with a material U.S. shareholder base spins off a portion of its business could implicate U.S. registration requirements depending on the structure of the transaction. In the context of a spin-off transaction where a parent company will distribute shares of a subsidiary to its shareholders, the parent company must determine whether the transaction constitutes an
offer or sale requiring registration under Section 5 of the Securities Act. SEC guidance set forth in Staff Legal Bulletin No. 4 (September 16, 1997) ("SLB 4") states that securities issued and distributed in connection with a spin-off are exempt from registration so long as the following conditions are satisfied:

- the parent shareholders do not provide consideration for the spun-off shares;
- the spin-off is pro rata to the parent shareholders;
- the parent provides adequate information about the spin-off and the spun-off company to its shareholders and to the trading markets prior to the completion of the spin-off;
- the parent has a valid business purpose for the spin-off; and
- either the spun-off shares are not “restricted securities,” or the parent has held the spun-off shares for at least two years.

SLB 4 also states that registration is not required pursuant to Securities Act Rule 145 in connection with a shareholder vote relating to the transfer of assets in connection with a spin-off, provided that the conditions above are satisfied and the parent wholly owns the subsidiary issuing the new securities.

Following the completion of the spin-off, the subsidiary may be required to register the spun-off shares with the SEC under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, unless it is able to establish exemption from having to register under Section 12(g), e.g. the automatic exemption for FPIs pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b), as discussed in Section VII.A of this Guide.

e. Cashing Out U.S. Shareholders of Target

In other cases, an acquiror may avoid the registration requirements under the Securities Act by cashing out U.S. shareholders of the target company. For example, an exchange offer, merger or other transaction in which acquiror securities comprise some or all of the consideration may by its terms provide that all U.S. holders will receive cash rather than acquiror securities. The ability to cash out target shareholders, however, depends on the law of the non-U.S. company’s jurisdiction. For example, some jurisdictions require that all target shareholders be treated equally, in which case it may be more difficult to issue securities solely to the non-U.S. shareholders of the target company.

2. Listing of Securities Issued in an Acquisition

The acquisition of a non-U.S. company may involve the listing by a foreign acquiror of the securities being offered to target securityholders on a U.S. securities exchange (for example, because the target has a broadly held ADR program). The listing process is discussed above in Section III.C.2 of this Guide.
3. Post-Registration Obligations

As with the acquisition of a U.S. company, a critical consideration in determining whether to issue securities in the acquisition of a non-U.S. company is the set of post-transaction securities law obligations that the acquiror will incur if the securities are listed or the offering is registered under the Securities Act, including those concerning periodic reporting requirements, the preparation of financial statements and corporate governance. FPIs enjoy certain exemptions from such obligations.

Additional information on the registration process, exemptions and post-transaction obligations is provided in Section VII.

D. Tax Considerations

While U.S. tax considerations are not always relevant to acquisitions of non-U.S. companies, they generally will be implicated if the non-U.S. company has a significant U.S. shareholder base or if the buyer is a U.S. entity.

The United States has a robust CFC regime. A CFC is generally any non-U.S. corporation if more than 50% of its stock (by vote or value) is owned, directly, indirectly or constructively, by “U.S. shareholders.” For this purpose, a U.S. shareholder is any U.S. person that owns, directly, indirectly or constructively, by vote or value, 10% or more of the stock of the non-U.S. corporation. The constructive ownership rules that apply in making these determinations are expansive and can yield unexpected results. For example, a corporate non-U.S. subsidiary of a non-U.S. parent will generally be a CFC if the parent also owns a U.S. corporate subsidiary (even if the U.S. subsidiary does not itself own any stock in the non-U.S. subsidiary). The United States generally taxes U.S. shareholders who own (directly or indirectly, but not constructively) stock of a CFC on a current basis on most of the income earned by the CFC under one of two regimes: (1) the “Subpart F” rules under Section 951 of the Code, which generally apply to tax U.S. shareholders on certain types of passive income earned by their CFCs and (2) the “Global Intangible Low-Tax Income” (or “GILTI”) rules under Section 951A of the Code, which generally apply to tax U.S. shareholders on all other (non-Subpart F) income of their CFCs (subject to limited exclusions), even if no cash is brought back to the U.S. shareholder-level.

Given this landscape, an acquisition of a non-U.S. company can meaningfully affect the go-forward U.S. federal income tax profile of a U.S. buyer. Careful consideration of the expected tax consequences of any such acquisition in advance can help avoid surprises and inform structuring. One “structuring” question in particular that a U.S. corporate buyer will want to consider is whether or not to make an election under Section 338(g) of the Code with respect to the acquisition of the non-U.S. corporate target. If the U.S. buyer makes the election—which is generally available when a corporation purchases 80% or more of the stock of another corporation in a taxable transaction—the non-U.S. target will, for U.S. federal income tax purposes only, be deemed to have sold its assets to an unrelated party for the deal consideration. As a result, the non-U.S. target will, after the acquisition, be viewed as a newly formed entity, and will have a fair market value basis in its assets. This election can be beneficial to a U.S. buyer for a number of reasons. One “soft” but often important benefit relates to the election’s ability to eliminate the relevance...
of the target’s U.S. tax history. Non-U.S. companies often do not maintain various computations—such as earnings and profits calculations—that are relevant for U.S. federal income tax purposes, and absent a Section 338(g) election it would often be necessary for U.S. buyers to recreate that information from “scratch,” a time consuming and costly process. A more tangible benefit of the election is the resulting asset basis step-up (if there is built-in gain) in the non-U.S. corporation’s assets for U.S. tax purposes. The step-up will produce additional depreciation/amortization deductions that can reduce future Subpart F and GILTI inclusions, and, by eliminating any built-in gain for U.S. tax purposes, greatly facilitate post-acquisition integration, in particular, the process of taking historic U.S. operations of the non-U.S. target (if any), “out from under” the non-U.S. jurisdiction and into the U.S. buyer’s consolidated group. However, there can be drawbacks to the election depending on the specific facts and circumstances, including the exact profile of the buyer’s historic and the acquired foreign operations. Modelling is typically needed to inform a final determination. U.S. buyers acquiring non-U.S. companies will also want to consider the impact of any applicable book-based minimum tax regimes (such as the new corporate alternative minimum tax in the United States and the OECD’s global anti-base erosion rules already implemented or to be implemented in the near future by the European Union member states and elsewhere). These new regimes can operate to limit (and even eliminate) the benefits of a Section 338(g) election and can otherwise significantly impact the go-forward tax profile of the acquired business and the combined group.

U.S. tax considerations will also be relevant on the sell-side when a non-U.S. CFC target has U.S. shareholders, such as where a U.S. parent corporation is selling its foreign subsidiary. One of the principal questions will again be whether the buyer should be contractually required to make, or be prohibited from making, an election under Section 338(g) of the Code. This election can drastically alter the U.S. tax consequences of the transaction to a U.S. shareholder. Absent the election, a U.S. shareholder generally recognizes gain or loss equal to the difference between the consideration received and its tax basis in the stock sold, but any such gain will be treated as a dividend to the extent of the CFC’s accumulated earnings and profits, which, in the case of a U.S. corporate seller may be eligible for a dividends received deduction (and thus be exempt from U.S. tax). On the other hand, if a Section 338(g) election is made (and, absent a contractual agreement to the contrary, a buyer may make such an election in its discretion), then, in addition to the stock sale that actually occurs, the target is deemed to sell its assets. As a result, the CFC target realizes asset-level gain or loss, which is deemed to accrue while the U.S. shareholder still owns the target stock, resulting in potential GILTI and Subpart F inclusions to the U.S. shareholder (in addition to any gain on the stock sale, as adjusted to reflect any stock basis adjustments resulting from the Subpart F or GILTI inclusions). These rules, and their interaction, are complex, and all potential scenarios should be carefully modelled and considered.
E. Non-U.S. Law Considerations

While this Section IV of the Guide is focused on the potential application of U.S. laws to the acquisitions of non-U.S. Companies, any target and acquirer involved in the acquisition of a non-U.S. company should also work with local counsel to understand and comply with applicable non-U.S. laws. Certain aspects of M&A involving non-U.S. target companies may be expected for those familiar with U.S. laws, such as the obligation of the target’s board of directors or other governing body to comply with applicable fiduciary duties (though details and the beneficiary stakeholders of those duties may differ). Other aspects of M&A involving non-U.S. targets may be less expected. For example, an Irish target may be subject to the Irish Takeover Rules, which include various protections for target shareholders, such as potential prompt public confirmation of an offer approach by an acquirer in the event of a leak, while UK law restricts the ability for a UK target company to enter into an exclusivity agreement. Depending on the jurisdiction and the type of transaction, non-U.S. jurisdictions may also limit the ability to negotiate some transaction terms, such as limiting the closing conditions that an offer may be contingent upon, and limiting the size of the negotiated break-fee. Given the variety of restrictions and considerations to be understood in each jurisdiction, it is often advisable that both U.S. counsel and non-U.S. counsel be engaged early in the process when considering M&A involving non-U.S. targets.

V. Antitrust and National Security Considerations

Any cross-border transaction could be subject to U.S. laws on antitrust and national security. These laws could require additional filings and coordination between the transaction parties themselves and the U.S. government, and sometimes more importantly could lead to delays in the consummation of a transaction.

A. Antitrust Considerations and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act

The HSR Act requires parties to file notifications with the FTC and the DOJ for certain transactions and to observe certain statutory waiting periods before consummating the transactions. The purpose of the HSR Act is to give the FTC and the DOJ an opportunity to investigate whether the contemplated transaction would substantially lessen competition in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, as amended, and, if so, challenge the transaction in federal court. The transactions that fall under the HSR Act include all acquisitions of voting securities or assets that meet both the (i) “size-of-transaction” threshold of $111.4 million, which is generally calculated as the greater of the purchase price or fair market value of the securities or assets being acquired, and the (ii) “size-of-person” threshold, which is satisfied when one person to the transaction has at least $222.7 million in total assets or revenues and the other person has at least $22.3 million in total assets or revenues. There are two exceptions to these thresholds. First, where the size of the transaction is $445.5 million or greater, the “size-of-person” threshold is irrelevant and the parties will have to file, unless an exemption applies. And second, if a buyer has at least $222.7 million in assets or revenues and the target is a non-manufacturer, then the target’s revenues are irrelevant to the threshold, and so the second threshold is met only when the target has at least $22.3 million in total assets.
Additionally, certain acquisitions of non-U.S. targets, including in some cases acquisitions by non-U.S. acquirors, may require notification under the HSR Act. In general, and subject to several exceptions, an acquisition of non-U.S. businesses or assets will not require notification unless the sales in or into the United States generated by such businesses or assets exceed $111.4 million during the acquired person’s last fiscal year.

The specifics of the waiting periods under the HSR Act depend on the type of transaction involved. For most transactions, the waiting period begins when both the FTC and the DOJ receive complete HSR filings from both the target and acquiror; for tender offers and other non-consensual transactions, the waiting period begins when the agencies receive a complete HSR filing from the buyer (although both parties must comply with the process outside of a cash tender offer). The waiting period is generally 30 days, except for cash tender offers and acquisitions in bankruptcies under 11 U.S.C. § 363, where the period is 15 days. The first day of the waiting period is the day following the day on which the agencies receive the complete filings. If the last day of the waiting period does not fall on a business day, then the waiting period ends on the next business day. The parties may also once withdraw and refile their filings without paying an additional filing fee, before the waiting period elapses, which triggers a new 30-day waiting period (or a 15-day waiting period for cash tender offers and 11 U.S.C. § 363 bankruptcies).

If the waiting period elapses without either agency issuing a request for additional information and documents (known as a “Second Request”), the parties have met their obligations under the HSR Act and may consummate their transaction. The parties may request early termination of the waiting period before the period has elapsed, which both agencies must agree to grant. When early termination is available, the agencies will generally grant it within two to three weeks of the initial filing when a transaction raises no antitrust issues, in which case the parties have also met their obligations and may consummate the transaction. But note that the agencies publish the names of the parties who are granted an early termination publicly. When a Second Request is issued, it extends the waiting period until both parties substantially comply with the request. The waiting period will then end 30 days after the parties submit valid certifications of substantial compliance with the Second Request (or 10 days for cash tender offers and 11 U.S.C. § 363 bankruptcies). A Second Request is very burdensome and resource-intensive, requiring the search and production of substantial quantities of documents from the parties’ files, as well as cost, pricing, and other data for at least three years, and interrogatory responses. Compliance with a Second Request can take several months depending on the parties’ systems, document retention policies, and investment of resources. Once received, HSR clearance is generally valid for one year after the final waiting period expires.

The agencies’ current merger guidelines set forth the primary analytical techniques and types of evidence used to assess the anticompetitive effects of a transaction. The agencies focus on the definition of the market(s) involved in the transaction, including both product and geographic market definitions; market participants, market shares and market concentration; specific anticompetitive effects, including price discrimination, pricing of differentiated products, reduced innovation and product variety, coordinated effects and powerful buyers; and new entry and expansion into said markets. Further, the key pieces of evidence on which the agencies rely include, among others:
• the actual anticompetitive effects observed in consummated mergers;

• the historical “natural experiments” that are informative regarding the competitive effects of the merger, including in recent mergers, entries, expansions, or exits, in the relevant market(s);

• the parties’ market share in the relevant market(s), the level of their respective concentrations and the change in such concentrations caused by the transactions;

• the existence of head-to-head competition, in the present or future (absent the transactions) between the parties; and

• the disruptive role of a merging party (i.e., where the merger of a “maverick” firm would lessen competition).

If there are no issues, the HSR clearance process generally takes about six weeks to complete (including the preparation of the filings and the waiting period), and, if the parties receive a Second Request, then it could take nine months to a year, or more than a year in the event of litigation. Of note, where parties in a transaction do not file for review because the transaction is not reportable, the agencies may still review the transaction, before or after closing, if they believe the transaction may have anticompetitive effects, and in such cases the agencies are not bound by HSR time limitations.

B. National Security Considerations and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States

CFIUS is a federal interagency committee that reviews certain transactions for national security risks. CFIUS operates pursuant to Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 and several other federal regulations. CFIUS membership is composed of the heads of nine federal agencies, including the departments of Treasury (chair), Justice, Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, State and Energy and the offices of the U.S. Trade Representative and Science & Technology Policy, and has additional observer and non-voting, ex-officio members.

CFIUS may conduct national security reviews of “covered control transactions,” defined as proposed or completed mergers, acquisitions or takeovers that could result in “control” of an existing U.S. business by a non-U.S. person, as well as “covered investments,” defined as non-controlling investments in U.S. businesses that develop critical technology, perform certain functions with respect to critical infrastructure, or handle sensitive personal data of specified types and volumes that confer certain governance rights to a foreign investor. Covered transactions generally include all transactions with the characteristics of an equity investment. Parties must therefore consider whether their transactions, including debt and hybrid investments, exhibit characteristics that are equity-like in nature (i.e., acquisition of an interest in a U.S. business, acquisition of the right to appoint board members or other equity-like financial or governance rights). FIRRMA, which became law in August 2018, represents the most
significant changes in the last 10 years to the U.S. framework for reviewing foreign investment transactions in the United States, including an expansion of the scope of covered transactions. FIRRMA extends the reach of CFIUS by adding four new types of covered transactions:

- Non-controlling investments involving critical technologies, critical infrastructure or sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens that afford a non-U.S. person access to material non-public technical information in the possession of the U.S. business, membership on the board of directors or other decision-making rights, other than through voting of shares;

- A purchase, lease or concession by or to a non-U.S. person of real estate located in proximity to sensitive government facilities;

- Any change in a non-U.S. investor’s rights resulting in non-U.S. control of a U.S. business or “other investment” in certain U.S. businesses; and

- Any other transaction, transfer, agreement or arrangement designed to circumvent the jurisdiction of CFIUS.

Some provisions of FIRRMA took effect upon enactment, while others required formal rulemaking by CFIUS. Implementing regulations were finalized in January 2020 and became effective on February 13, 2020. Among other things, the rules introduce a mandatory filing requirement for certain investments resulting in foreign-government controlled entities obtaining 25% or more of the voting power in a U.S. business involved in critical technology or infrastructure or sensitive personal data. The new regulations also identify several categories of businesses involving “critical technology,” including the sorts of military- and defense-related items with which CFIUS has traditionally been associated, as well as certain technologies subject to export control and “emerging and foundational technologies” used in industries such as computer storage, semiconductors and telecommunications equipment. Businesses involving “critical infrastructure” are identified by reference to a list of 28 subsectors. With respect to businesses involving “sensitive personal data,” the new regulations include any business that maintains or collects genetic information or other “identifiable data” such as financial, health-related, biometric or insurance data for more than one million individuals. The rules also implement the real estate provisions of FIRRMA by expanding CFIUS’s jurisdiction to capture the purchase, lease or concession of certain U.S. real estate to a foreign person.

FIRRMA’s changes have resulted in an increase in the number of CFIUS notices and declarations being filed and in longer overall review periods for many transactions, thus further increasing the potential impact of CFIUS in cross-border deals. Rather than the more traditional indicia such as protection of defense facilities and infrastructure, government contracts, etc., FIRRMA mandates that CFIUS view national security through a wider lens and acknowledges that the capability to develop emerging technologies, both digital and otherwise, is critical to ensuring long-term U.S. national security. A September 2022 executive order formalized CFIUS’s expansive view of its national security remit, directing CFIUS to consider five categories of risk in connection with transactions:
1. A transaction’s effect on the resilience of critical supply chains in the United States that may have national security implications, including certain manufacturing capabilities, services, critical mineral resources or technologies;

2. A transaction’s effect on U.S. technological leadership in areas affecting U.S. national security, including artificial intelligence, microelectronics, biotechnology, quantum computing, advanced clean energy and climate adaptation technologies;

3. Industry investment trends that may have consequences for a given transaction’s impact on national security;

4. Whether the foreign person in a transaction may obtain the ability to harm U.S. cybersecurity as a result of the transaction; and

5. Whether the U.S. business in a transaction has access to sensitive personal information, and whether the foreign person or its third-party ties will have the ability to exploit such data to the detriment of national security.79

CFIUS considers all relevant facts and circumstances with respect to a covered transaction, regardless of industry, that have potential national security implications. CFIUS generally considers in its review: with regard to the nature of a U.S. business, (i) the existence of government contracts, (ii) whether the U.S. business has operations relevant to national security and (iii) whether the U.S. business deals in certain advanced technologies or goods and services controlled for export; and, with regard to the identity of a non-U.S. person, (iv) the nationality of the buyer, (v) the track record of the non-U.S. person acquiring control of the U.S. business and (vi) the nonproliferation record of the non-U.S. person’s country of origin.80 Additionally, non-U.S. government control constitutes a national security consideration, although certain circumstances may lessen its significance in a transaction, and, in rare cases, corporate reorganizations may also raise national security concerns.

CFIUS’s opposition in 2021 to South Korean chip maker Magnachip Semiconductor Corp.’s merger with Wise Road Capital Ltd., a Chinese private equity firm, confirms that CFIUS will take an expansive view of its jurisdiction when semiconductor supply, even involving non-military applications, is at stake. CFIUS had “called in” the transaction for its review even though the transacting parties indicated that they had no U.S. nexus except for being incorporated in Delaware, having a Delaware subsidiary, and being listed on the NYSE, with any de minimis sales into the United States only occurring through third-party distributors and resellers. Magnachip’s 2020 annual report, though, indicated that it had a facility in San Jose, California, which it used for “administration, sales and marketing and research development functions,” that had been closed only in September 2020. A notable aspect of the deal was CFIUS’s issuance on June 15, 2021 of an interim order preventing Wise Road from completing the acquisition of Magnachip pending its review of the transaction. While FIRREA gave CFIUS the authority to prevent consummation of a transaction pending its review, CFIUS has so far rarely used that
authority. In abandoning the transaction, Magnachip cited its inability to obtain CFIUS’s approval for the merger. Companies operating overseas with even a limited nexus to the United States need to undertake CFIUS due diligence before engaging in a transaction in sectors that may involve core national security areas of interest.

The CFIUS review process generally starts with the filing of a notice or declaration, at which point CFIUS will initiate its review process. While filings for most transactions are voluntary, as noted above FIRRMA introduced mandatory filing requirements for certain investments by foreign-government controlled entities as well as investments in U.S. businesses involved in critical technology. When CFIUS clears a covered transaction, the parties receive a “safe harbor” before closing, which allows “the transaction [to] proceed without possibility of subsequent suspension or prohibition under section 721.” If, however, CFIUS does not clear a covered transaction that it believes presents national security issues before closing, it may do so after closing, which could lead to the imposition of mitigation measures, including potentially burdensome divestitures, after the closing of the transaction.

In addition, FIRRMA allows mandatory and voluntary filers to use an abbreviated “declaration” containing basic information in lieu of a full-length notice. A declaration must be submitted at least 45 days before closing of the applicable transaction, and within 30 days of filing, CFIUS must decide whether to clear the transaction or request submission of a full-length notice, which would commence a full review period. Statistics suggest that the abbreviated “declaration” may present an attractive option for foreign investors in transactions in which the risk of review is low—in 2020 and 2021, CFIUS cleared more than two thirds of transactions filed on a declaration without requesting submission of a full notice.

FIRRMA also lengthened CFIUS’s initial review period upon the filing of a full-length notice from 30 days to 45 days, and allowed for investigations to be extended for an additional 15 days (from 45 to 60 days) in extraordinary circumstances. While in theory these changes could increase the review period from 75 days up to 105 days, in practice, this extended timeline is unlikely to have a significant effect on sensitive transactions, as parties to such transactions typically engage in protracted “pre-notification” discussions with CFIUS and are often asked to withdraw and refile their notice, restarting the applicable review period.

In circumstances in which a mandatory filing is not required, it is often still prudent to make a voluntary filing with CFIUS if control of a U.S. business is to be acquired by a non-U.S. acquiror and the likelihood of an investigation is reasonably high or if competing bidders are likely to take advantage of the uncertainty of a potential investigation. If there is significant likelihood of an investigation, it may be advantageous for the parties to forego the opportunity to file a short-form “declaration” and instead move straight to filing a long-form notice, so as to avoid an additional 30-day delay while CFIUS evaluates the “declaration,” only to then require a full-length notice and full investigation. Similar considerations with respect to the use of a “declaration” or the full-length notice will apply for transactions where a mandatory filing is required as a result of the FIRRMA changes. Filings typically are preceded by discussions with U.S. Treasury officials and other
relevant agencies, and companies should consider suggesting methods of mitigation early in the review process in order to help shape any remedial measures and avoid delay or potential disapproval. In some cases, it may even be prudent to make the initial contact prior to the public announcement of the transaction. Given the higher volume of filings that have occurred in the last few years, such discussions can be instrumental in minimizing the review period. In circumstances where no filing is required and the risk of review is low, but the parties still want assurances that CFIUS or the U.S. president will not take action on their own initiative, the short-form “declaration” provided for by FIRRMA will be a useful tool to streamline the CFIUS process and remove lingering uncertainty.

Additionally, although practice varies, an increasing number of cross-border transactions in recent years have sought to mitigate CFIUS-related non-consummation risk by including reverse break fees specifically tied to the CFIUS review process. In some of these transactions, U.S. sellers have sought to secure the payment of the reverse break fee by requiring the acquiror to deposit the amount of the reverse break fee into a U.S. escrow account in U.S. dollars, either at signing or in installments over a period of time following signing. While still an evolving product, some insurers have also begun offering insurance coverage for CFIUS-related non-consummation risk, covering payment of the reverse break fee in the event a transaction does not close due to CFIUS review, at a cost of approximately 10%-15% of the reverse break fee.

The CFIUS review process involves several steps. The parties submit a draft notice to CFIUS, which then initiates a national security review and, if necessary, a national security investigation. CFIUS investigates a transaction when it determines in its review that it may impair national security. In the review and investigation, CFIUS examines the transaction to identify and address any potential national security concerns that may arise as a result of the transaction. Lastly, CFIUS makes its recommendations to the president to approve, either unconditionally or with certain conditions (e.g., divestitures, forfeitures of contracts, appointments of compliance personnel or appointments of proxy board composed solely of U.S. persons), suspend or prohibit the transaction.

Parties to cross-border transactions must continue to give the process due consideration. In recent years, CFIUS has loomed particularly large over cross-border deals, especially those involving investors from China or other non-allied countries. For example, in September 2017, President Trump issued an executive order blocking Lattice Semiconductor’s $1.3 billion acquisition by a Chinese government-backed private equity fund, Canyon Bridge Capital Partners, based on CFIUS concerns. In early January 2018, MoneyGram and Alibaba affiliate Ant Financial terminated their proposed $1.2 billion deal, following failure to gain CFIUS approval over concerns about protection of personal data. And in what was likely the most high-profile CFIUS-related action, in March 2018 CFIUS ordered Qualcomm to postpone its annual shareholder meeting, at which Broadcom had nominated a slate of directors who would constitute a majority of the Qualcomm board; shortly thereafter, President Trump ordered Broadcom to cease pursuit of its hostile bid for Qualcomm, ending what would have been one of the largest technology transactions in history. In 2019, CFIUS continued to use its authority to block or cause parties to abandon transactions, including forcing post-consummation divestitures, as was the case with two Chinese companies’ investments in technology startups Grindr and PatientsLikeMe,
allegedly due to concerns regarding cybersecurity or access to sensitive personal data. In 2020, CFIUS blocked a Chinese entity from acquiring a fertility clinic in San Diego, highlighting the increasing concerns over sensitive data collection and retention of U.S. persons by foreign entities, and forced several post-consummation divestitures on national security grounds, including Beijing Shiji’s interest in StayNTouch, which provides property management software for hotels and guests.

While remaining open to foreign investments in the United States, particularly from traditional allies, the Biden administration has maintained a robust CFIUS review process. In particular, investments from countries that are viewed by the U.S. government as strategic competitors continue to face close scrutiny. In addition, the Covid-19 pandemic has brought supply chain issues to the fore, with many U.S. businesses struggling to obtain medical and personal protective equipment from foreign suppliers. The supply chain vulnerabilities exposed by the pandemic may result in heightened CFIUS scrutiny of transactions that may affect supply chains of U.S. industries critical to the economy and public health.

Also, while CFIUS has historically reviewed only foreign investments in the United States, in August 2023 President Biden issued the Executive Order on Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern. This order, for the first time, will give CFIUS authority to also review outbound foreign investments by U.S. businesses. This outbound review process is often referred to as “reverse CFIUS.” The Department of the Treasury simultaneously released an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with proposed details for the program. The reverse CFIUS program will not take effect until this rulemaking is complete, and it is not proposed that the program apply retroactively. The Executive Order attempts to thread the needle of “taking narrowly targeted actions to protect our national security while maintaining our longstanding commitment to open investment.” Accordingly, the reverse CFIUS order exclusively focuses on three technologies: semiconductors and microelectronics; quantum information technologies; and artificial intelligence. At this point, the Biden administration has only identified China, including Hong Kong and Macau, as a country of concern (although the President may modify this list).

The European Union has also adopted a framework to screen foreign direct investments. The framework encourages EU member states to adopt a CFIUS-style foreign direct investment regime focusing on national security concerns, including the protection of critical infrastructure and technologies, and provides a consolidated mechanism through which member states can coordinate foreign direct investment review. By the end of 2023, most European Union countries had adopted or enhanced foreign investment screening regimes, many of which cover a large number of industries and transactions. In January 2024, the European Commission published a proposed reform of the EU’s foreign direct investment screening regime, which, if adopted, would introduce some notable changes, including expanding the range of transactions that would be covered, increasing the amount of information that foreign investors would need to provide in their notifications and, in an attempt to increase harmonization across the EU’s 27 Member States, introducing a set of minimum requirements that national screening mechanisms would be required to meet.
Similarly, in early 2022, the United Kingdom adopted an enhanced foreign investment regime. In industries with national security sensitivities, including semiconductors, technology, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and healthcare, these regimes can have a significant impact on how parties structure transactions and assess transaction risks when foreign parties are involved. In addition, another development that may impact execution risk in deals involving foreign parties is the EU’s Regulation on Foreign Subsidies Distorting the Internal Market, which went into effect in October 2023. The new regulation, which aims to address distortions caused by government subsidies to foreign companies, includes a mandatory notification and review regime for certain acquisitions of EU-based companies by foreign investors that have received subsidies or other contributions from non-EU governments in the three years prior to the deal. The review process will run in parallel to the traditional merger review, and the European Commission will have new investigatory powers and the ability to impose measures to mitigate the effects of foreign subsidies. The new regulation defines government contributions very broadly, including sales of goods or services to any government entity, thus increasing the risk that deals will trigger a notification obligation. We expect that this new screening tool will create new burdens and potential delays for M&A deals involving companies active in the EU.
VI.  

Negotiation, Diligence and Integration Considerations

Practical and tactical considerations with respect to structuring and executing a cross-border transaction are as important to understand as related U.S. legal considerations. A complex combination of local laws and custom may guide the parties not only in transaction structure and consideration, but also in the negotiation, due diligence and integration phases of the cross-border deal.

A. Negotiation

When negotiating a potential cross-border transaction, understanding the custom and practice of M&A in the target’s jurisdiction is essential. Successful execution is as much art as science, and will benefit from early involvement by experienced local advisors. For example, understanding when to respect—and when to challenge—a target’s sale “process” may be critical. Knowing how and at what price level to enter the discussions will often determine the success or failure of a proposal. In some situations, it is prudent to start with an offer on the low side, while in other situations, offering a full price at the outset may be essential to achieving a negotiated deal and discouraging competitors, including those who might raise political or regulatory issues. Decisions as to pricing can also fundamentally impact the timeline for a transaction—offering a full price at the outset avoids the need for multiple rounds of negotiation. In strategically or politically sensitive transactions, hostile maneuvers may be imprudent; in other cases, unsolicited pressure may be the only way to force a transaction. Similarly, understanding in advance the roles of arbitrageurs, hedge funds, institutional investors, private equity funds, proxy voting advisors and other important market players in the target’s market—and their likely views of the anticipated acquisition attempt as well as when they appear and disappear from the scene—can be pivotal to the outcome of the contemplated transaction. Occasionally, local regulators and other local constituencies may seek to intervene in a global deal. Seemingly modest social issues, such as the name of the continuing enterprise and its corporate seat, or the choice of the nominal acquiror in a merger, may affect the perspective of government and labor officials. Depending on the industry involved and the geographic distribution of the workforce, labor unions and “works councils” may be active and play a significant role in the current political environment, and as a result, demand concessions.

Where the target is a U.S. public company, the customs and formalities surrounding participation by the board of directors in the M&A process, including the participation of legal and financial advisors, fairness opinion practice and the inquiry and analysis surrounding the activities of the board and the financial advisors, can be unfamiliar and potentially confusing to non-U.S. transaction participants and can lead to misunderstandings that threaten to upset delicate transaction negotiations. Non-U.S. participants must be well-advised as to the role of U.S. public company boards and the legal, regulatory and litigation framework and risks that can constrain or prescribe board action. In particular, the litigation framework should be kept in mind as shareholder litigation often accompanies M&A transactions involving U.S. public companies. The acquiror, its directors, shareholders and other offshore stakeholders should be conditioned
in advance (to the extent possible) to expect litigation and not to necessarily view it as a sign of trouble. In addition, it is important to understand that the U.S. discovery process in litigation is different, and in some contexts more intrusive, than the process in other jurisdictions. Moreover, the choice of governing law and the choice of forum to govern any potential dispute between the parties about the terms or enforceability of the agreement may have a substantial effect on the outcome of any such dispute, or even be outcome determinative. Parties entering into cross-border transactions should consider with care whether to specify the remedies available for breach of the transaction documents and the mechanisms for obtaining or resisting such remedies.

The litigation risk and the other factors mentioned above can impact both tactics and timing of M&A processes and the nature of communications with the target company. Additionally, on top of U.S. securities law considerations, local takeover regulations often differ from those in the acquiror’s home jurisdiction. For example, the mandatory offer concept common in Europe, India and other countries—in which an acquisition of a certain percentage of securities requires the bidder to make an offer for either the balance of the outstanding shares or for an additional percentage—is very different from U.S. practice, as is a regulator-supervised auction. Permissible deal-protection structures, pricing requirements and defensive measures available to targets also differ. Sensitivity also must be given to the contours of the target board’s fiduciary duties and decision-making obligations in home jurisdictions, particularly with respect to consideration of stakeholder interests other than those of shareholders and non-financial criteria.

In addition to these customs and formalities, participants in a cross-border transaction should focus attention on the practical considerations of dealing with a counterparty that is subject to a foreign legal regime. For example, acknowledging the potential practical constraints around enforcing a remedy in a foreign jurisdiction can significantly change negotiating dynamics and result in alternative deal structures. Escrow deposit structures or letters of credit from U.S. banks have been used a number of times to reduce enforceability risk in transactions with Chinese acquirors and may be instructive in other contexts where enforceability is not assured.

The multifaceted overlay of foreign takeover laws and the legal and tactical considerations they present can be particularly complex when a bid for a non-U.S. company may be unwelcome. Careful planning and coordination with foreign counsel are critical in hostile and unsolicited transactions, on both the bidder and target sides. For example, Italy’s “passivity” rule, which limits defensive measures a target can take without shareholder approval, is suspended unless the hostile bidder is itself subject to equivalent rules. A French company’s organizational documents can provide for a similar rule, and France’s Florange Act contains default provisions that a French company’s long-term shareholders are granted double voting rights, which would reduce the influence of toehold acquisitions or merger arbitrageurs. Dutch law and practice allow for the target’s use of an independent “foundation,” or stichting, to at least temporarily defend against hostile offers through the issuance of voting shares. The foundation, which is controlled by independent directors appointed by the target and has a broad defensive mandate, is issued high-vote preferred shares at a nominal cost, which allow it to control the voting outcome of any matter put to target shareholders.
Disclosure obligations may also vary across jurisdictions. How and when an acquiror’s interest in the target is publicly disclosed should be carefully controlled to the extent possible, keeping in mind the various ownership thresholds or other triggers for mandatory disclosure under the law of the jurisdiction of the company being acquired. In addition to mandatory disclosure thresholds under federal securities laws in the United States, there are also regulatory agency rules applicable for particular industries, such as those of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Federal Communications Commission.

For example, under the Irish Takeover Panel’s new “put-up or shut-up” (“PUSU”) regime, which came into effect in July 2022, if a bidder proposing to acquire an Irish public company has been publicly identified, the bidder has 42 days to either announce a formal offer to acquire the company (i.e., “put-up”) or announce it does not intend to make an offer (i.e., “shut-up”), after which time, if the bidder does not announce a formal offer, it will be restricted from making an offer to acquire the company for six months thereafter. The new PUSU regime also requires that a target company announcing a potential offer (including in connection with a leak announcement, which may be mandatory in certain circumstances under the Irish Takeover Rules) identify in such announcement all potential offerors that it is in discussions with, which then commences the 42-day clock for all such potential offerors to make an offer. This regime may be useful to a target company that receives an unwanted offer as a takeover defense measure by putting a tight deadline on the hostile bidder’s ability to submit an offer. But, the regime may also consequently chill or impede discussions with a different, “friendly” offeror with whom the company may be having transaction discussions, especially if those discussions were in preliminary stages and the offeror would not be prepared to make a formal, public offer within the 42-day timeframe (and may otherwise hamper the ability to use the veil of confidentiality as a negotiating tool).

Treatment of derivative securities and other pecuniary interests in a target other than equity holdings also vary by jurisdiction and have received heightened regulatory focus in recent periods, as well as potential consequences for acquirors once a public disclosure has been made. For example, in 2021, a panel of the Alberta Securities Commission in Canada found that a hostile bidder’s use of cash-settled total return swaps—which gave the bidder economic exposure to (and control of) underlying target shares—and lack of disclosure of them was abusive to the target company’s shareholders and ordered that the minimum tender condition be increased to take account of the shares that were controlled by the bidder through the cash-settled swaps.

Companies are also well advised to understand jurisdictional differences in typical M&A contracts and the impact on risk allocation between the parties. For example, U.S. private company acquisition agreements often determine the final purchase price based on the closing cash, debt and net working capital of the target, while U.K. acquisition agreements typically use a “locked box” structure whereby the purchase price is fixed based on financial statements prior to signing (with the date of such financial statements referred to as the “locked box date”) and dividends and other “leakage” are prohibited. While parties to U.S.-style agreements must focus on the net working capital target and negotiate detailed purchase price adjustment mechanics, parties to U.K.-style agreements
should be prepared to negotiate what transactions constitute “leakage” of value after the locked box date that reduce the final purchase price. U.K. locked box agreements also sometimes include a daily ticking fee payable by the buyer to the seller for the period between the locked box date and the closing date. The ticking fee may be set based on the expected daily profit of the target business after the locked box date. This structure therefore in a sense shifts economic ownership of the target business from the seller to the buyer at the locked box date (rather than at closing, as with the purchase price adjustment structure), with the risks of decline (and benefit of improvement) in the target’s business following the locked box date borne by the buyer, and the seller being compensated for the risk of regulatory or other delays to closing. Differences between U.S.-style representation and warranty insurance and U.K.-style representation and warranty insurance also affect risk allocation post-closing. While U.K.-style representation and warranty insurance is typically less expensive that U.S.-style insurance, U.K. representation and warranty insurance policies often provide less coverage, such as by excluding from coverage any item in the target’s data room. Parties may insist on using a U.S.-style contract or a U.K.-style contract to take advantage of more favorable risk allocation.

It is essential that a comprehensive communications plan be in place before the announcement of a transaction so that all the relevant constituencies can be targeted and addressed with the appropriate messages. It is often useful to involve local public relations firms in the planning process at an early stage. Planning for premature leaks is also critical, especially in certain jurisdictions with regimes requiring mandatory disclosure when there are leaks involving takeovers or material information more generally. Similarly, potential regulatory hurdles require sophisticated advance planning. In addition to securities and antitrust regulations, acquisitions may be subject to foreign investment review, and acquisitions in regulated industries (e.g., energy, public utilities, gaming, insurance, telecommunications and media, financial institutions, transportation, semiconductor and defense contracting) may be subject to additional layers of regulatory approvals. Regulation in these areas is often complex, and political opponents, reluctant targets and competing bidders may seize on any perceived weaknesses in an acquiror’s ability to clear regulatory obstacles. Most obstacles to a cross-border deal are best addressed in partnership with local players (including, in particular, the target company’s management, where appropriate) whose interests are aligned with those of the acquiror, as local support reduces the appearance of a foreign threat.

It is in most cases critical that the likely concerns of national and local government agencies, employees, customers, suppliers, communities and other interested parties be thoroughly considered and, if possible, addressed prior to any acquisition or investment proposal becoming public. Flexibility in transaction structures, especially in strategic or politically sensitive situations, may be helpful in particular circumstances, such as: (i) no-governance or low-governance investments, minority positions or joint ventures, possibly with the right to increase to greater ownership or governance over time (though as discussed below, recently enacted legislation and related rulemaking may decrease the utility of these structures as tools to avoid regulatory scrutiny in the United States); (ii) when entering a foreign market, making an acquisition in partnership with a local company or management or in collaboration with a local source of financing or co-investor (such as a private equity firm); or (iii) utilizing a controlled or partly controlled local acquisition
vehicle, possibly with a board of directors having a substantial number of local citizens and a prominent local figure as a non-executive chairman.

B. Due Diligence and Integration Planning

Due diligence and integration planning warrant special attention in the context of a cross-border transaction. Regardless of jurisdiction, wholesale application of the acquiror’s domestic due diligence standards to the target can cause delay, wasted time and resources, or result in the parties missing key transaction issues.

Due diligence methods must take account of the target jurisdiction’s legal regime and local norms, including what steps a publicly traded company can take with respect to disclosing material non-public information to potential bidders and implications for disclosure obligations. Many due diligence requests are best funneled through legal or financial intermediaries as opposed to being made directly to the target company. For a U.S. company acquiring a non-U.S. company, due diligence relating to compliance with the sanction regulations overseen by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is essential. Similarly, due diligence with respect to risks related to the FCPA—and understanding the DOJ’s guidance for minimizing the risk of inheriting FCPA liability—is critical for a U.S. company acquiring a company with non-U.S. business activities; even acquisitions of foreign companies that do business in the United States may be scrutinized with respect to FCPA compliance. In 2018, the DOJ established guidance expanding its FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy to M&A transactions. As a result, when an acquiring company identifies misconduct through pre-transaction due diligence or post-transaction integration, and then self-reports the relevant conduct, the DOJ is now more likely to decline to prosecute if the company fully cooperates, remediates in a complete and timely fashion and disgorges any ill-gotten gains. This presumption of declination was further broadened by the DOJ’s 2019 revisions to the policy, which provide that an acquiring company may still be eligible for a declination even if the target it acquired presented aggravating circumstances—for example, if the target’s management was complicit in the corruption, the presumption of declination could still apply if the acquiror timely discovered and removed such members of management. This guidance further underscores the importance of careful pre-acquisition due diligence and effective post-closing compliance integration, which will place acquiring companies in the best position to take advantage of the DOJ’s enforcement approach in appropriate cases where misconduct is uncovered. Further information on FCPA liability and recent enforcement actions involving FPIs can be found in Section VIII.C of this Guide. Acquirors should also keep in mind the key sanctions imposed by the United States, European Union, and the United Kingdom (among other nations) on Russia, Belarus and their related persons and entities in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; recent enforcement actions by the DOJ reflect an aggressive stance towards Russia sanctions and export control evasion. Acquirors considering targets with multi-jurisdictional supply chains or financial institutions or other entities involved in facilitating international trade should evaluate such targets’ compliance programs and review their relationships with higher-risk customers and counterparties, in particular those with connections to Russia, Belarus, and other higher-risk jurisdictions.
Cross-border transactions sometimes fail due to poor post-acquisition integration where multiple cultures, languages, historic business methods and distance may create friction. If possible, the executives and consultants who will be responsible for integration should be involved in the early stages of the deal so that they can help formulate and “own” the plans that they will be expected to execute. Too often, a separation between the deal team and the integration/execution teams invites slippage in execution of a plan that in hindsight is labeled by the new team as unrealistic or overly ambitious. However, integration planning needs to be carefully phased in, as implementation cannot occur prior to the time most regulatory approvals are obtained, and merging parties must exercise care not to engage in conduct that antitrust agencies perceive as a premature transfer of beneficial ownership or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Investigations into potential “gun-jumping” present costly and delaying distractions during substantive merger review.

C. ESG Considerations in Integration Planning and Due Diligence

Environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) considerations have remained an important strategic and operational priority, exerting noticeable influence over the M&A landscape in recent years. Senior executives and corporate boards have leveraged M&A to advance ESG strategies and companies are integrating ESG considerations into due diligence and post-transaction integration processes to ensure maximal synergies and long-term value creation. Recent months have seen a wave of consolidation in the oil and gas sector led by the announcements of Chevron’s $53 billion acquisition of Hess and Exxon’s $59.5 billion acquisition of Pioneer Natural Resources, which were soon followed by the announcements of Chesapeake’s $7.4 billion acquisition of Southwestern Energy, Diamondback’s $26 billion acquisition of Endeavor and APA’s $4.5 billion acquisition of Callon Petroleum. The latest series of mergers in the oil and gas sector reflect ongoing pressure on fossil fuel producers to improve efficiency and scale and to secure access to the most profitable drilling sites as they look to compete with the growing renewables sector. Other transactions that have been in part driven by ESG-related strategic considerations include BlackRock’s $12.5 billion acquisition of Global Infrastructure Partners, RWE’s $6.8 billion purchase of Con Edison’s clean energy business and Infrastructure Investment Fund’s $8.1 billion acquisition of South Jersey Industries, SSE’s $1.8 billion sale of a minority stake in its electricity transmission network to the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board, Alphabet’s $5.4 billion acquisition of cybersecurity firm Mandiant, BP’s $4.1 billion acquisition of bioenergy firm Archaea, and Chevron’s $3.1 billion acquisition of Renewable Energy Group.

The influence of environmental and social considerations on M&A is likely to persist as shareholders and regulators continue to exert pressure on companies to make strategic and operational changes to address new risks and opportunities, in addition to enhancing board and management oversight of such matters. Notably, in the United States and the European Union, new and pending rules mandating disclosures on climate, human capital, cybersecurity and board diversity will require companies to provide accurate and timely disclosures, incentivizing acquirors and targets to carefully diligence these areas to identify potential risks and vulnerabilities, including disclosure-related risks that may arise from inaccurate public reporting or insufficient internal controls. In light of the continued investor and regulatory focus on rigorous ESG-related governance and oversight, parties
to a transaction will also need to pay close attention to the internal processes used to identify, manage and mitigate ESG-related risks at both the management and board levels. Acquirors will also need to make a determination of the pro forma ESG impact of a transaction, including the impact on reputation and culture, when assessing deal synergies, and on the target side, boards and managements will also need to be cognizant that ESG concerns may factor into the shareholder vote.

Human capital considerations may also impact post-transaction integration processes. Corporate culture, values and employee morale are often tested following a transaction, and management and the board are responsible for setting the right tone at the top. Clear leadership in this area is particularly valuable in cross-border transactions where divergences in corporate culture and workforce expectations may be acute. Integration efforts will also need to be sensitive to existing environmental, social and governance goals, policies and procedures of the target and acquiror, so as not to adversely impact the profile of the combined company or side-step growing regulatory requirements in different jurisdictions.
VII.

Post-Transaction Obligations of an FPI That Lists or Registers Securities

A critical consideration for a non-U.S. company that is evaluating whether to issue securities as consideration in the transaction is the potential post-transaction securities law obligations that may be imposed as a result of the issuance. The listing of securities on a U.S. securities exchange, or registration of an offering under the Securities Act, can impose post-transaction obligations, including those concerning periodic reporting requirements, the preparation of financial statements and corporate governance. FPIs enjoy certain exemptions from such obligations. This section summarizes these obligations and the exemptions that are afforded to FPIs.

It is important to keep in mind that a non-U.S. company would lose the benefit of the various exemptions available to FPIs if it ceases to qualify as an FPI. In that circumstance, the company would become subject to the full panoply of federal securities laws applicable to U.S. companies. See Section II.C.1 for a description of FPIs and the requirements for annual evaluation of a non-U.S. company’s status as an FPI.

A. Registration Requirements

Sources of Exchange Act Obligations

The registration requirements under the Exchange Act set forth the three ways by which an issuer becomes a “reporting company,” and thereby must register with the SEC and comply with the periodic reporting requirements of Sections 13(a) or 15(d) and other obligations. Specifically, an issuer becomes a reporting company when it:

- lists a class of securities on a national securities exchange, requiring it to register the securities under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act;85

- has assets in excess of $10 million and its shares are held of record by (i) 2,000 or more persons or (ii) 500 or more persons who are not accredited investors, excluding persons who received unregistered securities pursuant to an employee compensation plan, requiring it to register its securities under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act;86 and/or

- files a registration statement for a class of securities under the Securities Act in a public offering, and, as a result, incurs ongoing reporting obligations under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, which would continue for at least the fiscal year in which the registration statement became effective.87

The Rule 12g3-2 Exemptions

Unlike Sections 12(b) and 15(d), which an FPI can avoid by not listing its securities on a U.S. securities exchange and not conducting an offering registered under the Securities
Act, an FPI may be unable to avoid meeting the numerical shareholder tests of Section 12(g). However, Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2 provides two important exemptions from Section 12(g).

Rule 12g3-2(a) exempts an FPI from having to register under Section 12(g) if it has fewer than 300 holders of record in the United States. For this purpose, issuers must count all beneficial U.S. holders and not only record holders. To do so, an issuer must (i) “look through” the record ownership of the brokers, dealers, banks and nominees holding the issuer’s securities for the accounts of their customers to identify all beneficial U.S. holders and (ii) consider beneficial ownership reports and other similar documentation with U.S. holder information. This exemption continues until the next fiscal year end at which the FPI has a class of equity securities held by 300 or more persons resident in the United States.

In 2016, the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 12g5-1 under the Exchange Act as required by the JOBS Act, which affects how US record holders are counted for the purposes of Rule 12g3-2(a).\textsuperscript{88} Rule 12g5-1(a)(8)(i), which was adopted as a result of these amendments, excludes from the definition of “held of record” securities that are either: (a) held by persons who received them under an employee compensation plan in transactions exempt or excluded from registration under the Securities Act (for example, under Section 4(a)(2) of, or Regulation D or S); or (b) held by persons who received them in a transaction exempt or excluded from Securities Act registration from the issuer, a predecessor of the issuer, or an acquired company in substitution or exchange for securities excludable under clause (a), as long as the persons were eligible to receive securities under Rule 701(c) at the time the excludable securities were originally issued to them. As a result, FPIs are permitted to exclude the securities listed in Rule 12g5-1(a)(8)(i) when determining if they have met the 300 U.S. resident holder standard under Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2(a).

Rule 12g3-2(b) exempts an FPI from having to register under Section 12(g) if it meets the following requirements: (1) the FPI is not currently be required to file or furnish Exchange Act reports (due to being listed on a U.S. securities exchange or having had a Securities Act registration statement become effective); (2) the FPI maintains a listing of the subject class of securities on a non-U.S. exchange that is its “primary trading market”\textsuperscript{89} for those securities as of its most recently completed fiscal year; and (3) the FPI has published, in English, certain home country disclosure documents since the first day of its most recently completed fiscal year, on its website or through an electronic information delivery system. This exemption continues until the FPI no longer satisfies the electronic publication condition; no longer maintains a listing of the subject class of securities on one or more exchanges in a primary trading market; or registers a class of securities under Section 12 of the Exchange Act or incurs reporting obligations under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act. Since 2008, the SEC has permitted FPIs qualifying for the Rule 12g3-2(b) exemption to claim it automatically (as under Rule 12g3-2(a)), rather than requiring FPIs to apply via written application.\textsuperscript{90}
B. Periodic Reporting Obligations

1. Periodic Reports

An FPI with reporting obligations must file an annual report on Form 20-F with the SEC within four months after the FPI’s fiscal year-end. FPIs thus enjoy a benefit relative to U.S. issuers, which must file their annual reports on Form 10-K within 60, 75 or 90 days after the end of their fiscal years, depending on whether the issuer is a “large accelerated filer,” “accelerated filer,” or “non-accelerated filer.” Form 20-F provides investors with comprehensive information about an FPI’s business, management and operational and financial status during a fiscal year. Among other items, Form 20-F must include:

- a description of the issuer’s business;
- selected financial data;
- a discussion of material risk factors;
- management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations (the “MD&A”);
- disclosures concerning directors, management and employees;
- major shareholders (i.e., beneficial owners of more than 5% of the FPI’s stock, unless home country disclosure requires a lower percentage);
- information about related-party transactions (including transactions and agreements with major shareholders);
- a summary of material litigation;
- a description of any changes to the rights of security holders;
- reports and attestations assessing the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls over financial reporting;
- disclosures related to accountants, including fees and changes in the certifying accountant;
- full annual audited financial statements prepared in accordance with one of (i) U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“U.S. GAAP”), (ii) IFRS as issued by the IASB, or (iii) GAAP of a foreign country, together with a U.S. GAAP-reconciliation disclosure;
- CEO and CFO certifications as required by Sarbanes-Oxley; and
- key documents filed as exhibits, including (i) charters and bylaws as currently in effect and any amendments to either; (ii) all certificates,
instruments and agreements defining the rights of shareholders; (iii) all instruments and documents defining the rights of holders of long-term debt issued (with some exceptions); (iv) any voting trust agreements and any amendments to them; (v) material contracts; (vi) management contracts or compensatory plans (with some exceptions); (vii) a list of subsidiaries; and (viii) an explanation of earnings per share calculations.

SEC regulations issued under the Exchange Act pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley further require a U.S. issuer’s annual report to contain a report on internal controls that states management’s responsibility for maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting and to include an assessment of the effectiveness of such controls as of the end of the reporting period.94 An issuer’s independent auditor is required to attest to management’s assessment in accordance with standards adopted by the U.S. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”).95 These requirements apply to FPIs, although a new reporting company is not required to comply with them until it has been required to file, or has filed, an annual report for the prior fiscal year.96

Under final rules adopted to implement the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (“HFCAA”), the SEC began provisionally identifying issuers beginning with annual reports for the year ended December 31, 2021. An “identified issuer” under the HFCAA is one that has filed financial statements audited by a registered public accounting firm with a branch or office located in a foreign jurisdiction that the PCAOB has determined impedes or prevents full PCAOB inspections. Once the SEC has provisionally identified an issuer, the issuer has 15 business days to dispute its classification and to provide evidence supporting its claim; absent such notification of a dispute, the SEC will treat the issuer as conclusively identified, subjecting it to the HFCAA. If a “foreign issuer” has been conclusively identified, in its next annual report following identification it must disclose:

- the PCAOB-identified accounting firm that has prepared an audit report for the issuer during the period covered by the annual report
- the percentage of the issuer’s shares held by governmental entities in the foreign jurisdiction in which the issuer is organized;
- whether governmental entities in the applicable foreign jurisdiction have a controlling financial interest with respect to the issuer;
- the name of each official of the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) who is a member of the board of directors of the issuer or its operating entity; and
- whether the articles of the issuer contains any charter of the CCP, including the text of any such charter.
After three consecutive “non-inspection years” years, the HFCAA requires the SEC to impose a trading prohibition on an identified issuer’s securities traded on a U.S. stock exchange or the U.S. over-the-counter market.97

As with Form 10-K, the SEC does not routinely review annual reports on Form 20-F when filed. However, the SEC may elect at any time to review all or part of an annual report after it has been filed, and the SEC is required to review disclosures made by issuers in their annual reports (including their financial statements) at least once every three years. If the SEC reviews a report, it may issue a comment letter that includes questions based on a disclosure and/or requests that the company revise the disclosure on the basis of its interpretation of its regulations and the information contained in the report. If the company receives comments from the SEC, it must respond to each comment and make revisions to its report as necessary.98 SEC comment letters and company response letters are made public.

Unlike U.S. issuers, which are required to file quarterly reports with the SEC, FPIs are exempt from quarterly reporting on Form 10-Q and need not file any other report on a quarterly basis. However, both the NYSE and Nasdaq require listed FPIs to submit semi-annual financial information to the SEC on Form 6-K.99 Additionally, if an FPI is required to file or make public periodic reports under the laws of its home jurisdiction, it must disclose those reports under Form 6-K, in accordance with the criteria discussed below.

An FPI must furnish to the SEC material information it makes public in its home country or elsewhere under cover of Form 6-K. Unlike a U.S. issuer, which must make disclosures upon the occurrence of any of the specific events itemized on Form 8-K, an FPI must furnish information that it (i) makes or is required to make public pursuant to the laws of the jurisdiction of its domicile or the laws in the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated or organized, (ii) files or is required to file with a securities exchange on which its securities are traded and which was made public by that securities exchange or (iii) distributes or is required to distribute to its shareholders.100 This information generally includes: changes in business; changes in management or control; acquisitions or dispositions of assets; bankruptcy or receivership; changes in registrant’s certifying accountants; the issuer’s financial condition and results of operations; material legal proceedings; changes in securities; defaults upon senior securities; material increases or decreases in the amount outstanding of securities or indebtedness; the results of shareholder votes; transactions with directors, officers or principal shareholders; the granting of options or payment of other compensation to directors or officers; and any other information that the registrant deems of material importance to shareholders.

Form 6-K consists of a copy of the relevant information, as well as cover and signature pages, and must be furnished “promptly” after the information required to be included has been made public, although there is no precise deadline. The information and documents furnished in a Form 6-K are not deemed to be “filed” for the purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act.101 U.S. issuers, by comparison, are generally required to file a Form 8-K within four business days of the event that triggers the filing obligation, and depending on the Form 8-K item under which the information was disclosed, such information may be deemed “filed,” not “furnished,” in which case it is subject to liability
under Section 18 of the Exchange Act and incorporated into the issuer’s Securities Act registration statements.102

2. Forward-Looking Statements

When an issuer makes forward-looking statements in its periodic reports and public statements, it can avail itself of the statutory safe harbor from securities fraud liability created by Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the “PSLRA”) in the event the statements turn out to be incorrect.103 The term “forward-looking statement” is defined to include statements that “contain[] a projection of revenues, income [or] other financial items” or discuss the “plans and objectives of management for future operations.”104 The safe harbor provides for three separate tests, any one of which, if met, eliminates liability.

Under the first test, a forward-looking statement is protected if it is identified as a forward-looking statement and is “accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement.” Guidance on what constitute “meaningful cautionary statements” can be found in the case law.105 In particular, such case law suggests that (i) the cautionary language must be tailored to the forward-looking information; (ii) risk disclosure should convey the magnitude of the risk (not just that it exists); (iii) the warnings should be prominent; and (iv) if the forward-looking statement is based on specific assumptions, those assumptions should be disclosed. In the case of oral communications, the safe harbor provides more flexibility. Companies relying on the safe harbor for oral statements must still identify the statement as forward-looking, but may reference other “readily available” documents for the required disclosure of factors that could cause actual results to vary. This eliminates the need to take the awkward step of including lengthy oral risk factor recitations in every analyst conference call or offering road show. Under the second test, the statement is protected if it is immaterial. As one important example, courts have repeatedly held that general statements of corporate optimism, or “puffery,” are immaterial under the U.S. securities laws because a reasonable investor would not rely on them.106 Under the third test, the statement is protected if the plaintiff is not able to prove that the statement was made with actual knowledge that it was false. Because the safe harbor expressly requires actual knowledge, showing that an individual acted recklessly does not suffice—there must be subjective, actual knowledge.107 If the forward-looking statement is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, then the first test applies and a defendant’s state of mind is irrelevant.

Additionally, if the statutory safe harbor under the PSLRA is not available, issuers can rely on the judicially-created “bespeaks caution” doctrine, which courts recognized prior to the adoption of the PSLRA. This doctrine provides that forward-looking statements are not misleading if they are accompanied by “cautionary statements” that are “substantive and tailored to the specific future projections, estimates or opinions in the [disclosure] which the plaintiffs challenge,” on the theory that sufficient cautionary language will “negate[] the materiality of an alleged misrepresentation or omission.”108 The legislative history surrounding the PSLRA indicates that Congress intended for the bespeaks caution doctrine to survive and complement the PSLRA, and courts have continued to apply it.109 The defense can protect issuers and those acting on their behalf
from liability where the PSLRA safe harbor is unavailable. However, the doctrine will not apply if the supposed “risk” the company identifies has in fact already materialized.110

3. **Director and Officer Compensation Disclosures**

FPIs must disclose in their annual reports on Form 20-F the aggregate amount of compensation given to directors and officers, including benefits in kind, deferred compensation accrued in the relevant fiscal year and stock option grants. Disclosure of compensation on an individual basis is required only if the FPI’s home jurisdiction requires it or if the FPI otherwise makes that information publicly available. Additionally, an FPI must file as exhibits to its public filings individual management contracts and compensatory plans if required by its home-jurisdiction requirements or if it previously disclosed such documents.111

4. **Regulation FD**

Regulation FD under the Exchange Act prohibits selective disclosure of information by public U.S. issuers by requiring public companies that disclose, whether orally or in writing, material nonpublic information to securities analysts and shareholders to also disclose that information to the public.112 Regulation FD applies to all issuers with a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act or that are required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act. The timing requirements of the public disclosure turns on intentionality: where disclosure is intentional, an issuer must make a public disclosure “simultaneously”; where it is unintentional, it must make it “promptly.” Required public disclosures can be made on Form 8-K or through another method reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.

FPIs are not subject to the disclosure requirements of Regulation FD. Nonetheless, most FPIs voluntarily comply with the rule or look to it for guidance in adopting policies that are designed to prevent selective disclosure because Regulation FD addresses a circumstance that can give rise to liability under Rule 10b-5 and is similar to the policies that underlie the prohibition on insider trading that applies to all public companies. Restrictions on public disclosure in an FPI’s home jurisdictions may overlap Regulation FD requirements.

5. **Conflict Minerals Disclosures**

Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) added Section 13(p) to the Exchange Act, and the SEC later adopted Rule 13p-1, requiring all reporting companies, including FPIs, that have “conflict minerals that are necessary to the functionality or production of a product manufactured or contracted by that registrant” to disclose that fact on Form SD. Conflict minerals, as defined in Form SD, include “Columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, gold, wolframite, or their derivatives, which are limited to tantalum, tin, and tungsten, unless the Secretary of State determines that additional derivatives are financing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.”113
Form SD requires companies to file either a short “Conflict Minerals Disclosure” or a longer “Conflict Minerals Report,” the latter of which also requires an “independent private sector audit.” The Conflict Minerals Disclosure is filed as an exhibit to Form SD when the issuer reasonably determines that the conflict minerals in its supply chain did not originate in the Democratic Republic of Congo or an adjoining country or did come from recycled or scrap sources and has no reason to believe otherwise. The Conflict Minerals Report is filed as an exhibit to Form SD when the issuer reasonably determines that the conflict minerals in its supply chain did originate in the Democratic Republic of Congo or an adjoining country, or the company has reason to believe, based on its reasonable country of origin inquiry, that conflict minerals in its supply chain originated in the Democratic Republic of Congo or an adjoining country. In such circumstances, the company must exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of its conflict minerals and make additional disclosures about its diligence efforts and the results of that diligence.

However, as a result of legal challenges to the conflict mineral rules, the SEC has indicated that it will not recommend enforcement action against issuers that do not comply with Item 1.01(c) of Form SD—the provision requiring companies to conduct due diligence to determine the source and custody of conflict minerals in their supply chain and to prepare a Conflict Minerals Report describing their efforts and findings—although issuers are not relieved of their obligation to file a Form SD.

Form SD is due on May 31 following the end of an issuer’s most recent fiscal year.

C. Section 13(d) and 13(g) Obligations of Shareholders

The shareholders (including non-U.S. shareholders) of an FPI with voting equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act are subject to the reporting obligations under Sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Exchange Act. These provisions are intended to give notice of significant acquisitions and potential changes of control to securities markets and other holders of the issuer’s securities. The reporting obligations thus turn on the percentage of beneficial ownership of equity securities, and each shareholder or group of shareholders is responsible for complying with these provisions. In 2022, the SEC proposed amendments to Schedules 13D and 13G related to beneficial ownership reports (the “Proposed Amendments”). We have noted below where the Proposed Amendments would modify existing deadlines under Schedules 13D and 13G.

Rule 13d-1(a) under the Exchange Act mandates that a person or group that acquires, directly or indirectly, beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a class of registered equity securities must file a statement containing the information required by Schedule 13D with the SEC within 10 days of the acquisition (the Proposed Amendments shorten this deadline to within five days of the acquisition). A shareholder that has filed a Schedule 13D must promptly amend it whenever a material change occurs concerning the facts set forth in the filing. Any increase or decrease of 1% or more in such a shareholder’s ownership of the company’s equity securities constitutes a material change sufficient to warrant an amended Schedule 13D, which must be filed promptly after the triggering event (the Proposed Amendments require that the amendment be filed within one business day after the triggering event). Schedule 13D requires, among other things:
• a description of the identity and background of each filing person and each of its controlling persons and their respective directors and officers, including as to their occupations and criminal convictions or judgments in civil proceedings involving violations of securities laws;

• the purpose of the transaction and the plans that the acquiror may have for the subject company or for accumulating additional subject company securities;

• the source(s) and amount of funds used to acquire the securities;

• the percentage of the class of securities acquired (by the filing persons as well as by their controlling persons and their respective directors and officers);

• details about transactions in the subject company’s securities in the preceding 60 calendar days by the filing persons as well as by their controlling persons and their respective directors and officers (including the date of each transaction, the amount of securities involved, the price per share and where and how the transaction was effected); and

• the nature of any arrangements to which the acquiror is a party relating to the subject company’s securities.

In addition, ownership of derivative securities (such as options) may in certain circumstances constitute beneficial ownership of the securities upon which the derivatives are based, or otherwise require disclosure in a Schedule 13D. Even cash-settled instruments may raise Schedule 13D concerns (the Proposed Amendments would deem certain holders of cash-settled derivatives to have beneficial ownership to the reference equity securities, causing the derivatives position to be counted toward the reporting thresholds of Section 13(d)). Accordingly, if it is contemplated that a company will enter into any derivative transactions referenced to its shares at any time before or during the proposal or transaction process, it should be carefully discussed and the disclosure and other implications determined.

A person who would otherwise be required to file a Schedule 13D may in some cases file a Schedule 13G. Schedule 13G follows a similar format to Schedule 13D but requires the filer to provide less-detailed information. There are three general types of 13G filers: (i) passive investors, (ii) qualified institutional investors and (iii) exempt investors.

First, a shareholder may qualify as a “passive investor” under Rule 13d-1(c) if it is a beneficial owner of more than 5% but less than 20% of a covered class that can certify under Item 10 of Schedule 13G that the subject securities were not acquired or held for the purpose or effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer of such securities and were not acquired in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect. These investors are ineligible to report beneficial ownership pursuant to Rule 13d-1(b) or (d) but are eligible to report beneficial ownership on Schedule 13G in
A passive investor must file a Schedule 13G with the SEC within 10 days after becoming a 5% beneficial holder (the Proposed Amendments shorten this deadline to within five days after crossing such threshold) and must amend its Schedule 13G annually, and at times more frequently, upon certain changes to its beneficial ownership, including promptly upon such time as the passive investor exceeds 10% beneficial ownership or experiences a 5% increase or decrease in beneficial ownership (the Proposed Amendments would require filing an amendment in such cases within one business day).

Second, a shareholder may qualify as a “qualified institutional investor” under Rule 13d-1(b) where that person (i) acquired such securities in the ordinary course of its business and not with the purpose nor with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer, nor in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect, including any transaction subject to Rule 13d-3(b), (ii) is one of the qualified institutional investors enumerated in the rule, and (iii) promptly notified any other person (or group within the meaning of Section 13(d)(3) of the Exchange Act) on whose behalf it holds securities exceeding 5% of the class of any acquisition or transaction on behalf of such other person which might be reportable by that person under Section 13(d). This person must file Schedule 13G with the SEC within 45 days after the end of the calendar year in which the person became obligated to report under this rule (the Proposed Amendments instead require such person to file a Schedule 13G within five business days after the month-end in which the person became obligated to report under this rule), and must amend its Schedule 13G annually, and at times more frequently, although less frequently than a Rule 13d-1(c) passive investor, upon certain changes to its beneficial ownership, including within 10 days after the end of the month in which it exceeded 10% beneficial ownership or experiences a 5% increase or decrease in beneficial ownership (the Proposed Amendments would require filing of an amendment in such cases within five days).

Third, a shareholder may qualify as an “exempt investor” under Rule 13d-1(d) where that person beneficially owned 5% or more of a class of an issuer’s equity securities before the securities were registered under the Exchange Act. At the time the class of securities is registered, the person must file a Schedule 13G with the SEC within 45 days after the end of the calendar year in which the issuer’s shares were registered (the Proposed Amendments instead require such person to file their Schedule 13G with the SEC within five business days after the month-end in which the person became obligated to report under this rule). Thereafter, the person must amend its Schedule 13G annually upon certain changes to its beneficial ownership. In the event that the person acquires additional equity securities after the registration of the issuer’s securities, it must report its entire holdings on Schedule 13D if the most recent acquisition, when added to all other acquisitions of securities of the same class within the prior 12-month period, aggregates to more than 2% of the class of such securities.

Separate from the Section 13(d) and Section 13(g) requirements discussed above, Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act imposes reporting obligations on 10% shareholders (as well as directors and officers) of certain U.S. issuers, and also provides for disgorgement
by such persons of so-called “short-swing” profits. Rule 3a12-3 of the Exchange Act exempts FPIs from the entirety of Section 16.

In addition, shareholders of FPIs that are required to report under Section 15(d), as opposed to Sections 12(b) or 12(g), are not subject to the beneficial ownership reporting requirements of Sections 13(d) and 13(g). 124

D. Financial Statements

1. Accounting Standards

U.S. issuers are required to report audited financial statements prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP. As noted, however, the Exchange Act affords FPIs an important accommodation with respect to their audited financial statements on Form 20-F: FPIs generally have the option of reporting audited financial statements prepared in accordance with (i) U.S. GAAP, (ii) IFRS as issued by the IASB (in which case no reconciliation with U.S. GAAP is required) or (iii) home-jurisdiction generally accepted accounting principles accompanied with an indication of the body of comprehensive accounting principles used to prepare the financial statements and U.S. GAAP reconciliation disclosure. 125 Reconciliation comprises both disclosure of the material variations between local accounting principles/non-IASB IFRS, on the one hand, and U.S. GAAP, on the other hand, as well as a numerical quantification of those variations. 126 An FPI registering for the first time must reconcile only the two most recently completed fiscal years (and any interim period). 127

Pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC implemented Regulation G and amended Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K, which require a company releasing a non-GAAP financial measure to provide the most comparable GAAP measure and a quantitative reconciliation of the non-GAAP measure with the comparable GAAP measure. 128 For FPIs with financial statements prepared in accordance with non-U.S. GAAP, GAAP refers to the specific accounting principles of the country under which the financial statements are prepared; however, if an FPI calculates a non-GAAP measure derived from or based on a measure calculated in accordance with U.S. GAAP, then for purposes of the application of the non-GAAP rules, GAAP for that measure would be defined as U.S. GAAP. A non-GAAP financial measure that triggers the application of the rules is one that excludes amounts that would otherwise be included, or includes amounts that would otherwise be excluded, from the most directly comparable GAAP measure. 129 Regulation G applies to any public disclosure of material information, whether in writing or orally, while Regulation S-K Item 10(e) is limited to SEC filings.

Exceptions exist for each of the two rules. An FPI is exempt from Regulation G if (i) its securities are listed or quoted on a foreign stock exchange, (ii) the non-GAAP financial measure is not derived from or based on a measure calculated and presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP and (iii) the disclosure is made outside the United States. 130 The SEC has confirmed that the exception is available for information released by or on behalf of an FPI if (a) the information is released simultaneously both within and outside the United States (and is not otherwise targeted at persons located in the United States), (b) foreign or U.S. journalists or other third parties have access to the information, (c)
disclosures appear on one or more of a registrant’s websites so long as the websites are not targeted at or available exclusively to persons in the United States or (d) after disclosure of the information outside the United States, the information is included in a submission on Form 6-K in the United States.\(^{131}\) The references to GAAP in the FPI exemption from Regulation G refer to U.S. GAAP regardless of the accounting principles used in the primary financial statements.

Regulation S-K permits an FPI to use a non-GAAP financial measure in its SEC filings, without complying with the requirements of Item 10(e), if the measure (i) is required or expressly permitted by the standard-setter that establishes the GAAP principles used in the registrant’s primary financial statements and (ii) is included in the FPI’s annual report or financial statements used in its home-country jurisdiction.\(^{132}\) The SEC has stated that a measure is “expressly permitted” if “the particular measure is clearly and specifically identified as an acceptable measure by the standard setter that is responsible for establishing the GAAP used in the company’s primary financial statements included in its filing with the Commission.”\(^{133}\) However, note that the exemption described in this paragraph does not cover situations where the measure is merely not prohibited by the foreign standard-setter, but only applies where the standard-setter affirmatively acts to require or permit the measure.

2. Independent Audit

U.S. issuers and FPIs must have their financial statements and internal controls audited by an “independent” auditor under SEC rules. As a general matter, the SEC will not recognize an auditor as independent vis-à-vis an audit client if the auditor is not capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues encompassed within the auditor’s engagement. In determining whether or not this standard has been met, the SEC will consider all relevant circumstances, including all relationships between the accountant and the audit client, focusing on whether any such relationship: creates a mutual or conflicting interest between an auditor and the audit client, places an auditor in the position of auditing its own work, results in an auditor acting as management or as an employee of the audit client or places an auditor in a position of being an advocate of an audit client.

Audit committees, discussed in Sections VII.D.3 and VII.F.2 of this Guide, should be aware of and ensure that they or management have implemented appropriate policies and procedures to identify and evaluate such relationships and potential conflicts of interest.\(^{134}\) As part of the inquiry concerning an auditor’s independence, an audit committee should examine carefully the scope of work that the independent auditor has undertaken for the company and the value of that work to the auditor, including any related fees. An independent auditor also should be vetted carefully for any relationships that might be perceived as affecting its independence, such as the presence of its former employees, or relatives of its employees, on a company’s board or audit committee or among a company’s management or senior financial staff, as well as any financial or other business relationships between an independent auditor and a company or its officers, directors or substantial shareholders.
In addition to SEC rules concerning auditor independence, the PCAOB has adopted ethics and independence rules that require an audit firm to disclose in writing to the audit committee all relationships between the auditor and the company that, in the auditor’s professional judgment, may reasonably be thought to bear on its independence and to affirm to the audit committee that the auditor is independent.\textsuperscript{135}

Under Section 303 of Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC rules,\textsuperscript{136} directors and officers are prohibited from taking any action, direct or indirect, to coerce, manipulate, mislead or “fraudulently influence” any public accountant engaged in an audit of a company’s financial statements if they know or should have known that their action, if successful, could render the company’s financial statements false or materially misleading.

3. \textbf{Internal Controls}

In accordance with Sarbanes-Oxley, all public companies in the United States must have adequate internal controls over financial reporting: a process designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with proper accounting standards. This requirement aims to require an issuer to identify material weaknesses that have a reasonable possibility of leading to a material misstatement in the issuer’s financial statements.

Management is primarily responsible for designing and implementing internal controls. This includes establishing and maintaining adequate internal control structures and procedures for financial reporting, evaluating the effectiveness of internal controls at least annually, identifying in a timely manner weaknesses and deficiencies in internal controls, taking appropriate corrective actions where deficiencies or weaknesses exist and notifying the independent auditor and audit committee of significant internal control deficiencies and any acts of fraud.

Reflecting the importance of effective internal controls, Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC rules promulgated thereunder, applicable to both U.S. issuers and FPIs, require public companies to include in their annual reports both an assessment by management of the company’s internal control over financial reporting and an independent auditor’s attestation report on the company’s internal controls and financial reporting. Sarbanes-Oxley made clear that an independent auditor’s attestation under Section 404(b) must be based on the independent auditor’s own audit of the company’s internal controls. PCAOB AS 2201 prescribes the standards by which an independent auditor must conduct the Section 404(b) audit of a company’s internal control over financial reporting.

The audit committee should review the adequacy and effectiveness of a company’s internal controls over financial reporting, the process for monitoring compliance with applicable regulations and laws and any other legal matters that could have a significant impact on a company’s financial reports. In overseeing compliance with applicable laws and regulations and the integrity of the financial statements, the committee is encouraged to pay close attention to the compliance and internal controls environment generally. The U.S. Sentencing Commission, as well as the SEC, the DOJ and the PCAOB, have stressed
the singular importance in this area of management’s setting the right “tone at the top” and creating an organizational culture that encourages a commitment to compliance with law.

a. Reports on Internal Controls

Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC rules adopted thereunder require management to disclose on Form 10-K or, in the case of an FPI, Form 20-F, management’s involvement in and opinion regarding the effectiveness of the issuer’s internal control procedures, as well as a report and attestation by the issuer’s auditors. Also, if there will be disclosure that there have been material changes to internal controls over financial reporting during a quarter, the audit committee should inquire whether any significant deficiencies or material weaknesses underlying such changes are proposed to be specially disclosed, and, if it is determined that they will not be, ensure that this has been a properly considered decision and that there is a firm and reasonable basis for the decision not to disclose.

b. Disclosure Controls

In addition to financial accounting controls, issuers must assess their disclosure controls and procedures more generally, including procedures for good business and legal disclosure. While the SEC has not mandated any particular procedures, it recommends that issuers create a committee with responsibility for considering the materiality of information and determining disclosure obligations on a timely basis. The SEC has suggested that such a committee should include the principal accounting officer or controller, general counsel or other senior legal officer with responsibility for disclosure matters, principal risk management officer, chief investment relations officer and other officers or employees, including individuals associated with the issuer’s business units.137

c. Disclosure Certifications by the CEO and CFO

In addition to internal controls disclosure, Sarbanes-Oxley requires certifications from an issuer’s CEO and CFO under Sections 302 and 906. Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley, filed as exhibits to the relevant periodic report, requires a company’s CEO and CFO to certify in each quarterly and annual report or, in the case of an FPI, Form 20-F that, among other things:

- they have reviewed the report and, based on their knowledge, the report is not misleading;
- based on their knowledge, the financial statements and other financial information included in the report fairly present, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the company for the periods presented in the report;
- they are responsible for establishing and maintaining, and have performed certain specified tasks with respect to, the company’s internal controls and disclosure controls and procedures; and
• they have disclosed to the audit committee and auditors all significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
controls, as well as any fraud that involves management or other employees
with a significant role in the company’s internal controls.

The certification required by Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires that each
periodic report containing financial statements be accompanied by a statement by the
company’s CEO and CFO that (i) the report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act and (ii) the information contained in the report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the company. The “fairly presents” standard, since it excludes reference to any
accounting standard, encompasses the selection and proper application of accounting
principles, the disclosure of financial information that is informative and reasonably
reflects the underlying events and the inclusion of other information necessary to give
investors a materially complete picture of a company’s financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows. The CEO, CFO and any other company employees making
accounting or disclosure judgments must therefore base their decisions not only on the
accounting principles applicable to the company but also on the “fairly presents” standard.

The audit committee should take appropriate steps to satisfy itself that the
company’s CEO and CFO are meeting their obligations to the audit committee, the
independent auditor and the public under the certification requirements established by the
SEC, the company’s securities market and Sarbanes-Oxley.

E. Proxy Rules

Rule 3a12-3 under the Exchange Act exempts FPIs with registered securities from
the SEC’s proxy rules. An FPI may thus prepare and distribute proxy statements in
accordance with the law of its home jurisdiction rather than Schedule 14A. An FPI that
distributes its proxy statement to shareholders in accordance with home-jurisdiction rules,
however, may be required to furnish it under cover of Form 6-K.

F. Corporate Governance Obligations

Federal law and regulations, including the federal securities laws, Sarbanes-Oxley
and Dodd-Frank, and the rules of the U.S. securities exchanges, establish corporate
governance requirements. FPIs that trade on a U.S. securities exchange may receive
exemptions from these requirements in certain circumstances, particularly with regard to
director obligations and liabilities. Additionally, FPIs may be permitted to follow certain
corporate governance practices in accordance with their home-jurisdiction rules and
regulations.

1. Director Obligations and Liabilities

a. Transactions and Conflicts of Interests Involving Directors

Sarbanes-Oxley Section 402(a) added Section 13(k) to the Exchange Act, which
makes it unlawful for any issuer, including an FPI, directly or indirectly, including through
any subsidiary, to extend or maintain credit, to arrange for the extension of credit or to renew an extension of credit in the form of a personal loan to or for any of its directors or executive officers. Loans that are not prohibited include travel advances, cash advances and issuer-sponsored credit cards, provided that they are used only in the ordinary course of business, and, with respect to credit cards, the terms are not more favorable than the terms the issuer offers to the public. In addition, the prohibition has been interpreted as not applying to the advancement by the issuer of legal expenses to its directors and officers.

FPIs must disclose on Form 20-F any transactions or loans between the company and key management personnel, meaning those persons having authority and responsibility for planning, directing and controlling the activities of the company, including directors and senior management and members of such individuals’ close families. They also have to disclose any arrangement or understanding with major shareholders, customers, suppliers or others, pursuant to which any director or senior manager was selected as a director or member of senior management. In addition, FPIs must disclose any directors’ shareholdings in the FPI on Form 20-F.

b. Directors’ Dealings in Securities

The federal securities laws in the United States generally do not restrict a director’s ability to purchase or sell securities of a company that is publicly traded (whether a U.S. issuer or an FPI), other than the following:

- **Restrictions in relation to insider trading.** A director cannot trade in the company’s shares if he or she possesses material non-public information about the company.

- **Blackout Trading Restrictions** ("Regulation BTR"). Section 306 of Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits directors and executive officers from acquiring or transferring company equity securities during pension fund “blackout periods” imposed by the company itself or by a fiduciary of the company’s pension fund. Under Regulation BTR, if a director or officer is subject to such a blackout trading restriction, the issuer must timely notify each director or officer and the SEC of the blackout period and disclose the reasons for the blackout period.

- **Restrictions on public resale of securities that are considered “restricted” or “control” securities.** Restricted securities are securities acquired in unregistered, private sales from the issuer or from an affiliate of the issuer. Directors typically receive restricted securities through private placement offerings, Regulation D offerings or as compensation for professional services. Control securities are any securities held by an “affiliate” of the issuer (including directors, policymaking executive officers and potentially significant shareholders) – even if those securities are acquired on the public market. Public resale of restricted and control securities by directors is permitted only if certain conditions are met, including with respect to
holding periods, volume limitations and manner of sale, among other conditions.145

2. Sarbanes-Oxley

Sarbanes-Oxley was a significant revision to U.S. securities laws, focused on enhancing public disclosure, improving the quality and transparency of financial reporting and auditing and strengthening penalties for violations of securities laws. Sarbanes-Oxley provides that any violation of its provisions is considered a violation of the Exchange Act, thus availing the SEC of its full range of powers, remedies and penalties under the Exchange Act. Sarbanes-Oxley applies to all issuers, including FPIs, that have registered securities under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, that are required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act and that have filed a registration statement under the Securities Act that has not yet become effective or been withdrawn.

There are, however, exemptions from some Sarbanes-Oxley requirements for FPIs. Further, some Sarbanes-Oxley rules apply only to issuers with securities listed in the United States. The principal Sarbanes-Oxley requirements that apply to FPIs include the requirements set forth in Section VII.F.1 and the following:

- FPIs must generally include in their annual reports management’s report on internal controls, and an independent auditor must attest to, and report on, management’s assessment of internal controls.

- FPIs’ CEOs and CFOs must provide certifications on financial statements and internal controls in annual reports.

- FPIs must disclose “off-balance sheet arrangements,” a table of certain contractual obligations and a table of certain contingent liabilities and commitments in its SEC filings.

- FPIs’ CEOs and CFOs are subject to potential clawbacks of bonus, incentive-based compensation or equity-based compensation in the event of an accounting restatement due to material non-compliance with any financial reporting requirements due to misconduct, as well as any profits that the CEO or CFO realized based on the sale of the company’s securities during the previous 12 months.

- FPIs must disclose in their Form 20-F filings whether they have adopted a code of ethics that applies to certain of its executive officers, and, if not, must explain why they have not done so.

- Sarbanes-Oxley creates a series of requirements relating to the work of an FPI’s external auditors, e.g., that the auditor must be “independent,” requires disclosure of fees paid to such auditor, generally requires auditor registration in the United States, and forbids the provision of certain non-audit services by the auditor.
• FPIs must disclose that their boards of directors have determined whether or not they have one audit committee “financial expert,” and, if not, state why, and must disclose the name of the audit committee “financial expert” and whether such person is independent from management.

• FPIs with securities listed on an exchange must comply with certain audit committee standards, as discussed below. FPIs must generally maintain an audit committee composed solely of independent directors, although FPIs are granted certain exemptions from the “independence” requirements as well as a general exemption under Rule 10A-3(c). The audit committee must be granted certain responsibilities and authorities, such as oversight of auditors.

   a. Audit Committee Requirement and Exemptions for FPIs

The audit committee of an issuer’s board of directors plays a central role in the issuer’s corporate governance, which includes supervising management, overseeing the internal audit and ensuring adequate disclosure. Rule 10A-3, which implemented Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley, and which applies to issuers that are listed on the U.S. securities exchanges, requires each audit committee member to be a member of the listed issuer’s board and to otherwise meet certain independence requirements. Pursuant to the rule, the audit committee requirements include the following:

• Independence. All members of the audit committee must be independent from the issuer, which means, among other things, that they may not accept consulting, advisory or other compensatory fees from the issuer or any affiliate, or be an affiliate. Under the NYSE Listed Company Manual, a director does not qualify as independent unless the board affirmatively determines that the director has no material relationship with the company. Similarly, under Nasdaq rules, the board of directors must make a determination of which members or nominees are independent.

• Responsibilities relating to registered public accounting firms. The audit committee is responsible for the appointment, compensation, retention and oversight of external auditors and must have the authority to resolve disagreements between management and external auditors regarding financial reporting.

• Complaints. The audit committee must set up procedures for receipt, retention and treatment of complaints regarding accounting, internal accounting controls and auditing matters, including for confidential submissions by employees of the company.

• Authority to engage advisers. The audit committee must have the authority to engage independent counsel and advisers as it deems necessary.
- Funding. The audit committee must have adequate funding to compensate external auditors and advisers as well as to cover administrative expenses.

Rule 10A-3 grants FPIs limited exemptions from the independence requirement. The members of the audit committee may be exempt from such requirement in certain circumstances, including non-executive employee representation on the committee, two-tiered board systems, common in certain foreign jurisdictions, in which the committee is drawn from members of the supervisor/non-management board, representation of a controlling shareholder that owns more than 50% of the FPI’s voting securities and affiliated persons with only observer status and foreign government representation.\(^{148}\)

An FPI can therefore comply with the audit committee requirements by either:

- Forming an audit committee in full compliance with the standard requirements with at least three independent board members. The board of directors must approve the creation of the committee, the delegation of powers to the committee (to the extent permitted by the law of the home jurisdiction) and the committee’s charter, internal policies and procedures; or

- Under the general exemption for FPIs provided in Rule 10A-3(c)(3), using an existing board of auditors or similar body to perform the role of an audit committee, to the extent permitted by the law of the home jurisdiction. This exemption is available to FPIs, provided that:\(^{149}\)
  
  o the FPI has a board of auditors (or similar body), or statutory auditors, set up or selected under a law or listing requirement of the home jurisdiction that expressly requires or permits such a board or body;

  o the board of auditors is either (i) separate from the board of directors or (ii) composed of one or more members of the board of directors and one or more members who are not members of the board of directors;

  o the board of auditors is not elected by management and no executive officer of the FPI is a member of it;

  o local law stipulates standards for the board of auditors’ independence from management;

  o the board of auditors is responsible, to the extent permitted by local jurisdiction law, for the appointment, retention and oversight of the FPI’s independent auditors; and

  o the remaining requirements of an audit committee (\(i.e.,\) complaint procedures, authority to engage advisers and funding) are complied with to the extent permitted by the laws of the local jurisdiction.
An FPI relying on Rule 10A-3’s exemption from independence, or the general exemption under Rule 10A-3(c), will need to disclose on Form 20-F its reliance on the exemptions and an assessment of whether this reliance will materially adversely affect the audit committee’s ability to act independently and to satisfy any of the other requirements of Rule 10A-3.150 Moreover, while NYSE and Nasdaq rules applicable to U.S. issuers requiring at least one member of the audit committee to be a financial expert do not apply to an FPI, it is obligated to disclose on Forms 20-F whether it has at least one financial expert serving on its audit committees and, if so, the name(s) of the expert(s).151

3. Dodd-Frank

Signed into law in 2010 in response to the financial crisis, Dodd-Frank reformed numerous areas of U.S. securities regulation that affect public companies in the United States. It applies both to U.S. issuers and, in some cases, FPIs, and contains several key provisions affecting the corporate governance of such companies, including compensation committee disclosures, incentive-based compensation clawbacks and, as discussed in VII.B.5, conflict mineral disclosures.

a. Independent Compensation Committee

Rule 10C-1 of the Exchange Act, added pursuant to Section 10C of the Exchange Act and Section 952 of Dodd-Frank, directs U.S. securities exchanges to require (i) that each member of the compensation committee of a U.S. listed company be a member of the board and otherwise independent, (ii) that the compensation committee be given adequate funding and authority to retain compensation consultants, independent legal counsel, and other compensation advisors and (iii) compliance with independence considerations for all such advisors. In determining independence, Section 10(c)(a) requires the U.S. securities exchanges to consider certain factors, including the source of the director’s compensation (such as any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fees paid by the company) and whether the director is affiliated with the company or its subsidiary or affiliate. FPIs that disclose annually the reasons why they do not have an independent compensation committee in place are not subject to the independence requirements.152

Further, Form 20-F requires FPIs to disclose information about their compensation committee, including the names of the committee members and a summary of the terms under which the committee operates. Both the NYSE and Nasdaq permit an FPI to follow home-jurisdiction practices with respect to its compensation committee so long as the FPI discloses annually the differences between its home-jurisdiction practices and the applicable exchange requirements as well as, for Nasdaq, the reasons why it does not have an independent compensation committee in place.

b. Incentive-Based Compensation Clawback

Section 10D of the Exchange Act, added pursuant to Section 954 of Dodd-Frank, requires that the SEC direct U.S. securities exchanges to require listed issuers to develop and implement policies providing for the “clawback” of incentive-based compensation paid to current or former executive officers following a restatement due to the company’s material non-compliance with financial reporting requirements. Such policies must apply
to incentive-based compensation (including stock options) paid during the three-year period preceding the restatement and provide for recovery of the amount in excess of what otherwise would have been paid to the officer. The final compensation clawback rules were released by the SEC in October 2022.

Dodd-Frank, and Section 10D, furthers a trend in which compensation can be clawed back even though the officers in question were not directly involved in the actions that gave rise to the restatement. The SEC, for example, announced in 2011 a settlement in which it “clawed back” incentive-based compensation from a former CEO who was not accused of any wrongdoing. In that instance, the court rejected the notion that the misconduct-triggering clawback must be the officer’s own and focused instead on the misconduct of the company, acting through the efforts of its officers and employees.

The final compensation clawback rules apply broadly to all issuers with listed securities, including foreign private issuers, with limited exceptions. In the final rules, the SEC acknowledges that there are “practical concerns” regarding implementation of clawback policies for FPIs, but has included an impracticability accommodation to alleviate implementation challenges in the event that a clawback would be wholly inconsistent with a foreign regulatory regime. The impracticability exception is only available where (i) the direct cost of recovery would exceed the amount of recovery and (ii) the recovery would violate home country law and additional commitments are met, but the issuer must make a reasonable attempt to clawback the compensation before concluding that it would be impracticable to do so, and must obtain an opinion of home country counsel, acceptable to the applicable exchange, that recovery would result in a violation of home country law. Additionally, to minimize any incentives for foreign countries to change their laws in response to the final compensation clawback rules, any home country law which an issuer could point to as inconsistent would have to be passed prior to the date of the publication of the final compensation clawback rules in the Federal Register. The final rules became effective on January 27, 2023. Restatements are less common for FPIs than for U.S. issuers because IFRS and other foreign accounting principles often provide for adjustments of accounting errors in current periods under circumstances in which U.S. GAAP would require restatements, and the laws of some jurisdictions limit restatements.

4. Code of Ethics

An FPI must disclose on Form 20-F whether it has adopted a written code of ethics that applies to the company’s principal executive officer, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer or controller, or persons performing similar functions. A code of ethics is defined as written standards that are reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing and to promote honest and ethical conduct, full and accurate disclosure, compliance with applicable laws, prompt internal reporting of code violations and accountability for adherence to the code. The FPI must also describe the nature of any amendment to, or waiver of, any provision of the code. If the company has not adopted such a code, it must explain on its Form 20-F why it has not done so.
5. **NYSE and Nasdaq Corporate Governance Listing Standards**

The NYSE and Nasdaq impose rules and regulations governing audit committee composition and disclosures for companies that list on their exchanges, in addition to those under law. These rules apply to listed U.S. issuers and FPIs, although the securities exchanges offer certain accommodations for FPIs that allow them to follow home-jurisdiction corporate governance practices. Generally, FPIs must comply with the corporate governance standards of the relevant U.S. securities exchange or explain their departures from those standards. Under NYSE and Nasdaq “comply or explain” rules, and in response to certain SEC amendments to Form 20-F, FPIs must provide a concise summary of any significant ways in which their corporate governance practices differ from those followed by U.S. issuers under the relevant exchange rules.

**a. NYSE Corporate Governance Requirements**

The NYSE has granted substantial flexibility to listed FPIs by allowing them to follow their home-jurisdiction corporate governance practices rather than its standard corporate governance requirements as set forth in Rule 303A of the NYSE Listed Company Manual. There are exceptions to this accommodation, however, as FPIs must comply with the following:

- **Audit Committee.** Listed FPIs must have an audit committee that satisfies the requirements of Exchange Act Rule 10A-3, described in Section VII.F.2.a of this Guide.

- **Differences in Corporate Governance Practices.** Listed FPIs must disclose any significant ways in which their corporate governance practices differ from those followed by U.S. issuers under the NYSE listing standards. This disclosure may be provided either on the FPI’s website and/or in its annual report, provided that if disclosure is only provided on the website, the annual report must state so and provide the relevant web address for obtaining information.

- **Annual Certification Relating to Observance of Corporate Governance Standards.** The CEO of a listed FPI must certify to the NYSE each year that he or she is not aware of any violation of the NYSE corporate governance listing standards, qualifying the certification to the extent necessary. This certification must be disclosed in the FPI’s annual report to shareholders or, if the company does not prepare an annual report to shareholders, in the company’s annual report on Form 20-F filed with the SEC. In addition, the CEO of a listed FPI must promptly notify the NYSE in writing after any executive officer becomes aware of any material non-compliance with the applicable NYSE corporate governance standards.

**b. Nasdaq Corporate Governance Requirements**

The Nasdaq corporate governance rules also permit FPIs to follow home-jurisdiction practices (except for notification of non-compliance pursuant to Listing
Rule 5625, the voting rights requirement pursuant to Listing Rule 5640, and the audit committee rules under Listing Rule 5605(c)(3)) in lieu of certain Nasdaq corporate governance requirements, but only if the issuer promptly informs Nasdaq of such departure, as necessary, and provides a letter from outside counsel in the FPI’s home country certifying that the FPI’s practices are not prohibited by any home-jurisdiction law. Each Nasdaq requirement that an FPI does not follow must also be disclosed in the FPI’s annual report on Form 20-F, along with a description of the alternative corporate governance practices followed by the issuer. As with NYSE-listed companies, all Nasdaq-listed companies must comply with the audit committee requirements of Exchange Act Rule 10A-3.

c. NYSE and Nasdaq Shareholder Approval Requirements

The NYSE’s rules do not expressly exempt FPIs from its 20% shareholder vote rule, which, subject to certain exceptions, requires an issuer to obtain shareholder approval prior to issuances where the issued common shares equal 20% or more of the number of common shares or voting power outstanding before such issuance. The NYSE, however, will orally confirm to an FPI upon request at the time of a contemplated issuance that it is not required to comply with the rule so long as the FPI provided as part of its original listing application an opinion from local counsel certifying that a shareholder vote is not required under the laws of its home jurisdiction for such an issuance.

Nasdaq allows FPIs to follow their home-jurisdiction rules instead of its own 20% rule where they promptly inform Nasdaq, provide Nasdaq with an opinion from local counsel certifying that their practices do not violate the laws of their home jurisdictions, state in the annual Form 20-F that they are not complying with the 20% rule and explain the home-jurisdiction practices with which they are complying.

G. Delisting and Deregistering Securities

As with U.S. companies, FPIs that wish to cease having reporting and other obligations under the Exchange Act—that is, to “go dark”—may delist their securities from a U.S. securities exchange, if previously listed, and deregister their securities under the Exchange Act. Once this happens, an issuer is no longer subject to the applicable U.S. securities exchange’s rules or the Exchange Act obligations, including the obligations under Sarbanes-Oxley.

As described in Section VII.A of this Guide, a company, including an FPI, incurs obligations under the Exchange Act in any of the following three ways: (i) by listing securities on a U.S. securities exchange under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act; (ii) by surpassing a specific asset size and shareholder count under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act (unless it is then exempt under Rule 12g3-2); or (iii) by registering an offering under the Securities Act, under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act. To “go dark,” the registrant must terminate or suspend its obligations under each applicable Exchange Act section.
1. Delisting and Deregistration under Section 12(b)

To delist and deregister under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act, an issuer must first delist from each U.S. securities exchange on which it is listed and file a Form 25 with the SEC.\textsuperscript{157} At least 10 days before filing a Form 25, an issuer must notify each such exchange in writing of its intent to file a Form 25 and issue a press release, also posted to the issuer’s website, that it intends to delist and deregister, including its reasons therefor. Form 25 is automatically effective, as is the issuer’s delisting, 10 days after the Form 25 is filed; the issuer’s deregistration is effective 90 days after filing. When a Form 25 becomes effective, the issuer’s reporting obligations under Section 13(a) are suspended, meaning the issuer need not file current or periodic reports due on or after such effectiveness, unless the issuer is required to continue reporting pursuant to Sections 12(g) or 15(d).

Certain obligations, however, continue to apply to the FPI until its deregistration is effective (specifically, for FPIs, the tender offer rules and Sections 13(d) and 13(g)).

2. Termination of Obligations under Sections 12(g) and 15(d)

When an issuer delists and deregisters under Section 12(b), it may still have obligations under Sections 12(g) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act. FPIs have two main paths for addressing these obligations:

- terminate obligations under both sections pursuant to Rule 12h-6; or
- (a) terminate obligations under Section 12(g) pursuant to Rule 12g-4 and (b) suspend obligations under Section 15(d) either pursuant to Rule 12h-3 or pursuant to Section 15(d) itself.

These paths are discussed in turn below.

a. Rule 12h-6

The SEC adopted Rule 12h-6 in 2007 to facilitate Exchange Act deregistration by FPIs. An FPI would be able to terminate its obligations under Sections 12(g) and 15(d) by filing a Form 15F if it meets the following conditions:

- the FPI has had reporting obligations under the Exchange Act for at least 12 months preceding the Form 15F filing, and has filed at least one annual report on Form 20-F;
- the FPI’s securities have not been sold in the United States in a registered offering during the 12 months preceding the Form 15F filing, subject to certain exceptions; and
- the FPI has maintained a listing of its securities on one or more non-U.S. exchanges that, either singly or together with the trading in another jurisdiction, constitutes a “primary trading market,” as defined above, for the securities.
In addition to the three requirements above, the FPI must also certify that it passes at least one of the following two tests:

- **The trading volume test.** During the 12 months prior to the Form 15F filing, the average U.S. daily trading volume of its securities was less than or equal to 5% of the average daily trading volume of its securities worldwide; or

- **The record holder test.** On a date within 120 days before the Form 15F filing, there were fewer than 300 holders of record of the securities (either worldwide or in the United States).

An FPI must wait at least 12 months to file Form 15F in reliance on the Trading Volume Test (as opposed to the Record Holder Test) if it has delisted a class of equity securities from a U.S. securities exchange or terminated a sponsored ADR facility and at the time of delisting or termination the U.S. average daily trading volume of the applicable securities exceeded 5% of the worldwide average daily trading volume for the preceding 12 months. In addition, for purposes of the Record Holder Test, U.S. holders are counted using the method in Rule 12g3-2(a) (described above in Section VII.A of this Guide), except that the obligation to “look through” record ownership of the brokers, dealers, banks and nominees is limited to those in the United States and certain foreign jurisdictions.

Upon filing of the Form 15F, the FPI’s duty to file reports is suspended. Termination of registration under Section 12(g) and of the duty to file reports under Section 15(d) is effective 90 days after filing.

**b. Termination of Section 12(g) Obligations Pursuant to Rule 12g-4**

If Rule 12h-6 is unavailable, an FPI may seek to rely on Rule 12g-4, which is available to all issuers (both U.S. issuers and FPIs). To terminate registration under Section 12(g) pursuant to Rule 12g-4, the FPI must file a Form 15 certifying that its securities are held of record by fewer than 300 holders (or 500 holders if the company’s total assets have not exceeded $10 million as of the last day of its last three fiscal years). Unlike Rules 12g3-2(a) and 12h-6, for purposes of Rule 12g-4, securities held in street name by a broker-dealer are held of record only by the broker-dealer.158

An issuer cannot file a Form 15 after delisting and deregistering under Section 12(b) until the Form 25 is effective (i.e., 10 days after the Form 25 is filed). Upon filing of the Form 15, the issuer’s duty to file reports is suspended. Termination of registration under Section 12(g) is effective 90 days after filing.

An FPI that terminates its registration under Section 12(g) pursuant to Rule 12g-4 may then need to claim the exemption under Rule 12g3-2(b), in case the number of record holders of its securities later rises above the applicable threshold.
c. **Suspension of Section 15(d) Obligations**

If Rule 12h-6 is not available to terminate Section 15(d) obligations, there are two avenues for suspension of Section 15(d) reporting obligations, which are generally available for all issuers (both U.S. issuers and FPIs):

- the first is automatic—the issuer’s reporting obligations are suspended for any fiscal year if its securities are held by fewer than 300 record holders at the beginning of that fiscal year; and

- the second is available at any time, but requires the issuer to file a Form 15 pursuant to Rule 12h-3 (making the same certifications described above in the discussion of Rule 12g-4 with respect to the number of shareholders). As with deregistration under Section 12(g), the issuer’s reporting obligations under Section 15(d) would be suspended immediately upon filing the Form 15. Unlike deregistration under Section 12(g), however, a condition to filing a Form 15 to suspend Section 15(d) reporting obligations is that the issuer be current in all of its Section 13(a) reporting obligations.

Note that reporting obligations under Section 15(d) may only be suspended, not terminated, because they automatically retake effect with respect to a given fiscal year if there are more than 300 holders of record on the first day of that fiscal year. The number of record holders is counted in the same manner as for purposes of Rule 12g-4, discussed above.
VIII.

Sources of Liability

The Securities Act and the Exchange Act each impose liability on issuers, including FPIs, that run afoul of U.S. federal securities laws. The key provisions of these laws that create potential liability are Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, which create liability for intentionally false and misleading statements that impact trading in securities, and Sections 11, 12 and 17 of the Securities Act, which create liability for issuers and others in connection with public offerings. The SEC and, in certain cases, private parties and the DOJ, may bring actions against parties who violate these provisions of the U.S. securities laws.

These liability provisions adopt the general disclosure philosophy of the U.S. federal securities laws: with few exceptions, each provision requires only fair disclosure. Accordingly, while affirmative misrepresentations may lead to liability, “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading” under the U.S. federal securities laws. Liability based on the omission of information remains possible, however, if a duty to disclose exists under applicable law (such as an SEC disclosure regulation), or if a party makes voluntary, but incomplete, statements regarding a particular subject.

The U.S. federal securities laws limit liability to material misrepresentation or disclosure. A fact is material if there is “a substantial likelihood” that it would be “viewed by the reasonable investor” as “significantly alter[ing] the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” Although questions of materiality are typically decided on a case-by-case basis, based on a thorough factual record, courts have developed some general principles that allow the materiality question to be resolved as a matter of law. For example, statements in a corporate code of business conduct have been found to be “‘inherently aspirational,’” “not capable of objective verification,” and therefore not actionable under the U.S. securities laws, in part because “[a] contrary interpretation . . . could turn all corporate wrongdoing into securities fraud.”

In addition to the provisions in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the FCPA imposes anti-bribery and other obligations on issuers, with substantial potential penalties for non-compliance, and other federal legislation, including Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, has imposed additional obligations on issuers, increased potential penalties for violations and expanded enforcement authorities of federal agencies.

A. SEC Actions and Private Litigation

The SEC enforces the U.S. federal securities laws through either civil proceedings in U.S. courts or administrative proceedings before administrative law judges ("ALJs"). The SEC’s Division of Enforcement (the “Division”) conducts investigations and recommends that the SEC bring charges, as appropriate. The Division also prosecutes cases on behalf of the SEC and works with U.S. and non-U.S. law enforcement agencies with regard to criminal proceedings. The Division’s investigations involve informal inquiries, interviews with witnesses and reviews of brokerage records and trading data,
among other methods. When it obtains a formal order of investigation, the Division may subpoena witnesses to testify and produce books, records and other documentation. When an investigation is complete, the Division presents its findings to the SEC, which can authorize the Division to file a case, either in federal district court or before an ALJ, settle the matter before trial or take no action.

Civil actions and administrative proceedings differ both in process and possible sanctions or remedies. In civil actions in U.S. courts, the SEC files a complaint with a district court and asks the court for specific sanctions or remedies, which often include injunctions to prevent further acts or practices that violate the U.S. federal securities laws, civil money penalties, disgorgement of profits and/or barring an individual from serving as a corporate officer or director for a certain period of time. In administrative proceedings, ALJs preside over hearings at which the SEC and the charged individual(s) present evidence. ALJs issue initial decisions, which include findings of fact, legal conclusions and sanctions or remedies. Any party may appeal such initial decisions by ALJs to the SEC, which may affirm, reverse or remand the decision for additional hearings, and final orders from the SEC are subject to a further appeal to a U.S. appellate court. Sanctions and remedies available in administrative hearings include cease-and-desist orders, suspension or revocation of broker-dealer and investment advisor registrations, censures, bars from association with the securities industry, bars from serving as an officer or director of a public company, civil money penalties and/or disgorgement of profits.

Any violation of a provision of the U.S. securities laws can give rise to criminal liability if the facts and circumstances are sufficiently egregious. The SEC may refer such violations to the DOJ for criminal prosecution, and the DOJ also opens investigations at its own initiative. Any person who willfully violates the Securities Act or any of the rules promulgated thereunder can be sentenced to up to five years in prison and fined up to $10,000. Willful violations of the Exchange Act or the rules thereunder carry sentences of up to 20 years in prison and fines of up to $5 million. Companies that violate the Exchange Act may be subject to a $25 million criminal penalty. Companies can also face civil monetary penalties of similar magnitude in SEC enforcement actions.

Private parties may also be able to bring actions in U.S. courts for violations of the securities laws. As the Supreme Court has explained, there are in total “eight express liability provisions” in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act: Sections 9, 16, 18, 20 and 20A of the Exchange Act and Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities Act.164

Other private rights of action have been implied by the courts. For example, and most importantly, although the Exchange Act is silent as to whether private parties can sue for violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, courts have long recognized a private right of action under Rule 10b-5. In 1983, the Supreme Court, acceding to the significant extent of case law that developed over the years in the lower courts, recognized a private right of action under Rule 10b-5.165

The Supreme Court has also recognized an implied private right of action under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act (governing proxy solicitations),166 and other federal
courts have recognized an implied private right of action under Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act (governing tender offers).\textsuperscript{167}

B. The Liability Provisions of the Securities Act and Exchange Act

1. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act

Among the most significant provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws are Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Section 10(b) forbids the use of any “manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” in contravention of rules prescribed by the SEC “in connection with the purchase or sale” of any security. Rule 10b-5, in turn, prohibits using “any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,” making material misstatements or omissions or engaging in “any act, practice or course of business” that would “operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person” “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” Establishing a violation of Rule 10b-5 requires proof of scienter: that the defendant acted with an “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”\textsuperscript{168}

In general, to prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must prove (i) made a false statement or an omission of material fact, (ii) with scienter, (iii) in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (iv) upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied and (v) which proximately caused (vi) the plaintiff’s economic loss.\textsuperscript{169}

Under Rule 10b-5, therefore, an issuer and its employees may be liable for disseminating false or misleading information or suppressing material information about the issuer that was required to be disclosed, whether or not the issuer or any of its employees purchased or sold any securities; rather, it is enough that their conduct occurred “in connection with” purchases or sales of securities by others. Rule 10b-5 liability can be based on information filed in a registration statement or in a report filed with the SEC (including on Form 6-K), or upon public statements issued by the company. Another Exchange Act provision, Rule 12b-20, requires that public filings contain such “material information . . . as may be necessary to make the required statements, in light of the circumstances under which they are made not misleading,” and does not require the SEC to prove that the issuer engaged in fraud or recklessness tantamount to fraud as would be required under Rule 10b-5.\textsuperscript{170} All issuers should therefore carefully review their press releases and other public information prior to release.

Liability may also arise under Rule 10b-5 from “insider” trading in securities while material information remains undisclosed. Insiders should not trade when a material event (including a proposed financing or acquisition) is developing but is not yet ripe for disclosure. A corporate insider also may be held liable on an insider trading theory for the actions of persons to whom he or she discloses material nonpublic information and who then trade on that information, even though the insider has not personally profited.\textsuperscript{171} FPIs should thus avoid selective disclosure of material nonpublic information out of concern for potential liability under Rule 10b-5.

As noted, issuers, including FPIs, that violate Rule 10b-5 may be liable to private parties and subject to federal enforcement action and, where such violation is willful, criminal liability. Investors can sue issuers, as well as their directors and officers, in federal court under Rule 10b-5 to recover losses sustained as a result of the issuer’s materially
misleading statements or omissions made with scienter. U.S. courts allow investors to bring class-action claims under Rule 10b-5, which means that an issuer can be liable to thousands of investors for a single misstatement or omission. In the majority of cases that advance beyond the pleadings stage, issuers ultimately reach a settlement with class-action plaintiffs’ attorneys instead of taking a case to trial. From 2009 to 2018, the median size across all 537 class-action settlements in Rule 10b-5-only cases in the United States was $8.2 million.\(^{172}\) Settlements in several notable cases, however, have been significantly higher, including Tyco International Ltd. ($3.7 billion), AOL Time Warner, Inc. ($2.7 billion), Nortel Networks ($2.3 billion) and Royal Ahold ($1.1 billion).

Of particular importance to FPIs, in 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a ruling in *Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.* that limited the liability of FPIs under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.\(^ {173}\) The *Morrison* Court held that these provisions do not apply unless the allegedly fraudulent conduct occurred “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, [or] the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.”\(^ {174}\) Although *Morrison* itself involved non-U.S. investors, courts have subsequently extended its holding to cases involving U.S. investors as well.\(^ {175}\)

Under *Morrison*, it is clear that securities transactions that occur on a U.S. exchange will be subject to the U.S. securities laws, and that transactions that occur on foreign exchanges will not.\(^ {176}\) This means that purchases or sales of ADRs which are listed on a U.S. exchange will be subject to the U.S. securities laws. But what about securities transactions that do not take place on an exchange, such as purchases or sales of unsponsored ADRs? As a general rule, courts applying *Morrison* have held that triggering application of the U.S. securities laws requires the plaintiff to “allege facts suggesting that [1] irrevocable liability was incurred or [2] title was transferred within the United States.”\(^ {177}\) Applying this rule in a recent case, a court held that a U.S. investor had failed to establish that its purchase of unsponsored ADRs on an over-the-counter market took place in the United States, as required by *Morrison*.\(^ {178}\)

Dodd-Frank was intended to partly overrule *Morrison* by allowing the SEC and the DOJ to bring actions under Rule 10b-5 (as well as other antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws) against FPIs, even when an issuer’s shares are not listed on a U.S. securities exchange. But whether that statute successfully did so remains an open question.\(^ {179}\)

Rule 10b-5 can be enforced by the SEC in injunctive and civil penalty actions, brought pursuant to Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act, and by the DOJ in actions brought pursuant to Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act, for willful violations of that Act. Similarly, remedies available in private actions under Rule 10b-5 include injunctive relief as well as damages.\(^ {180}\) The Supreme Court has stated that the correct measure of damages under Rule 10b-5 for a defrauded seller or purchaser is the “out-of-pocket” measure, which is the difference between the price paid or received and the true value at the time of purchase (in the absence of fraudulent conduct).\(^ {181}\) It is universally accepted that punitive damages may not be awarded under Rule 10b-5.\(^ {182}\) The PSLRA adopted a further cap on damages in an attempt to account for any “bounce-back” in a security’s price after full or corrective disclosure is made.
2. Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act

Sections 11 and 12 are the basic private liability provisions of the Securities Act. In contrast with Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act, neither Section 11 nor Section 12 requires a plaintiff to prove scienter (that is, fraudulent intent). In fact, as discussed below, both provisions impose strict liability on issuers who make material misstatements or omit material information that was required to be disclosed.

In keeping with the general scheme of the Securities Act, Sections 11 and 12 protect buyers but not sellers. The difference between the two sections is this: Section 11 makes those responsible for a false or misleading registration statement liable in damages to any and all purchasers regardless of from whom they bought (provided that the purchaser can trace his or her shares to the defective registration statement), while Section 12 allows a purchaser to rescind his or her purchase of securities, or to get damages from his or her seller if he or she no longer holds the securities, if the seller used a false or misleading prospectus or false or misleading oral statements in making the sale. Section 11 deals with the “manufacturers” and “wholesalers” of securities (i.e., issuers, underwriters and experts who aid them in preparing registration statements), has no privity requirement and provides a remedy in damages. Section 12, on the other hand, deals with “retailers” of securities (i.e., the securities dealers who sell to the general public), requires privity (except for issuers in primary offerings selling through underwriters) and provides primarily for a rescission remedy.

A purchaser may not rescind or recover damages from a seller under Section 12 and recover damages from an issuer, underwriter or their advisors under Section 11. Yet nothing prevents a litigant from pursuing actions under both Sections 11 and 12 to judgment and then electing his or her remedy.

a. Section 11 of the Securities Act

Section 11 provides that any person who purchases a security covered by a registration statement has a private right of action, if at the time the registration statement became effective it contained any untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. The potential defendants under Section 11 include (i) the issuer, (ii) every person who signed the registration statement (i.e., the directors and certain executive officers of the registrant), (iii) every person named, with his or her consent, in the registration statement as being or about to become a director, (iv) every expert, such as an accountant, engineer or appraiser, who has with his or her consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement and (v) every underwriter of the security. All of the above, except experts, are responsible for all misstatements and omissions in the registration statement. Experts are responsible for misstatements and omissions only in those parts of the registration statement they are named as having prepared or certified.183

As noted above, unlike under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff under Section 11 need not establish a defendant’s scienter, or even negligence, to prove his or her case.184 Section 11 imposes strict liability as the baseline standard: it generally is enough if the registration
statement is shown to have contained material misstatements or omissions. Moreover, a purchaser who wishes to bring an action under Section 11 need not have purchased the securities in question in the initial offering. So long as the purchaser can trace the securities to a registration statement that contained a material misstatement or omission when it went effective, and is within the statute of limitations, the purchaser may sue.

Moreover, Section 11(a) provides that a person who purchases securities after an earning statement covering a period of at least 12 months beginning after the effective date of the registration statement has been made available must prove that he or she acquired the securities in reliance on a materially false or misleading statement in the registration statement to have a right of recovery under Section 11. Yet such person need not show that he or she read the registration statement to prove reliance on it. A Form 20-F may constitute an “earnings statement” for purposes of this provision.

Under Section 11, the issuer is strictly liable for material deficiencies in the registration statement irrespective of good faith or the exercise of due diligence. By contrast, the standard of liability imposed upon directors, officers and underwriters is somewhat less stringent, as a “due diligence” defense is available to all non-issuer defendants. A non-issuer defendant who is not designated as an expert may establish this defense by proving (i) with regard to parts of the registration statement based either on official reports or statements or on the reports or statements of experts (such as financial statements to the extent certified by independent public accountants), that he or she had no reason to believe that such statements or reports were false or misleading or were inaccurately represented in the registration statement and (ii) with regard to other parts of the registration statement, that he or she conducted a reasonable investigation, and that, after such investigation, he or she had reasonable grounds for believing, and did believe, that the registration statement was neither false nor misleading. Section 11(c) sets the standard of reasonableness for non-experts as that required of a prudent person in the management of his or her own property.

Thus, officers, directors and underwriters must exercise due diligence with respect to the preparation of the registration statement. They may not avoid liability by relying solely upon counsel or some other person to prepare the registration statement. If the issuer has made provision for the indemnification of its officers and directors, these arrangements must be disclosed in the registration statement. Any indemnification by the issuer of the underwriters or their controlling persons against liability under the securities laws must also be disclosed in the prospectus.

The primary remedy under Section 11 is money damages. Section 11(e) provides that the plaintiff may recover damages representing the decline in value of the plaintiff’s securities, measured as the difference between the amount paid for the securities (not exceeding the price at which the securities were offered to the public) and (i) the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought, (ii) the price at which such securities were sold in the market before suit or (iii) the price at which such securities were sold after suit but before judgment if such damages were less than the damages representing the difference between the amount paid for the securities (not exceeding the price at which the securities were offered to the public) and the value thereof as of the time such suit was
b. Section 12 of the Securities Act

Section 12(a)(2) provides that the purchaser of a security has a right of action for rescission or damages against the person who offered or sold the security to him or her by means of any prospectus or oral communication containing a material misstatement or omission (unless the purchaser was aware of the misstatement or omission). Liability can be based on a prospectus other than that required under Section 5 of the Securities Act. Any offering circular will do. And unlike Section 11, which applies only to securities subject to the requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act, Section 12(a)(2) applies to all securities except those exempted from the Securities Act by Section 3(a)(2).

The Supreme Court has held that Section 12(a)(2) does not apply to a private contract for a secondary market sale of securities. That decision left unclear the applicability of Section 12(a)(2) to private placement offerings, but a number of courts have subsequently held that the section does not apply to offerings made by means of a private placement memorandum. Moreover, the Second Circuit has held that a Section 12(a)(2) action cannot be maintained by a plaintiff who acquires securities through a private transaction even where the marketing of the securities relied on a prospectus prepared for a public offering.

As noted, Section 12(a)(2) does not require the plaintiff to prove scienter or negligence: a person who sells securities in violation of the registration provisions of the Securities Act is strictly liable. Thus, a plaintiff who proves that his or her seller made materially false or misleading statements or used a materially false or misleading prospectus, and that the plaintiff had no knowledge of any such untruth or omission, has established his or her case under Section 12(a)(2). Section 12(a)(2), however, provides sellers with a “due diligence” defense: the seller is not liable if he or she can prove that “he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission.” The effect of this defense is to turn Section 12(a)(2) into a negligence statute, with the burden on defendants to prove lack of negligence.

Like Section 11, Section 12(a)(2) also provides a “negative loss causation” affirmative defense. Specifically, the PSLRA added Section 12(b) of the Securities Act, which provides that if a person “proves that any portion or all of the amount recoverable under subsection [12](a)(2) of this section represents other than the depreciation in value of the subject security resulting from such part of the prospectus or oral communication . . . not being true or omitting to state a material fact . . . then such portion or amount . . . shall not be recoverable.” Consequently, “[a] Section 12 defendant is liable only for
depreciation that results directly from the misrepresentation at issue." The defendant bears the burden of showing this absence of loss causation.

In contrast to Section 11, the primary remedy provided by Section 12 is rescission, whereby a plaintiff tenders his or her securities to the defendant and receives his or her purchase price, with interest, in return. Interest is computed at what the court deems an equitable rate. But there are several wrinkles. First, where the plaintiff has received income (i.e., dividends or interest) on his or her securities, this income is subtracted from the purchase price in determining what he or she will get upon tendering his or her shares. Second, where the plaintiff has, before the filing of suit, disposed of the relevant securities, and thus cannot rescind the sale, he or she may recover damages, measured as the difference between the purchase price and the disposal price of the securities, plus interest, and less any income from the security received by the plaintiff. Of course, where the defendant is a person from whom the plaintiff did not receive title, such as a broker (to the extent a broker can be held liable under Section 12), the result of the Section 12 remedy is not rescission, strictly speaking, although it will be the equivalent to the plaintiff.

3. Section 17 of the Securities Act

Section 17 is the general antifraud provision of the Securities Act. It governs all sales, not just those that are part of a public offering. Sections 17(a)(1), (2) and (3), respectively, prohibit use of any means of interstate commerce (a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, (b) to obtain money or property by means of material misstatements or omissions or (c) to engage in any course of business that would operate as a fraud upon a purchaser. In keeping with the general scheme of the Securities Act, Section 17 protects only purchasers and operates only against sellers, unlike Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, which operates against both purchasers and sellers. The Supreme Court has emphasized that each of Section 17(a)(1), (2) and (3) contain different prohibitions, to be interpreted separately.

As previously discussed, Section 17 does not expressly create a private right of action, and, as noted, the lower U.S. courts have generally concluded that no private right of action should be implied from that provision. Section 17 has therefore been important primarily in actions brought by the SEC pursuant to Section 20(b) of the Securities Act, which authorizes the SEC to seek injunctions against violations of the Securities Act, and in criminal actions brought by the DOJ pursuant to Section 24 of the Securities Act, which imposes criminal liability for willful violations of that Act.

While Section 17 is textually similar to Rule 10b-5, the scope of the conduct that it reaches is broader in significant ways. Most notably, the Supreme Court has held that proof of negligence will suffice under Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3); scienter is not required, as it is under Rule 10b-5 (and Section 17(a)(1)). The result is that if an action can be framed under Section 17(a)(2) or (3)—as virtually any action against a seller under Section 10(b) or Section 17(a)(1) can be—it can be tried by the SEC under a negligence, rather than a scienter, standard. Another distinction between Section 17(a) and Section 10(b) is that “Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply to acts committed in connection with a purchase or sale of securities while Section 17(a) applies to acts committed in
connection with an offer or sale of securities.” As a result, “Section 17(a)’s proscription extends beyond consummated transactions.”

The majority view is that punitive damages are not available under Section 17(a). Disgorgement is available, however, and often sought in SEC enforcement actions. “In order to be entitled to disgorgement, the SEC needs to produce only a reasonable approximation of the defendant’s ill-gotten gains.” In addition, under its general civil penalty authority, the SEC can seek monetary penalties when it charges violations of Section 17(a).

4. **Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act**

As noted above, Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act is a general antifraud provision applicable to tender offers. In April 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that in the tender offer context, Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act does not require scienter for violation, but rather a lower standard of negligence. This ruling arose in the context of a buyout of a public company by tender offer, where a shareholder class action alleged that the failure by the target to include a summary of its investment bank’s comparable transaction premium analysis was a material omission that violated Section 14(e). By contrast, the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have held that Section 14(e) requires a showing of scienter. In January 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the Ninth Circuit holding and its deviation from the holdings of the other circuits, but the Supreme Court subsequently vacated that grant, and therefore did not address the merits.

5. **Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank**

Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank made several changes to liability under the federal securities laws, including enhancing the SEC’s powers and creating new criminal provisions. Specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley: (i) gave the SEC the authority to freeze possible “extraordinary payments” to directors, officers, agents and employees during the course of an investigation involving “possible” violations of the U.S. federal securities laws; (ii) gave the SEC the authority to bar persons from serving as directors or officers of public companies in cease-and-desist proceedings; (iii) created a new securities fraud crime with respect to public companies that does not contain a purchase or sale requirement, and simply prohibits knowingly defrauding any person (or attempting to do so) in connection with any security of an issuer, with violators subject to fines and imprisonment of up to 25 years; (iv) imposed fines of up to $5 million and prison terms of up to 10 years for CEOs and CFOs who knowingly make false certifications of the accuracy of SEC-filed financial reports (20 years in the case of willfully false certifications); (v) increased maximum prison terms for mail and wire fraud and violations of the Exchange Act; and (vi) enacted a broad new “anti-shredding” prohibition and sweeping new obstruction of justice offenses not limited to document destruction.

Dodd-Frank also: (i) granted the SEC the power to impose civil penalties on persons or companies (or their directors, officers or employees) for violations of the Securities Act and Exchange Act through out-of-court actions before ALJs; (ii) provided federal courts with jurisdiction to hear cases brought by the SEC or other agencies of the
U.S. government under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and Exchange Act that involve either (a) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of a violation of those provisions, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only non-U.S. investors or (b) conduct outside the United States, if that conduct would have a foreseeable substantial effect in the United States;210 (iii) established that persons who “knowingly” or “recklessly” provide substantial assistance to conduct that violates the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act or Exchange Act can be criminally or civilly liable for such conduct; and (iv) extended the statute of limitations for criminal violations of the Securities Act and Exchange Act from five years to six years.

C. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

The FCPA, which amended the Exchange Act, imposes requirements relating to company records and internal controls (the “Accounting Provisions”) and generally prohibits corrupt payments to non-U.S. officials for the purpose of obtaining or keeping business (the “Anti-Bribery Provisions”). Issuers, including FPIs, will be subject to both the Accounting Provisions and the Anti-Bribery Provisions if they have a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act or are required to file periodic reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act. In addition, the Anti-Bribery Provisions would apply to the issuer’s officers, directors, employees and agents, and shareholders acting on behalf of the issuer.

FCPA violations can result in significant fines and penalties. A company can be criminally fined up to $2 million per violation of the Anti-Bribery Provisions; culpable individuals can be subject to a criminal fine of up to $250,000 per violation and imprisonment for up to five years. Willful violations of the Accounting Provisions can result in a criminal fine of up to $25 million for a company; culpable individuals can be subject to a criminal fine of up to $5 million as well as imprisonment for up to 20 years. Fines can be even higher in certain circumstances, depending on the gain or loss resulting from the violation, and fines imposed on an individual may not be paid by his or her employer. In addition, the SEC is able to seek civil monetary penalties in similar amounts, as well as disgorgement of a company’s profits on contracts secured with improper payments, plus interest.

U.S. enforcement authorities have charged and prosecuted an increased number of foreign individuals and companies for FCPA violations over the last several years, with payments to U.S. authorities ranging from the hundreds of thousands to nearly half a billion dollars. Recent FCPA enforcement actions involving FPIs include the below:

- In 2022, a Switzerland-based automation company was ordered to pay more than $460 million to U.S. authorities to settle criminal and civil charges arising out of a bribery scheme in South Africa, where company executives had colluded with a high-ranking government official at a state-owned enterprise in South Africa to funnel bribes to third-party service providers.211
In 2022, the second-largest airline in Brazil agreed to pay over $160 million to the SEC, the DOJ and Brazilian authorities to resolve anti-bribery, books and records, internal accounting controls and other related charges for its involvement in a bribery scheme orchestrated by a senior executive.\textsuperscript{212}

In 2022, a Luxembourg-based global manufacturer agreed to pay more than $78 million to resolve charges that it violated the anti-bribery, books and records, and accounting controls provisions of the FCPA in connection with a bribery scheme involving its Brazilian subsidiary.\textsuperscript{213}

In 2021, an investment bank agreed to pay nearly $100 million to settle charges that it violated the anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws, as well as the internal accounting controls provisions of the FCPA, in connection with its role in three financial transactions on behalf of Mozambican state-owned entities.\textsuperscript{214}

In 2021, a separate investment bank agreed to pay more than $43 million to settle charges that it violated the books and records and internal accounting controls provisions of the FCPA in connection with improper payments to intermediaries in China, the UAE, Italy and Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{215}

In 2021, the former chief executive officer of a Brazilian petrochemical company which was an FPI was sentenced to 20 months in prison for a scheme to pay bribes to Brazilian government officials in violation of the FCPA; he was also ordered to forfeit $2.2 million and pay a $1 million fine.\textsuperscript{216}

In 2018, the SEC settled FCPA charges against a real estate broker in New Jersey for his attempt to bribe a foreign official in the Middle East on behalf of an FPI as part of an effort to broker the sale of a commercial building in Vietnam, in exchange for the broker forfeiting $225,000 in fees.\textsuperscript{217}

D. Director Personal Liability and Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance

The risk of personal liability under the federal securities laws is very slight when directors act conscientiously. Put simply, a director who performs his or her duties in good faith is unlikely to be found liable for losses suffered by reason of such performance.

While Sarbanes-Oxley signaled toughness by substantially increasing criminal penalties for securities fraud and by creating a criminal offense of knowingly executing, or attempting to execute, a scheme to defraud shareholders of public companies, as well as by prohibiting loans to directors and coercion of auditors (violations of which could result in SEC enforcement actions), it did not otherwise change the elements of civil liability under the securities laws or create new rights of civil actions for which directors may be liable.
The SEC has on occasion signaled a more rigorous enforcement posture. In 2013, the SEC announced the creation of a “Financial Reporting and Audit Task Force,” the purpose of which was to expand the SEC’s efforts to identify securities law violations relating to the preparation of financial statements, issuer reporting and disclosure, and audit failures. In 2022, the SEC notably imposed a $100 million penalty—the largest penalty ever imposed by the SEC against an audit firm—on Ernst & Young LLP for, and the accounting firm agreed to undertake extensive remedial measures to address, cheating by its audit professionals on exams required to obtain and maintain Certified Public Accountant licenses, and charged other auditors for auditing and internal controls improprieties. Numerous recent SEC enforcement actions have underscored the SEC’s focus on financial statements and issuer reporting, including in situations that do not involve fraud or material misstatements.

Companies should, and generally do, protect directors and officers against the risk of personal liability for their services to the company by: (i) exculpating directors and officers where permissible; (ii) indemnifying directors and officers to the fullest extent permitted by law; and (iii) purchasing directors’ and officers’ insurance (“D&O Insurance”), including Side A-only D&O Insurance to help cover non-indemnifiable claims.

Companies should seek advice from professionals to ensure that the company has appropriately tailored, and sufficiently broad, exculpation and indemnification provisions for directors and officers. In addition, companies should seek guidance from specialized D&O Insurance professionals to help ensure that the types and amounts of D&O Insurance purchased are consistent with industry benchmarks and the company’s risk profile. The nature and extent of D&O Insurance coverage is always a matter requiring reference to the particular policy language since such policies can vary in material ways. In particular, it is important for directors and officers and their counsel to understand the parameters of the D&O Insurance coverage, with a focus on the following provisions: policy period; any prior acts dates (i.e., dates before which conduct may be excluded); policy limits; retention (or self-insurance) amounts; policy exclusions; severability of knowledge/wrongful acts and policy rescission; and the general scope of policy coverage for typical claims and corporate investigations.

If a company is in a precarious financial position, it is particularly important to ensure that a company’s D&O Insurance policy has appropriate protections for directors and officers in the event of a bankruptcy filing. In addition, in such situations, Side A-only D&O Insurance coverage—which covers directors and officers only, in contrast to Side ABC policies, which cover both the company and the individual directors and officers—can be a critical tool to help protect directors and officers.

E. Liability of Controlling Shareholders

Controlling shareholders can be held secondarily liable for primary violations of the securities laws under Section 15 of the Securities Act or Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. Despite differences in wording, Section 15 of the Securities Act and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act have always been interpreted as parallel statutes. Section 15 imposes
secondary liability on controlling persons for primary liabilities of controlled persons under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act. Section 20(a) imposes secondary liability on controlling persons for primary liabilities of controlled persons under any provision of the Exchange Act or any regulation promulgated thereunder. Because Sections 15 and 20(a) are secondary liability provisions, establishing a primary violation is a prerequisite for liability under both sections, yet the controlled person need not be joined in an action under either one.222

“Control” is defined in the Securities Act as “the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise,”223 yet determining exactly who meets this standard requires a case-by-case assessment. Certainly controlling shareholders, directors and even lenders can be controlling persons, provided they have the power or potential power to influence the activities of the controlled person.224 Circuits remain split as to whether a plaintiff must establish that the defendant was a “culpable participant” in the alleged violation to qualify as a “controlling person” under these sections. Furthermore, neither section contains any scienter, or even negligence, requirement. But Section 15 states that the controlling person is not liable if he or she had no knowledge or reason to know the facts that establish the liability of the controlled person. Section 20(a) states that the controlling person is not liable if he or she acted in good faith and did not induce the acts on which the liability of the controlled person is founded. Courts have uniformly held that these are affirmative defenses to be pleaded and proved by defendants.225 Courts adopting the “culpable participant” standard, however, require plaintiffs to prove some culpability as part of a prima facie case before the burden of proving good faith shifts to the defendant.

A controlling person liable under Section 15 or 20(a) is jointly and severally liable for any damages for which the controlled person is liable. Thus, the measure of damages that can be assessed against a controlling person under these sections varies with the underlying claims or possible claims against the controlled person.

F. Whistleblowing Procedures and Up-the-Ladder Reporting

Sarbanes-Oxley amended Exchange Act Section 10A and added Section 1514A to the United States Code to require that audit committees establish “whistleblowing” procedures for the confidential submission of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters, as well as “up-the-ladder” reporting. This provision applies to both U.S. issuers and FPIs. Whistleblowing procedures must include procedures for receiving, treating and retaining any complaints received by an issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls or auditing matters. An issuer may, for example, permanently appoint a business practices officer to investigate complaints and report directly to the audit committee. FPIs must be careful to design their retention and other whistleblowing procedures so they comply with labor and local data protection laws and guidelines. If found to have taken retaliatory action against employee whistleblowers, public issuers are subject to civil and, in certain circumstances, criminal liability. In addition, whistleblowers are given protections against wrongful dismissal by their employers, including rights to reinstatement, back pay and damages.
Up-the-ladder reporting requires attorneys who appear and practice before the SEC in the representation of issuers that file periodic reports with the SEC who become aware of evidence of a material violation of U.S. law that has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, by the issuer or by an officer, director, employee or agent of the issuer, to report that violation internally to the issuer’s chief legal officer (“CLO”) forthwith and to determine whether an appropriate response has been made. In some cases, further reports to the board of directors or audit committee may be required or permitted. A CLO who receives such a report must then conduct an inquiry. If the CLO determines that no material violation has occurred, is ongoing or is about to occur, the reporting attorney must be so advised. Unless the CLO reasonably believes no material violation has occurred, is ongoing or is about to occur, he or she must take all reasonable steps to cause the issuer to adopt an appropriate response and advise the reporting attorney of the response. As an alternative to this procedure, an attorney may notify the qualified legal compliance committee, if the issuer has previously formed such a committee. Only the SEC may enforce requirements regarding attorneys representing issuers; that is, a private cause of action may not be brought. And a “non-appearing foreign attorney” does not “appear and practice” before the SEC for purposes of the rules.226
IX.

Appendix A

[See attached]
CROSS-BORDER M&A – 2024 CHECKLIST FOR SUCCESSFUL ACQUISITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

M&A activity in 2023 was subdued relative to recent record-setting volumes. Globally, M&A volume was $2.9 trillion in 2023, compared to $3.6 trillion in 2022, $6.4 trillion in 2021 and an average of $4.5 trillion annually over the prior ten years (in 2023 dollars). In the first part of the year, persistent inflation weighed on macroeconomic sentiment and many forecasters predicted a recession in the United States in 2023. The steepest monetary tightening in decades destabilized regional banks and continued to chill financing markets. At the same time, an aggressive antitrust agenda in the United States deterred dealmakers from pursuing transactions that posed risks of a significant delay or litigation with the government.

Despite the challenges confronting dealmakers in 2023, promising signals of a potential recovery in M&A activity emerged at the end of the year. The U.S. economy avoided recession in 2023, the current rate-hike cycle appears to be nearing its end and several significant transactions were completed after withstanding regulatory scrutiny, including Broadcom’s $69 billion acquisition of VMware and Microsoft’s $69 billion acquisition of Activision Blizzard.

As during the recent M&A boom, cross-border M&A continued to provide attractive opportunities to dealmakers in 2023, another indicator that M&A was cyclically muted but not fundamentally disrupted over the last year. Cross-border deals were 33% ($950 billion) of global M&A in 2023, consistent with the average proportion over the prior ten years (35%). Acquisitions of U.S. companies by non-U.S. acquirors were $165 billion in transaction volume and represented 6% of 2023 global M&A volume and 17% of 2023 cross-border M&A volume. Canadian, Irish, French, Swiss and British acquirors accounted for 42% of the volume of cross-border acquisitions of U.S. targets, while acquirors from China, India and other emerging economies accounted for about 9%.

We expect cross-border transactions into the United States to continue to offer compelling opportunities in 2024. Transacting parties will do better if they are well-prepared for the cultural, political, regulatory and technical complexity inherent in cross-border deals. Advance preparation, strategic implementation and deal structures calibrated to likely concerns are critically important. Now, more than ever, thoughtful regulatory strategy and creative financing approaches deserve special focus.

The following is our updated checklist of matters that should be carefully considered in advance of an acquisition or strategic investment in the United States. Because each cross-border deal is unique, the relative significance of the issues discussed below will depend upon the specific facts, circumstances and dynamics of each particular situation. There is no one-size-fits-all roadmap to success.
• **Political and Regulatory Considerations.** A high percentage of investment into the United States will be well-received and not politicized. However, a variety of global economic fault lines continue to make it critically important that prospective non-U.S. acquirors of U.S. businesses or assets undertake a thoughtful analysis of U.S. political and regulatory implications well in advance of any acquisition proposal or program. This is particularly so if the target company operates in a sensitive industry; if post-transaction business plans contemplate major changes in investment, employment or business strategy; or if the acquiror is sponsored or financed by a foreign government or organized in a jurisdiction where a high level of government involvement in business is generally understood to exist. High-profile transactions may result in political scrutiny by federal, state and local officials. The likely concerns of government agencies, employees, customers, suppliers, communities and other interested parties should be thoroughly considered and, if practical, addressed before any acquisition or investment proposal becomes public. Anticipation of these concerns is especially important in light of the increasingly widespread acceptance in the United States of stakeholder governance and the ongoing relevance of ESG principles to shareholders and companies alike. Planning for these issues is made all the more complex in the current political climate, in which debates about corporate purpose, stakeholder considerations and ESG factors in corporate decision-making have become politicized.

Similarly, potential regulatory hurdles require sophisticated advance planning. In addition to securities and antitrust regulations, acquisitions may be subject to CFIUS review, and acquisitions in regulated industries (e.g., energy, public utilities, gaming, insurance, telecommunications and media, financial institutions, transportation and defense contracting) may be subject to an additional set of regulatory approvals. Regulation in these areas is often complex, and political opponents, reluctant targets and competitors may seize upon perceived weaknesses in an acquiror’s ability to clear regulatory obstacles as a tactic to undermine a proposed transaction. Finally, depending on the industry involved, the type of transaction and the geographic distribution of the workforce, labor unions may play an active role during the entirety of the process. Pre-announcement communications plans must take account of all of these interests. It is essential to implement a comprehensive communications strategy prior to the announcement of a transaction, focusing not only on public investors but also on all other core constituencies so that the relevant constituencies may be addressed with appropriately tailored messages. It will often be useful, if not essential, to involve experienced public relations advisors at an early stage when planning any potentially sensitive deal.

• **CFIUS.** The scope and impact of regulatory scrutiny of foreign investments in the United States by CFIUS has expanded significantly over the last decade, particularly following passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) in 2018, and a series of implementing rules adopted by the U.S. Department of Treasury. As FIRRMA has been implemented, the role
of CFIUS and the need to factor the risks and timing of the CFIUS review process into deal analysis and planning has been further heightened. Although notification of most transactions remains voluntary, FIRRMMA introduced mandatory notification requirements for certain transactions, including investments in U.S. businesses associated with critical technologies, critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens where a foreign government has a “substantial interest” (e.g., 49% or more) in the acquiror. Critical technology and critical infrastructure are broad and flexible concepts, and FIRRMMA includes in that rubric “emerging and foundational technologies” used in computer storage, semiconductors and telecommunications equipment sectors and critical infrastructure in a variety of sectors. Supply chain vulnerabilities during the pandemic also increased the likelihood that investments in U.S. healthcare, pharma and biotech companies will be closely reviewed by CFIUS.

For example, as evidenced by CFIUS’ opposition in 2021 to South Korean chip maker Magnachip Semiconductor Corp.’s merger with Wise Road Capital Ltd., a Chinese private equity firm, CFIUS will take an expansive view of its jurisdiction when semiconductor supply, even involving non-military applications, is at stake. CFIUS had “called in” the transaction for its review even though the transacting parties indicated that they had no U.S. nexus except for being incorporated in Delaware, having a Delaware subsidiary, and being listed on the NYSE, with any de minimis sales into the United States only occurring through third-party distributors and resellers. Magnachip’s 2020 annual report, however, indicated that it had a facility in San Jose, California, which it used for “administration, sales and marketing and research and development functions,” that had been closed only in September 2020. A notable aspect of the deal was CFIUS’ issuance in June 2021 of an interim order preventing Wise Road from completing the acquisition of Magnachip pending its review of the transaction. While FIRRMMA gave CFIUS the authority to prevent consummation of a transaction pending its review, CFIUS has rarely used that authority. In abandoning the transaction, Magnachip cited its inability to obtain CFIUS’ approval for the merger. Companies operating overseas with even a limited nexus to the United States need to undertake CFIUS due diligence before engaging in a transaction in sectors that may involve core national security areas of interest.

Personal data is also a key area of scrutiny for CFIUS. Most recent enforcement actions involved concerns about Chinese investors’ access to sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens. CFIUS enforcement in these sectors is likely to continue, as is a focus on domestic supply chain security to ensure that neither the United States nor its allies will be dependent on critical supplies from certain nations, including China. At the same time, the United States is likely to remain open to foreign investment, even in the national security sector. Most foreign investment will still be cleared, although it may get close review and possibly require mitigation actions, especially to the extent involving intellectual property, personal data, and cutting-edge or emerging technologies. While notification of a foreign investment to CFIUS remains largely voluntary, transactions that are not reviewed pre-closing remain subject to potential CFIUS review in perpetuity.
Thus, conducting a risk assessment for inbound transactions or investment early in the process is prudent to determine whether the investment will require a mandatory filing or may attract CFIUS attention. Parties may wish to take advantage of the “declarations” process, which provides expedited review for transactions that present little or no significant risk to U.S. national security. Parties should also agree on their overall CFIUS strategy and consider the appropriate allocation of risk as well as timing considerations in light of possibly prolonged CFIUS review.

- **Antitrust Issues.** The U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies have had an aggressive enforcement agenda. Recently enacted federal legislation provides for significant increases in the budgets of these agencies. The scope of issues being reviewed in strategic transactions has expanded, and may result in delay and further efforts being required by the parties to get the deal cleared as quickly as possible. Although most enforcement continues to involve situations in which a non-U.S. acquiror directly or indirectly competes or holds an interest in a company that competes in the same industry as the target company, antitrust concerns may also arise if a non-U.S. acquiror operates either in an upstream or downstream market of the target. In addition, a new law, when implemented, will require companies to disclose information regarding subsidies they receive from a “foreign entity of concern.” Such foreign entities include, among other things, countries determined by the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, “to be engaged in unauthorized conduct that is detrimental to the national security or foreign policy of the United States.” China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are among the countries currently identified as “foreign entities of concern.” Pursuant to the new law, the federal antitrust agencies, in consultation with other government agencies, will promulgate rules that specify the information that affected parties must include in their HSR filings and when such changes will take effect. Once effective, filing parties should expect increased scrutiny of any disclosed foreign subsidies, even if such subsidies are unrelated to the transaction being notified.

For a vast majority of transactions, the ultimate outcomes of transactions remain predictable and achievable without the need for remedies or litigation. Even in transactions that raise concerns, careful planning and a proactive approach to engagement with the agencies can facilitate getting the deal through.

For those transactions that raise antitrust concerns, parties should be prepared to deal with the U.S. antitrust agencies’ strong preference for (1) divestitures in lieu of conduct remedies that require ongoing oversight to ensure compliance and (2) acquirors of the divestiture assets to be approved prior to closing rather than permitting divestiture acquirors to be identified by the parties and approved by the agency after closing. Also, the agencies have shown a greater willingness to refuse to engage in remedies discussions in some transactions, and transacting parties should be prepared to litigate, possibly with a remedy in place that resolves any concerns that the court may find justified. In all transactions, pre-closing integration efforts should be conducted with sensitivity to antitrust requirements.
that can be limiting. Home jurisdiction or other foreign competition laws may raise their own sets of issues that should be carefully analyzed with counsel.

- **Debt Financing.** In the first half of 2023, borrowers deferred new debt deals, delayed planned refinanccings and paused major corporate transactions while waiting for interest rates to top out. In the second half of the year, inflation slowed and deal activity picked up. With the exception of high-yield bond issuance, which increased $65 billion from the 13-year low of 2022, investment-grade bond and leveraged loan issuance remained muted compared to the boom year of 2021.

Direct lenders sought to deploy capital in transactions with companies of all types and sizes, including public borrowers, and began to take aim at investment-grade issuers (though investment-grade financing remains almost entirely the purview of the traditional markets). At the same time, banks began expanding into the private credit space through partnerships or in-house private credit vehicles.

High interest rates drove an increase in “debt default activism,” or debtholders deploying legal arguments to force borrowers to refinance existing low-rate debt on market-rate terms. To guard against such challenges, borrowers should think of their long-term, low-coupon debt as a valuable asset that must be tended carefully. In assessing corporate transactions, borrowers should build a record with defense in mind. Further, as the conditionality in acquisition agreements has generally tightened, acquirers with buyer’s remorse are searching for new ways to force a renegotiation or termination of pending acquisition agreements. Sellers, buyers and their respective counsel should strive for as much specificity and clarity as possible when negotiating these covenants to ensure that the parties’ expectations and needs are met while limiting the chances for opportunistic assertions or interpretations.

- **Transaction Structures.** Non-U.S. acquirors should consider a variety of potential transaction structures, particularly in strategically or politically sensitive transactions. Structures that may be helpful in sensitive situations to overcome potential political or regulatory resistance include no-governance and low-governance investments, minority positions or joint ventures, possibly with the right to increase ownership or governance rights over time; partnering with a U.S. company or management team or collaborating with a U.S. source of financing or co-investor (such as a private equity firm); utilizing a controlled or partly controlled U.S. acquisition vehicle, possibly with a board of directors having a substantial number of U.S. citizens and prominent U.S. citizens in high-profile roles; or implementing bespoke governance structures (such as a U.S. proxy board) with respect to specific sensitive subsidiaries or businesses of the target company. Use of debt or preferred securities (rather than common stock) should also be considered. Even seemingly more modest social issues, such as the name of the continuing enterprise and its corporate location or headquarters, or the choice of the nominal legal acquiror in a merger, can affect the perspective of government and labor officials.
• **Acquisition Currency.** All-cash transactions represented 51% by value of cross-border deals into the United States in 2023 (below the average of 55% over the prior five years). However, non-U.S. acquirors should also think creatively about potential avenues for offering U.S. target shareholders a security that allows them to participate in the resulting global enterprise. For example, publicly listed acquirors may consider offering existing common stock or depositary receipts (e.g., ADRs) or special securities (e.g., contingent value rights). If U.S. target shareholders are to obtain a continuing interest in a surviving corporation that is not already publicly listed in the United States, non-U.S. acquirors should expect heightened focus on the corporate governance and other ownership and structural arrangements of the non-U.S. acquiror, including as to the presence of any controlling or large shareholders, and heightened scrutiny placed on any de facto controllers or promoters. Creative structures, such as issuing non-voting stock or other special securities of a non-U.S. acquiror, may minimize or mitigate the issues raised by U.S. corporate governance concerns. Equity markets have never been more global, and investors’ appetite for geographic diversity never greater; equity consideration, or an equity issuance to support a transaction, should be considered in appropriate circumstances.

• **M&A Practice.** It is essential to understand the custom and practice of U.S. M&A transactions. For instance, understanding when to respect—and when to challenge—a target’s sale “process” may be critical. Knowing how and at what price level to enter the discussions will often determine the success or failure of a proposal; in some situations it is prudent to start with an offer on the low side, while in other situations offering a full price at the outset may be essential to achieving a negotiated deal and discouraging competitors, including those who might raise political or regulatory issues. In strategically or politically sensitive transactions, hostile maneuvers may be imprudent; in other cases, unsolicited pressure might be the only way to force a transaction. Takeover regulations in the United States differ in many significant respects from those in non-U.S. jurisdictions; for example, the mandatory bid concept common in Europe, India and other countries is not present in U.S. practice. Permissible deal protection structures, pricing requirements and defensive measures available to U.S. targets will also likely differ in meaningful ways from what non-U.S. acquirors are accustomed to in their home jurisdictions. Sensitivity must also be shown to the distinct contours of the target board’s fiduciary duties and decision-making obligations under state law. Consideration also may need to be given to the concerns of the U.S. target’s management team and employees critical to the success of the venture. Finally, often overlooked in cross-border situations is how subtle differences in language, communication expectations and the role of different transaction participants can affect transactions and discussions; preparation and engagement during a transaction must take this into account.

• **U.S. Board Practice and Custom.** Where the target is a U.S. public company, the customs and formalities surrounding board of director participation in the M&A process, including the participation of legal and financial advisors, the provision of customary fairness opinions and the inquiry and analysis surrounding the activities...
of the board and financial advisors, can be unfamiliar and potentially confusing to non-U.S. transaction participants and can lead to misunderstandings that threaten to upset delicate transaction negotiations. Non-U.S. participants must be well advised on the role of U.S. public company boards and the legal, regulatory and litigation framework and risks that can constrain or proscribe board or management action. These factors can impact both tactics and timing of M&A processes and the nature of communications with the target company.

- **Shareholder Approval.** Because most U.S. public companies do not have one or more controlling shareholders, public shareholder approval is typically a key consideration in U.S. transactions. Understanding in advance the roles of arbitrageurs, hedge funds, institutional investors, private equity funds, proxy voting advisors and other market players—and their likely views of the anticipated acquisition attempt as well as when they appear and disappear from the scene—can be pivotal to the success or failure of the transaction. These considerations may also influence certain of the substantive terms of the transaction documents. It is advisable to retain an experienced proxy solicitation firm well before the shareholder meeting to vote on the transaction (and sometimes prior to the announcement of a deal) to implement an effective strategy to obtain shareholder approval.

- **Litigation.** Shareholder litigation continues to accompany many transactions involving a U.S. public company, but is generally no cause for concern. Excluding situations involving competing bids—where litigation may play a direct role in the contest—and going-private or other “conflict” transactions initiated by controlling shareholders or management—which form a separate category requiring special care and planning—there are very few examples of major acquisitions of U.S. public companies being blocked or even delayed due to shareholder litigation or of materially increased costs being imposed on arm’s-length acquirors. In most cases, where a transaction has been properly planned and implemented with the benefit of appropriate legal and investment banking advice on both sides, such litigation can be dismissed or settled for relatively small amounts or non-financial “therapeutic” concessions. Sophisticated counsel can usually predict the likely range of litigation outcomes or settlement costs, which should be viewed as a cost of the deal.

While careful planning can substantially reduce the risk of U.S. shareholder litigation, the reverse is also true: the conduct of the parties during negotiations, if not responsibly planned in light of background legal principles, can create an unattractive factual record that may both encourage shareholder litigation and provoke judicial rebuke, including significant monetary judgments. Sophisticated litigation counsel should be included in key stages of the deal negotiation process. In all cases, the acquiror, its directors and shareholders and offshore regulators should be conditioned in advance (to the extent possible) to expect litigation in the United States and not to view it as a sign of trouble. In addition, it is important to understand that the U.S. discovery process in litigation is different, and often more intrusive, than the process in other jurisdictions. Here again, planning is key to reducing the risk. Turning back a high-profile litigation campaign by the plaintiffs’
bar, the New York courts recently made clear that deal-related fiduciary duty claims not arising under U.S. law should generally not proceed in the U.S. These rulings provide welcome comfort that U.S. courts will refuse to export their expansive discovery and procedural rules in the mine run of situations.

The pandemic reinforced the importance of merger agreement provisions governing the choice of law and the choice of forum in the event of disputes between the parties—particularly disputes in which one party may seek to avoid the obligation to consummate the transaction. In *Travelport Ltd v. Wex*, for example, the English High Court interpreted the material adverse effect provisions of the parties’ agreement under English law in a manner that surprised many U.S. observers. Similarly, in separate decisions examining whether and when a party can exit a merger agreement because the counterparty breached its interim operating covenants, the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario reached a different result than the Delaware courts. These disputes, reflecting the transactional disruption occasioned by the pandemic, have taught again an important lesson: cross-border transaction planners should consider the courts and laws that will address a potential dispute and consider with care whether to specify the remedies available for breach of the transaction documents and the mechanisms for obtaining or resisting such remedies.

**Tax Considerations.** Understanding the U.S. and non-U.S. tax issues affecting target shareholders and the combined group is critical to structuring any cross-border transaction. In transactions involving the receipt of acquiror stock, the identity of the acquiring entity must be considered carefully. Although some of the U.S. tax law changes enacted in 2017 (e.g., 21% corporate income tax rate and deduction for dividends received from non-U.S. subsidiaries) have ameliorated certain of the adverse tax consequences traditionally associated with being U.S.-parented, others remain or have been exacerbated (e.g., continued application of “controlled foreign corporation” (CFC) rules to non-U.S. subsidiaries and expansion of such rules to provide for minimum taxation of CFC earnings (GILTI)). Where feasible, it often remains preferable for the combined group to be non-U.S.-parented, although this determination requires careful modeling, taking into account the potential application of recently enacted U.S. and non-U.S. minimum taxes, as well as adjustments to certain U.S. tax rates currently scheduled to occur in 2026 (e.g., increase in GILTI and BEAT tax rates and reduction of the deduction for foreign-derived intangible income). In transactions involving an exchange of U.S. target stock for non-U.S. acquiror stock, the potential application of “anti-inversion” rules—which could render an otherwise tax-free transaction taxable to exchanging U.S. target shareholders and could result in significant adverse U.S. tax consequences to the combined group—must be evaluated carefully. Combining under a non-U.S. parent corporation frequently is feasible only where shareholders of the U.S. corporation are deemed to receive less than 60% of the stock of the non-U.S. parent corporation, as determined under complex computational rules.

The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 introduced a 15% corporate alternative minimum tax (CAMT) on the “adjusted financial statement income” of certain
large corporations effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 2022. The CAMT generally applies to corporations with average annual adjusted financial statement income over a three-year period in excess of $1 billion (but a lower $100 million threshold applies to U.S. corporations that are members of a non-U.S.-parented group that satisfies the $1 billion threshold). The introduction of a parallel set of U.S. minimum tax rules—with broad regulatory authority for the Treasury Department to “carry out the purposes” of the tax—added significant complexity for large taxpayers, and IRS guidance on numerous topics remains to be issued. While the CAMT shares certain features with the global minimum tax rules under the OECD’s “Pillar Two” rules (which impose a 15% minimum tax on the book income of certain large multinational enterprises and will be effective in many jurisdictions as of January 1, 2024), numerous differences give rise to complex coordination issues and may lead to double taxation.

Potential acquirors of U.S. businesses should carefully model the anticipated tax rate of the combined business, taking into account the CAMT and Pillar Two taxes (if applicable), limitations on the deductibility of net interest expense and related-party payments, and limitations on the utilization of net operating losses, as well as the consequences of owning non-U.S. subsidiaries through an intermediate U.S. entity. Such modeling requires a detailed understanding of existing and planned related-party transactions and payments involving the combined group.

- **Employee Compensation and Benefits Matters.** In the acquisition of a U.S. company, employee compensation and benefits arrangements require careful review as part of the diligence process and are often a key element of deal-related negotiations. Because both existing compensation arrangements and new arrangements that the target company seeks to implement in connection with a transaction may have a material impact on retention of target employees (and, therefore, the successful post-closing operation of the target’s business) and may have significant associated costs, close coordination among the corporate development, finance, human resources and legal teams at the acquiror, the acquiror’s investment bankers, and the acquiror’s external transaction counsel is critical in order to ensure that all elements are properly accounted for in the valuation analysis, transaction terms and integration plan.

In particular, equity incentive compensation is an area that requires significant focus as it is highly utilized at U.S. companies and, though the practices vary depending on whether a company is publicly traded or privately held, the sector in which it operates, the size of its employee population and other relevant factors, it would not be uncommon for equity awards to represent 10% or more of a company’s fully diluted equity value and for such awards to be held by a substantial percentage of the employee population. Consequently, outstanding equity awards will need to be addressed at multiple stages of the deal process, including accounting for awards in the valuation analysis and purchase price negotiations, establishment of parameters for grants of incremental equity awards between signing and closing, and inclusion of provisions regarding treatment of all
outstanding equity awards in the transaction agreement (which treatment must be consistent with the contractual terms of the awards).

Additionally, acquirors should be mindful that, because U.S. employment laws are generally less prescriptive on compensation and benefit matters than the laws of many other jurisdictions, some matters that are covered by applicable law outside the United States are generally negotiated on a bespoke basis in U.S. transactions. For example, it is customary in U.S. transaction agreements to include a covenant requiring that the acquiror maintain compensation and benefits for target company employees at specified levels (generally linked to either pre-closing levels or levels applicable to similarly situated acquiror employees) for a specified period of time following the closing (generally 12 months). While this covenant is not individually enforceable by target company employees as a contractual matter, it is a specific indication of the acquiror’s intended treatment of target employees and, because the terms of the covenant are communicated to employees, a failure of the acquiror to comply with the covenant would have significant consequences both as to employee satisfaction and retention at the target company and more broadly for the acquiror’s reputation when entering into future transactions. Another example is that, in the United States, severance benefits are generally a matter of contract rather than statute, and negotiation of specific severance protections for target employees—generally in the form of a commitment from the acquiror to maintain existing severance protections or to allow the target company to implement new or enhanced protections in advance of closing—is common.

Another area that requires careful analysis and planning in U.S. acquisitions is the potential adverse tax consequences—for both target companies and executives—imposed under Sections 280G and 4999 of the U.S. tax code. Together, these provisions result in a dual penalty, consisting of a loss of federal income tax deduction for the company and a 20% excise tax for the executive, on change-in-control related payments and benefits payable to certain officers and other highly compensated employees of a corporation undergoing a change in control to the extent that the value of such payments and benefits exceeds a threshold calculated based on average historic compensation paid by the corporation to the applicable individual. Consequently, in general, a calculation of the amount of payments and benefits potentially subject to these penalties should be performed by specialized accounting experts retained by the target company, and it is customary for the acquiror and the target company, their respective legal counsel and the accounting firm performing the calculations to work together to use widely accepted techniques in order to mitigate, to the extent possible, the potential adverse consequences.

- **Corporate Governance and Securities Law.** Current U.S. corporate governance and securities rules can be troublesome for non-U.S. acquirors who will be issuing securities that will become publicly traded in the U.S. as a result of an acquisition. SEC rules, the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts and stock exchange requirements should be evaluated to ensure compatibility with home jurisdiction rules and to be certain that a non-U.S. acquiror will be able to comply. Rules
relating to director independence, internal control reports and loans to officers and directors, among others, can frequently raise issues for non-U.S. companies listing in the U.S. Non-U.S. acquirors should also be mindful that U.S. securities regulations may apply to acquisitions and other business combination activities involving non-U.S. target companies with U.S. security holders.

- **Disclosure Obligations.** How and when an acquiror’s interest in the target is publicly disclosed should be carefully controlled and considered, keeping in mind the various ownership thresholds that trigger mandatory disclosure on a Schedule 13D under the federal securities laws and under regulatory agency rules such as those of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). While the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR) does not require disclosure to the general public, the HSR rules do require disclosure to the target before relatively low ownership thresholds may be crossed. Non-U.S. acquirors should be mindful of disclosure norms and timing requirements relating to home jurisdiction requirements with respect to cross-border investment and acquisition activity. In many cases, the U.S. disclosure regime is subject to greater judgment and analysis than the strict requirements of other jurisdictions. Treatment of derivative securities and other pecuniary interests in a target other than common stock holdings can also vary by jurisdiction.

- **Due Diligence.** Wholesale application of the acquiror’s domestic due diligence standards to the target’s jurisdiction can cause delay, waste time and resources or result in missing a problem. Due diligence methods must take account of the target jurisdiction’s legal regime and, particularly important in a competitive auction situation, local norms. Many due diligence requests are best channeled through legal or financial intermediaries as opposed to being made directly to the target company. Due diligence requests that appear to the target as particularly unusual or unreasonable (which occurs with some frequency in cross-border deals) can easily create friction or cause a bidder to lose credibility. Similarly, missing a significant local issue for lack of jurisdiction-specific knowledge or understanding of local practices can be highly problematic and costly. Prospective acquirors should also be familiar with the legal and regulatory context in the United States for diligence areas of increasing focus, including cybersecurity, data privacy and protection, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) compliance and other matters. In some cases, a potential acquiror may wish to investigate obtaining representation and warranty insurance in connection with a potential transaction, which has been used with increasing frequency as a tool to offset losses resulting from certain breaches of representations and warranties.

- **Distressed Acquisitions.** In 2023, bankruptcy filings surged as corporations dealt with the challenges of a rising interest-rate environment, resulting in one of the busiest years for bankruptcy since the financial crisis. Amid that upturn, the United States has remained the forum of choice for cross-border restructurings. A new participant in U.S. bankruptcy courts in late 2022 and 2023 was a number of cryptocurrency companies with worldwide activities which filed U.S. bankruptcies.
in response to the cryptocurrency downturn in 2022. Multinational companies across a broad range of more traditional sectors including retail, manufacturing, healthcare and finance also continued to take advantage of the debtor-friendly and highly developed body of reorganization laws, as well as the specialized bankruptcy courts, that have long made U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings attractive.

Advantages of a U.S. bankruptcy include: the expansive jurisdiction of the courts (such as a worldwide stay of actions against a debtor’s property and liberal venue requirements); the ability of the debtor to maintain significant control over its normal business operations; relative predictability in outcomes; the ability to bind holdouts to debt compromises supported by a majority of holders and two-thirds of the debt; and the ability to borrow on a super-senior basis to fund the company during and upon exit from bankruptcy.

Another unique tool of the U.S. bankruptcy system that is being used with increasing frequency is the “prepackaged” or “prepack” bankruptcy. A “prepack” is a bankruptcy case filed after pre-negotiating a plan of reorganization with key constituencies. In cases where broad creditor support can be obtained, a “prepack” can facilitate a rapid restructuring of debt or sale of a U.S. or foreign company or its assets in as little as 20-30 days (or even fewer). A “prepack” can also be filed in conjunction with foreign recognition proceedings, facilitating rapid transactions for companies with cross-border operations that still provide acquirors with the comfort and protection of court orders in relevant jurisdictions. Prepacks are an important means of avoiding the expense and disruption that can result from a protracted bankruptcy case.

U.S. bankruptcy courts generally permit the sale of substantial assets or of the whole company during, or in connection with emergence from, a Chapter 11 proceeding. Features of the Bankruptcy Code of particular importance to M&A transactions include the ability to obtain a sale order providing title to assets free-and-clear of all prior liabilities and liens on a worldwide basis, the ability to reject undesirable contracts and leases while keeping those desired by the buyer, and the easing of certain antitrust and securities regulatory burdens. The ability to sell assets free-and-clear of prior liabilities and thus protect a purchaser from the overhang of legacy liabilities, as well as to resolve all claims against a company in a single forum, makes Chapter 11 an attractive and increasingly routine option for companies facing potential mass tort liability.

Those evaluating a potential acquisition of a distressed target with a connection to the United States should consider the full array of tools that the U.S. bankruptcy process makes available to obtain equity or assets from a bankrupt company. Those could include acquisition of the target’s fulcrum debt tranches that are expected to be equitized through a restructuring, acting as a plan investor or sponsor in connection with a plan of reorganization, backstopping a plan-related rights offering, or participating as a bidder in a court-supervised “Section 363” auction of a debtor’s assets.
Transaction certainty is critical to a debtor and its stakeholders and thus to a potential acquiror’s success in a distressed context. Accordingly, non-U.S. participants need to plan carefully (particularly with respect to transactions that might be subject to CFIUS review, as discussed above) to ensure that their bid will be considered on a level playing field with U.S. bidders. Acquirors must also be aware that there are numerous constituencies involved in a bankruptcy case that they will likely need to address (including bank lenders, bondholders, distressed-focused hedge funds and holders of structured debt securities and credit default protection, as well as landlords and trade creditors), each with its own interests and often conflicting agendas, and that there exists an entire subculture of sophisticated investors, lawyers and financial advisors that must be navigated.

Various options are available to troubled companies seeking to take advantage of the U.S. bankruptcy laws. Multinational debtors often file bankruptcy petitions in the United States and link the confirmation or consummation of a plan of reorganization with successful administration of related foreign ancillary insolvency proceedings. Even when the principal proceeding takes place elsewhere, large non-U.S. companies can file cases under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to obtain “recognition” of foreign insolvency proceedings in a U.S. bankruptcy court. The legal requirements for such recognition are minimal and can include minor connections to the U.S., such as debt instruments with U.S. choice of law or venue provisions, or payment of a retainer to U.S. counsel. Recognition of a foreign proceeding under Chapter 15 facilitates restructurings and asset sales by providing debtors with many of the same protections that Chapter 11 provides from creditors in the United States, and the ability to take control of and administer U.S. assets. Chapter 15 also provides the ability to bind U.S. creditors or holders of U.S. law debt to the terms of a restructuring plan implemented in a foreign proceeding, so long as the proceeding accords with broadly accepted principles of due process and creditors’ rights.

- **Contingent Liabilities.** The United States has an often-exaggerated but not entirely unjustified reputation as the world’s most treacherous jurisdiction for tort, product liability and securities law litigation. Each U.S. target company or business will have its own history of interaction with customers, suppliers, employees, investors and others who may have pending or future claims against the acquisition target or its owners. Care should be taken in investigating such matters and assessing their likely and possible outcomes. Some will be deal-killers. Many will not be. Early and expert familiarity with the relevant subject matter and its litigation and liability history in the United States and the particular enterprise involved in an M&A transaction is an essential part of planning for every deal, as is negotiation of relevant counterparty arrangements, and third-party insurance and other risk-mitigation mechanisms.

- **Collaboration.** More so than ever in the face of current U.S. and global uncertainties, most obstacles to a deal are best addressed in partnership with local players whose interests are aligned with those of the non-U.S. acquiror. If possible, relationships with the target company’s management and other local forces should
be established well in advance so that political and other concerns can be addressed together, and so that all politicians, regulators and other stakeholders can be approached by the whole group in a consistent, collaborative and cooperative fashion.

Adam O. Emmerich
Scott K. Charles
David A. Katz
Andrew J. Nussbaum
Mark Gordon
William Savitt
Emil A. Kleinhaus
John R. Sobolewski
Raaj S. Narayan
Amy R. Wolf
Matthew T. Carpenter

Robin Panovka
Jodi J. Schwartz
Ilene Knable Gotts
Joshua R. Cammaker
T. Eiko Stange
Joshua M. Holmes
Karessa L. Cain
Emily D. Johnson
Erica E. Aho
Franco Castelli
Cross-Border M&A Guide Endnotes


2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.405. The term “foreign issuer” also includes a foreign government, but a foreign government cannot be an FPI.

3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.405.

4. Note to paragraph (c)(1) of Exchange Act Rule 3b-4.

5. Id.


7. Rule 13e-4 under the Exchange Act applies only to tender offers that meet both of the following conditions: (1) the tender offer is for equity securities of an issuer that (a) has a class of equity security registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, or (b) is required to file periodic reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act (i.e., an issuer that has had a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the Securities Act), declared effective), and (2) the tender offer is made by the issuer of such equity security or by an affiliate of such issuer. Section 14(e) and Regulation 14E, discussed below, also would apply to such a tender offer.


10. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(c).


15. See id.


See id.


See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10.


See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-11.

17 C.F.R. § 230.145.


Id. § 6310.3.

Id. § 6360.1.

Id. § 6360.2.

Id. § 6120.2.

J.P. Morgan, Depositary Receipts Universe (data as of March 27, 2024), available at https://www.adr.com/dr/drdirectory/.


17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-23.


See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1, Instructions to paragraphs (c) and (d).

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4, Instruction 3 to Paragraph (h)(8) and (i).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(c)(4). Note that the Tier I exemptions can apply to a registered closed-end investment company.

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(c)(2).

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(c)(3).

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(c) (“Any tender offer for the securities of a foreign private issuer as defined in § 240.3b-4 is exempt from the requirements of sections 14(d)(1) through 14(d)(7) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(1) through 78n(d)(7)), Regulation 14D (§§ 240.14d-1 through 240.14d-10) and Schedules TO (§ 240.14d-100) and 14D-9 (§ 240.14d-101) thereunder, and § 240.14e-1 and § 240.14e-2 of Regulation 14E under the Act . . . .”).

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(d)(2)(iii). Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(d). Rule 14e-1(d) also requires offerors to include in the announcement the approximate number of securities deposited to date.


Id.

Id.

Id.

Id. See also 1999 Cross-Border Adopting Release, Section II.G.2.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Depending on the circumstances, other Securities Act exemptions may be available. For example, Rule 903 under Regulation S provides a safe harbor for issuers, distributors, and affiliates from registration under the Securities Act for offerings made outside the United States. This safe harbor is non-exclusive and applies to both domestic issuers and FPIs. An issuer seeking safe harbor under Rule 903 must meet, at minimum, two primary requirements: (1) the offer or sale must be made in an “offshore transaction” (i.e., an offer not made to a person in the United States and where either the buyer is outside the United States or the transaction is executed on a foreign securities exchange); and (2) the offer or sale cannot involve “directed selling efforts” (i.e., sales activities that tend to condition the market) in the United States. Regulation S also contains a safe harbor for certain offshore resales in Rule 904. However, Regulation S is primarily relevant to capital-raising transactions and may be difficult to rely upon in business combinations.

See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (“Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any of the following classes of securities: . . . [e]xcept with respect to a security exchanged in a case under title 11, any security which is issued in exchange for one or more bona fide outstanding securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such exchange and partly for cash, where the terms and conditions of such issuance and exchange are approved, after a hearing upon the fairness of such terms and conditions at which all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities in such exchange shall have the right to appear, by any court, or by any official or agency of the United States, or by any State or Territorial banking or insurance commission or other governmental authority expressly authorized by law to grant such approval . . . .”).

Id.; Staff Legal Bulletin No. 3A, Division of Corporate Finance, available at https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb3r.htm#FOOTNOTE_5.

Id. at 60078. The SEC has indicated that such sales would presumably be effected pursuant to the procedure under Category 1 of Regulation S [17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(1)].

Id. at 60078. This guidance reiterates the guidance the SEC set forth in initial proposed revisions to the Cross-Border Rules, see Revisions to the Cross-Border Tender Offer, Exchange Offer, and Business Combination Rules and Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rules for Certain Foreign Institutions, Release No. 33–8917, 34–57781 (May 6, 2008), and previous no-action letters, see, e.g., Singapore Telecommunications Ltd. (May 15, 2001); Oldcastle, Inc. (July 3, 1986); Electrocomponents PLC (Sept. 23, 1982); Equitable Life Mortgage and Realty Investors (Dec. 23, 1982); Getty Oil (Canadian Operations) Ltd. (May 19, 1983); and Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Co. Ltd. (June 19, 1985).

Id. at 60078.

Id.

Id. at 60077.

On two occasions, the FTC and the DOJ temporarily suspended the practice of granting early termination. The first temporary suspension occurred during the month after the initial Covid-19 shutdown. The FTC announced another temporary suspension on February 4, 2021, as a result of the transition to the new Administration and heavy inflow of HSR filings. While the FTC’s announcement indicated that the agency anticipated that the temporary suspension would be brief, as of the publication of this Guide, this suspension remains in place.

Horizontal Merger Guidelines, FTC and DOJ (Aug. 19, 2010), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf; and Vertical Merger Guidelines, FTC and DOJ (June 30, 2020), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1580003/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf. In September 2021, the FTC withdrew its support of the Vertical Merger Guidelines, noting that they “include unsound economic theories that are unsupported by the law or market realities.” And in January 2022, the FTC and the DOJ launched a joint public inquiry aimed at modernizing the agencies’ merger guidelines with respect to both horizontal and vertical mergers.

31 C.F.R. § 800.303.


Exchange Act § 12(b).

17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1.

Exchange Act § 15(d).


For purposes of 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b), primary trading market means: (i) at least 55% of the trading of the shares on a worldwide basis took place on a securities market in one or at most two foreign jurisdictions during the FPI’s most recently completed fiscal year; (ii) if the FPI has to aggregate the trading in two foreign jurisdictions to meet the 55% threshold, then the trading in at least one of those two foreign jurisdictions must be greater than the trading in the United States for those shares.


Form 20-F, General Instruction A(b).

The MD&A is meant to explain the company’s performance and financial condition during the fiscal period in a way that is easy for investors to understand, describe the company’s earnings and cash flows, and enhance the company’s financial disclosure. This
section may include an overview, a discussion of results of operations and a comparison of financial information, a description of the company’s liquidity and capital resources, a description of recently adopted accounting standards, a description of related-party transactions, etc. An FPI should also refer to the reconciliation to U.S. GAAP and discuss any aspects of U.S. GAAP not covered in the reconciliation which it believes are necessary to understand the financial statements as a whole. See Form 20-F, Item 5.

93 For example, the Form 20-F must disclose the amount of executive compensation and benefits in kind given for services to the company and its subsidiaries. While FPIs may make this disclosure in the aggregate in certain instances, they must provide it on an individual basis if home-jurisdiction regulation requires that they do so or they otherwise publicly disclose such information. This requirement represents an accommodation in comparison to the more detailed individual executive compensation disclosures that U.S. companies are required to make.

94 Sarbanes-Oxley § 404(a).
95 Sarbanes-Oxley § 404(b).
96 Form 20-F, Item 15; Form 20-F, Item 18.
97 Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (Pub. L. 116-222, 134 Stat. 1063, 1064, 1065 and 1066 (Dec. 18, 2020)). Congress is currently considering legislation which would shorten the three-year non-inspection window to two years.
98 FPIs (other than non-accelerated filers) must disclose the existence of material unresolved SEC comments on their Forms 20-F. Form 20-F, Item 4A. For this and other reasons, companies usually seek to resolve SEC comments expeditiously.
99 See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 203.03; Nasdaq Listed Company Manual Rule 5250(c)(2).
100 Form 6-K, General Instruction B. Form 6-K must be submitted in English. While English summaries are permitted for certain documents, full translations are required for press releases, most communications distributed directly to security holders, annual audited and interim consolidated financial information and certain other information.
101 Form 6-K, General Instruction B.
102 See generally Form 8-K.
103 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (Dec. 22, 1995)). The PSLRA added Section 21E to the Exchange Act and Section 27A to the Securities Act, covering Exchange Act and Securities Act reports, respectively. Before Congress enacted the PSLRA, SEC rules established safe harbors for forward-looking statements. However, those safe harbors were tied to whether the forward-looking statements were made without a reasonable basis or disclosed other than in good faith, and thus provided less protection from liability than the PSLRA safe harbor. See 7 C.F.R. § 230.175 (Securities Act), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (Exchange Act).

105 See, e.g., Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799 (11th Cir. 1999); Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 377 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2004).

106 See, e.g., ECA, Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chicago v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 187, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2009).


108 See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casinos Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1993).

109 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104–369, at 46 (1995) (“The [PSLRA] Conference Committee does not intend for the safe harbor provisions to replace the judicial bespeaks caution doctrine or to foreclose further development of that doctrine by the courts.”); Roer v. Oxbridge Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 212, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“These [safe harbor] provisions of the PSLRA were modeled after, but not meant to displace, the judicial bespeaks caution doctrine.”).

110 See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 709 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In our view, a reasonable investor would be very interested in knowing, not merely that future economic developments might cause further losses, but that (as plaintiffs allege) current reserves were known to be insufficient under current economic conditions.”).

111 Form 20-F, Item 6.B.


113 Form SD Section 1, Item 1.01(d)(3).

114 Form SD Section 1, Items 1.01(b), 1.01(c).


116 ADSs are treated as the same class as the underlying equity securities for this purpose. Any ADSs listed on a U.S. exchange have been registered under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act. If a registrant does not have any listed securities and is exempted from or terminates its registration under Section 12(g), the Schedule 13D rules will no longer apply, even if it remains obligated to file reports under Section 15(d).

117 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a).

118 Although an investor that agitates for a change of control of the company is the classic example of a non-passive investor, the definition also excludes investors that merely
seek to have an effect on how the company is run. Moreover, directors and officers cannot be considered passive investors.

119 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1(c), 240.13d-2(b) and 240.13d-2(d).

120 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1(b), and 240.13d-2(b)-(c).

121 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(d).

122 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(b).


124 FPIs subject only to Section 15(d) also are not subject to the third-party tender offer rules in Section 14(d). However, they are subject to the Exchange Act provisions related to issuer tender offers and going-private transactions.

125 Form 20-F, Items 17(c) and 18.

126 Form 20-F, Item 17(c). Items that frequently require discussion and quantification as a result of the reconciliation requirements include stock compensation, restructuring charges, impairments, deferred or capitalized costs, investments, foreign currency translation, deferred taxes, pensions, derivatives, consolidation, asset retirement obligations, research and development, and revenue recognition.


128 Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K additionally requires disclosure of the reasons why management believes the non-GAAP measure provides information that is useful to investors and, if material, any additional purposes for which management uses it that are not otherwise disclosed. 17 C.F.R. § 240.100(a); 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(e)(1)(i).

129 17 C.F.R. § 240.101; 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(e)(2)-(5).

130 17 C.F.R. § 240.100(c).


132 Note to 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(e).


134 In addition to assessing independence, the audit committee is also responsible for assessing the competency of its independent auditors.


Form 20-F Item 7.B.

Form 20-F Item 6.E.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

For an FPI, a “blackout period” generally means a period that occurs when (i) at least 50% of the participants located in the United States are subject to the trading suspension and (ii) U.S. plan participants either total 50,000 or account for 15% of all participants worldwide.

In addition, the issuer must file the notice as an exhibit to its Form 20-F.

17 C.F.R. § 240.144.

NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.02(a).

Nasdaq Marketplace Rules 4200, 4350.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(C)-(E).

17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(c)(3).

Form 20-F, Item 16D.

Form 20-F, Item 16A.

The requirements relating to the compensation committee do not apply to “controlled companies,” meaning companies with a single individual, group or other issuer that controls more than 50% of their shares.

Dodd-Frank goes beyond the clawback provision contained in Sarbanes-Oxley, which applies only (i) to compensation received by the CEO and CFO during the 12-month period following the first issuance of the restatement and (ii) if the restatement resulted from misconduct.

The case, SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010) involved Maynard L. Jenkins, the former CEO of CSK Auto Corporation. Although civil and criminal charges were brought against four other CSK Auto executives, the SEC did not charge Jenkins with
any wrongdoing in connection with the accounting fraud that occurred at CSK. Nevertheless, relying on Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304, the SEC filed a complaint seeking to claw back $4 million of incentive compensation that Jenkins received during the period of the fraud. Jenkins moved to dismiss the complaint, but that motion was denied in June 2010. On November 15, 2011, a settlement was announced by the SEC.


Form 20-F, Item 16B.

17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-2.

17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1.

See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (stating that the purpose common to the securities laws was to “substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor”).


Rule 10b-5, for example, provides that a party that makes public statements may not omit relevant information if the information is “necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. And Section 11 of the Securities Act prohibits a party from “omitting[ing] to state a material fact . . . necessary to make the statements [in the registration statement] not misleading.” 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).


Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union Local 338 Ret. Fund v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 845 F.3d 1268, 1275-77 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).


See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 n.20 (5th Cir. 1974).


17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20.

“Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain.” Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983) (discussing insider trading claim brought by the SEC under Rule 10b-5).

173 The *Morrison* decision has been interpreted to apply to the liability provisions of the Securities Act as well. *See, e.g.*, *In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., Sec. Litig.*, 842 F. Supp. 2d 522, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying *Morrison* to §§ 11, 12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities Act); *SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co.*, 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (applying *Morrison* to § 17(a) of that Act).


175 *See, e.g.*, *City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG*, 752 F.3d 173, 181-82 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The fact that OPEB was a U.S. entity, does not affect whether the transaction was foreign or domestic.”).

176 U.S. courts have rejected the argument that whenever securities that predominantly trade on a non-U.S. exchange are cross-listed on a U.S. exchange (such as in connection with an ADR program), all trades in that security anywhere in the world are subject to the U.S. securities laws. *See, e.g.*, *Liu v. Siemens AG*, 763 F.3d 175, 179-80 (2d Cir. 2014) (observing that *Morrison*, which involved an Australian issuer that had ADRs listed on the NYSE, “decisively refutes Liu’s contention that the United States securities laws apply extraterritorially to the actions abroad of any company that has issued United States-listed securities.”). They have likewise rejected the argument that a purchase or sale of a security on a foreign exchange takes place in the U.S. under *Morrison* if the purchase or sale order is made from the U.S. *See, e.g.*, *In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig.*, 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), *aff’d*, 838 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2016).

177 *Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto*, 677 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2012).

178 *See* *Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp.*, 2022 WL 220920, at *4-5 & n.9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2022) (finding that the “triggering event” that caused the plaintiff to “incur irrevocable liability occurred in Japan when [the broker] acquired shares of Toshiba common stock on the Tokyo Stock Exchange,” as the “first step in the ADR conversion process,” and observing that the plaintiff had “not identified a single case where the purchase or sale of unsponsored ADRs constituted or qualified as a domestic transaction”) (emphasis added).

179 The Tenth Circuit — the first U.S. appellate court to consider the issue — held that Dodd-Frank had successfully overruled the *Morrison* decision in this way. *See SEC v. Scoville*, 913 F.3d 1204, 1215-18 (10th Cir. 2019), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 483 (2019). The First Circuit also recently observed in dicta that “[s]hortly after *Morrison* was decided, Congress amended the federal securities laws to ‘apply extraterritorially’ . . . .” *SEC v. Morrone*, 997 F.3d 52, 60 n.7 (1st Cir. 2021). However, “Congress, in the Dodd-Frank Act, amended only the *jurisdictional* sections of the securities laws to indicate that the antifraud provisions applied extraterritorially when a version of the conduct-and-effects test is met. The Dodd-Frank Act did not make any explicit revisions to the *substantive* antifraud provisions themselves.” *Scoville*, 913 F.3d at 1218 (emphasis added). And in *Morrison*, the Supreme Court held that the question of the extraterritorial reach of Section
10(b) is a substantive, not a jurisdictional question. A different U.S. court, engaging in a more literalist analysis of the statute, could find that the Dodd-Frank amendments did not resolve the issues addressed in *Morrison* regarding the extraterritorial application Section 10(b). See, e.g., Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz, *Extraterritoriality of the Federal Securities Laws After Dodd-Frank: Partly Because of a Drafting Error, the Status Quo Should Remain Unchanged*, available at www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.17763.10.pdf; Richard W. Painter, *The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It Effective, Needed or Sufficient?*, 1 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 195, 205 (2011).


183 See, e.g., *In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig.*, 650 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that ratings agencies are not underwriters under Section 11).

184 Section 27A(c) of the Securities Act, added by the PSLRA, establishes a limited exception to Section 11’s scienter-less liability. It provides that no liability will attach in a private action based on certain statutorily defined “forward-looking statements” unless the plaintiff proves “actual knowledge” of the false or misleading nature of the statement on the part of a natural person making the statement or on the part of an executive officer approving the statement if made on behalf of a business entity. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B).

185 As the Second Circuit has explained, while materiality “will rarely be dispositive in a motion to dismiss” a Section 11 claim, it “remains a meaningful pleadings obstacle” whereby the court must ascertain whether there is a “substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted information would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information [already] made available.” *In re ProShares Tr. Sec. Litig.*, 728 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal after “read[ing] the prospectus cover-to-cover” and considering “whether the disclosures and representations, taken together and in context, would have misl[ed] a reasonable investor about the nature of the [securities]” (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

186 17 C.F.R. § 230.158.


188 The SEC, however, has taken the position that indemnification by the issuer of its officers, directors or controlling persons for liability arising under the Securities Act is against public policy and, therefore, unenforceable, and there is support for this position in court decisions. See, e.g., *Eichenholtz v. Brennan*, 52 F.3d 478, 484-85 (3d Cir. 1995); *Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc.*, 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969). The SEC has
also indicated that in addressing requests for prompt declaration of effectiveness of a registration statement, it will refuse to accelerate its declaration of effectiveness if the registrant indemnifies any of its officers, directors or controlling persons, unless: (i) such person waives the benefits of indemnification with respect to the proposed offering or (ii) the registration statement contains a certain undertaking to submit to a court of appropriate jurisdiction the question of whether such indemnification is against public policy and to be governed by the final adjudication of such issue.

See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1227 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding commercial paper reports to be prospectuses).


See, e.g., Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2001); Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1998); Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 67 F.3d 605, 609 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995); Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1161 (10th Cir. 2000); Vannest v. Sage, Rutty & Co., 960 F. Supp. 651, 655 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); In re JWP Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

Yung v. Lee, 432 F.3d 142, 149 (2d Cir. 2005).

However, as with Section 11, after the PSLRA, a plaintiff cannot premise a Section 12(a)(2) claim on statutorily defined “forward-looking statements” unless the plaintiff proves “actual knowledge” of the false or misleading nature of the statement on the part of a natural person making the statement or on the part of an executive officer approving the statement if made on behalf of a business entity. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B).


See Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 807 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir. 1970).


Miller v. Thane Int’l, Inc., 519 F.3d 879, 892 (9th Cir. 2007).

See Lalor v. Omtool, Ltd., 2000 WL 1843247, at *3 (D.N.H. Dec. 14, 2000) (“As to claims under §§ 11 and 12 of the Securities Act, ‘loss causation’ is not an essential element of a viable cause of action. It is, however, an affirmative defense that may be raised by a defendant.”); Kennilworth Partners L.P. v. Cendant Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 417, 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (“If the person who sold or offered the security can prove that all or part of the depreciation in value was caused by factors other than the false or misleading statement, he is not liable for that amount.”). But see In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 429, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing a Section
12(a)(2) claim over plaintiff’s argument that defendants bear the burden of proving “negative causation,” where the absence of causation was clear from the face of the complaint.


201 See, e.g., Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 F.2d 1028, 1036 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979); Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988, 990-91 (1st Cir. 1940); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 937 F. Supp. 834, 837 (W.D. Ark. 1996). But see Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 659-60 (1986) (finding that Section 12(a)(2) damages need not be reduced by the amount of tax benefits received from a shelter investment).

202 Section 12 expressly provides only for remedies in rescission or damages. The Supreme Court has held, however, that in an appropriate case brought primarily for rescission or damages under Section 12, ancillary relief, including injunctive relief, can be given. Deckert v. Indep. Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 287-90 (1940); see also In re Gartenberg, 636 F.2d 16, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1980). Cf. SEC v. Beisinger Indus. Corp., 552 F.2d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1977) (“It is well established that Section 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 confer general equity powers on the district courts.” (citations omitted)).


204 See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 701-02.

205 SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original); see SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 768 (7th Cir. 2013).

206 SEC v. Tourre, 2013 WL 2407172, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2013); see also, e.g., SEC v. Am. Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361, 1366 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that “actual sales were not essential” to a claim under Section 17(a)).


208 SEC v. Monterosso, 756 F.3d 1326, 1337 (11th Cir. 2014); see also SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 408 F.3d 727, 735 (11th Cir. 2005).
Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 2018).

Note that the extraterritoriality provision of Dodd-Frank applies only to the SEC and other U.S. government agencies, not to claims brought by private plaintiffs.


JooHyun Bahn, a/k/a Dennis Bahn, Exchange Act Release No. 84054 (Sept. 6, 2018).


In bankruptcy cases in which the D&O Insurance policy covers both individual directors and the company, courts have held that the proceeds will be property of the company if depletion of the proceeds would have an adverse effect on the bankruptcy estate of the company. See In re MF Glob. Holdings Ltd., 515 B.R. 193, 203 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).

220 See, e.g., SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1170 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kemmerer v. Weaver, 445 F.2d 76, 78-79 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that action may continue against controlling persons when suit against controlled persons dismissed on procedural grounds); Keys v. Wolfe, 540 F. Supp. 1054, 1061-62 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 709 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1983); Primavera Familienstiftung v. Aarkin, 1996 WL 580917, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996); McCarthy v. Barnett Bank of Polk Cty., 750 F. Supp. 1119, 1126 (M.D. Fla. 1990); see also In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Sec. Litig., 424 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the dismissal of Rule 10b-5 claims against individual defendants “is in no way incompatible” with a plaintiff’s right to establish their secondary liability under Section 20(a) as controlling persons of a liable corporation).


222 See, e.g., No. 84 Emp’r-Teamster Joint Council Pension Tr. Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a prima facie showing of control had been made where a corporation’s two largest stockholders controlled 57.4% of the total voting power and “had some of their own officers seated on” the corporation’s board); Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing standards for finding lenders and directors to be “controlling persons”); Arthur Children’s Trust v. Keim, 994 F.2d 1390, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1993) (directors); In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 1998 WL 276177, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1998) (officers), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com Ltd., 249 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2001); Stern v. Am. Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818, 824 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (directors); Klapmeier v. Telecheck Int’l, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1360, 1361 (D. Minn. 1970) (stating that a “majority shareholder might as a matter of law be held to ‘control’ the entity regardless of his actual participation in management decisions and the specific transaction in question”). But see In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig., 650 F.3d 167, 187 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that rating agencies were not controlling persons of banks that issued rated securities because “providing advice that the banks chose to follow does not suggest control”).
See, e.g., Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1994); Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980); Gould v. Am.-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 779 (3d Cir. 1976).

A “non-appearing foreign attorney” is defined as an attorney admitted to practice in a jurisdiction outside the U.S., who does not hold himself out as practicing and does not give legal advice regarding U.S. laws, who conducts activities before the SEC only incidental to and in the ordinary course of practice of law in a jurisdiction outside the U.S., and appears before the SEC only in consultation with counsel admitted to practice law in the United States.