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TAKEOVER LAW AND PRACTICE

2026

This outline describes certain aspects of the current legal and economic environment relating to takeovers, including mergers and acquisitions and tender offers. The outline topics include a discussion of directors' fiduciary duties in managing a company's affairs and considering major transactions, key aspects of the deal-making process, mechanisms for protecting a preferred transaction and increasing deal certainty, advance takeover preparedness and responding to hostile offers, structural alternatives and cross-border transactions. Particular focus is placed on recent case law and legislation as well as developments in takeovers. This edition reflects developments through April 2026.

Takeover Law and Practice

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Takeover Law and Practice

I.

Current Developments

A. Overview

M&A transactions, including acquisitions, dispositions, mergers and spin-offs, are among the most important ways for companies to navigate the constantly changing competitive, economic and regulatory environment in which they operate. Yet, the evolving nature of this environment has also increased the complexity of engaging in these transactions.

The rapid changes and volatility in stock market valuations, macroeconomic developments such as interest rate cuts, changes in the domestic regulatory and political environment, a new and active U.S. administration, tariffs (actual and threatened) and conflicts and other geopolitical disruptions around the globe are just a few of the factors that a company must consider when undertaking an M&A transaction. Adding to this complexity is the continued heavy participation of hedge funds and private equity funds in M&A, changing dynamics in financing markets, and developments in corporate governance such as an increase in anti-ESG considerations and pressure on proxy advisory firms. The constantly evolving legal and market landscapes highlight the need for boards of directors to be fully informed of their legal obligations when considering and undertaking M&A, and for companies and their management teams to understand the different factors that can affect whether a transaction is successful.

Section I of this outline identifies some of the major recent developments in M&A activity, activism and antitrust. Section II reviews the central responsibilities of directors, including basic case law principles, in the context of business combinations and takeover preparedness. Section III focuses on various preliminary aspects of the sale of a company, including the choice of method of sale, confidentiality agreements and use of financial advisors. Section IV discusses the various structural and strategic alternatives in effecting private, public and cross-border M&A transactions, including options available to structure the transaction consideration. Section V focuses on the mechanisms for protecting an agreed-upon transaction and increasing deal certainty. Section VI summarizes central elements of a company's advance takeover preparedness, particularly the role of a rights plan in preserving a company's long-term strategic plan and protecting a company against coercive or abusive takeover tactics and inadequate bids.

B. M&A Trends and Developments

1. Deal Activity

2025 was a year of significantly increased M&A activity, in the United States and around the world. M&A deal volume in the United States exceeded \$2.3 trillion, up 58% from 2024, and global M&A deal volume increased by over 42%. Notably, the number of very large M&A deals in the U.S. in 2025 — four \$40 billion-plus deals, up from zero such deals in 2024 — reflects a substantial increase in bolder transactions that may have been viewed as too risky in prior

regulatory and market environments. Notwithstanding concerns around tariffs, inflation and ongoing global conflicts, the M&A market ended the year energized across numerous industries. At the same time, the absolute number of deals was down, indicating that larger deals were the catalyst for the increase in overall deal volume.

Indeed, one highlight of 2025 was the reemergence of the megadeal. There were 68 deals globally worth \$10 billion or more in 2025, exceeding the prior annual high set a decade earlier and the 30 such transactions announced in 2024. Many of the largest transactions were announced in the second half of the year, after initial concerns regarding tariffs and their consequences subsided. Major transactions in 2025 included Union Pacific's \$85 billion combination with Norfolk Southern, Teck Resources' \$69 billion merger of equals with Anglo American and Palo Alto Networks' \$25 billion acquisition of CyberArk, and such megadeals have continued into the start of 2026 with Paramount Skydance's \$110 billion acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery, Sysco's \$21.9 billion acquisition of Jetro Restaurant Depot, and the \$44.8 billion combination of Unilever's Foods business with McCormick. Notably, many of the acquirors in these big-ticket transactions have traditionally not engaged in significant M&A activity, another indicator of the attractiveness of the current dealmaking environment.

As expected, several macroeconomic, regulatory, political and geopolitical factors have affected the M&A landscape since the beginning of 2025. The return of President Donald Trump to the White House, with the Republican party having majorities in both houses of the U.S. Congress, shifted the tone and approach of federal regulators. In addition to the different approach taken by antitrust regulatory agencies in this administration, as described more below, regulators have increased regulatory scrutiny in other ways, as evidenced by the Federal Communications Commission indicating that it may condition M&A transaction approval on companies eliminating diversity, equity and inclusion policies.

In other contexts, the federal government has emerged as a dealmaker itself, taking equity stakes, governance rights and sometimes economic upside in order to bolster critical industries, such as rare earth, lithium and chip making. For example, the government invested \$8.9 billion in Intel, paid for in large part with funds previously allocated under the CHIPS Act, to take a 9.9% equity stake and obtain other rights. The U.S. government also made investments to secure rare earth supply by taking equity stakes in, and in some cases entering into offtake and price support agreements with, companies such as MP Materials, USA Rare Earth, Vulcan Elements and Trilogy Metals. In addition, Nvidia and AMD entered into an agreement with the U.S. government to share a portion of revenues from chip sales to China in exchange for export licenses to China for chips previously subject to restrictions.

Still, volatility and uncertainty remain and affect the market. Challenges to the Federal Reserve Bank's independence could impact interest rates. The threat of tariffs, despite the recent Supreme Court ruling, remains omnipresent, and attempts to boycott U.S. based companies have gained traction amidst geopolitical tension. Yet the M&A market continues to show resilience, with activity that far surpasses that of recent years.

2. M&A Sector Highlights

Bank M&A

2025 saw a sea change in regulatory receptivity for consolidation in the banking sector. Much has been written about quicker regulatory approvals, but the change in the banking sector is more fundamental. There is a consensus forming among U.S. bank regulators that consolidation can result in a stronger, more efficient and more stable industry. In addition to the completion of Capital One's \$35.3 billion acquisition of Discover in May, last year saw a number of substantial regional bank transactions with the combination of Synovus and Pinnacle Financial, Huntington's acquisitions of Veritex and Cadence, Fifth Third's acquisition of Comerica, PNC's acquisition of FirstBank, Prosperity's acquisitions of American Bank and Southwest Bancshares, and Mechanics Bank's acquisition of HomeStreet, among others. The welcome shift of focus of bank regulators away from micromanaging banks toward material financial risks has also given reason for optimism in acquiring and growing banking franchises. During 2025, M&A also remained active across the broader financial services sector in asset management, insurance, payments, fintech and other areas.

Technology M&A

Technology M&A again represented the largest share of global M&A activity of all industries in 2025 at nearly 19% of deal volume, and M&A in the industry increased 65% from the prior year. The race for AI resources is fierce throughout Silicon Valley and has led to "acquire" transactions, through which larger technology companies seek to expand their talent pool by absorbing smaller startups, sometimes through novel structures. However, in early 2026, the FTC indicated that it would increase scrutiny on such transactions or other efforts to hire away employees instead of acquiring the company outright to ensure companies do not utilize that structure to avoid the FTC's merger review process. AI companies have also struck large, complex transactions for sheer computing power: OpenAI's partnerships with Broadcom and AMD are just a couple of many examples. A continuing focus on AI is also bringing together the technology, industry and energy sectors, with hyperscalers like Alphabet, Microsoft and Amazon each expected to spend \$100 billion or more on AI infrastructure by 2027. This activity has also led to substantial legal innovation, such as the recapitalization of OpenAI's for-profit organization into a public benefit corporation, controlled by the nonprofit OpenAI Foundation.

Media, Entertainment and Telecom M&A

Media, entertainment and telecom accounted for a substantial portion of 2025's global deal volume at 11%, though anticipated headwinds ranging from concerns of a bubble in the technology market to increased scrutiny from regulators, including those at the state level and in foreign jurisdictions, may dampen that momentum. The media and entertainment sector saw one of the largest takeover battles in corporate history, with Paramount Skydance having launched an unsolicited tender offer—as well as litigation and a proxy fight—in an ultimately successful attempt to top Netflix's \$82.7 billion deal to acquire Warner Bros. Discovery following a competitive auction process. Also noteworthy was Nextstar Media Group's \$6.2 billion acquisition of TEGNA, seeking to create one of the largest local TV broadcasters in the country,

which subsequent to closing faced an effort by State attorneys general and private litigants to seek and obtain a preliminary injunction against integrating the two businesses.

Healthcare M&A

Healthcare deals accounted for nearly 9% of 2025's global deal volume, with deals of all sizes making headlines. Abbott Laboratories' \$21 billion acquisition of Exact Sciences was one of the largest deals across sectors, a demonstration of the interest in cancer detection and diagnostic technology. Pfizer's acquisition of Metsera for \$10 billion also made headlines given Novo Nordisk's topping bid, though Pfizer ultimately prevailed. The consideration paid by Pfizer included a contingent value right ("CVR"), consistent with a broader trend of offering CVRs in 2025. For example, in June 2025, Carlyle and SK Capital closed their acquisition of bluebird bio pursuant to which tendering shareholders had the right to elect to receive either all-cash consideration or a lower cash payment at closing along with a CVR payable if bluebird bio meets a specified net sales milestone. Blackstone and TPG's acquisition of Hologic similarly contemplates a CVR based on revenue of Hologic's Breast Health business exceeding certain thresholds in FY 2026 and 2027. When structured carefully, CVRs are one way to help bridge valuation gaps in public company transactions, though they continue to be seen predominantly in healthcare transactions (in fact, nearly half of public company deals announced in 2025 involving a U.S. target company in the healthcare sector involved a CVR component).

3. Unsolicited M&A

Hostile and unsolicited transactions accounted for approximately 7.5% of global M&A activity in 2025, compared to about 11% in 2024 and 8% in 2023. The most prominent example of unsolicited M&A in 2025 was Paramount Skydance's unsolicited bid for Warner Bros. Discovery. Paramount Skydance's unsolicited advances led Warner Bros. Discovery's board of directors to launch a review of strategic alternatives, which resulted in Netflix penning a deal to acquire the Studios & Streaming businesses of Warner Bros. Discovery for \$82.7 billion; however, Paramount Skydance made an overbid, and Warner Bros. Discovery's board of directors ultimately declared Paramount Skydance's subsequent bid to acquire the entire company for \$110 billion to be superior. In the healthcare industry, Novo Nordisk attempted to acquire obesity drug developer Metsera after Pfizer had already entered into a definitive agreement with Metsera, though Pfizer ultimately prevailed at an increased price of \$10 billion. Although opportunistic behavior typically is not rewarded, takeover preparedness remains critical in today's M&A environment to ensure a beneficial outcome for shareholders.

4. Cross-Border M&A

Cross-border deals represented 30% (\$1.46 trillion) of global M&A volume last year. Cross-border M&A volume grew by 24% in 2025 compared to 2024, underpacing the global M&A deal volume increase of over 42%. Significant cross-border transactions included Palo Alto Networks' \$25 billion acquisition of CyberArk, an Israeli company, and the \$55 billion leveraged buyout of Electronic Arts by Silver Lake, Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund and Affinity Partners. There were 12 cross-border transactions exceeding \$10 billion announced in 2025, higher than the 10 such transactions in 2024 and nine signed in 2023.

A notable cross-border development in 2025 was Japanese steelmaker Nippon Steel's acquisition of U. S. Steel for \$15 billion. The transaction exemplified President Trump's interest in deals that could impact national security or strategic industries and highlighted the importance of CFIUS in cross-border transactions. The acquisition of the storied American steelmaker was approved by the Trump administration on the condition that the federal government receive a "golden share" with certain governance rights — despite the fact that President Biden had blocked the acquisition just months prior.

Overall, dealmakers pursuing cross-border M&A in 2026 should be nimble and strategic as they navigate ongoing geopolitical conflicts, national security concerns and possible tariffs and trade wars under the current administration.

5. Private Equity Trends

A significant portion of 2025 deal volume was driven by private equity, with a rebound in sponsor exit activity. Although the number of sponsor-led deals is up modestly year-over-year, deal volume is up more substantially as sponsors have focused on larger transactions. In fact, global private equity deal volume reached approximately \$2.1 trillion in 2025, a high since the banner Covid-era year of 2021. And although private equity fundraising dipped by 11% last year, the second straight year fundraising fell, aggregate dry powder remains near its 2023 historical peak, suggesting that there will continue to be significant buy-side demand and funding for private equity deals. Significant private equity transactions last year included Thoma Bravo's \$12.3 billion acquisition of Dayforce, the \$55 billion leveraged buyout of Electronic Arts (the largest leveraged buyout ever recorded) by Silver Lake, Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund and Affinity Partners, and the \$18.3 billion leveraged buyout of Hologic by Blackstone and TPG. Certain of these transactions exemplify the trend of well-regarded sponsors pairing up with each other or with sovereign wealth funds to diversify risk and put together bids that may have been unattractive — or impossible — for a sponsor to do alone. In addition to consortium deals for acquisitions, the year also saw an increase in the number of partial exits and sponsor-to-sponsor sales. Sponsor activity increased in the second half of the year in particular, indicating ongoing momentum that is expected to continue into 2026.

However, exit hold periods continue to remain elevated as compared to pre-pandemic levels, with sponsors having an average holding period of approximately five years in 2023-2025, compared to 4.2 years in 2021-2022. The longest hold periods were recorded in the telecom and media industry, followed by the energy and utilities industry and the industrials industry. As a result, continuation funds continued to be another alternative exit strategy. Continuation funds raised the same LP and sponsor issues in 2025 as in previous years, related to existing LPs seeking the highest price while new continuation fund investors demand the lowest price. It remains to be seen whether the growth in secondary and co-investment funds will cause continuation funds to increase going forward or whether the overarching alignment issues will keep their use consistent with current levels. In any case, high-profile write-offs by certain continuation funds in 2025 served as a stark reminder of these potential alignment and reputational issues.

Private equity sponsors also continued the trend of utilizing creative and nimble structures to execute transactions, such as through partnerships with other sponsors or strategics. For

example, in April 2025, GTCR, Global Payments and FIS announced a unique three-way transaction in which Global Payments acquired GTCR's 55% stake and FIS's 45% stake in Worldpay for \$24.25 billion in cash and stock, and FIS concurrently acquired Global Payments' Issuer Solutions business through a combination of cash and the transfer of its 45% Worldpay stake to Global Payments. The transaction structure allowed GTCR to partially exit its previous 55% investment in FIS while taking a significant ownership stake in Global Payments, and enabled both Global Payments and FIS to enhance and streamline their strategic focus on their respective core businesses.

6. Acquisition Financing

Debt financing markets soared in 2025, fueling acquisitions at scale, refinancings, repricings and dividend recapitalizations, and provided borrowers across the credit spectrum with access to a broader range of financing sources and solutions than ever before.

With the boom in mega M&A deals came the return of mega acquisition finance commitments. These include the likes of Paramount Skydance, which obtained an aggregate of \$54 billion worth of committed financing from Bank of America, Citigroup and Apollo to support its acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery, and Abbott Laboratories, which received \$20 billion in commitments to fund its acquisition of the early cancer detection company Exact Sciences.

The investment market also saw innovative technology come to the fore as banks competed for their share of these and other large commitments. Investment grade corporate buyers have historically relied on the traditional 364-day bridge loan commitment to finance major acquisitions. Market participants have embraced a new structure: the delayed draw term loan, which offers investment grade borrowers the ability to draw down what they need in tranches over time, thus resulting in a significantly more attractive fee arrangement without compromising certainty of funding or terms. Additionally, investment grade lenders are offering borrowers more flexibility around closing timing. In response to regulatory uncertainty, lenders are also agreeing to allow borrowers to keep their commitments in place for limited periods beyond specified termination dates in return for payment of margin interest from the borrower. These developments, taken together, have led to products that better match the realities of modern M&A dealmaking.

In the non-investment grade markets, private credit funds continue to prove themselves as critical sources of capital, but traditional banks also made aggressive moves to solidify their position. In Q3 2025, syndicated loan issuance reached a record \$404 billion—the busiest quarter on record. One has to look no further on the acquisition front than to the \$20 billion commitment led by JPMorgan for the \$55 billion leveraged buyout of Electronic Arts, the largest single bank commitment of its kind. By the end of 2025, banks refinanced over \$34 billion of loans previously held by private credit providers (an increase of approximately 18% from 2024) as borrowers sought the cheaper financing available through syndication to institutional lenders. This shift from previous years was particularly evident in large-scale deals where the lower interest spreads of the syndicated loan market seemed to attract borrowers more than the bespoke, and often more expensive, terms of private credit.

This push and pull between traditional banks and private credit redounded to the benefit of

borrowers. Amid intensifying competition among lenders and a more-favorable interest rate environment, borrowers, led by private equity sponsors, pushed for increasingly aggressive terms. These ranged from increased portability (*i.e.*, allowing debt to remain outstanding, subject to certain conditions, even after a change of control of the borrower) to terms that would impose materially higher risk on lenders, such as negative covenant baskets that increase as a borrower's business grows but never shrink if the company's business contracts, expanded rights to block certain institutions from becoming lenders and provisions designed to prevent lenders from banding together in certain circumstances. Although lenders resisted most of these asks, their recurring appearance at the negotiating table underscored borrowers' growing bargaining power.

7. Shareholder Litigation

Shareholder litigation challenging merger and acquisition activity remains common. Continuing the trend sparked by the Delaware Court of Chancery's 2016 *In re Trulia, Inc. Shareholder Litigation* decision, which curtailed the ability to settle such suits in Delaware by way of added disclosures, the bulk of these litigations in recent years have been styled as claims under the federal securities laws and were filed in federal court. Although recent reports from NERA and Cornerstone Research suggest that the number of such lawsuits has continued their downward trend of the past several years, these studies only account for class actions.¹ There has been a significant shift by stockholders toward filing merger objection suits on an individual basis rather than on behalf of a putative class—potentially to avoid class action filing limitations and disclosure requirements under the PSLRA—and therefore, these studies do not necessarily reflect the change in the number of merger-objection suits filed.

Merger-objection litigation generally challenges disclosures made in connection with M&A activity under Sections 14(a), 14(d) and/or 14(e) of the Exchange Act, and it sometimes also alleges breaches of state-law fiduciary duties. The overwhelming majority of such federal suits are “mooted” by the issuance of supplemental disclosures and the payment of the stockholder plaintiffs' lawyers' fees. Although federal courts have generally afforded minimal scrutiny to the resolution of disclosure claims asserted by individual stockholders, such settlements are still subject to some degree of judicial review. In particular, federal courts are required to determine that the stockholder's complaint was not frivolous under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before approving the dismissal of a case pursuant to a settlement.² Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has instructed federal trial courts that “suits seeking extra disclosure should be reviewed immediately after being filed.”³ On this basis, the Seventh Circuit in 2024 upheld a decision rejecting certain individual disclosure-only settlements because “the disclosures sought . . . were worthless to the shareholders.”⁴ Potentially in response to these decisions, there has been a recent drop in the filing of individual disclosure-only stockholder complaints, with many stockholders opting instead to issue and resolve disclosure demands out of court entirely. In any event, unless the federal courts begin applying a more onerous scrutiny to such resolutions akin to Delaware's *Trulia* review of settlements, we expect this settlement activity to continue.

The substantive suits that remain have often been filed in Delaware, although recent amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law are expected to curtail certain types of shareholder merger litigation in Delaware. In the years leading up to the amendments, as discussed in Section II, the Delaware Court of Chancery had allowed plaintiffs to claim—at least at the initial

pleadings stage of litigation—that stockholders with far less than majority voting power exercised control of the corporation and thus owed fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stockholders. Despite some recent post-trial decisions that reiterated Delaware’s traditionally onerous standard for a plaintiff to allege that a minority stockholder exercises control of a corporation,⁵ that trend created opportunities for plaintiffs to avoid dismissal under the *Corwin* doctrine (which allows for pleadings-stage dismissals of certain types of suits based on fully informed stockholder approval of non-controlling stockholder transactions) by alleging that the challenged transaction concerned controlling stockholders. In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court held in *In re Match Group, Inc. Derivative Litigation* that the *M&F Worldwide* framework—requiring approval of both a special committee of independent directors and a fully informed majority of the minority stockholders in order to lower the standard of review from entire fairness to business judgment—applied to all transactions with controlling stockholders, not only squeeze-out mergers.⁶ The Court also held in *Match* that every single member of a special committee, rather than a majority of the committee, was required to be “wholly independent.”⁷ However, in April 2025, in a case initiated prior to the 2025 Delaware General Corporation Law amendments, the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed nearly all of a lawsuit challenging an acquisition by CD&R of Focus Financial Partners on the grounds that 20% holder Stone Point Capital was the target’s controlling stockholder, and that Stone Point Capital breached its fiduciary duties by channeling the deal to CD&R. The Delaware Court of Chancery held that a stockholder with such a small stake could not be deemed a controlling stockholder absent additional well-pleaded facts showing actual control.⁸

Other states, such as Nevada and Texas, have sought to use the Delaware corporate climate, especially in situations involving controlling stockholders, as an opportunity to chip away at Delaware’s dominant share of the market for incorporations. In Texas, for example, the governor signed a bill into law on May 19, 2025 that, among other things, allows corporations to establish a minimum ownership threshold, up to 3%, for stockholders to initiate a derivative proceeding on behalf of the corporation. As discussed further in Section I.C.2 below, although the number of reincorporation proposals reached a peak in 2025—30 proposals compared to six or seven in the prior several years—Delaware is likely to remain the dominant state of incorporation due to its experienced judiciary and vast jurisprudence in business matters, among other factors.⁹

In response to these developments, the Delaware legislature on March 25, 2025 enacted landmark amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law that provide safe harbors from judicial review for many transactions involving controlling stockholders and other conflicted fiduciaries. Among other things, the amendments (i) limit the circumstances in which a stockholder can be found to owe fiduciary duties as a “controlling stockholder,” (ii) provide various procedural mechanisms for transactions involving conflicted fiduciaries to obtain safe harbors from judicial review, (iii) establish criteria for determining whether a director or stockholder is “disinterested” with respect to a transaction (including a presumption of independence for public company directors determined to be independent under the corporation’s listing standards), and (iv) exculpate controlling stockholders for good faith actions taken in their capacity as stockholders. The amendments generally apply retroactively, except to litigation pending as of February 17, 2025. The amendments are expected to reduce stockholder challengers to mergers in Delaware, particularly in the context of controlling stockholder transactions.

Further, the decision in March 2025 by the Delaware Court of Chancery in *Desktop Metal, Inc. v. Nano Dimension Ltd.*, was seen as a victory for deal certainty. There, after an acquirer signed a deal with a 3D printing company, an activist shareholder replaced the acquirer’s board and directed its new management to slow-walk negotiations with CFIUS, the last regulator whose approval was required to satisfy the closing conditions to the merger. That foot-dragging, the court held, breached the buyer’s obligation to use reasonable best efforts to close the merger promptly. Emphasizing that a “party cannot go looking for a way out of its deal,” the court focused on the buyer’s dilatory responses and shifting positions in its dealings with CFIUS.¹⁰ The entire dispute was resolved in just three months, with the court ordering specific performance.

C. Activism and Engagement

1. Hedge Fund Activism

a. The Activism Landscape

Activity by hedge funds has been consistently elevated in recent years, both domestically and abroad, and 2025 was no exception. In the United States, the number of activist campaigns was up approximately 23% year over year, as the country remained the most active jurisdiction, representing more than half of all activity.¹¹ Asia Pacific also saw a rapid increase in activity, with Japan and South Korea both experiencing activism well in excess of historical levels. Matters of business strategy, operations, capital allocation and structure, CEO succession, M&A, options for monetizing corporate assets, stock buybacks and other economic decisions remain key subjects of shareholder pressure, with operational matters attracting particular attention amid the ongoing geopolitical volatility.

Hedge fund activists have also pushed for governance changes when courting proxy advisory services and governance-oriented investors, particularly as they seek board representation, often through one or a few board seats or, in certain cases, control of the board. Activists have also increasingly targeted top management for removal and replacement by activist-sponsored candidates. The prevalence of activist campaigns explicitly targeting CEOs has increased over the last few years, and even prominent CEOs and those of large companies have not been immune. A record 32 U.S. CEOs resigned in 2025 within one year of an activist campaign.¹² In addition, M&A activism accelerated in the second half of 2025 amid a surge in deal activity, appearing in 54% of H2 2025 campaigns versus 35% of H1 2025 campaigns. In fact, 61% of Q4 2025 activism campaigns had an M&A-related thesis, which is the highest level in five years.¹³

While the more established activists maintained their outsized role in the 2025 proxy season, first-time activists accounted for approximately 50% of activists and 27% of campaigns, in-line with the record levels experienced in 2024.¹⁴ As demonstrated time and again, no company is too large, too small, too new or too successful to be immune from activism. Activists are increasingly working together—or “swarming”—marquee mega-cap companies, including to push an M&A or breakup thesis. Activists are also persisting year-over-year—as evidenced by Elliott Management’s campaigns against Phillips 66 in 2024 and 2025, and Nelson Peltz’s successive campaigns against Disney in 2023 and 2024—with activists returning more prepared and

potentially more successful. Companies that were able to resolve an activist situation in 2025, but continue to underperform this year, may find themselves subject to a second round of activism focused on the implementation of a publicly disclosed “strategic alternatives” review.

Set forth below are some of the key recent trends and developments in activism:

SEC Guidance on Schedule 13D and 13G. On February 11, 2025, the SEC published a Corporation Finance Interpretation (CFI), clarifying that investors seeking to exert pressure on a company to implement specific measures may lose their “passive investor” status and be disqualified from filing a short-form Schedule 13G. As a result, some shareholders have become more cautious about initiating conversations, especially on sensitive topics like director elections, executive compensation, and ESG issues. This dynamic has put the onus on boards to be proactive about continued engagement opportunities, asking for meetings with investors, setting agenda topics and asking targeted questions to solicit investor perspectives.

Updates to Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals. Rule 14a-8 permits eligible shareholders to submit proposals for inclusion in a company’s proxy materials at a relatively low cost, compared to a proxy contest. In November 2025, in a dramatic reconsideration of its role in the Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal process, the SEC Division of Corporation Finance announced that for the 2025-2026 proxy season, it would not substantively respond to no-action requests for companies’ reliance on virtually all bases for exclusion of shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8, effectively leaving it to companies to decide whether to omit these proposals. In January 2026, the SEC issued updated guidance, providing that the SEC will now object to a voluntary submission of a notice of exempt solicitation filed by a person that does not beneficially own over \$5 million of the company’s shares. The SEC staff noted that such voluntary submissions appear to be primarily a means for smaller shareholders to generate publicity.

SEC Exemptive Order on Tender Offers. In April 2026, the SEC issued an exemptive order, permitting certain tender offers to remain open for a minimum offering period of 10 business days (instead of the typical 20 business days) if they meet various criteria. Among other things, to fall within the criteria of the exemptive order, (i) the consideration must consist only of cash at a fixed price, (ii) any change in the percentage of securities sought (if more than 2% of the subject securities) or the consideration offered must be announced at least five business days before the expiration of the offer and (iii) any other material change in terms must be announced at least two business days before the expiration of the offer. A tender offer made pursuant to Regulation 14D (*i.e.*, a tender offer not made by the issuer) qualifies only if, among other things, it is made pursuant to a negotiated agreement with the subject company and the offer is for all outstanding securities of the subject class. In addition, the exemption does not apply to 13e-3 “going-private” transactions or tender offers relying on the SEC’s cross-border exemption rules.

The Role of Proxy Advisors. Proxy advisory firms, like ISS and Glass Lewis, which historically play a crucial role in proxy contests, have recently been under considerable legislative and regulatory pressure. In December 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order aimed at “increas[ing] oversight of and tak[ing] action to restore public confidence in the proxy advisor industry, including by promoting accountability, transparency, and competition.”¹⁵ Among other things, the Executive Order mandates that the SEC Chairman (i) review all rules relating to proxy

advisors and consider revising or rescinding them, especially to the extent that they implicate DEI and ESG policies, (ii) consider revising or rescinding all rules relating to shareholder proposals, including Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, that are inconsistent with the purpose of the Executive Order, and (iii) analyze whether a proxy advisor serves as a vehicle for investment advisers to act as a “group” for purposes of the Exchange Act. The Executive Order also mandates that the FTC Chairman investigate whether proxy advisors engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive practices that harm U.S. consumers, and that the Secretary of Labor revise regulations regarding the fiduciary status of individuals who manage or, like proxy advisors, advise those who manage shares held by plans covered under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and strengthen the fiduciary standards for ERISA plans.

More Engaged Retail. Companies are increasingly finding avenues to communicate with their retail shareholder base to garner support. Some are looking into the idea of implementing auto-voting programs for retail investors, believing that retail investors are generally inclined to support boards and management teams. And in September 2025, the SEC issued a letter confirming that, subject to certain conditions, it would not recommend enforcement action against Exxon Mobile’s retail voting program, which allows retail investors to opt into having their shares voted automatically in accordance with the recommendations of Exxon Mobile’s Board of Directors. Companies will continue to be creative and active in engaging their retail base, especially for corporate decisions that require a higher quorum to achieve (such as M&A or reincorporation proposals). Such efforts are already being met with some resistance from activists and their law firms, and may in the future be scrutinized by investors, proxy advisory firms, and other constituencies with an interest in how shareholder elections are administered. Retail shareholders should not be treated as a monolith, and depending on the specifics of the situation, some of these efforts may not have the intended consequences. We also have seen retail investors undertake activist tactics at companies in the form of organized social media campaigns, and in some cases their efforts have turned public companies into “meme stocks.”

b. M&A Activism

A large portion of shareholder activism is oriented wholly or partially toward M&A, a trend which continued into 2025, with 61% of Q4 2025 campaigns involving an M&A thesis, which is the highest proportion in five years. There are three key types of M&A activism: first, campaigns to sell the entire target company; second, campaigns aimed at breaking up a target company or having the target company divest a non-core business line; and, third, campaigns that attempt to scuttle or improve an existing deal. “Sell the company” campaigns were a key driver, reflecting a common push by activists for companies to explore or pursue transformative M&A as an alternative to perceived “stalled” or “failed” stand-alone strategies. Some notable M&A-focused campaigns in 2025 included Barington Capital’s push for a breakup of the business units at Matthews International and Dalton Investments’ push for a spin-off of Fuji Media Holdings’ real estate business.

2. Governance Landscape

Companies continue to face an evolving corporate governance landscape defined by ongoing scrutiny of a company’s approach to stakeholder relations, board skillsets and

composition, and overall governance *bona fides*. The growth of the stakeholder-centric corporate governance model, as embodied in Martin Lipton’s articulation of the New Paradigm,¹⁶ has been a key development in the corporate governance landscape in recent years. This approach reimagines corporate governance as a cooperative exercise among and involving a corporation’s stockholders, directors, managers, employees and business partners, as well as the communities in which the corporation operates. The shift to the New Paradigm has been in part a reaction to the transition of the U.S. corporate governance system from a board-centric model to a shareholder-centric model in prior decades. The New Paradigm for corporate governance seeks to mitigate the adverse impacts of short-termism and recognizes an appropriate balance of stakeholder interests as the bedrock of sustainable, long-term value creation.

The New Paradigm has emerged in an era that has seen tremendous growth in passive investing. The growth of passive investing has continued to outpace that of actively managed funds, a sea change from two decades earlier when passively held assets represented only 6% of a much smaller AUM pool. A significant portion of the companies that constitute the S&P 500 now have Vanguard, BlackRock and State Street among their “top five” shareholders. For the largest passive funds, their long-term investment horizon, coupled with their broad-based investments, have created a heightened need for investment stewardship geared toward identifying and addressing systemic risks within their sizeable portfolios. The rise of ESG has coincided with the growth of passive investing and investment stewardship teams at the largest passive funds and have helped redefine expectations of boards and management with respect to the oversight of risks that have previously not been captured in financial reporting, such as sustainability, cybersecurity and human capital risks.

However, the past few years have seen increasing politicization and backlash against ESG. Indeed, the term “ESG” itself has begun to steadily fade from the investor and corporate lexicon in the wake of cultural and political clashes over its meaning and purpose. “Anti-ESG” legislation adopted by several states has created legal and financial hurdles related to ESG for investment firms. Many institutional investors have gone quiet on ESG amid public criticism and congressional subpoenas. In February 2025, ISS announced that, in response to President Trump’s Executive Orders on diversity, equity and inclusion, it would “indefinitely halt” consideration of gender, racial and ethnic diversity of U.S. company boards when making voting recommendations.¹⁷ Glass Lewis followed suit in March, announcing that it “will flag all director election proposals at US companies in which [the] recommendation is based, at least in part, on considerations of gender or underrepresented community diversity” and offer an alternative recommendation.¹⁸ In addition, in March 2025, the SEC announced that it had determined to end its defense of the climate disclosure rules that had been adopted in 2024 and were the subject of ongoing litigation in the Eighth Circuit.

Set forth below are some of the key recent trends and developments in corporate governance matters.

Semi-Annual Versus Quarterly Reporting. In response to a social media post by President Trump calling for public companies to not be required to report on a quarterly basis, the SEC is exploring a proposal that would allow companies to opt into a semi-annual reporting regime. For most companies, quarterly reporting consumes substantial time and expense and imposes

opportunity costs, as management teams focus on quarterly results. A shift to semi-annual reporting could allow companies to spend more time and resources on long-term value creation, rather than short-term results. However, companies may have other reasons to continue to provide quarterly updates, including debt covenants, investor expectations and greater trading flexibility for insiders.

The “Big Three” Shift Their Approach to Stewardship. Last year, the “Big Three” asset managers—BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street—signaled that they are shifting their approach to stewardship. In particular, each of these institutions split its proxy voting team into two separate groups, each with their own voting decision-makers, voting policies and perspectives, to meet the growing demand for a more nuanced approach to voting and to reflect clients’ differing—and often opposing—stewardship philosophies. It is now more important than ever for boards to find one-on-one opportunities with their key investors to better understand how they hold and vote their shares. In addition, the Big Three have continued to expand their pass-through voting programs that allow individual investors to vote on matters companies submit to their shareholders.

Ongoing Dominance of Delaware. Historically, Delaware has been the gold standard for incorporation for most public companies, due to its well-established corporate law and highly specialized judiciary, which have created a stable and predictable legal environment. More recently, however, two states—Texas and Nevada—have implemented changes seeking to attract incorporations. In late 2024, Texas launched its own business court, modeled after the Delaware Chancery Court, and last year, Texas made significant business-friendly updates to its state corporate law, including to codify the business judgment rule and to allow companies to set higher ownership thresholds for shareholder proposals submitted under Rule 14a-8. Similarly, Nevada updated its state corporate laws to make business-friendly changes and limit the reliance on Delaware case law in interpreting Nevada law. Several high-profile reincorporations to these states, including Tesla’s reincorporation in Texas and TripAdvisor’s and Dropbox’s reincorporations in Nevada, have captured the attention of the corporate community.

However, for the vast majority of existing public companies, Delaware will likely remain “home” for the foreseeable future for several important reasons. First, reincorporation requires shareholder approval, and many investors still prefer Delaware due to the predictability and strong shareholder protections. Second, reincorporation is associated with high transaction costs and litigation risk, especially for early movers. Finally, Delaware has responded to the challenges by Texas and Nevada by instituting reforms of its own, most notably through SB 21, a meaningful set of amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law that, among other things, expanded the safe harbor protections for directors, officers and controlling shareholders for conflicted and controlling shareholder transactions and limited the scope of permissible Section 220 “books and records” demands. Boards should continue to stay abreast of these updates and the potential impact on governance rules and norms. Moreover, certain of the Texas Business Court’s early decisions have cast doubt about whether and to what extent Texas will be a more company-friendly home. For example, last year, the Texas Business Court held that the duties of loyalty and care cannot be fully eliminated in a partnership; in contrast, Delaware allows partners to contractually waive all duties other than the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Continued Rise of AI. Artificial intelligence (AI) was top of mind for boards, management, shareholders and the public throughout 2025. News cycles were dominated by large and high-profile AI transactions, from “acqui-hires” (transactions in which larger AI companies sought to expand their talent pool by acquiring smaller startups) to multibillion dollar financings (such as OpenAI’s \$40 billion investment round led by SoftBank in 2025 and \$122 billion investment round backed by Amazon, NVIDIA and SoftBank at the start of 2026) to strategic partnerships for computing power (such as OpenAI’s partnerships with Broadcom, NVIDIA and AMD). Companies in a wide range of industries are increasingly expected to incorporate AI in their product offerings and day-to-day business operations. Boards should also be thoughtful about integrating AI expertise into the boardroom, to ensure effective oversight of AI-related risks and opportunities. Boards will be expected to familiarize themselves with the competitive landscape and understand how AI factors into a company’s business model and strategy. Directors with meaningful AI experience and backgrounds will continue to be in high demand.

D. Regulatory Trends

1. U.S. Antitrust Trends

Following years of aggressive enforcement, at the beginning of 2025, there was widespread anticipation that the second Trump administration would usher in a more favorable regulatory environment for dealmaking. Thus far, these expectations appear justified. The Trump administration promptly installed new leadership at the antitrust agencies, with Andrew Ferguson taking over as Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission in January 2025, and Gail Slater taking office as the new Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in March. As the year progressed, the agencies signaled a return to more established antitrust enforcement practices. The agencies have committed to improving transparency and streamlining the merger review process, including by resuming a willingness to settle merger reviews, a traditional practice eschewed during the Biden administration. As more merger investigations are resolved with negotiated remedies, the number of court challenges has declined. A more constructive regulatory environment, however, does not imply that companies undertaking strategic transactions will be given a free pass. While the agencies are taking a pragmatic approach, they continue to enforce the antitrust laws and closely scrutinize transactions that raise potential concerns, including in industries—such as technology and healthcare—at the center of the Trump administration’s economic agenda.

The new administration has also taken action to supervise the antitrust agencies more directly and to align their activities with its policy priorities, and leadership at both agencies have embraced this new approach. In February 2025, the President issued an Executive Order establishing policies to “ensure Presidential supervision and control of the entire executive branch . . . including so-called independent agencies.”¹⁹ This shift toward direct executive supervision was evident in the President’s dismissal of the FTC’s two Democratic Commissioners in March 2025 on grounds that their service was “inconsistent” with the administration’s priorities. Former Commissioner Slaughter challenged her termination as a violation of the FTC Act. The case is currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, which is expected to issue a decision in the first half of 2026. The outcome of the case could have major implications for the independence of the FTC and other federal agencies. In a similar development, in February 2026, Gail Slater stepped

down as AAG in charge of the DOJ's Antitrust Division, after less than a year in the role, reportedly due to mounting tension with the DOJ leadership and the administration over merger enforcement decisions. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Omeed Assefi was appointed as acting head of the Antitrust Division. The agencies' efforts to more closely align their policy agenda and enforcement decisions with the administration's priorities has and will continue to add uncertainty to the merger review process.

In a significant departure from the prior administration, the FTC and DOJ have shown a renewed openness to settling merger reviews with negotiated remedies, rather than resorting to litigation, even for fixable deals. In fact, in the final year of the Biden administration, the DOJ did not enter into a single merger settlement. By contrast, in 2025, the DOJ entered into five settlements, all of which involved structural remedies. Notable settlements include *Hewlett Packard Enterprises/Juniper Networks*, which resolved the only court challenge initiated by the DOJ under the new administration, and *UnitedHealth/Amedisys*, which resolved a lawsuit filed under the Biden administration. The DOJ also entered into consent agreements to resolve concerns in the *Keysight/Spirent*, *Safran/Raytheon*, and *Constellation Energy/Calpine* mergers without first initiating a legal challenge to block those transactions. Under Chairman Ferguson, the FTC settled four merger investigations. Two settlements—*Synopsys/Ansys* and *Alimentation Couche-Tard/Giant Eagle*—involved structural remedies. In a statement issued in connection with the *Synopsys/Ansys* settlement, Chairman Ferguson outlined his approach to merger remedies, emphasizing a strong preference for structural remedies. Notwithstanding his statement that behavioral remedies are “disfavored,” the FTC entered into two settlements this past year involving non-divestiture remedies. In *Boeing/Spirit AeroSystems*—a vertical merger combining an aircraft manufacturer with a key supplier of aerostructures—the FTC agreed to a combination of structural and behavioral remedies, and the FTC's settlement in *Omnicom/Interpublic Group* involved behavioral remedies only.

Notwithstanding the renewed pragmatism, the agencies remain enforcement-minded and have shown a willingness to pursue court challenges of mergers. Each of the challenges brought by the agencies this past year focused on loss of direct competition between the merging parties, indicating a return to more traditional theories of harm.

The FTC, in particular, has maintained an active docket, challenging three transactions. In *GTCR/Surmodics*, the agency alleged that the transaction would have eliminated competition between Surmodics and Biocoat, a GTCR portfolio company, for the provision of “hydrophilic coatings in the United States.” Shortly after the FTC filed its lawsuit, the parties proposed to divest part of Biocoat's hydrophilic coatings business. While the FTC rejected the proffered settlement, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that the proposed divestiture was sufficient to mitigate the alleged anticompetitive effects and ruled against the FTC. The agency successfully blocked medical device supplier Edwards Lifescience's proposed acquisition of JenaValve. The FTC's complaint alleged that Edwards was JenaValve's only competitor, and that the acquisition would reduce competition for lifesaving medical devices used to treat a potentially fatal heart condition. After a six-day trial, on January 9, 2026, the District Court for the District of Columbia granted the FTC's motion for a preliminary injunction. Finally, the FTC filed a lawsuit to block Henkel's proposed acquisition of Liquid Nails, which competes with Loctite, a popular brand of construction adhesives owned by Henkel. The FTC alleges that the deal “would

bring under one roof the two biggest brands—by far—of construction adhesives sold domestically.” The lawsuit remains pending.

The DOJ had a lighter merger litigation docket in 2025 than the FTC. Except for the *Hewlett Packard Enterprises* lawsuit, which was later settled, the agency did not initiate any merger challenge. A pending litigation inherited from the prior administration—*UnitedHealth/Amedisys*—was settled with significant divestitures, and another—*American Express GBT/CWT*—was dropped just before the trial was set to begin.

Under the Trump administration, the agencies continue to explore expansive theories of harm in merger investigations. They have retained, and cited favorably in recent complaints, the 2023 Merger Guidelines adopted under the Biden administration, which include lower concentration tolerances and novel and more expansive theories of harm than the prior guidelines. Merger investigations continue to probe some of the theories of harm memorialized in the 2023 Guidelines, including notably labor market competition. The agencies have also focused on labor market competition outside of the merger context. Despite the continued focus on labor, the FTC in September abandoned its defense of a broad rule adopted under the prior administration banning almost all non-compete provisions in employment agreements, electing instead to prioritize case-by-case enforcement against anticompetitive practices in the labor markets.

The FTC and DOJ have also disavowed hostility towards private equity and its business model. The industry was subject to intense antitrust scrutiny under the Biden administration, which brought novel lawsuits against private equity firms, including an unprecedented merger challenge against Welsh Carson based on a serial-acquirer theory. In contrast, the only challenge against a private equity deal—GTCR’s acquisition of Surmodics—brought by the FTC under the new administration was based on a traditional horizontal theory of harm, claiming that the transaction would eliminate direct competition between Surmodics and Biocoat, a GTCR portfolio company.

While private equity may benefit from a more favorable regulatory environment, both the FTC and DOJ have vowed to vigorously enforce the antitrust laws in the technology industry, and in 2025, the agencies continued to prosecute high-profile monopolization cases against Big Tech companies that were filed by prior administrations. The agencies have so far had mixed results in their monopolization cases. The FTC is appealing its recent loss against Meta, in which it failed to prove that Meta had illegally monopolized the personal social networking market through its acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp. And while the DOJ won both its monopolization cases against Google, it failed to secure a structural breakup of Google’s search business. In addition, the FTC has recently increased scrutiny of so-called “acqui-hires,” whereby tech companies hire all or most of a startup’s employees instead of buying the company, to determine whether they may be intended to evade the agency’s merger review process. It remains to be seen whether the agencies’ proclaimed hostility towards Big Tech will impact dealmaking in the industry. On the other hand, in an encouraging sign for the sector, the DOJ recently cleared Google’s \$32 billion acquisition of Wiz announced in March 2025.

The administration also continues to prioritize antitrust enforcement in the healthcare sector. In April, President Trump issued an Executive Order tasking the FTC and DOJ to issue a

report “with recommendations to reduce anti-competitive behavior from pharmaceutical manufacturers,”²⁰ and a number of investigatory and enforcement initiatives have been announced following the Executive Order. The FTC remains particularly active with respect to merger enforcement in this space, with two of the agency’s three merger litigations last year involving the healthcare sector. In addition, the proposed merger of Aya Healthcare and Cross Country Healthcare, two healthcare staffing software providers, was abandoned in late 2025 in the face of FTC’s concerns. In November 2025, Novo Nordisk, the maker of Ozempic and other GLP-1 drugs, dropped its bid to acquire Metsera after the FTC expressed concerns that the deal structure would violate the HSR Act. We expect that the industry will continue to attract legal and political scrutiny in 2026.

Last year brought implementation of the most significant overhaul of the HSR premerger notification program in over four decades, with changes to the notification form adopted under the Biden administration taking effect in February 2025. The changes significantly increased the burden associated with preparing HSR filings. The new rules were challenged by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other business groups as outside the FTC’s statutory authority, alleging they were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act; litigation continued after the changes were implemented. In a major development, on February 12, 2026, the district court for the Eastern District of Texas ruled for the plaintiffs and vacated the new rules.²¹ The FTC appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit and sought a stay of the lower court’s decision pending the appeal. On March 19, 2026, after the Fifth Circuit denied the FTC’s motion for an emergency stay, the agency reinstated the HSR form that was in place before February 2025.

Finally, state attorneys general were increasingly assertive in merger reviews this past year, and we expect that trend to continue in 2026. A coalition of state attorneys general—including New York and California—recently intervened in the federal Tunney Act review of the DOJ’s *Hewlett Packard Enterprises* settlement, claiming that its terms are inadequate. The increased activity from state attorneys general parallels efforts during President Trump’s first term, when state enforcers stepped up their role in merger reviews claiming to “fill the void” left by lax federal enforcement. Furthering this trend, Washington and Colorado became the first states to adopt universal premerger notification regimes, which require transacting parties meeting certain thresholds to submit their HSR notification forms to the state attorneys general at the same time they file with the FTC and DOJ. California recently passed a similar bill, which will become effective on January 1, 2027, and other states are considering similar legislation. The increase in direct notification requirements likely portends more state involvement in merger reviews going forward. Finally, in April 2026, a group of state attorneys general, together with a private plaintiff, recently obtained an extraordinary preliminary injunction remedy preventing Nexstar from integrating its TEGNA acquisition pending a full trial on their antitrust claims.

2. National Security Considerations

Recently, regulatory scrutiny of foreign investments for potential national security concerns has increased in numerous jurisdictions around the world. In the United States, the scope and impact of regulatory scrutiny of foreign investments by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) has expanded significantly over the last decade. Most recently,

new rules that became effective in December 2024 substantially expanded the scope of CFIUS's jurisdiction over real estate transactions involving foreign investors, by adding nearly 60 locations to the existing list of military installations whose proximity to a potential real estate purchase could create CFIUS jurisdiction. In addition, over the last several years, successive administrations have increased regulatory oversight of companies operating in telecommunications or other sensitive industries that have potential links to China.

As a result, the role of CFIUS and the need to factor the risks and timing of the CFIUS review process into deal analysis and planning have been further heightened. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act ("FIRRMA")²² introduced mandatory notification requirements for certain transactions, including investments in U.S. businesses associated with critical technologies, critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens where a foreign government has a "substantial interest" (*i.e.*, 49% or more) in the acquiror.²³ Critical technology and critical infrastructure are broad and flexible concepts, and FIRRMA includes in that rubric "emerging and foundational technologies" used in computer storage, semiconductors and telecommunications equipment sectors and critical infrastructure in a variety of sectors.²⁴ Supply chain vulnerabilities during the pandemic also increased the likelihood that investments in U.S. healthcare, pharma and biotech companies will be closely reviewed by CFIUS.

While most transactions that have run into CFIUS opposition in recent years have involved Chinese investors and U.S. businesses engaged in critical technologies—in particular, the design or production of semiconductors—or that have access to sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens, acquirors from all non-U.S. jurisdictions should consider the U.S. political and national security environment with care. The case of Nippon Steel's acquisition of U. S. Steel, which was blocked by President Biden and then permitted by President Trump only after the imposition of significant conditions, is instructive. On January 3, 2025, after losing the election, and despite Nippon Steel having offered significant mitigating measures to allay CFIUS's expressed national security concerns, President Biden nevertheless issued an order blocking the deal. In an unprecedented move, within three months of taking office, President Trump ordered a new national security review of the deal, and ultimately approved the transaction in June 2025 on the condition that the federal government receive a "golden share" with certain governance rights in the storied American steelmaker.

While notification of a foreign investment to CFIUS remains largely voluntary, transactions that are not reviewed pre-closing will remain subject to potential CFIUS review in perpetuity. A decision whether to make a voluntary filing generally depends on an assessment of the risk that a deal may draw CFIUS's attention. In a transaction involving an investment in a U.S. business by a foreign person, it is important to determine early in the process whether the investment will require a mandatory filing or may attract CFIUS attention. Parties should agree on their overall CFIUS strategy and consider the appropriate allocation of risk in the event that CFIUS approval is not obtained, as well as timing considerations in light of possibly prolonged CFIUS review. From a transaction-structuring perspective, although practice varies, a number of cross-border transactions in recent years have sought to address CFIUS-related non-consummation risk by including reverse break fees specifically tied to the CFIUS review process. In some of these transactions, particularly in transactions involving Chinese acquirors, U.S. sellers have sought to secure the payment of the reverse break fee by requiring the acquiror to deposit the amount of the

fee into a U.S. escrow account in U.S. dollars, either at signing or in installments over a period of time following signing.

Although CFIUS has historically focused on foreign investments in the United States, in recent years the U.S. government has issued new rules prohibiting certain outbound investments by U.S. businesses. In 2023, President Biden issued an Executive Order on Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern, which gave the Treasury Department jurisdiction to review certain outbound foreign investments by U.S. businesses. This outbound review process is often referred to as “reverse CFIUS.” In October 2024, the Treasury Department released a final rule imposing restrictions on U.S. outbound investment in Chinese companies active in developing certain national security technologies. The rule, which took effect on January 2, 2025, imposes additional diligence responsibilities, record-keeping and notification requirements, and restricts U.S. persons and their controlled foreign entities from engaging in certain transactions with foreign persons in “countries of concern” (currently limited to China, including Hong Kong and Macau) that perform defined activities related to semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum information technologies or artificial intelligence. The rule applies to a broad range of investments, including, among others, the acquisitions of equity or contingent equity interests, provision of certain debt financing, conversion of contingent equity into equity interests, and involvement in greenfield or brownfield investment. The rule defines two different classes of covered transactions—prohibited transactions and notifiable transactions—based on the type of activity in a sensitive sector in which the Chinese target engages. A transaction is prohibited if it involves sensitive sectors implicating certain advanced or foundational technologies, such as design software for semiconductors, semiconductor fabrication or packaging equipment, and a range of activities related to quantum computing. The rule requires a party to notify the Treasury Department if it invests in a foreign target engaged in designing, fabricating or packaging integrated circuits (where the transaction is not prohibited), or developing AI systems designed for, among other uses, military or government intelligence, cybersecurity applications, or control of robotic systems. On December 18, 2025, President Trump signed into law the Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security (COINS) Act, which largely codifies the prohibitions and notification requirements under the existing outbound investment security program, but will eventually modify its scope, expanding the targeted countries and industry sectors. The COINS Act will not take effect until the Treasury Department issues new regulations, which it must do by March 13, 2027. In the meantime, the existing regime remains in effect.

The European Union has also adopted a framework to screen foreign direct investments, which encourages EU member states to adopt a CFIUS-style foreign direct investment regime focusing on national security concerns. By the end of 2025, all EU member states had adopted or enhanced foreign investment screening regimes, many of which cover a large number of industries and transactions.

In addition, another development that may affect execution risk in many transactions is the EU’s adoption of the Regulation on Foreign Subsidies Distorting the Internal Market, which went into effect in October 2023. The regulation, which aims to address distortions caused by government subsidies to foreign companies, includes a mandatory notification and review regime for certain acquisitions of EU-based companies by foreign investors that have received subsidies

(broadly defined) or other contributions from non-EU governments in the three years prior to the deal. The review process will run in parallel to the traditional merger review, and the European Commission will have new investigatory powers and the ability to impose measures to mitigate the effects of foreign subsidies. Recent statistics show that the new screening tool catches about three times more deals than originally expected by the European Commission, creating significant burdens for M&A deals involving companies or businesses that have an active presence in the EU.

II.

Board Considerations in M&A

The basic fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers are to act with care and loyalty. But the level of scrutiny with which courts review directors' compliance with those duties varies with situation and context. The default rule is the business judgment rule, which holds generally that when directors act with due care and without personal conflict of interest, the business results—even materially negative results—of their decision-making will not be considered a breach of their fiduciary duties. But certain contexts, including when directors take actions to defend against a threatened change to corporate control or policy or engage in a sale of control of a company, may invoke a heightened level of scrutiny. Finally, as it relates to transactions involving conflicts of interest, Delaware courts traditionally review whether such transactions are entirely fair, but there are both statutory and common law procedures that can be employed to shield the transactions from review or lower the standard of review that will be applied, as discussed further below.

A. Directors' Duties

Directors owe two fundamental duties to stockholders and the corporations they serve: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Directors satisfy their duty of care by acting on a reasonably informed basis. Directors satisfy their duty of loyalty by acting in good faith and in the best interests of the stockholders and the corporation, rather than in their own interests or in bad faith. Officers owe stockholders the same duties of loyalty and care.

1. Duty of Care

At its core, the duty of care may be characterized as the directors' obligation to act on an informed basis after due consideration of relevant information and appropriate deliberation. Due care means that directors should act to assure themselves that they have the information required to take, or refrain from taking, action; that they devote sufficient time to the consideration of such information; and that they obtain, where useful, advice from counsel, financial advisors, and other appropriate experts.

Directors who act without adequate information, or who do not adequately supervise a merger, sale process, or other significant transaction, risk criticism from the courts. Regardless of whether a transaction involves a "change of control" over the company, directors should take an active role in the decision-making process and remain adequately informed throughout that process.²⁵ Because a central inquiry in a duty of care case is whether the board acted on an informed basis, the board should carefully document the bases for its decisions.

Exercise of the duty of care is not a solitary act. In addition to conferring with fellow directors, directors are "fully protected" under Delaware statutory law in relying on advice from officers, employees, and experts such as financial and legal advisors who have been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation,²⁶ as to matters the director reasonably believes are within such persons' professional or expert competence.

While the use of competent advisors will generally protect directors from potential liability and help a board demonstrate that its decisions should not be set aside by the courts, ultimately business decisions must be made by directors—they cannot be delegated to advisors.²⁷

To demonstrate that directors have breached their duty of care, a stockholder plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the directors’ conduct constitutes “gross negligence,” measured under the standard announced in 1985 by the Delaware Supreme Court in *Smith v. Van Gorkom*.²⁸ Under that standard, “[g]ross negligence is ‘conduct that constitutes reckless indifference or actions that are without the bounds of reason.’”²⁹ Since *Van Gorkom*, the Delaware courts have been careful to employ a genuine gross negligence standard before imposing due care liability.

Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) allows corporations to include in their certificates of incorporation a provision exculpating directors and officers from monetary liability for care breaches. However, Section 102(b)(7) provisions cannot exculpate breaches of the duty of loyalty (including breaches arising from bad faith conduct), nor do they prevent a court from ordering equitable relief for violations of any duty.³⁰ Moreover, although Section 102(b)(7) provisions can exculpate directors from liability for all species of duty of care claims—whether brought directly by stockholders or the corporation, or brought derivatively by stockholders on behalf of the corporation—officers cannot be exculpated from liability for breaches of the duty of care brought by the corporation itself or asserted derivatively on its behalf. The distinctions between direct and derivative claims in the M&A context are discussed below in Section II.F.

The ubiquity of exculpatory charter provisions, together with the heightened gross negligence standard required to establish duty of care breaches, has meant that independent directors have very rarely faced monetary judgments for due care liability. Nevertheless, the question of whether independent directors acted with due care can still be relevant in cases involving the possible liability of interested parties to a transaction. For example, the failure of independent directors on a special committee to act as an adequate proxy for arm’s-length bargaining can result in a finding that a transaction was not entirely fair and subject the interested party to damages. Furthermore, even an exculpated breach of the duty of care can form the basis of a claim against a non-exculpated party (a financial advisor, for example, or even an acquiror) for aiding and abetting such breaches, provided that the non-exculpated party acted with scienter. Claims against third-party advisors, including allegedly conflicted financial advisors, are discussed below in Section III.D.

2. Duty of Loyalty

Directors have a duty to act in a manner they believe to be in the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders. This includes a duty *not* to act in a manner adverse to those interests, such as by putting a personal interest or the interests of someone to whom the director is beholden ahead of the interests of the corporation and its stockholders.

The duty of loyalty requires that directors’ actions be motivated by a good faith belief that what they are doing is in the best interests of the corporation. The Delaware Supreme Court has confirmed that the traditional duty of loyalty “encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act

in good faith.”³¹ Directors violate their good faith obligations where they “intentionally act[] with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, . . . act[] with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or . . . intentionally fail[] to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for [their] duties.”³² Bad faith (which Delaware courts have held to be synonymous with an absence of good faith)³³ thus requires an inquiry into whether “directors utterly failed to attempt” to comply with their responsibilities, rather than merely “questioning whether disinterested, independent directors did everything that they (arguably) should have done.”³⁴

Understanding what constitutes a violation of the duty of loyalty is especially important because corporations may not exculpate their directors or officers for breaches of the duty of loyalty under Section 102(b)(7). The Delaware Supreme Court has held that if a plaintiff has failed to plead a duty of loyalty claim against a particular director, that director may be dismissed from the litigation, even where the plaintiff may have adequately pleaded loyalty claims against other members of the board.³⁵

A classic example of a breach of the duty of loyalty is a director engaging in an unfair “self-dealing” transaction. Another application of the duty of loyalty is the corporate opportunity doctrine, which generally prohibits directors from appropriating for themselves opportunities in which the corporation has some interest or expectancy, unless the corporation has renounced the opportunity in its charter or by board action.³⁶ More generally, courts will be concerned about a potential violation of the duty of loyalty any time a majority of directors are either (a) personally interested in a decision before the board or (b) not independent from someone who is interested in such a decision.³⁷ In such cases, as discussed below in Section II.C.2.a, courts will examine whether appropriate protective measures were employed to approximate arms’-length negotiations (such as a special committee of independent directors or the approval of disinterested stockholders) and, if such measures were absent or inadequate, will review the corporate action under the “entire fairness” level of scrutiny.³⁸

B. Controlling Stockholders

Unlike directors and officers, stockholders generally do not owe fiduciary duties to the corporation or its other stockholders. The exception to this general rule is a “controlling stockholder” or a “control group,” as defined under Section 144(e) of the DGCL. Such controlling stockholders and control groups do owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and other stockholders when they breach their duty of loyalty, act in bad faith, or derive an improper personal benefit from a transaction with the corporation or its stockholders.³⁹ A “[c]ontrolling stockholder” is any “person” that, together with its “affiliates and associates,” (i) owns or controls a majority of the corporation’s voting power entitled to vote generally in the election of directors or in the election of directors who have a majority of the board’s voting power, (ii) “[h]as the right, by contract or otherwise, to cause the election” of a majority of the board or directors who have a majority of the board votes, or (iii) owns or controls at least a third of the voting power and possesses the “power to exercise managerial authority over the business and affairs of the corporation.”⁴⁰ As to the last of these categories, case law predating the enactment of Section 144(e) provides for a fact-intensive inquiry into what constitutes “managerial authority.”⁴¹

A “control group” is defined as two or more persons who are not themselves controlling stockholders, but “by virtue of an agreement, arrangement, or understanding between or among such persons, constitute a controlling stockholder.”⁴² Case law predating the enactment of Section 144(e) articulated a similar test, requiring the plaintiff to prove that the “group of stockholders” were “‘connected in some legally significant way’—such as ‘by contract, common ownership, agreement, or other arrangement—to work together toward a shared goal.’”⁴³ For example, in *In re Hansen Medical, Inc. Stockholders Litigation*, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that plaintiff stockholders had sufficiently pleaded a “reasonably conceivable” claim that two constituent groups holding 34% and 31% of the company’s stock, respectively, together constituted a control group, on the basis of their 21-year history of investment cooperation and coordination.⁴⁴ On the other hand, the courts have held that the “mere concurrence of self-interest among certain stockholders” is insufficient to establish a control group absent “some indication of an actual agreement.”⁴⁵

Under Section 144(d)(5) of the DGCL, controlling stockholders and members of control groups are exculpated for monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care in their capacity as stockholders.⁴⁶

C. Structuring Transactions Under Delaware Law: Standards of Review and Statutory Safe Harbors

The fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are standards of conduct describing a director’s obligations to the corporation.⁴⁷ Potential liability for fiduciary breaches turns significantly on which standard of review the court applies when evaluating the directors’ decision making. Generally speaking, Delaware courts will review transactions and decisions under one of three possible levels of review: the business judgment rule, intermediate scrutiny, and entire fairness review. The appropriate standard of review in a given case will depend on the context of the corporate action or decision at issue. Transactional planners can structure deals in ways to avoid or prevent undue scrutiny under various common-law doctrines and the safe harbor provisions of Section 144 of the DGCL.

The standard of review or safe harbor applied by Delaware courts when reviewing a transaction will often depend on whether the transaction involved conflicted fiduciaries, and if so, whether the conflicted fiduciary was a controlling stockholder. In addition, certain corporate actions—specifically, change-of-control transactions and the use of defensive measures against potential threats to control—are subject to additional considerations, discussed in Section II.D.⁴⁸

1. Transactions with No Conflicted Fiduciary: the Business Judgment Rule

Where a transaction does not involve a conflicted director, officer, or controlling stockholder, Delaware courts will generally review the transaction under the deferential business judgment rule absent a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors. In the case of a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors in a transaction that does not involve a conflicted fiduciary, the business judgment rule may still apply if the transaction was approved by a majority of the company’s disinterested stockholders, voting on an informed and uncoerced basis.

The traditional business judgment rule is the default standard of review applicable to directors' decisions. Under the business judgment rule, the court will defer to, and not second guess, decisions made by directors who have fulfilled their duties of care and loyalty. The purpose of the rule is to “encourage[] corporate fiduciaries to attempt to increase stockholder wealth by engaging in those risks that, in their business judgment, are in the best interest of the corporation ‘without the debilitating fear that they will be held personally liable if the company experiences losses.’”⁴⁹ In the case of a Delaware corporation, the statutory basis for the business judgment rule is Section 141(a) of the DGCL, which provides that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”⁵⁰ The business judgment rule will presumptively apply to a transaction that has been approved by a board majority of independent and disinterested directors.⁵¹

In cases where the business judgment rule presumptively applies, directors' decisions are protected unless a plaintiff is able to prove that a board has breached its duty of loyalty or duty of care.⁵² This rule prevents courts and stockholders from interfering with managerial decisions made by a loyal and informed board unless the decisions cannot be “attributed to any rational business purpose.”⁵³ Indeed, the Delaware Court of Chancery has described business judgment review as a “bare rationality test.”⁵⁴ If a plaintiff is able to rebut the presumptive protections of the business judgment rule by adequately pleading that an apparently disinterested decision may have been tainted by a breach of fiduciary duty, its complaint will survive a motion to dismiss and a more searching standard of review may be applied, including potentially the more exacting standard of entire fairness.⁵⁵

2. Transactions Involving Conflicted Fiduciaries Who Are Not Controlling Stockholders

The involvement of a conflicted director, officer, or controlling stockholder in a transaction can result in the application of entire fairness review. Such scrutiny can be avoided, however, through statutory safe harbors or common law ratification. The 2025 amendments to Section 144 of the DGCL codified common law procedural mechanisms that, if followed, validate the transaction and insulate those approving it from claims for monetary damages. These statutory safe harbors provide strong protection against post-closing monetary damages claims based on change of control or other M&A transactions, and whether to comply with their requirements should be an upfront consideration in any process for considering a conflicted transaction. In addition to the statute, common law ratification can similarly provide for cleansing.

a. The Statutory Safe Harbor

Conflicted director or officer involvement in a transaction can trigger entire fairness review. Section 144(a) of the DGCL speaks directly to such transactions and provides a safe harbor for transactions where a director or officer of a corporation stands on the opposite side of the transaction from the corporation.

Section 144(a) provides a safe harbor for transactions involving conflicted directors and/or officers other than controlling stockholder transactions, which are discussed below in Section II.C.3. The statute offers two alternative paths to cleanse the transaction, avoid application of the

entire fairness standard, and limit liability and injunctive relief. First, under DGCL Section 144(a)(1), a transaction will obtain safe harbor protection if it is approved by a majority of the disinterested directors or—if a majority of directors are not disinterested—by a majority of the disinterested members of a special committee.⁵⁶ For special committee approval to be effective under 144(a)(1), the committee must be composed of at least two members, “each of whom the board of directors has determined to be a disinterested director with respect to the act or transaction.”⁵⁷ The “[m]aterial facts” regarding the “director’s or officer’s relationship or interest” must also be disclosed to all members of the board or the special committee approving the transaction in order for such approval to be effective for purposes of the safe harbor.⁵⁸ The standard for determining director disinterestedness is discussed in Section II.C.3.c.1 below.

The influence (and number) of interested directors on a board may be relevant in determining the desirability of forming a special committee. For example, if directors have a personal interest that conflicts with those of the public stockholders, the disinterested directors can act for the board.⁵⁹ In such cases, the board can approve a transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors then serving on the board of directors or a special committee.⁶⁰ It may therefore be sufficient for interested directors to recuse themselves from any deliberations and votes in connection with a proposed transaction. Even where a majority of directors is independent, however, delegation of negotiation or review functions to a special committee may be appropriate or expedient in certain contexts; however, there is no automatic need to create a special committee of directors, or to layer on separate newly retained advisors (legal or financial) in every instance where there may potentially be conflicts.

The need for a special committee may also shift as a transaction evolves. Acquirors that begin as third-party bidders may become affiliated with management directors, or management may organize and propose a management buyout in response to an unsolicited bid from a third party. Throughout a sale process, the board and its advisors must be aware of any conflicts or potential conflicts that arise. Failure to disclose such conflicts may result in substantial difficulties in defending the board’s actions in court.⁶¹

Second, Section 144(a)(2) provides an additional avenue for obtaining the statutory safe harbor, codifying a version of the long-standing *Corwin* doctrine, discussed below in Section II.C.2.b. Section 144(a)(2) provides that transactions involving conflicted directors or officers may obtain a safe harbor from judicial review if “approved or ratified by an informed, uncoerced, affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast by the disinterested stockholders.”⁶² Thus, transactions involving a conflicted fiduciary require approval only by a majority of the disinterested stockholder votes cast, rather than a majority of the disinterested votes outstanding. DGCL Section 144(a)(2) will not apply unless the stockholders’ vote was fully informed and uncoerced, as further discussed below.

b. Stockholder Cleansing

Delaware courts have long recognized the ability of stockholders to approve or ratify a transaction and thereby shield it from judicial scrutiny.⁶³ In 2015, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified the scope of this doctrine in *Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC*, holding that “the business judgment rule is invoked as the appropriate standard of review for a post-closing damages

action when a merger that is not subject to the entire fairness standard of review has been approved by a fully informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested stockholders.”⁶⁴ In doing so, the Court explained that the cleansing effect of stockholder approval applied regardless of whether the stockholder vote was held on a voluntary basis or was statutorily required to complete the transaction.⁶⁵ The Delaware Court of Chancery has since explained that the *Corwin* doctrine also applies to the acceptance of a tender offer by an uncoerced, disinterested stockholder majority as the first step of a two-step merger under Section 251(h) of the DGCL.⁶⁶

In subsequent opinions, the Delaware Supreme Court has made clear that the application of the business judgment rule following stockholder approval under *Corwin* precludes any attempt to rebut the rule based on allegations of breach of the duty of care.⁶⁷ The Court has further stressed that applying the business judgment rule in this context should typically result in dismissal, because the transaction would be shielded from attack on all grounds other than waste, and the “vestigial waste exception has long had little real-world relevance, because it has been understood that stockholders would be unlikely to approve a transaction that is wasteful.”⁶⁸ Importantly, the Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery have also extinguished aiding and abetting claims as part of the cleansing effect of *Corwin* on numerous occasions, thus providing for broader application than the statutory safe harbors.⁶⁹

1. Fully Informed Stockholder Vote

Corwin will only apply if the stockholders’ vote was fully informed. The plaintiff bears the initial burden of adequately pleading a material omission or misstatement.⁷⁰ If the plaintiff is successful, the defendant will bear the burden of proving that the vote was fully informed.⁷¹ In order for the stockholders’ vote to be viewed as fully informed, stockholders must be apprised of the material facts regarding the transaction.⁷² Under Delaware law, a fact is material “if there is a substantial likelihood that . . . [it] would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information made available.”⁷³

Because a fully informed vote can be the determining factor in whether a transaction is afforded business judgment deference under *Corwin*, complete and accurate disclosure of material information before any stockholder vote is of particular importance in this context. Delaware courts have refused to grant business judgment deference under *Corwin* where stockholder disclosures are considered to be potentially inadequate. In *Morrison v. Berry*, for example, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a *Corwin*-based dismissal, finding that the company’s disclosures misleadingly represented the founder’s agreement with the buyer to roll over his equity interest in a transaction and that the founder had stated that he would sell his shares absent a transaction.⁷⁴ The Court held that “‘partial and elliptical disclosures’ cannot facilitate the protection of the business judgment rule under the *Corwin* doctrine.”⁷⁵ In *Appel v. Berkman*, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed another *Corwin*-based dismissal where a target company in a front-end tender offer transaction failed to disclose that its founder and former CEO abstained from the board’s vote on the transaction and held off on deciding whether or not to tender his shares due to his disagreement with the board’s assessment of the fairness or timing of the transaction.⁷⁶ In *Xura*, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that *Corwin* deference was not appropriate where the plaintiffs adequately pled several inadequate disclosures, including failing to disclose that the company’s CEO had regularly communicated with the acquiror and negotiated price terms without

the board's knowledge.⁷⁷ And in *Chester County Employees' Retirement Fund v. KCG Holdings, Inc.*, the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to apply *Corwin* deference where plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the company failed to disclose, among other things, that the CEO had initially voted against the company's proposed counteroffer on the basis that the price was too low, but later supported the transaction at a lower price after negotiating a compensation pool for himself.⁷⁸ On the other hand, even where deficient disclosures prevent the application of *Corwin* deference, they do not constitute a *per se* fiduciary breach in the absence of an adequately pleaded claim for breach of fiduciary duty.⁷⁹

2. Uncoerced Stockholder Vote

To obtain business judgment deference under *Corwin*, the stockholder vote must also be uncoerced. Coercion in this context refers to two related concepts—"structural coercion" and "situational coercion."⁸⁰ Structural coercion arises where "a vote [is] structured so that considerations extraneous to the transaction likely influenced the stockholder-voters, so that [the Court] cannot determine that the vote represents a stockholder decision that the challenged transaction is in the corporate interest."⁸¹ In *Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp.*, for example, the Court of Chancery found it reasonably conceivable that the transactions being challenged had been approved through a structurally coercive stockholder vote sufficient to prevent the use of a *Corwin* defense, because certain value-enhancing transactions had been conditioned on the approval of the challenged transactions, and that the challenged transactions therefore had not been evaluated solely on their own merit.⁸²

Other structural characteristics of a stockholder vote may render *Corwin* cleansing unavailable. For example, the Delaware Court of Chancery held in *Delman v. GigAcquisitions3* that a de-SPAC merger was not entitled to *Corwin* cleansing because the public stockholders' voting interests were decoupled from their economic interests.⁸³ The Court reasoned that the public stockholders lacked any incentive to vote against a merger, since they could instead redeem their shares if they disfavored a merger, and even redeeming stockholders were incentivized to vote for a merger to preserve the value of warrants included in their investments.⁸⁴

Situational coercion arises where "the status quo is so unattractive that it prevents a stockholder vote from operating as a clear endorsement of a transaction" for purposes of stockholder ratification.⁸⁵ For instance, in *In re Saba Software, Inc. Stockholder Litigation*, the Delaware Court of Chancery refused to grant business judgment deference under *Corwin* after finding it reasonably conceivable that the stockholder vote was coerced because stockholders were presented with a "Hobson's choice" between approving the merger in question or holding shares that had recently been de-listed as a result of the company's inexplicable and repeated failure to restate its financials.⁸⁶

3. Transactions Involving Conflicted Controlling Stockholders

Self-dealing transactions or other corporate transactions that provide material benefits to controlling stockholders not shared generally with other stockholders will, by default, trigger entire fairness review. The 2025 amendments to DGCL Section 144, however, provide safe harbors for "going private transaction[s]" and other transactions involving conflicted controlling stockholders.

a. Going-Private Transactions

Section 144(e) defines a “going private transaction” by reference to a “Rule 13e-3 transaction” under the federal securities laws (for corporations subject to the Exchange Act) or otherwise as a transaction, like a merger, in which “all or substantially all of the shares of the corporation’s capital stock held by the disinterested stockholders (but not those of the controlling stockholder or control group) are cancelled, converted, purchased, or otherwise acquired or cease to be outstanding.”⁸⁷

Under Section 144(c), a going private transaction will be shielded against damages and equitable relief if it is *both* (a) approved in good faith and without gross negligence by the majority of disinterested directors on a committee that is informed of the material facts of the transaction and expressly delegated with the authority to negotiate and reject the transaction; *and* (b) conditioned upon and approved by the informed and uncoerced vote of a majority of votes cast by minority stockholders.

For going-private controlling stockholder transactions, the use of a special committee alone shifts the burden of proof regarding entire fairness from the defendant to the plaintiff, thus requiring the plaintiff to prove that a transaction was not entirely fair, rather than requiring the defendant to prove that it was entirely fair. That said, the quantum of proof needed under entire fairness is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which has led the Delaware Supreme Court to note that the effect of a burden shift is “modest,” as it will only prove dispositive in the rare instance where the evidence is entirely in equipoise.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the Delaware Supreme Court has also stressed that it views the use of special committees as part of the “best practices that are used to establish a fair dealing process,” and thus special committees remain important in conflict transactions.⁸⁹

b. “Other” Controlling Stockholder Transactions

Section 144(b) of the DGCL defines “controlling stockholder transactions” that are not “going private transactions” as other acts or transactions (i) “between the corporation or one or more of its subsidiaries, on the one hand, and a controlling stockholder or a control group, on the other hand,” or (ii) “from which a controlling stockholder or a control group receives a financial or other benefit not shared with the corporation’s stockholders generally.”

Section 144(b) offers two paths to a safe harbor from “equitable relief” or “an award of damages” for such “controlling stockholder transactions.”⁹⁰ The safe harbor will apply if the transaction is subject to *either* the approval of a special committee *or* the majority of the votes cast by disinterested stockholders.⁹¹ The amendments thus overturn the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in *In re Match Group, Inc. Derivative Litigation*, which held that all transactions involving conflicted controllers required approval by *both* a committee of disinterested directors *and* an informed and uncoerced minority stockholder vote to avoid fairness review.⁹²

c. **Effective Special Committees**

Delaware law has long encouraged boards to utilize a “special committee” of independent directors when a conflict transaction is proposed. As discussed at greater length below, the purpose of a special committee is to reproduce the dynamics of arm’s-length bargaining.

Section 144 sets forth the criteria required for a special committee vote to be effective for purposes of the statutory safe harbors. To obtain the safe harbors available in Sections 144(a)-(c), the special committee must consist of two or more directors and the board of directors must determine that each committee member is disinterested with respect to the transaction.⁹³ For controlling stockholder transactions, the committee must also be “expressly delegated the authority to negotiate (or oversee the negotiation of) and to reject such controlling stockholder transaction.”⁹⁴ Even though the board of directors must determine that all special committee members are disinterested with respect to the transaction, the special committee is effective as long as the transaction is approved by a majority of the directors on the committee who are in fact disinterested.⁹⁵ In other words, the safe harbor will still apply if a court later determines that a member of the committee is not disinterested—despite the board’s contrary determination—so long as the majority of the committee is independent. Pre-amendment case law indicates that the special committee should have its own legal and financial advisors.⁹⁶

For non-going-private conflicted transactions, the use of a well-functioning special committee alone provides a statutory safe harbor from judicial review for claims for equitable relief or monetary damages against directors, officers or controllers.⁹⁷ Under the common law, the use of a special committee alone in a going-private controlling stockholder transaction shifts the burden of proof regarding entire fairness from the defendant to the plaintiff. Factors considered in determining whether a special committee functioned adequately are further described below.

1. Disinterestedness

The 2025 amendments to DGCL Section 144 define a “[d]isinterested director” to mean a director “who is not a party to the act or transaction and does not have a material interest in the act or transaction or a material relationship with a person that has a material interest in the act or transaction.”⁹⁸ The new DGCL Sections 144(e)(7) and (8) define a “material interest” and a “material relationship” as follows:

Material interest: An “actual or potential benefit, including the avoidance of a detriment, other than [one] which would devolve on the corporation or the stockholders generally, that . . . would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the director’s judgment when participating in the negotiation, authorization, or approval of the act or transaction at issue.”

Material relationship: A “familial, financial, professional, employment, or other relationship that . . . would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the director’s judgment when participating in the negotiation, authorization, or approval of the act or transaction at issue.”

Although these definitions encompass factual issues similar to those commonly addressed in pre-amendment cases assessing director independence, the amended Section 144 curtails the applicability of these definitions through a new heightened presumption of disinterestedness for certain public company directors. Specifically, Section 144(d)(2) provides that public company directors are presumed to be disinterested in a transaction if they are not a party to the transaction and the board of directors has “determined that such director satisfies the applicable criteria for determining director independence from the corporation and, if applicable,” the controller, under the rules of the corporation’s stock exchange.⁹⁹ The statute further provides that the presumption “shall be heightened and may only be rebutted by substantial and particularized facts that such director has a material interest in such act or transaction or has a material relationship with a person with a material interest in such act or transaction.”¹⁰⁰

In determining director independence and disinterestedness, a board should have its directors disclose their compensatory, financial and business relationships, as well as any significant social or personal ties that could be expected to impair their ability to discharge their duties. The Delaware Supreme Court has stressed that all of these factors must be considered “in their totality and not in isolation from each other.”¹⁰¹ Paying close attention to which directors are selected to serve on a special committee is important, and care should be taken to vet the disinterestedness of those selected.¹⁰² The use of a special committee will not shift the burden of proving unfairness to the plaintiffs if the directors on the committee are viewed as “beholden” to a controlling stockholder.¹⁰³ Even if a director does not have a direct personal interest in the matter being reviewed, the director will not be considered qualified if he or she has a “material relationship” with another person or entity that has a material interest in the transaction.

Certain compensatory relationships have led to independence concerns in cases decided before the 2025 amendments to DGCL Section 144.¹⁰⁴ Familial relationships may also be disqualifying.¹⁰⁵ And the confluence of business and social relationships may together compromise a director’s independence.¹⁰⁶ That said, the Court of Chancery has indicated that credible testimony from directors that their decision-making was consistent with the duty of loyalty could overcome the types of “familial ties, personal friendships, ‘thick’ business relationships, [or] cross-investments” that give rise to potential conflicts.¹⁰⁷

Not all relationships between special committee members and management or controlling stockholders will give rise to independence concerns, however, and Delaware courts have offered broad guidance on this topic. For example, Delaware courts have rejected the concept of “structural bias,” *i.e.*, the view that the professional and social relationships that naturally develop among members of a board impede independent decision-making,¹⁰⁸ and have likewise rejected the argument that a director lacks independence from an alleged controller because the director is allegedly beholden to someone else who, in turn, is allegedly beholden to the controller (the so-called “transitive theory” of conflict),¹⁰⁹ or that a stockholder’s ability to remove a director at will is sufficient, without more, to show that a director lacks independence.¹¹⁰ Moreover, DGCL Section 144(d)(3) now makes clear that “[t]he designation, nomination, or vote in the election of the director to the board of directors by any person that has a material interest in an act or transaction shall not, of itself, be evidence that a director is not a disinterested director with respect to an act or transaction to which such director is not a party.”¹¹¹ And DGCL Section 144(e)(4) codifies the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in *M&F Worldwide* that neither “the existence of

some financial ties between the interested party and the director” nor “allegations that directors are friendly with, travel in the same social circles as, or have past business relationships with the proponent of a transaction” are sufficient to rebut the presumption of independence.¹¹²

2. Role and Process

The function of a special committee is to protect stockholder interests by delegating a decision to a group of disinterested directors in cases where the interests of certain directors (such as directors participating in a management buyout or representing a controlling stockholder) differ significantly from those of the public stockholders. As the Delaware Court of Chancery has explained, “[t]he formation of a special committee can serve as ‘powerful evidence of fair dealing,’ but it is not necessary every time a board makes a decision.”¹¹³

As explained above, the use of such a well-functioning special committee will invoke safe harbors from judicial review for transactions involving conflicted fiduciaries, depending on the context. To achieve these safe harbor protections, the special committee must follow the procedures prescribed under Section 144.

For a controlling stockholder transaction to obtain safe harbor protection under Section 144, the special committee must be “expressly delegated the authority to negotiate (or oversee the negotiation of) and to reject such controlling stockholder transaction.”¹¹⁴ The committee must also do its work “in good faith and without gross negligence.”¹¹⁵ To meet these requirements, a special committee should generally receive independent financial and legal advice, negotiate diligently and without the influence of the controlling stockholder, and should possess all relevant material information,¹¹⁶ including the “[m]aterial facts as to such controlling stockholder transaction (including the controlling stockholder’s or control group’s interest therein).”¹¹⁷ The controlling stockholder need not, however, disclose information relating to its reservation price, how it would finance a purchase or invest the proceeds from a sale, or other information that “would undermine the potential for arm’s-length negotiations to take place.”¹¹⁸

The special committee should have a clear conception of its role, which should include the power to say no to the potential transaction.¹¹⁹ In *Southern Peru*, for instance, the Delaware Court of Chancery criticized the role of the special committee in reviewing a merger proposal from a controlling stockholder, holding that the special committee’s “approach to negotiations was stilted and influenced by its uncertainty about whether it was actually empowered to negotiate.”¹²⁰

The Delaware Court of Chancery has also found, in pre-amendment decisions, other flaws in a special committee’s process sufficient to render the committee “coopted” by the controller at the pleading stage. In *Giffuni v. Cornerstone Building Brands, Inc.*, for example, the Court criticized the special committee for engaging in hypothetical price negotiations, including a hypothetical “best and final indicative valuation,” while a standstill provision was in effect.¹²¹ The Court held that it was reasonably conceivable, based on the special committee’s willingness to engage in such “semantic somersaults,” that the committee had operated with a controlled mindset.¹²²

Special committees and their advisors should be proactive in seeking all relevant information (potentially including valuation information and information held by management or

the transaction proponent) and in negotiating diligently on behalf of stockholders.¹²³ The records of the deliberations of a special committee and the full board should reflect careful and informed consideration of the issues.¹²⁴

Special committees (and the full board of directors, when applicable) should maintain a clear record of their processes. Delaware courts have long encouraged stockholders to use DGCL Section 220, which provides stockholders a limited right to inspect corporate books and records, to identify evidence of wrongdoing before initiating a lawsuit.¹²⁵ In 2025, Section 220 was amended to limit the scope of the stockholder inspection right in most circumstances to core corporate documents, such as the charter, bylaws, and stockholders' agreements; minutes and materials of stockholders' meetings and board of directors' meetings; annual financial statements; and director and officer questionnaires.¹²⁶ When a stockholder seeks and uses such documents to file plenary litigation challenging the work of a special committee, the materials produced in the course of the Section 220 inspection will be incorporated by reference into the complaint to allow the court to see the full context of the production when testing the sufficiency of the allegations.¹²⁷ Boards and special committees should therefore carefully document in such core corporate documents their processes for negotiating and approving a transaction.

3. Selection of Advisors

The best practice is for the special committee itself, rather than management or a controlling stockholder, to choose its own financial and legal advisors. In *Macmillan*, the Delaware Supreme Court was critical of the conduct of an auction to sell the company in which a financial advisor selected by the company's CEO, rather than by the special committee, played a dominant role.¹²⁸ In *In re Tele-Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation*,¹²⁹ the Court found that the special committee's decision to use the company's legal and financial advisors rather than retaining independent advisors "raise[d] questions regarding the quality and independence of the counsel and advice received." And in *Gesoff v. IIC Industries Inc.*,¹³⁰ the Court strongly criticized a special committee's use of advisors who were handpicked by the majority stockholder seeking a merger.

Whether the special committee should retain advisors with a previous relationship with the corporation is a context-specific decision. While having a special committee advised by firms that have close ties to the company may raise independence concerns, it is not in all cases better for the special committee to choose advisors who are unfamiliar with the company or to avoid hiring advisors who have done prior work for the company. In one case, the Delaware Court of Chancery criticized a process in which the company's historical advisors were "co-opted" by the majority stockholder, leaving the special committee with independent advisors who did not know the company well and who lacked the information available to the majority stockholder's advisors.¹³¹

As a practical matter, some companies may have had at least some prior dealings with close to all of the financial or legal advisors who would have the relevant experience and expertise to advise a special committee on a transaction that is particularly complicated or of a certain size. If the special committee chooses to engage an advisor with such prior dealings, it should carefully document any potential conflict, the reasons the special committee considered it important to engage the advisor, and the measures the special committee took to mitigate any such conflict.

Such measures may include negotiating carefully worded confidentiality provisions and structuring the advisor's fee to prevent any misaligned incentives. The committee may also choose to hire a second advisor for a particular role, although it should take care to ensure that the second advisor's presence will successfully mitigate the conflict that has been identified—for example, by ensuring that the new advisor is not merely a “secondary actor,” and by not compensating it on a contingent basis.¹³² Interviewing several advisors, and ensuring a record of such through board and committee minutes, will also help to show that a special committee was aware of its options and made an informed decision in hiring its advisors, without delegating the decision to management.

Keeping a careful record of the special committees' deliberations regarding potential advisor conflicts also helps ensure that adequate disclosures are made in connection with an unaffiliated stockholder vote. The Delaware Supreme Court recently reversed two separate decisions of the Court of Chancery that had dismissed complaints, finding fault in each with disclosures that omitted detail about prior and concurrent work that the sell-side advisors were doing for the buyers.¹³³ Importantly, insufficient disclosures may result in a non-exculpated fiduciary claim based on claim of bad faith if the directors “intentionally withheld or failed to disclose the material information in conscious disregard of their fiduciary duties.”¹³⁴

D. Enhanced Judicial Review of Change-of-Control Situations

There are certain situations in which Delaware courts will not defer to board decisions under the traditional business judgment rule. These include a board's (a) approval of transactions involving a sale of control¹³⁵ and (b) adoption of defensive mechanisms in response to an alleged threat to corporate control or policy.¹³⁶

In these circumstances, board action is subject to judicial review under an “enhanced scrutiny” standard, which examines the substantive reasonableness of both the board's process and its action. The Delaware Court of Chancery has explained that “[e]nhanced scrutiny applies when the realities of the decision-making context can subtly undermine the decisions of even independent and disinterested directors.”¹³⁷ The decision-making process, including the information relied on, must satisfy the court's enhanced, or intermediate, standard. In addition, under the enhanced scrutiny test, unlike under the traditional business judgment rule, the court will need to be satisfied that the directors' decisions were objectively reasonable rather than merely rational.¹³⁸ These tests have greatest utility before (as compared to after) a stockholder vote and when a third-party bidder or other plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief.¹³⁹ As discussed further above in Section II.C.1, when a board decision that would otherwise be subject to enhanced scrutiny under *Revlon* is approved via a fully informed, uncoerced vote of a majority of the disinterested stockholders, the standard of review shifts to business judgment.¹⁴⁰

Importantly, the Section 144 safe harbors discussed above are not intended to “[l]imit judicial review for purposes of injunctive relief of provisions or devices designed or intended to deter, delay, or preclude a change of control or other transaction involving the corporation or a change in the composition of the board of directors.”¹⁴¹ As a result, the enhanced scrutiny standard of review applied to a sale of control or defensive measures adopted in response to corporate

control or policy remain essential considerations for transactional planning purposes, particularly at the pre-closing stage.

1. Sale of Control Transactions

Transactions involving a “sale of control” or “change of control” of a corporation (*i.e.*, a merger in which all or a preponderant percentage of the consideration paid to the corporation’s stockholders is cash, or a merger that results in a corporation having a controlling stockholder) are subject to enhanced judicial review.¹⁴² In *Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.*, the Delaware Supreme Court held that in a sale of control context, directors must attempt to achieve the highest value reasonably available for stockholders.¹⁴³ Under this conception of *Revlon*, if a board is choosing between two or more capable bidders presenting transactions that are comparable in terms of timing and likelihood of consummation, it must look solely to price. Specifically, a board comparing two or more all cash offers cannot, for example, choose the lower one because it has advantages for “constituencies” other than common stockholders, such as management, employees, customers, and preferred stockholders.

But even when *Revlon* requires that a board seek the highest value reasonably available, it is also true that “there is no single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its duties” in the *Revlon* context.¹⁴⁴ The Delaware Supreme Court has held that “[i]f a board selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should not second-guess that choice even though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s determination.”¹⁴⁵ This flexibility is particularly significant in determining a board’s *Revlon* obligations when it is considering a friendly merger for cash but does not wish to engage in pre-signing negotiations with more than one partner. The Court has stressed that “[w]hen a board exercises its judgment in good faith, tests the transaction through a viable passive market check, and gives its stockholders a fully informed, uncoerced opportunity to vote to accept the deal,” the board’s *Revlon* obligations are likely met.¹⁴⁶

a. When Does *Revlon* Apply?

The *Revlon* “duty to seek the best available price applies only when a company embarks on a transaction—on its own initiative or in response to an unsolicited offer—that will result in a change of control.”¹⁴⁷ The most common example of this is where the board of a non-controlled company decides to enter into a definitive agreement to sell the company in an all-cash deal. But where the board does not embark on a change-of-control transaction, such as when it is arguably put “in play” by the actions of outsiders,¹⁴⁸ *Revlon* review will not apply. Accordingly, enhanced scrutiny is not triggered by a board’s refusal to engage in negotiations where an offeror invites discussion of a friendly (or unfriendly) deal.¹⁴⁹ Nor does *Revlon* obligate a company that has embarked on a sale process to complete a sale process, even if the offers received are at a substantial premium to the company’s current trading value.

In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court held in its seminal 1989 opinion in *Time-Warner* that *Revlon* will not apply to a merger transaction in which there is no change-of-control, such as in a purely stock-for-stock merger between two non-controlled companies. Rather, the ordinary business judgment rule applies to the decision of a board to enter into a merger agreement under

those circumstances.¹⁵⁰ But the Delaware Supreme Court later clarified in its decision in *Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.* that a stock-for-stock merger is considered to involve a sale of control when a corporation that has no controlling stockholder pre-merger would have a controlling stockholder post-merger.¹⁵¹ The reason that pure stock-for-stock mergers between non-controlled entities do not result in a *Revlon*-inducing “change-of-control” is that such combinations simply shift “control” of the seller from one dispersed generality of public stockholders to a differently constituted group that still has no controlling stockholder. Accordingly, the future prospect of a potential sale of control at a premium is preserved for the selling company’s stockholders. This principle applies even if the acquired company in an all-stock merger is very small in relation to the buyer. Despite the formal difference between the standards of review applicable to stock-for-stock transactions, the Delaware courts have indicated that the doctrinal distinction is not absolute, and, even in all-stock transactions, directors are accordingly well advised to consider alternatives for maximizing long-term stockholder value and to take care that the record reflects such consideration.¹⁵²

In addition, the *Time-Warner* decision makes clear that so long as the initial merger agreement did not itself involve a change-of-control transaction, the appearance of an unsolicited second bid (whether cash or stock) does not in and of itself impose *Revlon* duties on the target board. Rather, the seller in a strategic stock-for-stock deal, as a matter of law, is free to continue to pursue the original proposed merger, assuming it has satisfied the applicable standard. As the Court said, “[d]irectors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.”¹⁵³ In other words, a *Revlon* situation cannot be unwillingly forced upon a board that has not itself elected to engage in a change-of-control transaction. Absent circumstances defined in *Revlon* and its progeny—that is, a decision by the board to engage in a change of control transaction—a board is not obligated to choose short-term over long-term value and, likewise, “is not under any *per se* duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a takeover.”¹⁵⁴ Thus, even if an unsolicited bid provides greater short-term value than a stock-for-stock merger, the target’s board may attempt to preserve or achieve for its shareholders the business benefits of the original merger transaction so long as the original merger does not itself constitute a change of control. But as discussed below in Section II.D.2, *Unocal* review applies to a board’s defensive measures in the face of a competing bid, even when neither bid is subject to *Revlon* review.

Whether *Revlon* scrutiny applies in the context of the sale of a company with a controlling stockholder to a third party is presently unclear.¹⁵⁵ Analytically, where a company already has a controlling stockholder, “control” is not an asset owned by the minority stockholders and, thus, those shareholders should not be entitled to a control premium. In *In re Synthes*, the Delaware Court of Chancery held, therefore, that the sale of controlled companies does not invoke *Revlon* review.¹⁵⁶ This rule was questioned, however, in *Firefighters’ Pension System of the City of Kansas City v. Presidio, Inc.*, which concluded that *Revlon* should be the applicable standard of review if the transaction could not be cleansed under the *Corwin* doctrine, discussed above.¹⁵⁷

Although it is clear that all-cash deals invoke *Revlon* review and all-stock deals do not, the standard is less clear with regard to situations in which the consideration is mixed. A line of Delaware authority—beginning with *In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp.* (where cash was 33% of the transaction consideration) and continuing, most recently, with *Flannery v. Genomic Health Inc.*

(where cash was 42% of the transaction consideration)—has held that transactions in which cash represented less than half of the consideration would not be subjected to *Revlon* review.¹⁵⁸ But the Delaware Court of Chancery has ruled that the *Revlon* standard would likely apply to half-cash, half-stock mergers, reasoning that enhanced judicial scrutiny was in order because a significant portion “of the stockholders’ investment . . . will be converted to cash and thereby be deprived of its long-run potential.”¹⁵⁹

Revlon applies after the board actually makes the decision to embark on a change-of-control transaction and not while it is exploring whether or not to do so.¹⁶⁰ Accordingly, the board may change its mind at any time before making the decision to enter into a transaction. But once a board makes a decision that attracts the heightened *Revlon* level of scrutiny, courts may look back at the board’s behavior during the exploration process and may be critical of actions taken that appear unreasonable and inconsistent with the board’s duty to maximize stockholder value.¹⁶¹ For this reason, it is important for boards and their advisors to keep a good record of the reasons for taking their actions.

b. What Constitutes Value Maximization?

Revlon does not require boards to simply accept the highest nominal offer for a company. A board may conclude that a cash offer, although “higher” in terms of price than another cash offer, is substantially less likely to be consummated; the risk of non-consummation is directly related to value. Directors “should analyze the entire situation and evaluate in a disciplined manner the consideration being offered.”¹⁶² In the context of two all-cash bids, under certain circumstances a board may choose to take a bid that is “fully financed, fully investigated and able to close” promptly over a nominally higher, yet more uncertain, competing offer.¹⁶³ Bids that present serious issues concerning regulatory approval or the buyer’s ability to close may be viewed as less attractive, although nominally higher, than offers that are more certain of consummation. In addition, “where stock or other non-cash consideration is involved, the board should try to quantify its value, if feasible, to achieve an objective comparison of the alternatives.”¹⁶⁴

An example of judicial deference to a board’s strategic decisions when conducting a sale of control is *In re Dollar Thrifty Shareholder Litigation*,¹⁶⁵ where the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to enjoin the completion of Dollar Thrifty’s merger with Hertz, finding that the Dollar Thrifty board had not violated its duties in declining a higher bid made post-signing, because the directors had concluded that the new bidder lacked the resources to finance the deal, and that the deal was subject to greater antitrust risk.¹⁶⁶ The Court wrote that “directors are generally free to select the path to value maximization [under *Revlon*], so long as they choose a reasonable route to get there.”¹⁶⁷ Similarly, the Delaware Court of Chancery refused to enjoin a stockholder vote on a proposed merger between Family Dollar Stores and Dollar Tree Stores when the Family Dollar board turned down a facially higher bid from Dollar General, Inc.¹⁶⁸ The Court held that the independent directors properly complied with their fiduciary duties and were justified in concluding that “a financially superior offer on paper does not equate to a financially superior transaction in the real world if there is a meaningful risk that the transaction will not close for antitrust reasons.”¹⁶⁹ At the same time, the Delaware courts also show deference to boards that have pursued facially higher value but riskier transactions. Last year, the Court of Chancery’s ruling in *Pfizer Inc. v. Metsera, Inc. et al.* declined to restrain a target board from declaring a third-

party overbid as a “Superior Company Proposal” under an existing merger agreement despite the significant antitrust risk it presented.¹⁷⁰

The importance of judicial recognition that a board may give weight to deal certainty in determining what transaction to pursue has been heightened by recent trends. These include increased regulatory risks, as discussed in Section I.D, and the willingness of acquirors to seek to escape closing by alleging that circumstances have caused a material adverse effect, or that there is another basis for non-consummation. A 2023 decision from the Delaware Court of Chancery crediting a board’s consideration of antitrust risk in evaluating its strategic options, *Teamsters Local 677 Health Services & Insurance Plan v. Martell*,¹⁷¹ underscores that boards are entitled to take risks to closing into account.

c. What Sort of Sale Process is Necessary?

Boards have substantial latitude to decide what tactics will result in the best price. As the Delaware Supreme Court has made clear, “*Revlon* and its progeny do not set out a specific route that a board must follow when fulfilling its fiduciary duties, and an independent board is entitled to use its business judgment to decide to enter into a strategic transaction that promises great benefit, even when it creates certain risks.”¹⁷² The Delaware Supreme Court further noted in *Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan* that a board’s decisions “must be reasonable, not perfect.”¹⁷³ *Revlon* does not “demand that every change in the control of a Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated bidding contest.”¹⁷⁴ Courts have recognized that, in general, disinterested board decisions as to how to manage a sale process are protected by the business judgment rule. In *Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.*, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that “[i]n the absence of self-interest . . . the actions of an independent board of directors in designing and conducting a corporate auction are protected by the business judgment rule.”¹⁷⁵ A board approving any sale of control must also be informed concerning the development of the transaction, alternatives, valuation issues and all material terms of the merger agreement. Thus, even in the change-of-control context reviewed under *Revlon*’s enhanced scrutiny, a board retains a good deal of authority to determine how to obtain the best value reasonably available to stockholders.

The Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in *In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. Shareholder Litigation* illustrates that well-advised boards have wide latitude in structuring sale processes.¹⁷⁶ The Court’s noteworthy holdings included, among others: (1) rejection of the plaintiffs’ claims that a 3.75% break-up fee and matching rights unreasonably deterred additional bids; (2) approval of the board’s decision to permit two of the competing private equity firms in the deal to “club” together, which potentially reduced the number of competing bidders in later rounds but was designed to facilitate bidding; (3) the rejection of allegations of a conflict of interest on the part of the CEO arising out of his stock and option holdings; and (4) the rejection of claims that the board’s financial advisor’s advice was tainted by the terms of its engagement letter, which provided for greater fees in the event of a sale of the whole company versus some smaller transaction. The opinion reaffirmed the principle that courts will not second-guess well-informed, good faith decisions that need to be made to bring a sale process to successful conclusion.

A board is permitted to forego a pre-signing market check if the merger agreement permits the emergence of a higher bid after signing and contains reasonable deal protection measures.¹⁷⁷

The Delaware Court of Chancery has explained that “there is no bright-line rule that directors must conduct a pre-agreement market check or shop the company,” and “as long as the Board retained significant flexibility to deal with any later-emerging bidder and ensured that the market would have a healthy period of time to digest the proposed transaction, and no other bidder emerged, the Board could be assured that it had obtained the best transaction reasonably attainable.”¹⁷⁸ Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that a post-signing market check “does not have to involve an active solicitation, so long as interested bidders have an opportunity to present a higher-value alternative, and the board has the flexibility to eschew the original transaction and accept the higher-value deal.”¹⁷⁹ The Court instead held that a “passive market check” which “enabled the board to terminate the transaction . . . if a more favorable deal emerged” was sufficient.¹⁸⁰ But as explained in *In re Topps Co. Shareholders Litigation*, if a *bona fide*, financially capable bidder emerges during a “go-shop” period prescribed under the merger agreement, a board must conduct serious negotiations with it.¹⁸¹ If *Revlon* applies, the board should fully engage, and make an appropriate record of such engagement, with the bidder on both price and non-price terms to determine if a truly “superior” transaction is available.

Although there is no requirement that selling boards shop their companies to all classes of potential bidders,¹⁸² Delaware courts have criticized certain sale processes in which the board unreasonably failed to consider certain categories of buyers. In *In re Netsmart Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation*, the Court of Chancery found that the board failed to fully inform itself about possible bidders in its auction process, because management and the company’s advisors assumed strategic buyers would not be interested and therefore contacted only potential private equity buyers.¹⁸³ The Court held that a fiduciary violation was likely because it found that the private equity route was favorable to management, potentially biasing them toward such buyers.¹⁸⁴ Because no higher bid had emerged, the Court refused to enjoin the transaction and risk losing the deal entirely, but it did require more accurate disclosure to stockholders of the board’s decision-making process, including its failure to contact potential strategic buyers.¹⁸⁵ Similarly, in *Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc.*, the Delaware Court of Chancery criticized a board’s decision to forego a market check when the deal price was well below the low end of the bankers’ valuation, and potential private equity bidders were unable to renew discussions because they had signed standstill agreements containing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” provisions.¹⁸⁶ Although the Court refused to enjoin the transaction and risk scuttling a premium offer, *NetSpend* nonetheless serves as a reminder that boards engaging in single-bidder sales strategies and deploying contractual features such as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” standstills must do so as part of a robust and carefully designed strategy. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” provisions are discussed in more depth in Section V.A.2.

Delaware courts have found *Revlon* violations only in rare cases, usually involving unusual, or unusually egregious, circumstances.¹⁸⁷ In 2015, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery to impose substantial aiding-and-abetting liability on the lead financial advisor of the Rural/Metro ambulance company in that company’s sale to a private equity firm.¹⁸⁸ Such aiding-and-abetting liability was predicated on a finding of a *Revlon* violation. The Court found the sale process flawed because the company’s lead financial advisor (a) deliberately timed the process to coincide with a strategic process involving another ambulance company to try to obtain lucrative financing work, (b) attempted to provide staple financing to whomever bought Rural, and (c) presented flawed valuation materials.¹⁸⁹ The financial advisor

did not disclose these conflicts to the board. Indeed, the board was not aware of the financial advisor's efforts to provide buy-side financing to the buyer, had not received any valuation information until a few hours before the meeting to approve the deal and did not know that the advisor had manipulated the valuation metrics.¹⁹⁰ Applying enhanced scrutiny under *Revlon*, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that the directors had acted unreasonably and therefore violated their fiduciary duties. The Court then held that the financial advisor had aided and abetted this fiduciary breach and was liable for almost \$76 million in damages to the stockholders, even though the company that was sold entered bankruptcy shortly afterward.¹⁹¹ On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed and ruled that the presence of a secondary financial advisor did not cure the defects in the lead advisor's work, and that the post-signing market check could not substitute for the board's lack of information about the transaction.¹⁹² The *Rural/Metro* case is further discussed in Section III.D.

And in 2018, the Delaware Court of Chancery found a *Revlon* violation in the sale of the circuit company PLX Technology, Inc.¹⁹³ The Court found that the sale process was undermined by the conflicting interest of an activist hedge fund and its designee on PLX's board, who vocally advocated for a "quick sale [of PLX] that would serve their interests" in "achieving quick profits."¹⁹⁴ The Court found that the hedge fund and its designee's conflict ultimately "undermine[d] the [b]oard's process and led the board into a deal that it otherwise would not have approved."¹⁹⁵ The key facts the Court relied on in reaching this conclusion included that the board allowed the hedge fund to take control of the sale process and instructed management to generate lower revenue projections so as to support a sale at the deal price.¹⁹⁶ As in *Rural/Metro*, the Court also emphasized that the board's decision was not fully informed, noting that the board agreed to the final deal price before receiving a stand-alone valuation of PLX, and that the hedge fund and the company's financial advisor failed to advise the board that the buyer had informed the company's financial advisor of its plans to bid for PLX and that it was willing to pay a higher price than PLX's board ultimately approved.¹⁹⁷ The Delaware Court of Chancery's opinion underscores that activists who join boards must adhere to the same fiduciary duties as other directors and must place the interests of the company and all its stockholders above any personal, fund-specific, or short-sighted interests.

2. Defensive Measures

Courts also apply an enhanced level of scrutiny to the adoption of defensive measures against potential threats to control. Directors who adopt such defensive measures carry the burden of proving that their process and conduct satisfy the enhanced standard established in 1985 by *Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.*¹⁹⁸ The *Unocal* standard requires that the board meet a two-pronged test:

first, the board must show that it had "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed," which may be shown by the directors' reasonable investigation and good faith belief that there is a threat; and

second, the board must show that the defensive measure chosen was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed," which in *Unitrin*,

Inc. v. American General Corp. the Delaware Supreme Court defined as being action that is not “coercive or preclusive” and otherwise falls within “the range of reasonableness.”¹⁹⁹

Under the first prong of this test, a court may take issue with defensive action when a board is unable to identify a threat against which it may justifiably deploy anti-takeover efforts. For example, in *Unitrin*, the Court viewed the first prong of *Unocal*—whether a threat to corporate policy exists—as satisfied based on the board’s conclusion that the price offered in an unsolicited takeover bid was inadequate, although it described the threat as “a mild one.” *Unitrin* also made clear that a board has discretion to act within a range of reasonably proportional responses to unsolicited offers,²⁰⁰ *i.e.*, not limited by an obligation to act in the least intrusive way. But the board’s discretion under the *Unocal* standard is not unlimited. In the 2000 case *Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore*, the Delaware Court of Chancery invalidated the board’s adoption of a supermajority voting bylaw in the midst of a consent solicitation and tender offer, stating that *Unitrin* “in no way suggests that the court ought to sanction a board’s adoption of very aggressive defensive measures when that board has given little or no consideration to relevant factors and less preclusive alternatives.”²⁰¹

The landmark 2011 decision in *Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.* upheld under *Unocal* the Airgas directors’ decision to block a hostile tender offer by refusing to redeem its “poison pill” stockholder rights plan. In ruling for the Airgas board, the Court found that the directors had acted in good faith in determining that Air Products’ “best and final” tender offer was inadequate. In making this finding, the Court relied on the fact that the board was composed of a majority of outside directors, that the board had relied on the advice of outside legal counsel and three separate financial advisors, and that the three Airgas directors nominated to the Airgas board by Air Products (and elected by the stockholders) had sided with the incumbents in concluding that Air Products’ offer should be rejected. The Court’s opinion held that “in order to have any effectiveness, pills do not—and cannot—have a set expiration date.”²⁰² The Court continued that while “this case does not endorse ‘just say never.’ . . . it does endorse . . . Delaware’s long-understood respect for reasonably exercised managerial discretion, so long as boards are found to be acting in good faith and in accordance with their fiduciary duties (after rigorous judicial fact-finding and enhanced scrutiny of their defensive actions). The Airgas board serves as a quintessential example.”²⁰³

The court reaffirmed these principles in early 2026 when it denied an application for a temporary restraining order brought by an activist investor seeking to enjoin the closing of Comerica Inc.’s stockholder-approved merger with Fifth Third Bancorp.²⁰⁴ The merger agreement between Comerica and Fifth Third contained symmetrical deal protection provisions including termination rights and fiduciary outs. The activist investor alleged that the merger and deal protection devices represented unreasonable defensive measures. The Court disagreed, finding that the activist investor had failed to show that the deal protections were preclusive or coercive, in large part because of the fiduciary out in the merger agreement and the fact that the stockholders of Comerica were free to consider the deal in its entirety and to vote down the merger without penalty.

Even in the absence of a hostile bid, deal protection devices included in friendly merger transactions—such as termination fees, force-the-vote provisions, expense reimbursements, and no-shop provisions—generally are reviewed under the *Unocal* standard. This is because, as one Delaware Court of Chancery case put it, “[w]hen corporate boards assent to provisions in merger agreements that have the primary purpose of acting as a defensive barrier to other transactions not sought out by the board, some of the policy concerns that animate the *Unocal* standard of review might be implicated.”²⁰⁵ Generally, Delaware courts will consider the effect and potentially excessive character of “all deal protections included in a transaction, taken as a whole,” in determining whether the *Unocal* standard has been met.²⁰⁶

Announcement of a merger agreement may provoke an unsolicited competing bid by a third party. Since a third-party bid could represent a threatened change-of-control, a target’s directors’ actions with respect to that bid, including any changes to the original merger agreement, will be governed by the *Unocal* standard even if, as explained in Section II.D.1 above, *Revlon* would not apply because the initial transaction did not constitute a change-of-control. In *Time-Warner*, the Delaware Supreme Court allowed directors great latitude in determining when a threat to a previously agreed merger exists. The Time board was permitted to act based on: (1) the “concern . . . that Time shareholders might elect to tender into Paramount’s cash offer in ignorance or a mistaken belief of the strategic benefit which a business combination with Warner might produce”; (2) its view of whether the conditions attached to Paramount’s offer introduced “a degree of uncertainty that skewed a comparative analysis”; and (3) the issue of whether the “timing of Paramount’s offer to follow issuance of Time’s proxy notice was . . . arguably designed to upset, if not confuse, the Time stockholders’ vote.”²⁰⁷

Notably, more than one standard of review can apply to directors’ decisions during the same transaction. For example, the approval of a friendly stock-for-stock merger may be governed by the traditional business judgment rule, but modifications of that transaction after the appearance of a third-party hostile bidder may be subject to the *Unocal* standard.²⁰⁸ Similarly, the *Unocal* standard will continue to apply so long as a board’s response to a third-party bid is defensive in an effort to keep the company independent, but once a board pursues an alternative transaction that constitutes a change-of-control, the board’s decision will generally be subject to *Revlon* scrutiny. And although it appears that the deference afforded to certain transactions under *Corwin v. KKR Financial Services* can apply to transactions that would otherwise have been subject to enhanced scrutiny under *Revlon* or to transactions that would otherwise be subject to entire fairness review, in *In re Edgio, Inc. Stockholders Litigation*, the Court declined to interpret *Corwin* as applying to claims for injunctive relief under *Unocal*, holding that “because the injuries *Unocal* is designed to prevent elude valuation, they cannot inform a stockholder vote on the economic merits of a transaction.”²⁰⁹ Nor do the statutory safe harbors for interested transactions in DGCL § 144 preclude “injunctive relief of provisions or devices designed or intended to deter, delay, or preclude a change of control or other transaction involving the corporation or a change in the composition of the board of directors.”²¹⁰

a. Board Action Affecting the Stockholder Vote

Limits on the board’s discretion under the *Unocal* standard are especially relevant where “defensive conduct” affects the stockholder franchise or a proxy contest. In those situations, courts

may refer to *Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.*,²¹¹ a decision setting forth a standard of review that has since largely been absorbed into *Unocal*. In *Blasius*, the directors of the target increased the size of the board so that a proxy insurgent, which was running a short slate, could not have a majority of the board even if all of its candidates won. The Delaware Court of Chancery invalidated the bylaw as impermissible interference with the stockholder franchise. In *Blasius*, the Court set forth a standard of review requiring that a board show “compelling justification” for any conduct whose “primary purpose” is to thwart effective exercise of the franchise. As subsequently demonstrated in *MM Companies Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.*,²¹² this standard will apply to actions that impede the exercise of the stockholder franchise even where the defensive actions do “not actually prevent the shareholders from attaining any success in seating one or more nominees in a contested election” and where an “election contest [does] not involve a challenge for outright control of the board.”²¹³ On the other hand, Delaware courts are reluctant to apply *Blasius* review outside the context of board elections, stressing that “the reasoning of *Blasius* is far less powerful when the matter up for consideration has little or no bearing on whether the directors will continue in office.”²¹⁴

Over time, Delaware courts have suggested that the “compelling justification” standard of *Blasius* need not serve as an independent standard of review, but could instead exist as a stricter application of the *Unocal* framework.²¹⁵ In 2023, in *Coster v. UIP Companies Inc.*, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted this approach in a contest for corporate control, applying *Unocal* review “with the sensitivity *Blasius* review brings” to “the stockholder franchise.”²¹⁶ Consequently, defensive conduct affecting the stockholder franchise in connection with a contest for corporate control is best viewed as triggering a particularly careful *Unocal* analysis. For example, in *Vejseli v. Duffy*, the Court of Chancery found that the directors of Ionic Digital, Inc. breached their fiduciary duties by reducing the size of the Board, not for a valid corporate purpose, but as an inequitable defensive measure.²¹⁷ The Court applied “enhanced scrutiny under *Unocal*, with sensitivity to the stockholder franchise under *Blasius*” and determined that the board’s purported justifications of cost savings and avoiding deadlock were not supported by contemporaneous evidence.²¹⁸ Moreover, the board resolution was preclusive because it rendered a successful proxy contest realistically unattainable by eliminating one of the two seats up for election.

These decisions reflect the Delaware courts’ continuing willingness to closely scrutinize defenses against activism for reasonableness, and to require boards that place a toll on the ability of stockholders to elect new directors to demonstrate a strong basis for doing so.

E. Entire Fairness

The “entire fairness” standard is “Delaware’s most onerous standard [of review].”²¹⁹ It imposes the burden of proof upon directors to show the fairness of both the price and process of the transaction they approved. Absent compliance with one of the safe harbor or other standard-shifting doctrines discussed above, a court will review a board’s actions under the entire fairness standard in the following situations:

- when the board breaches its duty of care and the directors are not exculpated from liability under DGCL 102(b)(7);²²⁰

- when a majority of the board has an interest in the decision or transaction that differs from the stockholders in general;²²¹
- when a majority of the board lacks independence from or is dominated by an interested party;²²²
- when the transaction at issue is one where the directors, officers, or a controlling stockholder “stand[] on both sides” of a transaction;²²³ or
- when a controlling stockholder receives additional consideration or another non-ratable benefit to the detriment of the other stockholders.²²⁴

There is no bright-line test to determine whether an individual director is interested, or a majority of directors are interested, for purposes of determining whether the entire fairness standard will be applied. Directors are disinterested if they are “not a party to the act or transaction and do[] not have a material interest in the act or transaction or a material relationship with a person that has a material interest in the act or transaction.”²²⁵ Potential conflicts can take many shapes, including when a director receives certain payments,²²⁶ has certain family relationships with,²²⁷ or has certain significant prior business relationships with, a party to the transaction,²²⁸ and other instances where a director will benefit or suffer a detriment in a manner that is not aligned with the interests of the public stockholders.²²⁹ A key consideration is whether the director can be said to stand on both sides of the transaction in question, or whether he or she has obtained some benefit not ratably shared with the public stockholders.

For example, in *In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation*, the Delaware Court of Chancery applied entire fairness review to a board’s decision to approve a merger that provided consideration to members of management and the company’s preferred stockholders, where a majority of the directors were affiliated with either management or the preferred stockholders.²³⁰ On the other hand, directors’ mere ownership of different classes of stock, or of common stock rather than preferred stock, will not necessarily trigger entire fairness review, absent a showing that the directors’ holdings of different classes of stock were sufficiently material to make it improbable that the directors could fulfill their obligation to act in the collective best interest of holders of common stock.²³¹ And in several cases, the Delaware Court of Chancery has ruled that the entire fairness standard would apply to SPAC transactions as a result of differing interests between SPAC sponsors and directors, on one hand, and public stockholders, on the other.²³²

Entire fairness review can be triggered even though a majority of directors are disinterested if the conflicted directors control or dominate the board, or if one or more of the conflicted directors failed to disclose his or her interest “and a reasonable board member would have regarded the existence of the material interest as a significant fact in the evaluation of the proposed transaction.”²³³

In addition, the courts have applied entire fairness review to transactions involving conflicted controlling stockholders, including “squeeze-out” mergers and other transactions in which the controller stands on both sides. These transactions, and the related statutory safe harbor provisions applicable to them, are examined more closely in Section II.C.2 above. In general,

Delaware courts closely review the conduct of parties in controlling stockholder transactions and have in several cases been skeptical of processes that did not involve the active participation of a special committee. For example, the Delaware Court of Chancery held in *In re Digex, Inc. Shareholders Litigation*, in the context of a preliminary injunction, that the conflicted directors on a board controlled by a majority stockholder had likely breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to waive the protections of the Delaware business combination statute in favor of the acquiror of that majority stockholder over the opposition of the independent directors on the special committee.²³⁴ In *McMullin v. Beran*,²³⁵ the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a dismissal of a challenge to the directors' conduct where, in connection with the approval of a merger agreement between a controlled subsidiary and a third party, an already-established special committee was not empowered to participate in the sale process and the majority stockholder controlled the process and allegedly had interests divergent from those of the public stockholders.

When analyzing a transaction to determine whether it satisfies the entire fairness standard, a Delaware court will consider both process ("fair dealing") and price ("fair price"), although the inquiry is not a bifurcated one; rather, all aspects of the process and price are considered holistically in evaluating the fairness of the transaction.²³⁶ In *Weinberger v. UOP*, the Delaware Supreme Court described the standards for determining fair dealing and fair price:

[Fair dealing] embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. [Fair price] relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock.²³⁷

Even where a process is imperfect, a fully empowered and well-functioning special committee can significantly influence an entire fairness analysis. In the 2017 case *ACP Master, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp.*,²³⁸ the Delaware Court of Chancery found that the acquisition of Clearwire by its controlling stockholder, Sprint, satisfied entire fairness notwithstanding "blemishes, even flaws" early in the deal process, including retributive threats and vote-buying by Sprint.²³⁹ The Court noted that minority stockholders' opposition to Sprint's initial offer and the special committee's engagement with a competing buyer "freshened the atmosphere and created a competitive dynamic," which ultimately resulted in a higher price for Clearwire.²⁴⁰ And in *In re BGC Partners*, the Delaware Court of Chancery held (and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed) that despite "some defects" in the special committee's negotiation of a transaction with a controlling stockholder, "the process—albeit imperfect—was ultimately fair."²⁴¹

Likewise, Delaware courts have explained that a "fair price" is not always "the highest price financeable or the highest price that fiduciary could afford to pay," but rather, it is "a price that is one that a reasonable seller, under all of the circumstances, would regard as within a range of fair value; one that such a seller could reasonably accept."²⁴²

Although courts have described the entire fairness standard as Delaware's "most onerous standard [of review],"²⁴³ it is possible for defendants to prove that a merger was fair under the entire fairness standard. In *In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litigation*, the Court of Chancery, subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court, concluded that Tesla's acquisition of SolarCity was

entirely fair.²⁴⁴ And *In re BGC Partners, Inc. Derivative Litigation*, the Court found after trial that BGC Partners' acquisition of Berkeley Point Financial was entirely fair, notwithstanding that the controlling stockholder of BGC Partners also controlled Berkeley Point's prior owner.²⁴⁵ Finally, in *Jacobs v. Akademos, Inc.*, the Court found after trial that the evidence of fair price was so strong that "even if the [controller] had implemented the merger unilaterally, without any process whatsoever, the defendants proved that the common stock was so far out of the money that the merger was entirely fair."²⁴⁶ Although these decisions considered both process and price in detail, they emphasized that the paramount consideration in the entire fairness inquiry is the price.²⁴⁷

In addition, although entire fairness is a fact intensive inquiry, Delaware courts have stressed that it "is not . . . a free pass to trial."²⁴⁸ To the contrary, "[e]ven under the entire fairness standard, a complaint devoid of well-pleaded allegations sufficient to establish the elements for a cause of action will be dismissed."²⁴⁹ In *In re Hennessy Capital Acquisition Corp. IV Stockholder Litigation*, the Court therefore dismissed at the pleading stage a claim against the directors of a SPAC, even though the claim was subject to entire fairness review, because it failed to identify a reasonably conceivable disclosure violation or otherwise explain how the stockholders were unable to make a fair redemption choice.²⁵⁰

That said, as demonstrated by other decisions, it remains challenging for defendants to prove at trial that a transaction was entirely fair, because the Court will weigh evidence from both sides and reach its own determination on price and process, with the burden of proof presumptively on the defendants. In *In re Sears Hometown & Outlet Stores, Inc. Shareholder Litigation*, for example, the Court found at trial that the defendants failed to prove the entire fairness of a squeeze-out merger.²⁵¹ In doing so, the Court rejected the fair price methodology proposed by both sides, which valued the seller as a whole, and instead valued the fair price of the seller's two business segments separately, finding that the controller underpaid based on the Court's sum-of-the-parts valuation.²⁵² The Court also found that the negotiation process was unfair because the controller removed two members of the special committee "who were his most visible and vigorous opponents."²⁵³

Because of the significant challenges that an entire fairness trial poses for defendants, the ever-increasing costs and burdens of discovery in such cases, and the Court of Chancery's disfavoring of summary judgment motions, many defendants ultimately opt to settle rather than try such cases, even where the evidence of a fair price and process is strong. In *Manti Holdings, LLC v. Carlyle Group Inc.*, for example, the defendants prevailed at trial under the business judgment rule after the plaintiffs failed to prove a disabling conflict that would trigger entire fairness review—but only after litigating that action and a separate appraisal action for over seven years.²⁵⁴

F. Additional Considerations for Buy-Side Boards

Most merger litigation involves claims brought by a target's stockholders asserting that the selling corporation's board of directors breached its duties in agreeing to the transaction. But litigation can arise out of claims against fiduciaries of the acquiror or the acquiror itself.

Buy-side claims often assert that an acquiror's board or controlling stockholder breached fiduciary duties owed to the acquiror by causing it to overpay for the target or otherwise to enter into a transaction on unfair terms, injuring the acquiror.²⁵⁵ Such buy-side claims implicate the same fiduciary duties, standards of review, and statutory safe harbors described above. But they tend to be less amenable to shareholder litigation because they typically belong to the acquiror corporation itself, rather than its stockholders, and may therefore be asserted by a stockholder only derivatively on behalf of the corporation.²⁵⁶ Delaware law treats derivative claims as assets of the corporation itself, meaning that they fall within "[t]he board's authority to govern corporate affairs," including deciding "whether the corporation should file a lawsuit against its directors, its officers, its controller, or an outsider."²⁵⁷ Recognizing that a derivative action seeks to "deprive the board of control over a corporation's litigation asset," Delaware law imposes additional requirements on a stockholder asserting a derivative claim: it must either make a demand on the board to initiate litigation, or establish that a litigation demand would be futile because the board would be incapable of impartially considering the demand.²⁵⁸

In *United Food and Commercial Workers Union v. Zuckerberg*, the Delaware Supreme Court established a three-part test to determine whether a litigation demand on a board would be futile. To establish that a demand would be futile, the stockholder must show that at least half of the directors would (i) receive a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct, (ii) face a substantial likelihood of liability on the claims that would be the subject of the litigation demand, or (iii) lack independence from someone who received such a benefit or faces such liability.²⁵⁹ Absent that showing, a board is presumed to be able to exercise its business judgment in managing the corporation's litigation asset, and the stockholder will not be permitted to assert the claim derivatively. A failure to establish demand futility—a hurdle not faced by a stockholder pursuing direct claims—could end litigation even in circumstances where the entire fairness standard might otherwise apply.²⁶⁰

Acquirors and their fiduciaries can also face claims by the target company's stockholders for aiding and abetting sell-side breaches of fiduciary duty. Unlike the overpayment claims discussed above, such aiding and abetting claims belong to the stockholders of the target, and thus do not require a showing of demand futility. In addition, under Section 144(d)(6)(C) of the DGCL, the Section 144 statutory safe harbors do not "[l]imit or eliminate the right of any person to seek relief on the grounds that a stockholder or other person knowingly aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty by one or more of the directors of the corporation."²⁶¹

Nevertheless, aiding and abetting claims against acquirors still face substantial obstacles, because of a "long-standing rule that arm's-length bargaining is privileged and does not, absent actual collusion and facilitation of fiduciary wrongdoing, constitute aiding and abetting."²⁶² A target's stockholder can successfully pursue an aiding and abetting claim against an acquiror by showing that the acquiror "induce[d] the target's fiduciaries to sell out the target's stockholders by creating or exploiting self-interest on the part of the fiduciaries."²⁶³ As the Delaware Supreme Court has made clear in two recent opinions, this requires a showing that the aiding and abetting defendant had "actual knowledge" that its conduct was improper, and constructive knowledge is insufficient.²⁶⁴ Allegations that the acquiror pursued a "hard-nosed and aggressive" negotiating strategy, in contrast, are insufficient to establish aiding and abetting liability.²⁶⁵

Aiding and abetting claims are also often asserted against the third-party advisors to the target, such as the investment bank advising the target's board. Claims against third-party advisors are discussed below in Section III.D.

III.

Preliminary Considerations in the M&A Deal-Making Process

A. Preliminary Agreements: Confidentiality Agreements and Letters of Intent

Companies considering M&A transactions should be cognizant of certain risks arising from negotiations that take place and agreements that are entered into before the execution of definitive transaction agreements. Preliminary agreements, such as confidentiality agreements and letters of intent, are sometimes seen as routine or relatively inconsequential. Because of this, parties may sometimes enter into these agreements without sufficient consideration of their provisions or without involving counsel at all, only to later find themselves restricted, obligated or exposed in ways they had not anticipated. It is important to appreciate that the M&A process begins with (or even before) the first discussions and that each step in the process may have significant consequences.

1. Confidentiality Agreements

Often, the first legally binding undertaking in an M&A transaction negotiation is the execution of a “confidentiality agreement,” which is sometimes referred to as a “non-disclosure agreement” or “NDA.” It is entirely understandable and prudent that a company providing its proprietary or non-public information to another company would want to protect such information’s confidentiality and ensure that it is only used for the intended purpose for which it is being provided. Likewise, it is advisable for an information recipient to pay close attention to the terms it is agreeing to in the NDA and ensure that it is comfortable with the restrictions, which will apply even if it walks away from the transaction. It is also important to understand that confidentiality agreements used for standard commercial arrangements are often not appropriate in the M&A context, and parties should consult with outside counsel when negotiating a confidentiality agreement to be used for M&A discussions. This seemingly innocuous document often includes important substantive agreements.

For example, a confidentiality agreement will often contain an express “standstill” provision restricting the ability of the party (or parties, if it is mutual) receiving information from taking various actions with respect to the other party, including commencing a takeover bid, buying shares, launching a tender offer, participating in proxy contests and engaging in other acts considered “unfriendly” to the party providing the information. This standstill agreement will continue for a set period of time or, in some cases, until a specified “fall-away” event occurs, such as agreeing to a transaction with a third party.

When standstill provisions are included in confidentiality agreements, they are typically worded very tightly to prevent a party that has obtained confidential information about a company from making an unsolicited bid or otherwise taking harmful action against the disclosing party. However, standstill provisions often permit private, nonpublic proposals to the board of directors. To prevent evasion of the standstill, these provisions often specify that the bound party may not request a waiver of these restrictions. Delaware courts have scrutinized these provisions, which they call “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” clauses, to ensure that they do not unduly restrict a board of

directors from complying with its *Revlon* duties to maximize shareholder value if a decision is made to sell the company.

The courts have recognized, however, that a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” provision may sometimes be appropriate. For example, when conducting an auction to sell the company, the board may decide to include a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” provision to incentivize bidders to put their best foot forward in the auction rather than holding back, knowing they can overbid the auction winner later. Because of the effect such a provision may have, Delaware courts have indicated that they would expect a board to include it only after careful consideration of its impact. These provisions and the developments in Delaware case law on this issue are discussed in Section V.A.2.

Even in the absence of an explicit standstill provision, a confidentiality agreement may still work to prohibit the receiving party from taking certain actions in support of an unsolicited bid. In addition to requiring that information provided be kept confidential, confidentiality agreements typically restrict the recipient’s use of the information to evaluating and negotiating a transaction (sometimes a specifically contemplated transaction) between the parties. Until 2012, Delaware courts had not considered whether a violation of use and disclosure restrictions in a confidentiality agreement could be a basis for blocking a takeover bid. The Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2012 decision in *Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co.*,²⁶⁶ which was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court, determined that Martin Marietta breached both the use and disclosure restrictions in two confidentiality agreements by using the confidential information obtained pursuant to those agreements in its unsolicited takeover bid for Vulcan. Although then-Chancellor Strine found the wording to be ambiguous (but more consistent with Vulcan’s reading), after an exhaustive interpretive analysis of the language of the agreements and parsing of whether a business combination “between” the parties would include a hostile takeover and proxy contest, he concluded that the parties—especially Martin Marietta—intended for the agreements to preclude the use of the information exchanged in a hostile transaction. He also held that Martin Marietta had willfully breached its non-disclosure commitments by disclosing confidential information obtained from Vulcan and the details of the parties’ confidential negotiations in its tender offer and other materials, without complying with the required procedures for such disclosure under the agreements. Consequently, the Court enjoined Martin Marietta’s unsolicited takeover bid for four months, which effectively ended its hostile bid.

Since *Vulcan*, parties have generally focused more closely on making clear the extent, if any, to which a confidentiality agreement should be interpreted to prevent a hostile bid by one of the parties. For example, potential acquirors will sometimes add language to a confidentiality agreement’s standstill provision that expressly permits the receiving party, following the expiration or termination of the standstill period, to take some or all of the actions previously prohibited by the standstill, notwithstanding any other restrictions contained in the confidentiality agreement. This is intended to deal with the use and disclosure restrictions, which typically do not terminate when the standstill does. Targets sometimes push back or agree to a limited version of this construct. Alternatively, the party providing confidential information will sometimes restrict the use of that information to the evaluation and negotiation of a “negotiated” transaction, which is intended to make more clear that the confidential information cannot be used in a hostile situation.

Parties should also consider how use and confidentiality obligations may restrict a party in future M&A activity when a confidentiality agreement is or may be deemed to have been assigned to a third party after an acquisition. In 2015, a California court in *Depomed Inc. v. Horizon Pharma, PLC*²⁶⁷ preliminarily enjoined a hostile bidder on the grounds that it misused information in violation of a confidentiality agreement, effectively ending the hostile takeover attempt. Unlike in *Vulcan*, the confidentiality agreement at issue was not directly entered into by the parties that ultimately became involved in litigation. In 2013, Horizon, while pursuing a co-promotion arrangement concerning a drug asset owned by Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., signed a confidentiality agreement with Janssen containing customary provisions limiting Horizon's permitted use of Janssen proprietary information solely to evaluating Horizon's interest in pursuing a business relationship with Janssen. Without signing a new confidentiality agreement, Horizon later participated in an auction process that Janssen ran for the drug asset. Depomed also participated, winning the auction and acquiring the U.S. rights to the drug asset. Two years later, Horizon launched a hostile bid for Depomed, which sued for injunctive relief, asserting that Horizon was improperly using information relating to the drug asset (purchased from Janssen) in evaluating and pursuing its hostile bid. In a ruling applying the plain terms of the agreement, the court rejected arguments that the confidentiality agreement only applied to the earlier co-promotion transaction structure. The court concluded that it was likely that Depomed had acquired from Janssen the right to enforce the confidentiality restrictions against Horizon, noting that "a different conclusion would be illogical as it would mean that Depomed could not protect the confidential information" about its newly acquired asset.²⁶⁸ The court held that Horizon had misused confidential information in formulating its takeover proposal, and Horizon withdrew its bid the following day.

Other typical provisions in confidentiality agreements may also have far-reaching consequences for the parties to a potential transaction. For example, a party providing confidential information often insists that the confidentiality agreement contain broad disclaimer and non-reliance language making clear that the providing party has not made any representation or warranty to the receiving party as to the accuracy or completeness of the information provided, and that the providing party will not have any liability to the receiving party arising from the use of the information. Delaware courts have enforced broad disclaimer and non-reliance language that effectively allocates to the potential buyer the risk that the information provided by the potential seller (and not otherwise warranted by the potential seller in another binding agreement) may be inaccurate, even in the case of allegations of fraud.²⁶⁹ Other important provisions to focus on include restrictions on the solicitation and hiring of employees, co-bidding arrangements, sharing confidential information with or restricting financing sources, contacts with the counterparty and/or its customers, vendors and other business partners, choice of law, and disclosure of the transaction process, identity of the information recipient and details about negotiations, as well as provisions regarding legally required disclosures, term and termination, the return and destruction of confidential information, remedies for breach and application of the confidentiality agreement to the parties' affiliates, advisors or representatives, permitted use (or prohibitions on the use) of AI tools with respect to the confidential information, as well as the recipient's liability for the conduct of such parties.

Certain types of prospective acquirors typically include provisions that are specific to the characteristics and circumstances of that type of acquiror. For example, private equity bidders

often include provisions specific to their fund structure, such as a provision stating that its portfolio companies will not be bound by the confidentiality agreement solely by virtue of investment professionals at the private equity fund serving on the board of directors of such portfolio companies (so called “dual hat” individuals). Companies should be wary of provisions that may undermine the confidentiality and use restrictions in the confidentiality agreement, such as broad carveouts stating that nothing in the confidentiality agreement will restrict investments in competitors or overly narrow provisions limiting applicability of the agreement to only certain affiliates that actually receive confidential information from the seller. In addition, companies should be mindful of whether a private equity bidder is considering acquiring the target as a new portfolio company or as an acquisition by one of its existing portfolio companies, which should inform what provisions may be appropriate in the confidentiality agreement.

When a potential transaction involves two strategic counterparties, the parties often enter into separate “clean team” agreements establishing more stringent restrictions on each party with respect to competitively sensitive information. Clean team agreements typically restrict the sharing of competitively sensitive information to only an enumerated subset of individuals identified by each party and include procedures for generating and approving summaries of such information that can be shared outside of the members of the clean team. Clean team members may be restricted from being involved for a period of time in day-to-day operations of the portions of the business for which there is a competitive overlap. In addition to safeguarding important information, clean team arrangements can help mitigate antitrust risk while facilitating detailed diligence. Strategic counterparties should consult with counsel regarding the potential use of clean team protocols prior to commencing detailed documentary diligence.

2. Letters of Intent

Another type of preliminary agreement is the letter of intent, sometimes referred to as a “memorandum of understanding” or “MOU.” Letters of intent are more common in private transactions than in public company deals, although it is not uncommon even in public deals for parties to negotiate term sheets, which are similar in that they spell out the most critical terms of a proposed transaction but are typically unsigned or, if signed, are typically nonbinding.

Whether to negotiate a letter of intent or proceed straight to definitive documentation depends on the facts in each case. Letters of intent can serve several purposes at the outset of negotiations, including demonstrating both parties’ commitment to the possible transaction and alignment on fundamental deal terms, establishing a time frame for executing definitive agreements, creating a period of exclusivity of negotiations, creating confidentiality obligations, allocating responsibility for expenses, and serving as a form of preliminary documentation for third parties requesting it (such as lenders). A letter of intent can also be used to make a Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust filing, so as to commence the requisite waiting period, even if the letter of intent is not binding. For certain types of more complicated private transactions, such as structured investments or joint ventures, which involve lengthy negotiations and complex issues, the parties may benefit from term sheets (which are generally unsigned) to define the relationship before proceeding to drafting the documentation. While letters of intent can be useful to identify any deal-breakers early on in negotiations, saving the parties from unfruitful expenditure of time and money, they can also take time to negotiate (increasing the possibility of leaks), may impact the

dynamics between the parties, and can raise disclosure issues in the case of public companies or Schedule 13D filers.

Parties that do not wish to be bound by provisions of a letter of intent or term sheet should avoid statements or actions that may indicate that a letter of intent or term sheet was understood by the parties to be binding. If maximum flexibility and clarity is desired, parties should also consider expressly disclaiming an obligation to negotiate in good faith and making clear that negotiations may be terminated without liability at any time until a definitive agreement has been executed.

B. Choice of Sale Process: Auctions and Market Checks

A merger transaction may impose special obligations on a board. Every transaction is different, and courts have recognized that a board should have significant latitude in designing and executing a merger process. As the Delaware Supreme Court has reiterated several times, there is “no single blueprint” that directors must follow in selling a company.²⁷⁰ This is true even if *Revlon* applies: directors are not guarantors that the best price has been obtained, and Delaware case law makes clear that “[n]o court can tell directors exactly how to accomplish that goal [of getting the best price in a sale], because they will be facing a unique combination of circumstances, many of which will be outside their control.”²⁷¹ Thus, *Revlon* “does not . . . require every board to follow a judicially prescribed checklist of sales activities.”²⁷² Rather, the board has reasonable latitude in determining the method of sale most likely to produce the highest value for the stockholders. As a result, even in a change-of-control setting, a board may determine to enter into a merger agreement after an arm’s-length negotiation with a single bidder, as opposed to putting the company up for auction or canvassing the market, if it determines in good faith that the single-bidder strategy is optimal. Even after a competitive bidding process has begun, a board may, under proper circumstances, favor one bidder over another “if in good faith and advisedly it believes shareholder interests would be thereby advanced.”²⁷³ In demonstrating that it pursued the best price reasonably available, however, it is generally necessary for the board to be able to point to some form of “market check,” whether active or passive.

1. Auction

In an auction, prospective acquirors are asked to make a bid for a company by a fixed deadline, in one or several “rounds” of bidding. A company, usually with the assistance of an investment banker, may prepare a descriptive memorandum, known as a “confidential information memorandum” or a “confidential information presentation” (or just a short “teaser” since, in a public company sale, the material information is already public) that is circulated following the execution of confidentiality agreements to prospective bidders. An auction often has more than one round, usually with only certain bidders getting invited to subsequent rounds, and sometimes involves simultaneous negotiations by the target with more than one bidder. Interested bidders are allowed to engage in due diligence (subject to entry into a confidentiality agreement) and then submit their bids, together with any comments on the draft transaction agreement and related documentation. In subsequent rounds, bidders often get greater access to sensitive confidential information and are encouraged to revise their bids. Before the final bidding deadline, a company will typically send a draft transaction agreement and related documentation (such as draft

disclosure schedules or a draft transition services agreement or other ancillary agreements), along with a bid process letter setting forth the auction process, to the remaining bidders. The draft transaction agreement often has multiple forms depending on the types of bidders participating in the process. For example, a company may have one transaction agreement for strategic acquirors and a separate transaction agreement for financial acquirors. Differences between the forms typically relate to financing provisions and remedies.

An important advantage of an auction is that it can be effective even if there is only one bidder remaining. Absent leaks, a bidder has no way of being certain if there are other bidders, which creates an incentive for the bidder to put forward its best bid. In addition, the seller in an auction can negotiate with one or more bidders to try to create and maintain competitive tension and elicit both higher bids and improved terms. An auction may be conducted openly (typically by publicly announcing that the company has hired an investment bank to “explore strategic alternatives”) or conducted without an announcement. Even without an announcement, however, it is difficult to conduct a broad auction without rumors of a sale leaking into the marketplace. The risk of leaks is one of the key disadvantages of an auction, which is that a private auction process that becomes publicly known can cause damage to the company’s relationships with employees, customers, suppliers and other stakeholders, and might make the company a target for activism. Auction processes are also heavily resource intensive, and can result in distractions to management. Companies may also engage in a limited or “mini-auction,” in which only the most likely bidders are invited to participate.

One difficulty in any auction process is that the true “value” of a bid may be difficult to discern with certainty because, under *Revlon*, as described in Section II.B, the “value” should take into account not only the price to be paid but also the likelihood and timing of consummation and the related financing and regulatory approval risks. But, just as the Delaware courts have respected the need for boards to make difficult judgments about the extent and nature of the sales process, so too have they respected reasonable decisions by boards to factor considerations of certainty and timing into their assessments of what bids offer the most value, as discussed in Section II.B. Additionally, some bidders may propose stock or part-stock deals, which implicate considerations regarding valuation and pricing mechanisms, as further discussed below in Section IV. The optimal sale process to be employed depends on the dynamics of the particular situation and should be developed in close consultation with financial and legal advisors. Following the Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2023 decision in *In re Columbia Pipeline Group, Merger Litigation*, where the court found that the CEO and CFO of the target breached their fiduciary duties by favoring one bidder, boards should also be mindful of their obligation to monitor the conduct of management in connection with a sales process.²⁷⁴

2. Market Check

An alternative to a full auction is a “market check,” in which the seller gauges other potential buyers’ interest without conducting a formal bidding process. A market check may occur either before or after the signing of a merger agreement, and post-signing it may be active (also known as a “go-shop”) or passive. A market check may be preferable to a full auction for a number of reasons, including a reduced likelihood of leaks and a shortened and less onerous negotiating process. A seller may also forgo an auction following a bid because it determines that an auction

is unlikely to yield other serious bids or superior bids, or because the seller strategically accedes to an attractive bidder's refusal to participate in an auction and its demand for exclusivity. It is important to note that a seller may, depending on the circumstances, appropriately conclude that it should negotiate only with a single bidder without reaching out to other potential bidders pre-signing. In determining whether to engage in negotiations with a single bidder, it is critical to recognize that the deal protection package offered to a single bidder—and that is not awarded to the prevailing party in a competitive auction process—may be more closely reviewed because only that bidder had the opportunity to make an initial bid without incurring the barriers and costs presented by such deal protections. Likewise, it is important to consider and monitor any conflicts of interest that the single bidder presents, and to weigh and address them in determining whether to proceed without a pre-signing competitive process that would involve other bidders.

a. Pre-Signing Market Check

In a pre-signing market check, a company, usually through its financial advisors, attempts to determine which parties may be interested in acquiring the company and makes an approach to these parties to gauge potential interest. A pre-signing market check may effectively occur even if not initiated by the company, for example, when there are public rumors that the company is seeking an acquiror or is the subject of an acquisition proposal. Such rumors may encourage potential acquirors to privately approach the board of the company that appears to be “in play.” By contrast, the absence of such approaches in the face of rumors provides some evidence to a board that there may not be other interested parties waiting in the wings.

b. Post-Signing Market Check

In a post-signing market check in the public company setting, provisions in the merger agreement provide an opportunity for other bidders to make competing offers after execution of the agreement.²⁷⁵ An advantage of a post-signing market check is that it ensures that the seller may secure the offer put forth by the first bidder while leaving the seller open to considering higher offers. Acquirors, of course, will typically seek to limit the post-signing market check and will negotiate for deal protection provisions, such as a “no-shop” covenant, which restricts the seller's ability to solicit or discuss alternative transactions, and termination or “break-up” fees, in the event that the initial transaction is not consummated due to the emergence of a superior proposal. Another customary deal protection provision is a “matching right,” which ensures that the initial bidder has an opportunity to enhance its bid to match or exceed any higher bid that may be made. For a post-signing market check to be effective, potential bidders must be aware of the opportunity to bid, have sufficient information and time to make a bid, and not be unduly deterred by excessive break-up fees or deal protections afforded to the first bidder.

Post-signing market checks may either be active or passive. In an active market check, the merger agreement permits the seller to actively seek out new bidders—through a so-called “go-shop” provision discussed further below, generally for a limited period of time following signing. In a passive market check, the merger agreement includes a “no-shop” provision prohibiting the active solicitation of alternative bids, but also includes a “fiduciary out” permitting the target board to consider higher unsolicited bids and change its recommendation or, in many cases, terminate the agreement with the first bidder to enter into a transaction with a subsequent bidder who has

made a superior proposal. Market check provisions never extend beyond the time that the target company's stockholders have approved the transaction.

A board may discharge its fiduciary duties by selling a company through a single-bidder negotiation coupled with a post-signing, passive market check, even in a *Revlon* transaction. Although this method is more likely to be closely scrutinized by courts, it is permissible so long as the board is informed of the downsides of this approach and has an appropriate basis for concluding that they are outweighed by the benefits and that the agreement provides for sufficient opportunity for competing bids to emerge. In 2011, Vice Chancellor Parsons ruled in *In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. Shareholder Litigation* that an active market check was unnecessary because the selling company had been "in play" both during and after its bankruptcy, yet no competing offers were made.²⁷⁶ Similarly, in *In re Fort Howard Shareholders Litigation*, in 1988, which was reaffirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in *C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. City of Miami General Employees' & Sanitation Employees' Retirement Trust* in 2014, Chancellor Allen ruled that the company's directors had satisfied their fiduciary duties in selling the company by negotiating for an approximately month-and-a-half-long period between the announcement of the transaction and the closing of the tender offer in which new bidders could express their interest.²⁷⁷ The Chancellor ruled that the market check was not "hobbled" by deal protection measures and noted that he was "particularly impressed with the announcement [of the transaction] in the financial press and with the rapid and full-hearted response to the eight inquiries received."²⁷⁸

The Delaware Court of Chancery has provided valuable guidance for sellers considering forgoing an active market check. In *In re Plains Exploration & Production Co. Stockholder Litigation* in 2013, Vice Chancellor Noble found that the directors were experienced in the industry and had "retained 'significant flexibility to deal with any later-emerging bidder and ensured that the market would have a healthy period of time to digest the proposed transaction.'"²⁷⁹ When no competing bids surfaced in the five months after the merger was announced, the Plains board could feel confident that it had obtained the highest price reasonably available. In contrast with *Plains*, in *Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc.* in 2013, Vice Chancellor Glasscock criticized the NetSpend board's failure to perform an adequate market check, given the facts surrounding the merger.²⁸⁰ NetSpend's suitor had entered into voting agreements with NetSpend stockholders totaling 40% of the voting stock and had bargained for customary deal protections in the merger agreement, including a no-shop, a 3.9% termination fee and matching rights. The merger agreement also prohibited the NetSpend board from waiving "Don't Ask, Don't Waive" standstills that NetSpend had entered into with two private equity firms that had previously expressed an interest in investing in the company, but which had not been part of a pre-signing auction process or market check. Even though the record showed that the investment bank advising NetSpend's board had advised that a private equity bidder was unlikely to match the buyer's offer, Vice Chancellor Glasscock found that, by agreeing to enforce the "Don't Ask, Don't Waive" standstills, the NetSpend board had "blinded itself" to the two most likely sources of competing bids and, moreover, had done so without fully understanding the import of the standstills.²⁸¹ This, combined with the board's reliance on a "weak" fairness opinion and an anticipated short period before consummation of the transaction, led Vice Chancellor Glasscock to conclude that the sales process was unreasonable.²⁸² *Plains* and *NetSpend* reinforce that the terms of a merger agreement and its surrounding circumstances will be viewed collectively, and, in the *Revlon* context, the sales process must be reasonably designed to obtain the highest price reasonably available.

c. Go-Shops

Delaware courts have generally found active market checks, more commonly known as “go-shop” provisions, to be a reasonable, but not mandatory, approach to satisfying *Revlon* duties.²⁸³ Go-shop provisions offer buyers (often financial buyers) the benefit of avoiding an auction and the assurance of a break-up fee if a deal is topped, which is usually an acceptable outcome for financial buyers. On the other hand, a go-shop enables a company being sold to “lock-in” an acceptable transaction without the risks of an auction, while mitigating the potentially heightened fiduciary concerns that can arise in such deal settings, including (if the buyer is a financial sponsor) that there may be interested strategic buyers who can leverage expected synergies to offer a higher headline price. These provisions allow the target to solicit competing offers for a limited time period (typically 25 to 50 days) after signing an acquisition agreement—permitting the target to actively shop the deal during that interval. Go-shop provisions frequently provide for a lower break-up fee (often half the fee that would apply after the go-shop period) if the agreement is terminated to accept a superior proposal received during the go-shop period.

Strategic acquirors are more likely to object to go-shops not only because they have heightened sensitivity to encouraging competitors to become interlopers, but also because their interest in the target is strategic and thus the receipt of a break-up fee as an alternative to acquiring this specific asset is usually a suboptimal outcome. But strategic deals have also seen some tailored variations of go-shop provisions, such as carving out certain bidders from the no-shop provision and providing for a reduced break-up fee with respect to deals pursued with these bidders, or just generally coupling a no-shop with a lower break-up fee for a specified period of time.

When a go-shop provision is employed, it is important that there be an active solicitation and that the timeframe for competitors to digest information and make a qualifying expression of interest be viable. Confidentiality agreements should be signed and requisite information should be made available to qualified competing bidders who emerge, even though they may be competitors and the buyer and management may not want to provide sensitive information to them. Though go-shop provisions can be an effective means of satisfying a board’s fiduciary duties through an active post-signing market check so long as the go-shop process provides a commercially feasible opportunity for other bidders, some critics still note that they seldom result in higher bids.

C. Board Reliance on Financial Advisors as Experts

The board, in exercising its business judgment as to the appropriate form and valuation of transaction consideration, may rely on experts, including investment bankers, in reaching an informed view. In Delaware, Section 141(e) of the DGCL provides protection from personal liability to directors who rely on appropriately qualified advisors. A board is entitled to rely on the expert advice of the company’s financial advisors “who are selected with reasonable care and are reasonably believed to be acting within the scope of their expertise,” as well as on the advice and analyses of management.²⁸⁴ In merger transactions, an investment banker’s unbiased view of the fairness of the consideration to be paid and the underlying and related analyses provide a board with significant information with which to evaluate a proposed transaction. Since Delaware’s 1985 decision in *Smith v. Van Gorkom*, it has been common in a merger transaction involving a

public company for a fairness opinion to be rendered to the board of the seller (and, sometimes, to the buyer). The analyses and opinions presented to a board, combined with presentations by management and the board's own long-term strategic reviews, provide the key foundation for the exercise of the directors' business judgment.²⁸⁵ Courts reviewing the actions of boards have commented favorably on the use by boards of independent investment bankers in evaluating merger and other transaction proposals (although the receipt of a fairness opinion by independent investment bankers is generally not required as a matter of law).²⁸⁶ In transactions subject to the federal proxy rules, SEC staff also require detailed disclosure of the procedures followed by a financial advisor in preparing a fairness opinion, including a summary of the financial analyses underlying the banker's opinion and a description of any constraints placed on those analyses by the board. The additional detailed disclosure obligations of Rule 13e-3 under the Exchange Act, which applies to "going private" transactions between issuers and their affiliates, also mean that reports, opinions and appraisals materially related to the Rule 13e-3 transaction prepared by outside financial advisors in such transactions should be prepared with the understanding that they may be required to be disclosed to the SEC and publicly filed, and companies should ensure that any engagement letter with an outside financial advisor permits such public disclosure.

Particularly in situations where target directors are choosing among competing all-stock (or other non-cash) offers, a board's decision-making may be susceptible to claims of bias, faulty judgment or inadequate investigation of the relative values of competing offers. Because the stock valuation process inherently involves greater exercise of judgment by a board than that required in an all-cash deal, consideration of the informed analyses of financial advisors is helpful in establishing the fulfillment of the applicable legal duties.

In a stock-for-stock fixed exchange ratio merger, the fairness of the consideration often turns on the relative contributions of each party to the combined company in terms of revenues, earnings and assets—not the absolute dollar value of the stock being received by one party's stockholders based on its trading price at a particular point in time.

Great care should be exercised by investment bankers in preparing the analyses that support their opinions and in the presentation of such analyses to management and the board, and boards should exercise care in determining what analyses to request in light of the potential requirement to disclose such analyses in proxy or tender offer materials. Certain court decisions indicate that the scope of potential liability under the federal securities laws and Delaware law for disclosure violations may be broader than previously thought. In April 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that in the tender offer context, Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act does not require scienter for violation, but rather a lower standard of negligence.²⁸⁷ This ruling arose in the context of a buyout of a public company by tender offer, where a shareholder class action alleged that the failure by the target to include a summary of its investment bank's analysis of the premiums paid in comparable transactions was a material omission that violated Section 14(e). By contrast, the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have held that Section 14(e) requires a showing of scienter. In January 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the Ninth Circuit holding and its deviation from the holdings of the other Circuits, but then dismissed the writ of certiorari as being improvidently granted in April 2019, leaving a circuit split. Similarly, the Delaware Court of Chancery found in *In re PLX Technology Inc. Stockholders Litigation* that the board breached its fiduciary duty by failing to disclose in its proxy materials the results of a

discounted cash flow analysis commissioned by a special committee of the board that was only partially described in the proxy materials; specifically, the proxy materials discussed how the special committee had requested a discounted cash flow analysis, which had been received and discussed by the board, but the proxy materials did not disclose the actual results of the discounted cash flow analysis.²⁸⁸ The Delaware Court of Chancery found that although the omitted information may not have been independently material, once the proxy materials disclosed that an analysis was performed, the omission of the results of the analysis was a misleading partial disclosure.²⁸⁹

More generally, financial advisor analyses disclosed in proxy statements are regularly the target of shareholder plaintiff lawsuits. Plaintiffs will often send disclosure demand letters and/or file such suits after the company's filing of its preliminary proxy statement, alleging that the disclosures in the proxy statement are materially false or misleading, or that material information has been omitted. In response, the company typically issues supplemental disclosures to moot such claims, usually in connection with a settlement with the plaintiffs for a monetary sum, or the plaintiffs may seek mootness fees from the court. These suits were previously commonly filed in Delaware, until 2016 when the Delaware Court of Chancery expressed in *In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation* that "disclosure settlements are likely to be met with continued disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly material misrepresentation or omission."²⁹⁰ Federal courts have also exhibited some resistance. In 2019, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware denied contested mootness fee applications in two lawsuits challenging supplemental disclosures relating to, among other things, discounted cash flow analyses and multiples used in comparable transactions analyses. The plaintiffs had argued that the financial advisor-related disclosures were materially misleading, in response to which the company filed supplemental disclosures. The plaintiffs argued that without their original lawsuits, the supplemental disclosures would not have been made, but since such disclosures substantially benefited the target's stockholders, they were entitled to fees as a result. The Court found that the supplemental disclosures were not material, so there was no substantial benefit conferred by the disclosures and therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to fees.²⁹¹ However, as discussed in Section I.B.7, disclosure-based litigation based on federal securities laws remains common, and the overwhelming majority of such federal suits are settled and "mooted" by the issuance of supplemental disclosures and payments of the stockholder plaintiffs' lawyers' fees.

The wording of the fairness opinion and, as illustrated by these cases, the scope of related proxy statement and tender offer disclosures, must be carefully drafted to accurately reflect the nature of the analyses underlying the opinion and the assumptions and qualifications upon which it is based.²⁹²

D. Financial Advisor Conflicts of Interest

It is important that banks and boards take a proactive role in encouraging the disclosure and management of actual or potential conflicts of interest both at the board level and among the board's advisors. In recent years, there has been a significant focus on financial advisor conflicts. As noted in *In re El Paso Corp. Stockholder Litigation*, banks should faithfully represent their clients and disclose fully any actual or potential conflicts of which they are aware so that such conflicts can be managed appropriately.²⁹³

1. Identifying and Managing Financial Advisor Conflicts of Interest

Boards should ensure that any conflicts their financial advisors may have are brought to light prior to formally engaging the advisor and as they may arise throughout the transaction process. The existence of a potential conflict does not, in and of itself, necessarily disqualify a financial advisor, but the board must appropriately monitor and manage any such conflicts. These steps are vital to protect banks and boards from liability for banker conflicts and inadequate disclosure. In the absence of disclosure and management of conflicts, among other results, a board may be found to have breached its fiduciary duty, the deal could be delayed and deal protections could be compromised. It has become standard industry practice for investment banks to present a memo to the board disclosing potential conflicts of interest. Companies have, in turn, become more adept at identifying and mitigating potential conflicts, including by performing appropriate diligence and asking investment banks to provide such conflict memos and updates as needed.

Courts and the SEC will scrutinize perceived conflicts of interest of the investment bank rendering the fairness opinion. Since 2007, FINRA's rules have required specific disclosures and procedures addressing conflicts of interest when member firms provide fairness opinions in transactions where the opinion will be provided or described to the company's stockholders.²⁹⁴ FINRA requires disclosure in the fairness opinion as to, among other things, (1) whether the member has acted as a financial advisor to any party to the transaction that is the subject of the fairness opinion; (2) if the member is entitled to receive any other significant compensation contingent upon the transaction's completion; (3) any material relationships that existed during the past two years or that are mutually understood to be contemplated in which any compensation was received or is intended to be received as a result of the relationship between the member and any party to the transaction that is the subject of the fairness opinion; (4) if any information forming a substantial basis for the fairness opinion and supplied by the company requesting the opinion had been independently verified, and if so, a description of the information that was verified; (5) whether the fairness opinion was approved or issued by the member's fairness committee; and (6) whether the fairness opinion expresses an opinion regarding the fairness of the amount or nature of the compensation to be received in such transaction by the company's officers, directors, employees or class of such persons, relative to the compensation to be received in such transaction by the stockholders.²⁹⁵

The Delaware courts have also played a role in deciding what constitutes a conflict of interest on the part of a financial advisor to a company in an M&A transaction. For example, although FINRA does not ban the practice of contingent fee arrangements for financial advisors, in some circumstances, certain contingent fee arrangements will cause Delaware courts to find triable issues of bias. In *In re Tele-Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation*, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the fact that the fairness opinion rendered by a special committee's financial advisor was given pursuant to a contingent fee arrangement—\$40 million of the financial advisor's fee was contingent on the completion of the transaction—created “a serious issue of material fact, as to whether [that advisor] could provide independent advice to the Special Committee.”²⁹⁶ More recently, the Court of Chancery sustained aiding and abetting claims against the financial advisors of both the special committee and the board, holding at the motion to dismiss stage that the advisors' contingent fee arrangements incentivized them to pursue a transaction that would trigger a change-of-control payment to the controlling stockholder.²⁹⁷ Nevertheless,

although certain contingent fee arrangements in specific factual contexts have been questioned by Delaware courts, contingent fee arrangements, which also sometimes are a function of deal value on the sell side, generally “ha[ve] been recognized as proper by [the] courts,”²⁹⁸ as they “provide an incentive for [the investment bank] to seek higher value.”²⁹⁹ Companies on the buy-side should remain sensitive to contingent payments based on a percentage of the transaction value; the financial advisor’s larger fee at a higher transaction price could be misaligned with the buyer’s goal of acquiring the target at the lowest possible price.

The Delaware Court of Chancery highlighted potential conflicts of interest of financial advisors in a January 2023 decision, *Delman v. GigAcquisitons3*, which held that de-SPAC transactions are subject to entire fairness review. In the *Delman* litigation, the plaintiff-shareholder claimed that the SPAC engaged in a value-decreasing de-SPAC transaction even though public stockholders would have benefitted more from liquidation.³⁰⁰ In holding that entire fairness review applied, the court considered that the SPAC’s financial advisors held large stakes in private placement shares and that their \$8 million of contingent compensation would be worthless if the de-SPAC did not occur.³⁰¹ *Delman* is consistent with the Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2022 decision in *In re MultiPlan Corp. Stockholders Litigation*, which also applied entire fairness review to a de-SPAC transaction.³⁰²

The role of managing conflicts of interest and overseeing potential conflicts of financial advisors is within the scope of a board’s fiduciary duties. In an important decision concerning the role played by outside financial advisors in the board’s decision-making process, the Delaware Court of Chancery held in 2011 that a financial advisor was so conflicted that the board’s failure to actively oversee the financial advisor’s conflict gave rise to a likelihood of a breach of fiduciary duty by the board. In *In re Del Monte Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation*,³⁰³ the Court found that after the Del Monte board had called off a process to explore a potential sale, its investment bankers (1) continued to meet with several of the bidders—without the approval or knowledge of Del Monte—ultimately yielding a new joint bid from two buyout firms, (2) sought and received permission to provide financing to the bidders for a substantial fee before the parties had reached agreement on price, and (3) after Del Monte entered into a definitive agreement with the two buyout firms, ran Del Monte’s go-shop process. The Court faulted the board and bankers for the foregoing actions and stated that, although “the blame for what took place appears at this preliminary stage [lay] with [the bankers], the buck stops with the Board,” because “Delaware law requires that a board take an active and direct role in the sale process.”³⁰⁴ The case ultimately settled for \$89 million, with the investment bank bearing roughly a quarter of the cost. In 2014, in *In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litigation*,³⁰⁵ the Delaware Court of Chancery found that Royal Bank of Canada aided and abetted fiduciary duty violations of the board of Rural/Metro Corporation in its sale of the company to a private equity firm. The Court noted that, while negotiating on behalf of the board, RBC never disclosed to the Rural board that RBC was lobbying the private equity firm to allow RBC to participate in buy-side financing. RBC was found to have failed to disclose certain critical information to the board and the Court concluded that “RBC knowingly participated in the Board’s breach of its duty of care by creating the informational vacuum that misled the Board,” in part, by revising its valuation of Rural downward so as to make it appear that the private equity firm’s offer was fair to and in the best interests of Rural’s stockholders.³⁰⁶

In 2015, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery's ruling in *Rural Metro*, but emphasized that its holding was "a narrow one that should not be read expansively to suggest that any failure on the part of a financial advisor to prevent directors from breaching their duty of care gives rise to a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of the duty of care"³⁰⁷ and provided clarification on the practical steps boards and their financial advisors can take to manage potential conflicts.³⁰⁸ The Court accepted the practical reality that banks may be conflicted, but put the onus on directors to "be especially diligent in overseeing the conflicted advisor's role in the sale process"³⁰⁹ and explained that "because the conflicted advisor may, alone, possess information relating to a conflict, the board should require disclosure of, on an ongoing basis, material information that might impact the board's process."³¹⁰

Financial advisors' conflicts based on relationships with sellers or acquirors may be "more subtle, but no less self-interested."³¹¹ In *Firefighters' Pension System of the City of Kansas City v. Presidio, Inc.*, the plaintiff alleged that Presidio's financial advisor, LionTree, favored a sale of the company to BC Partners to the detriment of a competing bid from Clayton Dubilier & Rice. The plaintiff's principal alleged defect in the transaction process was that, during a go-shop period following the signing of a merger agreement with BC Partners, LionTree "tipped" the terms of a topping bid from CD&R to BC Partners, allowing BC Partners to strategically increase its bid by only \$0.10 per share, the minimum per share amount required to do better than the potential topping bid, and ultimately consummate the transaction. Vice Chancellor Laster found that it was reasonably conceivable that LionTree had steered the Board toward a quick transaction with BC Partners due to several factors: (i) LionTree's existing relationships with BC Partners, (ii) the fact that Apollo Global Management, the controlling stockholder of Presidio, allegedly preferred a near-term sale, and (iii) that CD&R intended to replace Presidio's CEO, with whom LionTree had developed a relationship, whereas BC Partners intended to retain him. As Vice Chancellor Laster hypothesized, "[p]ushing for a competitive process involving CD&R might earn LionTree a little more money in the short run through its contingent fee, but it would not serve LionTree's interests in the long run. If CD&R won the bid, then the Company would have a new owner, a new management team, and no incumbent relationship with LionTree. Meanwhile, people with whom LionTree had existing relationships would be disappointed."³¹² Presidio's board did not receive any disclosures regarding LionTree's potential conflicts of interests and relationships with Apollo and BC Partners until nearly a month after it had been running point on the transaction and a week after the board had reached an agreement on price with BC Partners. Moreover, LionTree's alleged "tip" to BC Partners was not disclosed to Presidio's board or stockholders until after the litigation was commenced and Vice Chancellor Laster found that the tip "cast[] a dim light on the sale process as a whole" by hindering an active bidding contest.³¹³ While recognizing that, absent LionTree's conduct, the sale process would otherwise have fallen within a range of reasonableness, Vice Chancellor Laster found that it was reasonable to infer that the board's actions fell outside the range of reasonableness because the board based its decisions on information that was shaped by LionTree's conflicts of interest and the board failed to provide active and direct oversight of LionTree.³¹⁴ This case shows the importance of full disclosures by financial advisors to the board of potential conflicts of interest early in a transaction process. Companies should include outside deal counsel in the review of financial advisor engagement letters and disclosures to the board to ensure that the board is fully informed.

Del Monte, *Rural Metro* and *Presidio* are examples of cases where, based on the records before them, the courts found serious improper behavior by the investment banks. Such cases have been rare and, moreover, the Delaware Court of Chancery has ruled, and the Delaware Supreme Court has affirmed, that a fully informed stockholder vote may effectively insulate a financial advisor from aiding and abetting liability, just as it may insulate directors.³¹⁵ In *Singh v. Attenborough*, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of claims that investment bankers had aided and abetted the directors of Zale Corporation in an alleged breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the sale of the company. Amplifying its 2015 ruling in *Corwin v. KKR Financial*³¹⁶ (addressing “aiding-and-abetting” claims against corporate advisors), the Court held that, with the exception of a claim for waste, when a merger is approved by an informed body of disinterested stockholders and then closes, the business judgment rule applies, further judicial examination of director conduct is generally inappropriate and “dismissal is typically the result.”³¹⁷

Citing both *Corwin* and *Singh v. Attenborough*, the Delaware Court of Chancery, as affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court, has since dismissed aiding and abetting claims against a financial advisor where there was no underlying breach of fiduciary duties by the board of directors.³¹⁸ So, too, has the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed an aiding and abetting claim against a financial advisor who had passive awareness that its client’s disclosures had material omissions, where the client itself was also aware of that information. The Court stated that “[a] general duty on third parties to ensure that all material facts are disclosed, by fiduciaries to their principals, is . . . not a duty imposed by law or equity.”³¹⁹ A “passive failure” by a financial advisor to ensure adequate disclosure to stockholders “without more,” does not give rise to aiding and abetting liability.³²⁰ These decisions affirm that Delaware provides transaction advisors with “a high degree of insulation from liability by employing a defendant-friendly standard that requires plaintiffs to prove scienter and awards advisors some measure of immunity from due-care liability.”³²¹

2. Public Disclosure of Financial Advisor Conflicts of Interest

A key aspect of managing financial advisor conflicts is ensuring adequate public disclosure of such conflicts as required by law. It is well established that “[b]ecause of the central role played by investment banks in the evaluation, exploration, selection, and implementation of strategic alternatives,” Delaware law requires “full disclosure of investment banker compensation and potential conflicts.”³²² In 2017, the Delaware Court of Chancery preliminarily enjoined a special meeting of stockholders in connection with a merger, where it found that the acquiring company’s board breached its fiduciary duties by failing to disclose in a “clear and transparent manner” its financial advisor’s potential financial interests in the merger.³²³ The Court’s ruling stated, “[a] stockholder should not have to go on a scavenger hunt to try to obtain a complete and accurate picture of a financial advisor’s financial interests in a transaction.”³²⁴ The failure to disclose material information, such as LionTree’s alleged “tip” in *Presidio*, will lead Delaware courts to reject *Corwin* cleansing on the basis that the stockholder vote was not fully informed.³²⁵

That said, if information pertaining to a potential conflict is clearly disclosed in a proxy statement, recommendation statement or similar document, this may suffice to prevent liability. For example, the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that a recommendation statement adequately disclosed a potential conflict of interest between the seller’s financial advisors and a bidder when

it disclosed that the financial advisor had performed past work for the bidder, even though the disclosure only generally described such work and did not disclose specific fee amounts.³²⁶ Another case in 2019 found a similar result for not only past, but also ongoing, conflicts: the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed plaintiffs' claim based on the failure to disclose the specific nature of services a financial advisor may provide in the future to the target, as well as expected fee amounts, ruling that such information was not necessary in providing stockholders with sufficient information to assess the conflict.³²⁷

However, two Delaware Supreme Court decisions from 2024, both reversing decisions of the Court of Chancery, underscore the importance of demonstrating full disclosure of all material information regarding a financial advisor's conflict of interest in order to obtain the benefit of business judgment review under the *M&F Worldwide* framework. In *City of Dearborn Police & Fire Revised Retirement System v. Brookfield Asset Management, Inc.*, the Delaware Supreme Court found that disclosures regarding a financial advisor's conflict of interest were inadequate when the target company failed to disclose that its financial advisor held a nearly half-billion dollar stake in affiliates of the acquiror—even though such a stake represented less than one-tenth of one percent of the firm's total holdings—finding that such an investment might be material when “assessed from the viewpoint of the ‘reasonable’ stockholder.”³²⁸ And in *City of Sarasota Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc.*, the Delaware Supreme Court found that disclosures regarding two separate sell-side financial advisors were lacking.³²⁹ The Court found the disclosure regarding the first advisor misleading because the proxy statement stated that the advisor “may provide” services to some of the acquiring parties, when that advisor was in fact already providing such services.³³⁰ The Court also found disclosure regarding the second advisor inadequate because merely disclosing that the advisor was receiving “customary compensation” from its concurrent representation of two of the acquiring entities, and not providing more information about the relative size of the fees, was insufficient for “contextualizing and evaluating” the conflict.³³¹

In addition to state law requirements, the federal proxy rules require disclosure regarding financial advisors. Where a board receives a fairness opinion from a financial advisor that is referred to in the proxy statement or prospectus, the company must describe any material relationship that existed during the past two years or that is mutually understood to be contemplated and any compensation received or to be received as a result of the relationship between the financial advisor and its affiliates, on the one hand, and the subject company or its affiliates, on the other hand.³³² This disclosure should describe the compensation to be received by the financial advisor in connection with the transaction, including any contingent fee arrangements. In addition, in 2016 the SEC issued guidance related to the disclosure of financial advisor fees in solicitations involving equity tender offers, providing that the board of a target company must disclose a summary of the material terms of the compensation of the target's financial advisor in its solicitation/recommendation statement. The disclosure must be sufficient to permit stockholders to evaluate the advisor's objectivity, and generic disclosures about “customary compensation” are generally not sufficient. The guidance provides that such disclosure would generally include the types of fees payable, contingencies, milestones or triggers relating to the fees, and any other information that would be material to a stockholder's assessment of the financial advisor's analyses or conclusions, including any material incentives or conflicts.³³³

E. Use and Disclosure of Financial Projections

Financial projections are often prepared by the management of the target company (or of both companies in a stock-for-stock deal) and can play a critical role in the decision-making process of both the acquiror and target boards with respect to the amount and nature of consideration. These projections customarily also serve as the foundation for certain analyses supporting a fairness opinion given by a financial advisor. Despite their usefulness, the creation of, reliance on and provision to potential buyers of financial projections may trigger certain disclosure obligations under both Delaware law and SEC rules. Failing to understand and follow the disclosure requirements may result in costly shareholder litigation claiming that the company's disclosure to stockholders was inadequate and misleading, which could also lead to delay in completing a transaction.

Since the *Netsmart* decision and the consistent line of cases that followed, it has become a standard expectation that the management projections underlying the banker's analyses supporting its fairness opinion be fairly disclosed.³³⁴ Courts have also indicated that partial or selective disclosure of certain projections, including omission of other cases prepared by management, can be problematic.

Not all projections will be deemed sufficiently material or reliable as to require disclosure in the proxy statement. Nor is the mere receipt or review of certain projections by parties or advisors to a transaction enough to require disclosure.³³⁵ For one thing, the development of financial projections is an iterative process, which often involves deliberation between the board (or special committee), its financial advisors and management as to which assumptions are reasonable. Additionally, financial projections often contemplate a base case, an upside case and a downside case, not all of which are necessarily material and required to be disclosed.³³⁶ As explained in *In re Micromet, Inc. Shareholders Litigation*, "Delaware law does not require disclosure of inherently unreliable or speculative information which would tend to confuse stockholders or inundate them with an overload of information."³³⁷

In *In re BEA Systems, Inc. Shareholder Litigation* in 2008, the plaintiffs argued that certain financial data considered by BEA's financial advisor had been presented to the board and thus had to be disclosed.³³⁸ The Delaware Court of Chancery found that neither the financial advisor nor the board considered the contested data reliable or actually relied upon that data in forming their views on valuation and that the information did not have to be disclosed, noting that disclosure of such unreliable information "could well mislead shareholders rather than inform them."³³⁹ The *BEA* case indicates that Delaware courts have not imposed *per se* disclosure standards for financial projections or other aspects of a financial advisor's work; case-specific materiality is the touchstone for disclosure. The Delaware Court of Chancery reiterated this view in *In re Saba Software, Inc. Stockholders Litigation* in 2017, stating that "the omission from a proxy statement of projections prepared by a financial advisor for a sales process rarely will give rise to an actionable disclosure claim."³⁴⁰ The Court also found on a separate occasion that the failure to disclose projections that the financial advisor "ostensibly did not rely on," such as a supplemental analysis that concerned only a small fraction of the company's estimated revenues, was not material.³⁴¹

Not only is the decision of whether and what projections to include a consideration under Delaware law, but so too is how they are characterized if disclosed. In October 2018, the Delaware Court of Chancery in *In re PLX Technology Inc. Shareholders Litigation* found that a board breached its fiduciary duty by mischaracterizing projections that were prepared specifically in connection with an acquisition, by characterizing them as being made in the ordinary course of business for operating purposes.³⁴² In a different context, in 2019 the Delaware Court of Chancery rejected disclosure challenges raised by plaintiffs claiming that financial projections “understated the Company’s upside and overstated certain risk factors” in comparison to more optimistic statements publicly made during investor conference calls and in a published article. In finding that the projections were not inconsistent (the Court found them to still be generally favorable), and thus not materially false or misleading, the Court made clear there is some leeway to have projections and public statements be different, especially when the context of the public statements (such as puffery or discussion of post-closing plans and prospects) justify the difference.³⁴³

The SEC also imposes its own disclosure requirements in transactions subject to the proxy rules. While the SEC is receptive to arguments that certain projections are out of date or immaterial, it is normally the company’s burden to persuade the SEC that projections that were provided to buyers should not be disclosed. There can be significant consequences for non-disclosure, including cease-and-desist actions in certain situations where a company misleads investors about the future financial performance of the company, such as through the divergence between a company’s own private model indicating underperformance and its subsequent public statements affirming the company’s more optimistic projections, which later prove to be inaccurate. Companies should take care that their projections are carefully prepared, are thorough, include an appropriate measure of caution and describe any key assumptions made in their preparation. In light of the timing pressure facing many transactions, where even a few weeks’ delay may add unwanted execution risk, a company may preemptively disclose projections in its proxy statement that it would have otherwise kept private absent requested disclosure by the SEC. Such preemptive efforts help accelerate the SEC review process and also help to minimize the likelihood that a successful shareholder lawsuit will enjoin a transaction pending further disclosure found to be required by a court. Nevertheless, a company must avoid including too many figures in its disclosure so as to be confusing or misleading to stockholders.

Delaware law and the views of the SEC staff on how much disclosure to require (both of target projections and, in the case of transactions involving stock consideration, buyer projections) continue to develop. For example, in October 2017, likely in response to an increasing amount of frivolous litigation claims that such projections must be reconciled under Regulation G, the SEC staff released guidance clarifying that financial measures included in projections provided to financial advisors for the purpose of rendering an opinion related to a business combination transaction, which measures are being disclosed in order to comply with law, do not require GAAP reconciliation.³⁴⁴ Further, in April 2018, the SEC staff released guidance to confirm that the foregoing exemption for non-GAAP financial measures applies if (1) the forecasts provided to financial advisors are also provided to boards or board committees, or (2) a company determines that disclosure of material forecasts provided to bidders is needed to comply with federal securities laws, including anti-fraud provisions.³⁴⁵

In March 2022, in light of the then-recent increase in the number of SPAC transactions, the SEC proposed significant rule changes for SPACs—these rules were finalized in late January 2024 and became effective on July 1, 2024.³⁴⁶ Among other things, the final rules render the PSLRA’s safe harbor for forward-looking statements unavailable for projections contained in the Form S-4 for a SPAC transaction, generally aligning SPAC transactions with initial public offerings. In addition to new disclosure requirements that apply to financial projections used in de-SPAC transactions, these final rules also include amendments to the rules governing financial projections in all SEC filings. Specifically, these rules add the following additional disclosure requirements: (1) the presentation of projected measures that are not based on historical financial results or operational history should be clearly distinguished from projected measures that are based on historical financial results or operational history, (2) historical financial results or operational history that form the basis of financial projections should be presented with equal or greater prominence than such financial projections, and (3) the presentation of projections that include non-GAAP financial measures should include a clear definition or explanation of those financial measures, a description of the GAAP financial measure to which it is most directly comparable, and an explanation of why the non-GAAP measure was selected instead of a GAAP measure.³⁴⁷

As the rules and law regarding disclosure of projections are fact-specific and evolving, companies should consult with their legal and financial advisors well in advance of a filing to ensure that they are well informed as to how to strike the delicate balance between under- and over-disclosure in this area.

IV.

Structural Considerations

A. Private Deal Structures

Although this outline generally focuses on takeovers of public companies, transactions involving private targets, including the sale of a subsidiary or business by a public company, make up a substantial portion of global M&A activity. A sale of a private company or business can involve the sale of assets, stock or a combination of both, or may be effected through a merger, a spin-off combined with a merger or a joint venture, among other structures.

Various considerations may make one acquisition structure preferable to another. For example, the acquisition of the equity of an entity results in all of the entity's assets and liabilities being indirectly transferred to the acquiror. In some cases, the parties do not wish to (or are not able to) transfer the entity that holds the target business to the acquiror (for instance, because the relevant assets, employees and liabilities are housed in entities that may also hold assets, employees and liabilities unrelated to the target business) and, instead, provide for the transfer of specified assets and liabilities associated with the target business. The choice of transaction structure typically will have tax ramifications and may affect which governmental or contractual consents may be required for the transaction.

1. Basic Structures

There are major differences between deals involving public and private company targets, as well as important considerations that are unique to deals with private company targets. For example, transactions involving private company targets can potentially be consummated more quickly than transactions involving public company targets because a private target can typically be acquired without having to hold a shareholder meeting subject to the federal proxy rules. Even when a vote is required, many private company transactions involve a target with a single owner or concentrated shareholder base, enabling the acquiror to "lock up" the deal at signing by obtaining all requisite stockholder consents to the transaction in connection with entry into the transaction agreement. Where a private company is being acquired without any need for post-signing target shareholder approval, there typically would not be any "fiduciary-out" or "change in recommendation" provisions of the type discussed in Section V.A.3. Not only does this reduce the time needed to close a deal by eliminating the post-signing shareholder approval process, but it also increases deal certainty by eliminating interloper risk.

Although public mergers and acquisitions often have a handful of bespoke issues arising from the particular circumstances involved, their terms and conditions tend to have less variation than private deals due to the expectations of boards and shareholders of public company targets. By contrast, asset purchase agreements, unlike public company merger agreements, typically include provisions either specifically or generally defining which assets and liabilities are included in the sale and which are excluded, which allows the parties greater ability to customize the transaction. For example, the parties can provide for the transfer of all liabilities relating to the target business, including liabilities relating to the period prior to the closing of the transaction,

the retention by the seller of the pre-closing liabilities—a so-called “our-watch, your-watch” construct—or a more bespoke allocation of specified pre-closing liabilities between the seller and the purchaser. In addition, acquisition agreements involving private company targets typically include purchase price adjustments tied to the amount of cash, debt and/or working capital transferred with the business at closing or other specifically negotiated adjustments (such as adjustments related to seller transaction expenses or taxes), whereas acquisition agreements involving public company targets typically do not provide for any purchase price adjustments. Furthermore, although it is rare for acquisition agreements involving a public company target to feature contingent consideration that would be payable post-closing, acquisition agreements involving a private company target occasionally include earn-outs providing for additional consideration to be possibly paid after closing. Private company acquisition agreements also may include post-closing covenants, such as non-competition or employee non-solicitation provisions, whereas covenants in public company agreements generally terminate at closing.

Where the acquiror is purchasing less than 100% of the equity of a private company, the parties will need to consider the go-forward governance arrangements and other terms of their ongoing relationship as shareholders of the target company, which raises a myriad of additional issues to be negotiated. These issues may include board representation, veto rights, preemptive rights, put/call and other exit rights, transfer restrictions, tag/drag-along rights, registration rights and/or information rights, among others, depending on the circumstances. In August 2024, a new Section 122(18) of the DGCL went into effect, which was enacted in response to uncertainty about the enforceability of go-forward governance arrangements contained in investor rights agreements following the Delaware Chancery Court’s February 2024 decision in *West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Co.*³⁴⁸ The new amendments expressly authorize a corporation to enter into stockholder agreements that require the corporation, the board or stockholders to take certain actions specified in the agreement, or that restrict them from doing so without the approval or consent of any such persons (including the stockholder entering into the agreement).³⁴⁹

2. Indemnification and Representation and Warranty Insurance

One fundamental difference between acquisition agreements involving private company targets as opposed to public company targets is that private M&A agreements often contemplate post-closing recourse, whether through indemnification or representation and warranty (“R&W”) insurance, while public company agreements do not. One reason for this distinction is simply practicality: in an acquisition of a private company or business (including the acquisition of a division or a group of assets from a public company), an acquiror may be able to seek recourse from the sellers post-closing in the event of a breach of the agreement. By contrast, in an acquisition of a public company, the public target has dispersed ownership that changes daily and there is typically no identifiable party from whom recourse for breaches of the agreement could realistically be obtained post-closing. Furthermore, unlike the acquiror of a public company, the acquiror of a private company does not have the benefit of presumptively reliable public disclosures being made by the target on a regular basis and regulated under the federal securities laws. The difference in the degree of information available about public as compared to private company targets leads to both a greater need for post-closing recourse for the acquiror of a private company as well as greater negotiation of the precise wording of representations and warranties in

private company acquisition agreements and the related disclosure schedules. In a private transaction where there is doubt about the credit quality of the seller or the selling entity's intent to continue operating rather than distributing its assets to a dispersed group of owners (against whom recourse may be difficult), the acquisition agreement may provide for an escrow or holdback of a portion of the transaction consideration as security for indemnification obligations.

As an alternative or supplement to indemnification in private deals, acquirors may obtain representation and warranty insurance, which provides coverage for breaches of representations and warranties in purchase agreements. In recent years, there has been a steady upswing in the use of R&W insurance. Data on private M&A transactions is somewhat difficult to track, but studies have shown that from 2022 to 2025, approximately 40–63% of private transactions in North America included R&W insurance, slightly down from approximately 65% in 2020 to 2021 but up from approximately 29% in 2016 to 2017.³⁵⁰ In addition, the number of R&W insurance brokers and insurers has increased, allowing clients to obtain several different proposals before selecting a primary insurer. Although the rise of R&W insurance cannot be attributed to a single factor, the following developments have clearly contributed: transaction parties and their advisors have become more comfortable using R&W insurance to supplement or replace indemnification obligations in an acquisition agreement; additional insurers have entered the space, with the number of carriers jumping from just six in 2014 to over 30 in 2025, which has led to a more competitive underwriting environment; the process of obtaining a policy has become more streamlined, with the rise of dedicated and sophisticated brokers responsible for shepherding and coordinating insurers through the R&W process, and insurers have demonstrated that they are able to act efficiently to meet transaction timelines; insurance coverage has become increasingly available in larger transactions through large policies which involve the use of multiple carriers; insurers have shown sophistication in being able to analyze and understand complex transactions and a variety of different risks; and insurers have been willing to proceed without the seller having any “skin in the game,” in the form of an indemnity obligation. As the number of R&W insurance claims has increased in recent years (commensurate with the increased use of the product), R&W insurers have overwhelmingly demonstrated that they will honor claims³⁵¹; indeed, to date, there have been very few disputes between insureds and insurers regarding claims under R&W insurance policies.

The use of R&W insurance has become an attractive structural solution for both sellers and acquirors and has become prevalent across almost all industries. From the perspective of a seller, R&W insurance can facilitate a clean exit from a business without post-closing contingent liabilities or holdback of the purchase price. While R&W insurance has become commonplace in strategic transactions (indeed, brokers have estimated that approximately 40–50% of policies involved “corporates” as sellers), R&W insurance can be especially attractive for private equity sellers, where any type of post-closing contingent liability or holdback (*i.e.*, in the form of potential indemnification obligations) can create structural challenges and friction in a fund's relationship with its limited partners. Private equity sellers of portfolio companies have been increasingly successful in requiring buyers to accept limited or no post-closing indemnification so they may safely and quickly distribute deal proceeds to their limited partners—a position that has been facilitated by the expanding availability and use of R&W insurance.

At the same time, from the perspective of an acquiror, R&W insurance provides a reliable source for reimbursement for breaches other than a seller, especially where the seller is not an optimal source of indemnification due to credit risks or future plans with respect to the sale proceeds. And assuming that the acquiror has performed adequate diligence, RWI can provide more reliable protection than can a seller indemnity with respect to unknown risks. Additionally, an acquiror can usually obtain a longer survival period for representations and warranties (typically three years of coverage for general representations and six or seven years of coverage for tax representations and fundamental representations that address core concepts such as title, authorization, and capitalization) and more robust coverage from an insurance carrier than it might otherwise receive from a seller indemnity. RWI policies also typically include a “double materiality scrape”—that is, reading out materiality qualifiers both for purposes of determining whether the representation was breached and for determining the magnitude of loss suffered.

Given the increased availability and market familiarity with R&W insurance, sellers now often insist that prospective acquirors obtain R&W insurance in lieu of post-closing seller indemnification; likewise, prospective acquirors sometimes substitute R&W insurance for post-closing indemnification to enhance the attractiveness of their bids. In addition to negotiating whether R&W insurance will be used in lieu of post-closing indemnification, parties also negotiate who will bear the cost of the R&W insurance premium and the policy deductible (known in the R&W insurance space as the “retention”).

To be sure, R&W insurance is neither identical to seller indemnities, nor a panacea. There are certain inherent costs associated with purchasing R&W insurance (*e.g.*, premium costs and insurers’ diligence costs, *plus* there is a deductible (recently, typically 0.5%–1.0% of the transaction size) before recovery under the R&W insurance policy is available). Additionally, some insurers may not participate in certain sectors or geographic locations perceived by such insurers as higher risk, which may limit the overall level of coverage available and competition over pricing and terms. In addition, although increasingly more streamlined, the process for purchasing R&W insurance, including a review of the acquiror’s due diligence and negotiation of policy wording, takes time and effort. Although brokers and insurers alike can move with speed and put a policy in place in a compressed period of time, doing so generally requires the acquiror to have not only completed an in-depth diligence review of the target across multiple functions, but to be prepared to respond to a series of questions and follow-up questions across multiple business areas.

Additionally, R&W insurance policies do not cover covenant breaches or items specifically disclosed or problems specifically identified as part of diligence.³⁵² Insurers also seek to exclude from coverage matters for which they believe the risk of a claim is too high. Some categories, for instance, environmental liabilities (such as those relating to asbestos or polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)), business operations or employees in known war zones, and certain pension liabilities, are often automatic exclusions from R&W insurance policies, whether the liabilities are known or unknown.³⁵³ R&W insurance is also premised on the R&W insurers becoming comfortable with the level of diligence performed by the acquiror. Accordingly, if the R&W insurers conclude that a particular risk area (or type of representation) was not sufficiently diligenced by the acquiror, the R&W insurers may seek to exclude or narrow coverage of that risk area (or representation). Moreover, R&W insurers have recently focused on increased diligence in areas such as data

privacy and cybersecurity, environmental matters, employment classification, and certain tax matters. A robust diligence process by the acquiror can aid in eliminating specific exclusions by demonstrating to the carrier that the acquiror has uncovered all material issues in any area of concern. Careful review and negotiation of the drafting of exclusions from coverage is key to ensure that acquirors understand which risks they have coverage for, either through insurance or indemnification, and which risks they will bear.³⁵⁴

Looking ahead, although R&W insurance has thus far been used nearly exclusively in private deals, it might become more readily available in public transactions.³⁵⁵ But, because the insurers would generally have no subrogation rights (even with respect to fraud) in a transaction involving a public company target, the underwriters would be even more insistent on the scope of both the acquiror's diligence and the disclosure schedules, and might seek certain additional exclusions from coverage. Similarly, the nature and scope of public company disclosures and SEC filings might result in certain limited variations to R&W insurance policies in the public company R&W insurance context.

B. Public Deal Structures

Where the target of an acquisition is a public company, the legal form of the transaction is similarly a critical structuring consideration. The legal structure may have important consequences for the deal, including the tax treatment of the transaction, the speed at which the transaction will be completed and the potential transactional litigation risks. Parties to a transaction should be mindful of the consequences of the transaction structure they select.

Public acquisitions typically take the form of (i) a one-step merger or (ii) a two-step tender offer, which is a tender offer for shares of the target company followed by a second-step "squeeze-out" merger where all remaining shares are acquired. The decision to choose one structure over another is generally informed by timing, regulatory considerations, tax, financing requirements and other tactical considerations.

A one-step merger is a creature of state statutes that provides for all of the non-surviving entity's assets and liabilities to become assets and liabilities of the surviving entity. A merger is effectively the acquisition of all assets and an assumption of all liabilities of one entity by another, except that, in a merger, the separate legal existence of one of the two merger parties ceases upon consummation of the merger by operation of law. A statutory long-form merger with a public company target typically requires the target's stockholders to vote on the merger proposal at a shareholder meeting after the preparation (and potential SEC review) of a proxy statement. Most commonly, statutory mergers are structured so that the constituent entities to the merger are the target and a subsidiary of the acquiror (a so-called "triangular" merger), in lieu of the acquiror directly merging. A forward triangular merger involves the target merging with and into a subsidiary of the acquiror, with the subsidiary as the surviving entity. A reverse triangular merger involves a subsidiary of the acquiror merging with and into the target, with the target as the surviving entity. Choosing a merger structure is a deal-specific decision that is primarily driven by tax considerations, industry-specific regulatory requirements and sometimes by concerns relating to whether anti-assignment and change-of-control provisions in critical contracts may be triggered if one form is chosen over the other.³⁵⁶ The requirements for tax-free treatment of

forward triangular mergers and reverse triangular mergers, as well as certain other transaction structures, are discussed in Section IV.D.

A two-step transaction involves a public tender offer in which the acquiror makes a direct offer to the target's public shareholders to acquire their shares, commonly conditioned on the acquiror acquiring at least a majority of the target's common stock upon the close of the tender offer. In cases where, upon consummation of the offer, the acquiror holds at least the statutorily prescribed percentage (typically 90% for a short-form merger, or a majority in the case of a transaction effected under Section 251(h) of the DGCL or corresponding provisions in other states, as discussed below) of each class of target stock entitled to vote on the merger, the acquiror can complete the acquisition through a merger without a stockholder vote promptly following consummation of the tender offer,³⁵⁷ thereby avoiding the need to solicit proxies and hold a shareholders' meeting to approve the second-step merger.

1. Considerations in Selecting a Merger vs. a Tender Offer Structure

a. Speed and Interloper Risk

Depending on the circumstances, a tender offer structure can lead to a transaction being completed faster than a long-form merger. This is because the stockholder vote contemplated by a merger requires the preparation and filing, and potential review by the SEC, of a proxy statement, followed by a shareholder solicitation period. By contrast, a tender offer statement for an all-cash tender offer can usually be mailed to stockholders within one or two weeks of the parties reaching agreement, and any SEC review is typically completed during the tender offer period. In general, a tender offer must stay open for a minimum of 20 business days under the federal securities laws.³⁵⁸ However, the SEC recently issued an exemptive order that allows certain all-cash equity tender offers to be completed in as few as 10 business days.³⁵⁹ Additionally, the tender offer rules reduce the timing disparity between all-cash tender offers and tender offers with consideration including securities (or "exchange offers") by allowing the 20-business day time period for exchange offers to begin as early as upon initial filing of a registration statement, rather than upon effectiveness of the registration statement following SEC review. If an acquiror commences an exchange offer on the basis of an initial registration statement, the SEC typically will endeavor to work with an offeror to clear the registration statement in time for the exchange offer to be completed within 20 business days of commencement, although this outcome is not assured.

But a two-step structure involving a tender offer is not always preferable to or faster than a one-step merger. For example, in a transaction that involves a lengthy regulatory approval process, a tender offer would have to remain open until the regulatory approval is obtained (which could involve repeated extensions of the tender offer expiration date), and if Section 251(h) or the DGCL or a comparable statute is unavailable and the tender offer does not result in the acquiror holding sufficient shares to effect a short-form "squeeze-out" merger, additional time would be needed to complete the back-end merger structure. By comparison, a one-step merger would permit the parties to obtain shareholder approval during the pendency of the regulatory process (and cut off interloper risk following shareholder approval), and then close the transaction promptly after obtaining regulatory approval. An acquiror may prefer a one-step merger in this circumstance, as fiduciary-out provisions in a merger agreement typically terminate upon

shareholder approval, while a tender offer remains subject to interloper risk and the risk that market changes make the offer less attractive to target shareholders so long as the tender offer remains open. In addition, if there is a possibility of a time gap between the closing of the tender offer and the closing of the second-step merger, the tender offer structure poses financing-related complications—albeit ones that have been manageable in most instances—because financing for the tender offer will be needed at the time of its closing, before the acquiror has access to the target’s balance sheet (the Federal Reserve Board’s margin rules restrict borrowings secured by public company stock to 50% of its market value). Finally, the length of time between signing and closing a one-step merger may depend on the type of consideration. The SEC often declines to review and provide comments on all-cash merger proxy statements. Nevertheless, the shortening of the tender offer period to as little as 10 business days in certain all-cash equity tender offers can create an even greater timing advantage for a tender offer over a voted merger, even where the SEC declines to review an all-cash merger proxy.

b. Dissident Shareholders

One potential advantage of the tender offer structure is its relative favorability in dealing with dissident shareholder attempts to “hold up” friendly merger transactions. The tender offer structure may be advantageous in overcoming hold-up obstacles because (1) tender offers do not suffer from the so-called “dead-vote” problem that arises in contested merger transactions when the holders of a substantial number of shares sell after the record date and then either do not vote or change an outdated vote and (2) dissident shareholders may be less likely to try to “game” a tender offer than a merger vote, and therefore the risk of a “no” vote (*i.e.*, a less-than-50% tender) may be lower than for a traditional voted-upon merger.

c. Controller Transactions

As discussed in Section II, transactions with a conflicted controlling stockholder are subject to entire fairness review by default, absent the use of protective procedures. Under the newly amended DGCL Section 144, non-going private controlling stockholder transactions such as tender offers can obtain a safe harbor from judicial review if approved by an informed special committee or an informed vote of the disinterested stockholders.

2. Delaware Facilitates Use of Tender Offers: Section 251(h)

Before Delaware adopted Section 251(h) in 2013 to facilitate the use of tender offers, a second-step merger following a tender offer for a Delaware corporation always required a stockholder vote—even if the outcome was a formality because the acquiror owned enough shares to single-handedly approve the transaction—unless the acquiror reached Delaware’s short-form merger 90% threshold. Despite the inevitability of the vote’s outcome, the extended process of preparing a proxy statement and holding a meeting would impose transaction risk, expense and complexity on the parties. The prospect of delay was a significant deterrent to the use of tender offers, especially by private equity acquirors, which typically need to acquire full ownership of the target in a single step to facilitate their acquisition financing. Dealmakers had relied on several imperfect workarounds to address shortfalls, as discussed further in Section IV.B.3 below.

DGCL Section 251(h) permits the inclusion of a provision in a merger agreement eliminating the need for a stockholder vote to approve a second-step merger following a tender offer under certain conditions—including that following the tender offer the acquiror owns sufficient stock to approve the merger pursuant to the DGCL and the target’s charter (*i.e.*, a majority of the outstanding shares, unless the target’s charter requires a higher threshold or the vote of a separate series or class).³⁶⁰ The provision also requires that (i) the merger agreement permits or requires that the merger be effected under Section 251(h); (ii) the tender offer extend to any and all outstanding voting stock of the target (except for stock owned by the target itself, the acquiror, any parent of the acquiror (if wholly owned) and any subsidiaries of the foregoing); (iii) all non-tendering shares receive the same amount and type of consideration as those that tender; and (iv) the second-step merger be effected as soon as practicable following the consummation of the offer.

Subsequent amendments to Section 251(h) clarified that, for purposes of determining whether sufficient shares were acquired in the first-step tender offer, shares tendered pursuant to notice of guaranteed delivery procedures cannot be counted by the acquiror toward the threshold until the shares underlying the guarantee are actually delivered. Amendments also now exempt “rollover stock” from the requirement that all non-tendering shares receive the same amount and kind of consideration as those that tender, which facilitates the use of two-step structures by private equity acquirors—which sometimes seek to have target management roll over some or all of their existing equity in connection with an acquisition to further align the management team’s incentives with those of the acquiror post-acquisition. Rollover stock is also counted toward satisfaction of the requirement that the acquiror own sufficient shares following completion of the tender offer to approve the second-step merger in situations where rollover stock is exchanged following completion of the tender offer.

A 2016 decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery, *In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litigation*,³⁶¹ makes clear that using the two-step structure under Section 251(h) does not, by itself, cause a target board to lose the benefit of the business judgment standard of review that could be obtained through stockholder approval in a long-form merger. *Volcano* held that the first-step tender of shares to the acquiror in a Section 251(h) transaction “essentially replicates [the] statutorily required stockholder vote in favor of a merger in that both require approval—albeit pursuant to different corporate mechanisms—by stockholders representing at least a majority of a corporation’s outstanding shares to effectuate the merger.”³⁶² Accordingly, the standard of review for a Section 251(h) transaction, which is also known as a “medium form” merger, is the business judgment rule, where a majority of a company’s fully informed, disinterested and uncoerced stockholders tender their shares, providing *Corwin* protections in the tender offer context. *Volcano* therefore suggests that tender offers under Section 251(h) do not deprive the target board of the benefits of fully informed stockholder approval.

Maryland, the jurisdiction in which many publicly traded real estate investment trusts (“REITs”) are incorporated, also provides a statutory method to accomplish a two-step merger via use of a tender offer. Similar to Section 251(h), Section 3-106.1 of the Maryland General Corporation Law permits the inclusion of a provision in a merger agreement eliminating the need for a stockholder vote to approve a second-step merger following a tender offer under similar

conditions to Section 251(h), including that the number of shares tendered into the offer must meet the same threshold as the number of votes needed to approve a merger.

3. Other Methods of Dealing with Tender Offer Shortfalls

Before the adoption of Section 251(h), several workarounds were sometimes used to deal with the possibility that a tender offer would result in the acquisition of sufficient shares to (eventually) approve a second-step merger, but not reach the 90% threshold needed for a short-form merger: the top-up option, dual-track structure and subsequent offering period. Although Section 251(h) has diminished the prominence of these workarounds by eliminating in applicable transactions the need to reach the 90% threshold, they remain relevant because Section 251(h) may not always be available or optimal for the parties. For instance, it would not be available for targets that are not incorporated in Delaware or another state that has adopted a provision similar to Section 251(h). Section 251(h) is likewise unavailable if the target's charter expressly requires a stockholder vote on a merger or if the target's shares are not publicly listed or held by more than 2,000 holders.

a. Top-Up Options

To address the burden of the 90% threshold, the market evolved a workaround in the form of the top-up option. Such an option, exercisable after the close of the tender offer, permits the acquiror to purchase a number of newly issued shares directly from the target so that the acquiror may reach the short-form merger statute threshold, thereby avoiding a stockholder vote and enabling an almost immediate consummation of the transaction. Critically, a top-up option is limited by the amount of authorized but unissued stock of the target, which may prevent the target from issuing sufficient stock for the acquiror to reach the short-form merger threshold. As a technical matter, issuances of greater than 20% of outstanding shares in a top-up option would likely violate stock exchange rules that require shareholder approval before such issuance, but such rules do not limit such issuances in practice since the punishment for such violation would be de-listing and the target would otherwise be de-listed at the closing of the acquisition.

b. Dual-Track Structures

A number of years ago, some private equity firms began using a dual-track approach that involves launching a two-step tender offer (including a top-up option) concurrently with filing a proxy statement for a one-step merger. The logic behind this approach is that, if the tender offer fails to reach the minimum number of shares upon which it is conditioned—which in combination with the shares issued pursuant to a top-up option would allow for a short-form merger—the parties would already be well along the path to a shareholders' meeting for a fallback long-form merger (it should be noted that while the SEC may begin review of a proxy statement, it will not complete its review until after the expiration of the tender offer). Examples of this approach include 3G Capital/Burger King, Bain Capital/Gymboree and TPG/Immucor.

Although dual-track tender offers are now infrequently employed as a result of Section 251(h), dual-track structures continue to be potentially useful, especially in cases where the target is incorporated in a state that has not adopted a provision similar to Section 251(h). In addition, some strategic transactions have employed a dual-track approach where there is uncertainty at the

outset as to whether regulatory hurdles, such as an antitrust “second request,” will involve a lengthy process that could subject an acquiror in a tender offer to prolonged interloper risk. If regulatory approval is promptly received, the acquisition can close under the tender offer route (and the second-step merger can be effected under Section 251(h), if available); if not, the stockholder vote can be taken on the long-form merger route, thereby reducing interloper risk.

c. Subsequent Offering Periods

SEC rules permit a bidder in a tender offer to provide for a subsequent offering period if, among other requirements, the initial offering period of at least 20 business days has expired, the bidder immediately accepts and promptly pays for all securities tendered during the initial offering period, and the bidder immediately accepts and promptly pays for all securities as they are tendered during the subsequent offering period. This gives a bidder a second opportunity to reach 90% if it does not reach that threshold by the end of the initial offering period; once shareholders see that the bidder has acquired sufficient shares in the initial offer to ultimately approve a second-step merger, they may choose to tender into the subsequent offering period rather than wait until that merger is completed. Of course, there is no assurance that providing a subsequent offering period will result in reaching the 90% threshold.

4. Mergers of Equals

Combinations between public companies of similar sizes are often referred to as “mergers of equals,” or “MOEs,” although the term does not describe a distinct legal transaction structure or have a universally agreed meaning in the market. Nonetheless, some general characteristics of MOEs can be described. MOEs are typically structured as tax-free, stock-for-stock transactions, with a fixed exchange ratio without collars or walk-aways, and with a balanced contract often containing matching representations, warranties and interim covenants from both parties. In addition, MOEs tend to raise certain “social” issues that are not typically debated by the parties in situations where there is a clear acquiror and target. As described below, key social issues in MOEs may include the identity of the CEO of the combined company, the composition of the combined board, the identity of the chairman, the location of the combined company’s headquarters and the combined company’s name. MOEs are particularly common in financial services transactions, and they have been prevalent in recent years, as exemplified by the \$28.3 billion merger of BB&T and SunTrust creating Truist and the \$21.5 billion merger of Global Payments and TSYS.

MOEs often provide little or no premium above market price for either company. Instead, an exchange ratio is set to reflect one or more relative metrics, such as assets, earnings and capital contributions, or market capitalizations of the two merging parties—typically, but not always, resulting in a near market-to-market exchange. Assuming a proper exchange ratio is set, MOEs can provide a fair and efficient means for the shareholders of both companies to benefit because the combined company can enhance shareholder value through merger synergies at a lower cost than high-premium acquisitions.

Due to the absence or modesty of a premium to market price, however, MOEs are particularly vulnerable to stockholder dissatisfaction and competing bids. As a preliminary matter,

it is important to recognize that the period of greatest vulnerability is the period before the transaction is signed and announced. Parties must be cognizant that leaks or premature disclosure of MOE negotiations can provide an opening for a would-be acquiror to submit a competing proposal or pressure a party into a sale or an auction; such leaks can also encourage shareholders to pressure one or both companies into abandoning the transaction before it is ever signed or the parties have had an opportunity to fully and publicly communicate its rationale to the market. A run-up in the stock price of one of the companies—whether or not based on merger rumors—also can derail an MOE, because no company wants to announce a transaction with an exchange ratio that reflects a discount to market. MOE agreements generally include robust structural protections, such as break-up fees, support commitments, no-shops and “force the vote” provisions, which prevent the parties from terminating the merger agreement in the face of a competing offer without giving the shareholders an opportunity to vote on the merger. Once the deal has been made public, it is critical to advance a strong business rationale for the MOE in order to obtain a positive stock market reaction and thus reduce both parties’ vulnerability to stockholder unrest. The appearance and reality of a true combination of equals, with shareholders sharing the benefits of the merger proportionately, are essential to winning shareholder support in the absence of a substantial premium.

Achieving the reality and perception of a true combination of equals presents an MOE transaction with unique structural and governance challenges. Structurally, the companies may choose to have both companies’ stock surrendered and a new company’s stock issued in their place to, among other possible benefits, promote the market’s understanding of the transaction as a true combination of equals, rather than a takeover of one company by the other. This is sometimes accomplished using a “double dummy” or “top hat” merger structure, in which both merger parties become subsidiaries under a new holding company. However, as with all mergers, no structure should be selected without a careful analysis of its impact on “change of control” provisions in each company’s debt, equity plans and other contracts, stockholder vote requirements and tax considerations for each company. Similarly, parties to an MOE should carefully consider the post-merger governance and management of the combined company. Among the issues that will need to be addressed are the combined company’s name, the location of the combined company’s headquarters and key operations, the rationalization of the companies’ separate corporate cultures and the selection of officers and directors. In most of the larger MOEs, there has been substantial balance, if not exact parity, in board representation and a “best athletes” approach among senior executive officers. This approach allows for a selection of the best people from both organizations to manage the combined company, thereby enhancing long-term shareholder value. For example, the CEO of one company may become the executive chairman, while the other CEO continues as CEO of the combined company, thus providing for representation at the helm from both constituent companies. Occasionally, but rarely, some MOEs have even utilized co-CEO structures. Ensuring that employee, community and other stakeholder interests are properly protected can present challenging issues, but such arrangements can be instrumental in crafting a successful transaction. Moreover, depending on the state of incorporation of the seller, or whether the seller is a public benefit corporation, greater legal flexibility, and even a duty, may arise to consider stakeholder best interests.

Due to their size and complexity, MOEs could face heightened regulatory scrutiny and a lengthy review process, especially in larger transactions. Accordingly, MOE transactions are less

likely to be announced in challenging regulatory environments. In particular, MOEs are more likely to raise potential competitive concerns. Historically, with respect to bank MOEs, competition concerns by the DOJ and bank regulators have been focused on geographic branch overlaps with branch divestitures as an accepted remedial measure to address any problematic competitive overlaps. This approach provides merging parties with the ability to analyze the competitive risks associated with a transaction and identify a remedial package that ensures a path to closing.

5. Rule 13e-3 “Going Private” Transactions

When structuring a public deal involving affiliated parties, an important consideration is Rule 13e-3 under the Exchange Act, which imposes additional disclosure obligations on the parties to so-called “going private” transactions. “Going private” transactions are ones in which the issuer or affiliates of the issuer purchase the issuer’s equity securities (including by way of a merger, tender offer or other business combination transaction), and as a result any class of the issuer’s equity securities becomes eligible for deregistration. Over the years, including in the context of Rule 13e-3 transactions, the SEC has taken a broad view of persons that come within the scope of the “affiliate” definition, attributing “control” to directors, members of senior management, material stockholders and other parties with significant rights to exert influence over an issuer (*e.g.*, with the power to designate members of the board or material contractual consent rights). Moreover, the SEC has taken the view that—even in a transaction where an unaffiliated third party is the purchaser—there are various factors which can still subject the transaction to Rule 13e-3, including when members of the target issuer’s management would hold a material amount of the equity securities of the surviving company (or otherwise “control” the surviving company) following the closing.³⁶³ An important exemption to the application of Rule 13e-3 exists for transactions in which the consideration consists entirely of publicly traded common stock or other equity securities with substantially the same rights as the target’s equity.

Rule 13e-3 is intended to provide greater transparency and protection to the non-affiliated shareholders in potential conflict transactions, which it accomplishes by requiring enhanced public disclosures relative to those that apply in a typical business combination not involving purchases by affiliates of the issuer. These disclosures include, among other things, an affirmative statement by the acquiror, each affiliate and the issuer as to whether they each believe that the going private transaction is fair to minority stockholders (with a detailed description of the factors underlying that conclusion), as well as extensive disclosure regarding any report, opinion or appraisal received by the acquiror or issuer from an outside party (other than an opinion of counsel) that is materially related to the transaction. Given these requirements, it is crucial that practitioners identify early in the transaction process whether the deal will or may be subject to Rule 13e-3, and, if so, be mindful that banker “board books” and other documents produced for any transaction party (including those of the acquiror), even at a preliminary stage of transaction planning, may eventually become public based on the comprehensive disclosure requirements of Rule 13e-3.

C. Cash and Stock Consideration

The pricing structure used in a particular transaction (and the allocation of risk between the acquiror and the target and their respective shareholders) will depend on the characteristics of the

deal and the relative bargaining strength of the parties. All-stock and part-stock mergers raise difficult pricing and market risk issues, particularly in a volatile market. In such transactions, even if the parties come to an agreement on the relative value of the two companies, the value of the consideration may be dramatically altered by market changes, such as a substantial decline in financial markets, industry-specific market trends, company-specific market performance or any combination of these. Although nominal market value is not the required legal criterion for assigning value to stock consideration in a proposed merger, a target in a transaction may have great difficulty in obtaining shareholder approval of a transaction where nominal market value is less than, or only marginally greater than, the unaffected market value of the target's stock. In addition, a stock merger proposal that becomes public carries substantial market risk for the acquiror, whose stock price may fall due to the anticipated financial impact of the transaction. Such a market response may put pressure on the acquiror to offer additional make-whole consideration to a target, worsening the impact of the transaction from an accretion/dilution perspective, or to abandon the transaction altogether.

In addition to considering the market risk of non-cash transaction consideration, parties often will prefer—and target companies (especially in competitive bidding situations) may require—their deal to avoid the closing risk associated with an acquiror stockholder vote, such as the vote required by both NYSE and Nasdaq listing rules upon an issuance of voting shares equal to 20% or more of an issuer's outstanding shares. For example, in 2019, Occidental Petroleum made several proposals to acquire Anadarko both before and after Anadarko signed a merger agreement with Chevron (which would not require any vote of Chevron's stockholders), each of which would have been conditioned on approval of Occidental's stockholders and each of which was rejected by Anadarko. Ultimately, Anadarko terminated its merger agreement with Chevron and signed with Occidental only after Occidental improved its proposal by, among other things, increasing the cash component sufficiently to avoid any vote of Occidental's stockholders. Along similar lines, in 2020, WESCO ultimately succeeded in its topping bid to acquire Anixter, which had signed a deal with a private equity firm with committed financing and no required acquiror vote, by agreeing to pay with a mix of cash, common stock and shares in a new class of non-voting cumulative preferred stock such that no vote of WESCO's stockholders would be required. Additionally, WESCO utilized a "one-way cash-collar" that protected Anixter stockholders from up to a 20% decline in the value of WESCO common stock by "topping" them up for such a decline with additional cash.

Where the parties intend to remain below the 20% issuance threshold to avoid an acquiror stockholder vote, careful planning and calculations are required to ensure that the acquiror remains below such threshold. The NYSE and Nasdaq consider the maximum number of shares potentially issuable pursuant to the transaction, therefore parties should be especially cognizant of the assumption and conversion of target equity awards into acquiror equity awards, the assumption of the reserve of shares available for issuance pursuant to a target equity plans and the treatment of convertible notes, including whether those notes will become convertible into acquiror stock.³⁶⁴

1. All-Cash Transactions

The popularity of stock as a form of consideration ebbs and flows with economic conditions. All-cash bids have the benefit of being of certain value and will gain quick attention

from a target's stockholders, particularly in the case of an unsolicited offer. Of course, some bidders may not have sufficient cash and financing sources to pursue an all-cash transaction. In such cases, the relative benefits and complexities of part-cash/part-stock and all-stock transactions should be considered.

2. All-Stock Transactions

a. Pricing Formulas and Allocation of Market Risk

The typical stock merger is subject to market risk on account of the interim period between signing and closing and the volatility of security trading prices. A drop in the price of an acquiror's stock between the execution of the acquisition agreement and the closing of the transaction can alter the relative value of the transaction to both acquiror and target shareholders: target shareholders might receive less value for their exchanged shares or, if additional shares are issued to compensate for the drop, the transaction will be less accretive or more dilutive to the acquiror's earnings per share. This market risk can be addressed by a pricing structure that is tailored to the risk allocation agreed to by the parties. These pricing structures may include using a valuation formula instead of a fixed exchange ratio, a collar, or, more rarely, the so-called "walk-away" provisions permitting unilateral termination in the event the acquiror's share price falls below a certain level. Companies considering cross-border transactions may also need to consider the impact of different currencies on the pricing structure. Currency risk raises similar issues to market risk and can amplify the market volatility factor inherent in all-stock transactions.

i. Fixed Exchange Ratio

The simplest and most common pricing structure (especially in the context of larger transactions) in a stock-for-stock transaction is to set a fixed exchange ratio at the time a merger agreement is signed. On the one hand, the advantage of a fixed exchange ratio for an acquiror is that it permits the acquiror to determine at the outset how much stock it will have to issue in the transaction (and thus to determine with some certainty the impact on per-share earnings and whether a stockholder vote may be required on such issuance pursuant to the rules of the applicable stock exchange). On the other hand, a fixed exchange ratio with a post-signing decline in the market value of the acquiror's stock could jeopardize shareholder approval and/or invite third-party competition (by decreasing the value that the target's stockholders will receive at closing). From many acquirors' perspective, these are often risks that can be dealt with if and when they arise, and the acquiror typically prefers the certainty of a fixed number of shares. To the extent an acquiror and a target are in the same industry, industry-specific events could very well affect their stock prices similarly and therefore not affect the premium to be afforded by the exchange ratio.

Even where the market moves adversely to the acquiror's stock, companies that are parties to pending strategic mergers have been able to successfully defend their deals based on the long-term strategic prospects of the combined company. Nevertheless, in cases where there is concern that shareholders may vote down a transaction because of price fluctuation, the parties may turn to other pricing mechanisms to allocate market risk.

ii. Fixed Value with Floating Exchange Ratio; Collars

In many situations, one or both parties (typically the target) will be unwilling to permit market fluctuation to impair its ability to achieve the benefits of the bargain that was struck at signing. One solution is to provide for a floating exchange ratio, which will deliver a fixed dollar value of the acquiror's stock (rather than a fixed number of shares). The exchange ratio is set based on an average market price for the acquiror's stock during some period, normally 10 to 30 trading days, before closing. Thus, the acquiror would agree to deliver a fixed value (*e.g.*, \$30) in stock for each of the target's shares, with the number of acquiror's shares to be delivered based on the market price during the specified period. An acquiror bears the market risk of a decline in the price of its stock since, in that event, it will have to issue more shares to deliver the agreed value. Correspondingly, an acquiror may benefit from an increase in the price of its stock since it could deliver fewer shares to provide the agreed value. Because a dramatic drop in the acquiror's stock may require the acquiror to buy its target for far more shares than had been intended at the time the transaction was announced (and may even trigger a requirement for a vote of the acquiror shareholders to authorize such issuance), companies should carefully consider the possibility of dramatic market events occurring between signing and closing. A target's stockholders bear little market risk in this scenario and correspondingly will not benefit from an increase in stock prices since the per-share value is fixed.

To mitigate the risk posed by market fluctuations, parties may desire a longer measuring period for valuing the acquiror's stock. Longer measuring periods minimize the effects of market volatility on how many acquiror shares will be issued as merger consideration. Additionally, acquirors favor longer measuring periods because, as the transaction becomes more likely and approaches fruition, the acquiror's stock may drop to reflect any anticipated earnings dilution. By contrast, a target may argue that the market price over a shorter period immediately prior to consummation provides a better measure of consideration received.

But merely lengthening the valuation period is often insufficient to protect acquirors against large price declines. The number of shares that an acquiror may have to issue under a floating exchange ratio based upon the acquiror's stock price is limited only by the amount by which the stock price can decline. Consequently, acquirors must be cognizant of the fact that the price of their stock may decline precipitously based on events or circumstances having little or nothing to do with the value of the acquiror. Although such declines may be only short-lived, the acquiror will still have to compensate the target for even a temporary shortfall that occurs during the measuring period for the floating exchange ratio. To protect against having to issue a very high number of shares, agreements with floating exchange ratios frequently include a "collar" that places a cap on the number of shares to be issued and, at the same time, a floor on the number of shares that may be issued. Effectively, these mechanisms provide upper and lower market price limits within which the number of shares to be delivered will be adjusted. If market prices go outside the range, no further adjustments to the number of shares delivered to the target's stockholders will be made. The size of the range determines the degree of protection afforded to the protected party and, correspondingly, the amount of the market risk borne by the other party's stockholders. Collars are typically, but not always, symmetrical in the level of price protection they provide to acquirors and targets.

The determination whether to negotiate for collar pricing or another price protection device depends on various factors, including:

the parties' views on the potential impact from an accretion/dilution perspective of issuing additional shares and any potential timing consequences thereof (*i.e.*, if an increased share issuance would require a stockholder vote and delay closing);

the overall prospects for share prices in the relevant industry;

the relative size of the two companies;

the parties' subjective market expectations over time; and

the desirability or necessity of pegging the transaction price to a cash value.

Parties must also consider the anticipated effect on the acquiror's stock price of short selling by arbitrageurs once the transaction is announced. In some mergers, pricing formulas and collars are considered inadvisable due to the potential downward pressure on an acquiror's stock as a result of arbitrage trading.

The fixed exchange ratio within a price collar is another formulation that may appeal to a target that is willing to accept some risk of a pre-closing market price decline in an acquiror's stock, but wishes to protect against declines beyond a certain point. In this scenario, the target's stockholders are entitled to receive a fixed number of shares of acquiror stock in exchange for each of their shares, and there is no adjustment in that number so long as the acquiror's stock is valued within a specified range during the valuation period (*e.g.*, 10% above or below the price on the date the parties agree to the exchange ratio). If, however, the acquiror's stock is valued outside that range during the valuation period, the number of shares to be delivered is adjusted accordingly (often to one of the endpoints of the range). Thus, for example, if the parties agree on a one-for-one exchange ratio and value the acquiror's stock at \$30 for purposes of the transaction, they might agree that price movements in the acquiror's stock between \$27 and \$33 would not result in any adjustments. If, however, the stock is valued at \$25 during the valuation period, the number of shares to be delivered in exchange for each target share would be 1.08, *i.e.*, a number of shares equal to \$27 (the low end of the collar) based on the \$25 valuation. Therefore, although the target's stockholders will not receive an increased number of shares because of the drop in the acquiror's stock price from \$30 to \$27, they will be compensated in additional acquiror shares by the drop in price from \$27 to \$25.

b. Walk-Aways

Another, far less common market-risk price protection is to include as a condition to closing the right for the target to walk away from the merger if the price of the acquiror's stock falls below a certain level. For example, a fixed exchange ratio walk-away provision could permit termination of a merger agreement by the target if, at the time the parties are otherwise contractually obligated to close the transaction, the acquiror's stock has decreased by 15%—a single trigger.

Although walk-away provisions are quite rare, they have occasionally been found in all-stock bank deals. Generally, these provisions provide for a double trigger, requiring not only an agreed-upon absolute percentage decline in the acquiror's stock price, but also a specified percentage decline in the acquiror's stock price relative to a defined peer group of selected companies or a designated index of industry stocks during the pricing period. For example, the double-trigger walk-away may require that the acquiror's average stock price prior to closing fall (1) 15% or 20% from its price at the time of announcement and (2) 15% or 20% relative to a defined index of industry stocks. The double trigger essentially limits the walk-away right to market price declines specifically related to the acquiror, leaving the target's stockholders to bear the risk of price declines related to industry events. That is, the acquiror may argue that if its stock does no more than follow a general market trend, there should be no right on the part of the target to "walk." Walk-away rights are generally tested during a short trading period prior to closing and often include an option for an acquiror to elect to increase the exchange ratio to avoid triggering the target's walk-away right.

Walk-aways can raise disclosure issues that need to be considered in the event the applicable thresholds are crossed, and may create other unintended consequences. The benefits of a walk-away, and the related components of a floating exchange ratio or a price collar, must be weighed carefully against the potentially significant costs of transaction uncertainty and the risk of non-consummation after months of planning for the combined company. In practice, walk-aways are rarely employed.

c. Finding the Appropriate Pricing Structure for All-Stock Transactions

The pricing structure used in a particular all-stock transaction (and thus the allocation of market risk between an acquiror and a target and their respective shareholders) will depend on the characteristics of the transaction and the relative bargaining strength of the parties. A pricing structure used for one transaction may, for a variety of reasons, be entirely inappropriate for another. For instance, in a situation that is a pure sale, a target might legitimately request the inclusion of protective provisions such as a floating exchange ratio, especially if the target has other significant strategic opportunities. An acquiror may argue, of course, that the target should not be entitled to absolute protection (in the form of a walk-away) from general industry (compared to acquiror-specific) risks. A double-trigger walk-away can correct for general industry-wide events. At the other end of the spectrum, in an MOE or "partnership" type of transaction, claims on the part of either party for price protection, especially walk-aways, are less convincing. The argument against price protection is that, once the deal is signed, both parties' stockholders are (and should be) participants in both the opportunities and the risks of the combined company.

Because of the length of time required to complete some strategic acquisitions subject to high levels of regulatory scrutiny, the management of, or protection against, market risk through various price-related provisions can assume particular significance during stock-for-stock transaction negotiations. Blind adherence to precedent without an analysis of the particular circumstances of the transaction at hand can be disastrous, as can careless experimentation. Transaction participants should carefully consider the many alternative pricing structures available in light of the parties' goals and the various risks involved. In all events, and consistent with their

fiduciary duties, directors need to be fully informed as to how any price adjustments work, and understand the issues presented by such provisions.

3. Hybrid Transactions: Cash and Stock

In certain circumstances, the use of a mixture of stock and cash as consideration is appealing. Targets may find mixed consideration desirable because the cash component provides them with some downside protection from a decline in the price of the acquiror's stock. In addition, depending on the allocation procedure employed (*e.g.*, whether each target shareholder is permitted to select its mix of consideration), both short- and long-term investors may be able to receive their preferred consideration in the form of all cash or all stock. Those who choose not to cash out may be able to obtain the benefits of a tax-free exchange.

a. Possible Cash-Stock Combinations

There is a wide variety of potential pricing structures for a part-cash, part-stock transaction. Choosing the right pricing formula involves all of the complications raised in determining pricing formulas for an all-stock transaction (namely, the issues relating to fixed exchange ratios, floating exchange ratios, collars and walk-aways). In addition, if there is a formula for the cash component, it must be matched to the formula for the stock component. An important threshold issue is whether the parties intend for the values of the stock and cash components to remain equal as the price of the acquiror's shares fluctuates or whether there should be scenarios in which the values of the cash and stock components can diverge. This will be a vital consideration in determining the proper allocation procedures for the cash and stock components in circumstances where target shareholders are afforded the opportunity to make a consideration election.

The simplest structure in a part-cash, part-stock transaction is a fixed exchange ratio for the stock component linked with a fixed per-share cash amount for the cash component, with fixed percentages of the target's shares being converted into cash and stock, respectively. Because the value of the stock component of the transaction will vary with fluctuations in the acquiror's share price while the cash component remains fixed, it is important in transactions in which shareholders may elect the type of consideration that the allocation procedures are sensitive to the potential for significant oversubscriptions for stock, if the value of the acquiror's shares rises, and significant oversubscriptions for cash, if the value of the acquiror's shares declines. After all, at the time the target's stockholders make the decision to subscribe to a particular mix of consideration, they will have more visibility into what the acquiror's stock price will be at closing than the transaction parties will have had at signing. Because using a fixed exchange ratio for the stock component and a fixed per share cash amount for the cash component will often lead to differing consideration being paid to stockholders making one election or the other, in some instances, the parties may instead agree to track the blended value of the cash and stock consideration until closing and pay all shareholders the same blended per share value while still permitting target shareholders to make a cash or stock election. This structure has the benefit of treating all shareholders equally but runs the risk of requiring the acquiror to issue more shares or pay more cash than was initially contemplated at signing. Consequently, to mitigate this risk and preserve the tax-free treatment of the deal, parties typically will place limits on the aggregate amount of cash to be paid or number

of shares to be issued in circumstances where target shareholders may make a consideration election.

Another hybrid pricing mechanism is to link a floating exchange ratio pricing formula for the stock component with a fixed cash price. This formula has the advantage of equalizing the stock and cash values (generally based upon the average trading price for the acquiror's shares over a 10- to 30-day trading period prior to the effective date of the merger). This approach helps facilitate a cash election procedure by minimizing any economic differential pushing shareholders toward either the cash or stock consideration. But, issues may still arise in situations where the acquiror's shares trade outside the collar range established for the floating exchange ratio or where there is a last-minute run-up or decline in the price of the acquiror's stock.

Although there can be a variety of business reasons for adjusting the aggregate limits on the percentage of target shares to be exchanged for cash versus stock consideration, historically, the most common reason has been the desire to preserve the tax-free status of the transaction. As described below in Section IV.D.5, a part-cash, part-stock merger (including a two-step transaction with a first-step tender or exchange offer followed by a back-end merger) generally can qualify as a tax-free reorganization only if at least a minimum portion of the total value of the consideration consists of acquiror stock. Historically, satisfaction of this requirement was, in all cases, determined by reference to the fair market value of the acquiror stock issued in the merger (*i.e.*, on the closing date). Accordingly, a part-cash, part-stock merger, particularly with a fixed or collared exchange ratio, that met this requirement when the merger agreement was signed could fail to qualify as a tax-free reorganization if the value of the acquiror's shares declined before the closing date. As described in Section IV.D.1, Treasury regulations issued in 2011 permit the parties, in circumstances where the consideration is "fixed" within the meaning of the regulations, to determine whether this requirement is met by reference to the fair market value of the acquiror stock at signing rather than at closing. The regulations clarify that parties can rely on the signing date rule even if the acquisition agreement contemplates a stock/cash election, as long as the aggregate mix of stock/cash consideration is fixed.

Adding an additional degree of complexity, hybrid cash-stock mergers may have formula-based walk-away rights. The walk-away formula can be quite complex, reflecting the specific concerns of the acquiror and the target.

Part-cash, part-stock transactions can also be structured to avoid triggering a vote by the acquiror's stockholders under stock exchange rules, by providing for a decrease in the stock portion of the consideration (and a corresponding increase in the cash portion of the consideration) to the extent necessary to keep the number of shares issued below the relevant threshold (as was done in the Pfizer/Wyeth transaction).

In structuring a part-cash, part-stock pricing formula and allocating the cash and stock consideration pools, it is also important to consider how dissenting shares, employee stock options and other convertible securities will be treated. In addition, a board considering a proposal involving both cash and stock consideration should seek the advice of counsel with regard to whether the transaction may invoke enhanced scrutiny under *Revlon*.

b. Allocation and Oversubscription

A key issue in part-cash, part-stock transactions is choosing the best method of allocating the cash and stock components to satisfy divergent shareholder interests. The simplest allocation method is straight proration without target shareholder elections. In a straight proration, each of the target's stockholders receives a proportionate share of the aggregate pools of stock and cash consideration. Thus, in a transaction in which 50% of the consideration is being paid in stock and 50% of the consideration is being paid in cash, each target shareholder exchanges 50% of its shares for acquiror stock and 50% of its shares for cash. Shareholders who exchange their shares for a mixture of cash and stock generally will recognize gain, for federal income tax purposes, on the exchange to the extent of the lesser of (1) the gain on the exchange, measured as the difference between the fair market value of the stock and cash received over the stockholder's tax basis in their shares, and (2) the amount of cash received. Thus, one drawback of straight proration is that the target's stockholders cannot choose their desired form of consideration and, accordingly, may be required to recognize taxable gain.

Another approach is the use of a cash election merger. Cash election procedures provide the target's stockholders with the option of choosing between cash and stock consideration. These procedures allow investors to either cash out of their positions or exchange their shares in a tax-free exchange. Cash election procedures work best where a mechanism equalizes the per share value of the cash and the stock consideration. Contractual provisions and related public disclosures concerning the election procedures must be drafted carefully to deal with the possibility that there may be significant oversubscriptions for one of the two types of consideration. Additionally, ensuring that the timing of the election process does not unnecessarily delay a closing is an important consideration. Practitioners should keep in mind that generally, in a transaction in which shareholders of a public company are offered an opportunity to elect the form of consideration that they receive, shareholders who submit a valid election will not be able to trade their shares following the deadline to make such election.

Of course, the easiest way to ensure simplicity in a cash election process is to provide for straight proration in the event of oversubscriptions for either the cash or the stock pool. This allocation method still has some advantages over a straight proration without election procedures, because even if there is an oversubscription, some shareholders will elect to receive the undersubscribed consideration and some shareholders will not return an election form and can be deemed to have elected to receive the default consideration, which can be set as the option expected to be undersubscribed. Proration in this context, however, also has certain important drawbacks. Few target shareholders will be fully satisfied because most will get a prorated portion of the undesired consideration and will also incur tax.

Another, albeit rarer, approach for handling oversubscriptions has been to select shareholders on a random or other equitable basis from those who have elected to receive the oversubscribed consideration until a sufficient number of shares are removed from the oversubscribed pool. The methods by which shareholders are selected for removal from the oversubscribed pool vary from a straight lottery to selection based on block size or time of election. Because proration to account for an oversubscription of cash generally does not result in shareholders incurring additional tax beyond that which is caused by their election, there is some

precedent for using proration for cash oversubscriptions but a lottery selection process for stock oversubscriptions.

4. Valuing Stock Consideration in Acquisition Proposals

Once the form of consideration is settled, targets are still confronted with the challenge of properly valuing the consideration offered in a proposed transaction. This valuation is a significant element in a board's decision whether to approve a particular transaction. Even with diligence, the evaluation of a stock merger, regardless of whether it involves a sale-of-control, can be quite complex. Directors may properly weigh a number of issues beyond the headline per share payment when evaluating a proposed transaction.

a. Short- and Long-Term Values

Although current market value provides a ready first estimate of the value of a transaction to a company's stockholders, the Delaware Supreme Court in *QVC* and other cases has stated that such valuation alone is not sufficient, and certainly not determinative, of value.³⁶⁵ In the sale-of-control context, directors of a company have one primary objective: "to seek the transaction offering the best value reasonably available to the stockholders."³⁶⁶ This objective would ordinarily not be satisfied by looking only to the latest closing prices on the relevant stock exchange.

In fact, in *Van Gorkom*, a seminal Delaware Supreme Court decision on director responsibilities in selling a company, the Court criticized the directors for relying upon the market prices of the company's stock in assessing value. The Court held that using stock market trading prices as a basis for measuring a premium "was a clearly faulty, indeed fallacious, premise."³⁶⁷ Instead, the Court emphasized that the key issue must be the fundamental value of the business, and that the value to be ascribed to a share interest in a business must reflect sound valuation information about the business. The same point was reiterated by the Delaware Supreme Court in its decision in *Time-Warner*, where the Court pointedly noted that "it is not a breach of faith for directors to determine that the present stock market price of shares is not representative of true value or that there may indeed be several market values for any corporation's stock."³⁶⁸

When valuing stock consideration, in addition to current stock prices, directors should also consider historical trading prices and financial indicators of future market performance. The result of such analyses may be that a target board values the stock consideration proposed by one bidder with a lower nominal market value more highly than that proposed by another bidder with a higher nominal market value. This is especially so in the context of competing bids, where market prices may be a particularly confusing indicator. Once the offers are announced, the market may discount the securities of the higher bidder to reflect a likely victory and potential accompanying dilution, but it also may discount the securities of the lower bidder if that party is expected to raise its bid. These uncertainties, however, do not affect the validity of historical trading averages and other financial indicators that are not based on current stock prices. Of course, the target's stockholders may not agree with the board in such a case and may reject the offer with the lower current market value.

A target board's valuation task necessarily calls for the exercise of business judgment by directors. Due diligence by both parties to a stock-based merger is indispensable to informed decision-making, and boards will typically carefully review pro forma financial information. Directors of a company may need to consider such factors as past performance of the security being offered as consideration, management, cost savings and synergies, past record of successful integration in other mergers, franchise value, antitrust or other regulatory issues, earnings dilution and certainty of consummation. Although predicting future stock prices is inherently speculative, a board can and should evaluate such information in the context of the historical business performance of the other party, the business rationale underlying the merger proposal and the future prospects for the combined company. To the extent competing bids are under review, directors should be careful to apply comparable evaluation criteria in an unbiased manner to avoid any suggestion that they have a conflict of interest pushing them to favor one bid over another or that they are not acting in good faith.

Absent a limited set of circumstances as defined under *Revlon*, directors are not required to restrict themselves to an immediate or short-term time frame. Instead, directors are entitled to select the transaction they believe provides shareholders with the best long-term prospects for growth and value enhancement with the least amount of downside risk; directors thus have substantial discretion to exercise their judgment. In its *Time-Warner* decision, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that the directors' statutory mandate "includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability."³⁶⁹ In the same vein of judicial deference to director decision-making, *Time-Warner* likewise explained that, even when a transaction is subject to enhanced scrutiny, a court should not be involved in "substituting its judgment as to what is a 'better' deal for that of a corporation's board of directors."³⁷⁰

b. Other Constituencies and Social Issues

In stock mergers not involving a change-of-control, Delaware directors may appropriately consider the effect of the transaction on non-shareholder constituencies. In seeking to achieve shareholder value, directors are permitted to take into account the impact of the prospective transaction on the company, its employees, its customers and the community in which it operates.³⁷¹ Some states outside Delaware, such as Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon and Pennsylvania, among others, have adopted statutes known as "constituency statutes" which specifically permit boards to take into account such factors when making their business decisions. Some of these statutes, including those in Maryland and Oregon, only permit boards to consider the interests of other constituencies within the change-of-control context.³⁷² Delaware itself, and 43 other states, have also adopted "Public Benefit Corporation" statutes that permit a for-profit corporation to bind itself in its charter to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner and adopt a governance framework designed to consider the best interests of all stakeholders (rather than just shareholders), including a requirement to consider the best interests of all stakeholders in a sale of control transaction.

The manner in which more broadly drafted constituency statutes or Public Benefit Corporation statutes interact with a board's duties in a change-of-control context, and whether a

target board can rely on such statutes to justify considering the interests of other constituencies instead of just shareholder value maximization, varies from state to state.³⁷³ The economic terms of a proposed merger or an acquisition transaction and the benefits that the transaction brings to stockholder interests will predominate in the directors' inquiry. Nevertheless, "social issues"—concerns for the community and the combination's impact on the continued viability of various operations—can play an important role in bringing two merger partners to the negotiating table and may be properly considered by directors in evaluating the strategic benefits of a potential merger or acquisition transaction not involving a change-of-control, at least insofar as they will promote future value.

Consideration of employee and other constituent interests is also important in ensuring a smooth transition period between the signing of a merger agreement and the closing of the transaction, as well as a smooth integration process following closing. It is important for the selling company to strive to preserve franchise value throughout the interim period, which may be more difficult in mergers that require a lengthy time period for consummation. Moreover, the impact of a proposed merger on a selling company's franchise and local community interests can have a direct impact on the acquiror's ability to obtain the requisite regulatory approvals.

5. Contingent Value Rights

Contingent value rights ("CVRs") have reemerged as consideration mechanisms in public deals. Twenty-seven deals in 2025 included a CVR, a nearly four-fold increase from 2024. CVRs can generally be categorized into two types: "price-protection" and "event-driven" CVRs.

Where target shareholders are particularly concerned about assessing the value of acquiror securities received as merger consideration, the parties can employ a CVR to provide some assurance of that value over some post-closing period of time. This kind of CVR, often called a "price-protection" CVR, typically provides a payout equal to the amount (if any) by which the specified target price exceeds the actual price of the reference security at maturity of the CVR. Unlike floating exchange ratios, which only provide value protection to target shareholders for the period between signing and closing, price-protection CVRs effectively set a floor on the value of the reference securities issued to target shareholders at closing over a fixed period of time, usually ranging from one to three years.

For example, a price-protection CVR for a security that has a \$40 market value at the time of the closing of a transaction might provide that if, on the first anniversary of the closing, the average market price over the preceding one-month period is less than \$38, the CVR holder will be entitled to cash or acquiror securities with a fair market value to compensate for the difference between the then-average trading price and \$38. Price-protection CVRs may also include a floor price, which caps the potential payout under the CVR if the market value of the reference shares drops below the floor, functioning in the same manner as a collar or a cap in the case of a floating exchange ratio. For example, the previously described CVR might include a \$33 floor price, such that CVR holders would never be entitled to more than \$5 in price protection (the difference between the \$38 target price and the \$33 floor price), thereby limiting the financial or dilutive impact upon the acquiror at maturity of the CVR.

In most cases, CVRs are memorialized in a separate agreement, which usually calls for a trustee or rights agent to act on behalf of the holders. At maturity, CVRs may be payable in cash or acquiror securities or, in some cases, a combination of the two at the option of the acquiror. Acquirors may also negotiate for the option of extending the maturity of the CVRs, typically in exchange for an increase in the specified target price. In this way, an acquiror gives itself more time to achieve the specified target stock price, even at the cost of establishing a higher target stock price at the time of the transaction. Targets typically require the acquiror to make price-protection CVRs transferable (in which case the CVRs generally also have to be registered under the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”))³⁷⁴ and, in some cases, to list them on a stock exchange.

In recent years, CVRs have predominantly been used to bridge valuation gaps relating to contingencies affecting the target company’s value, such as, for example, the outcome of a significant litigation or the regulatory approval of a new drug of the target. A CVR of this type, often called an “event-driven” CVR, may also increase deal certainty by allowing the parties to close the deal without the contingency having been resolved. Event-driven CVRs are more commonly used than price protection CVRs and typically provide holders with payments when certain events resolving the contingency occur, or when specific goals, usually related to the performance of the acquired business, are met. Event-driven CVRs are often used in pharmaceutical transactions, with payments tied to the receipt of regulatory approvals or the success of clinical trials of a drug in development. An example of this is Pfizer’s acquisition of Metsera following its bidding war with Novo Nordisk, which transaction included a cash payment at closing plus a CVR tied to three specific clinical and regulatory milestones.

Although both price-protection and event-driven CVRs can provide benefits in the structuring of a transaction, parties considering their use need to be aware of potential pitfalls. CVRs are highly structured instruments with many variables, and their negotiation and implementation can introduce substantial additional complexity to a deal. Although CVRs may be useful tools in bridging valuation gaps and overcoming disagreements, there is also a possibility that they create their own valuation issues and increase the potential for disputes during negotiations. Moreover, because CVRs remain outstanding and often impose restrictions on the actions of the acquiror long after closing, they may become the source of litigation, particularly where the parties did not anticipate potential misalignments between the interests of the acquiror and the CVR holders. Finally, CVRs are subject to a host of additional securities law, accounting and tax considerations, and parties contemplating use of CVRs should seek legal, financial, accounting and tax advice.

D. Federal Income Tax Considerations and Excise Tax on Stock Buybacks

As a result of both an acquiror’s need to conserve cash and the desire of target shareholders to participate in future value creation by the combined company and/or to have the opportunity for tax deferral, the consideration paid by the acquiror in many mergers includes acquiror stock. Whether it is important, in any particular transaction, that acquiror stock can be received on a tax-free basis typically will depend on the relative mix of cash and stock consideration, as well as the composition of the target’s stockholder base (*e.g.*, institutional investors and non-U.S. investors frequently will be indifferent). For tax-free treatment to apply, a number of requirements must be

met, as described below. The requirements vary depending on the form of the transaction. For all forms of transactions (other than the so-called “double-dummy” structure), a specified minimum portion of the consideration must consist of acquiror stock.

1. Direct Merger

In this structure, the target merges with and into the acquiror (or into a limited liability company that is a direct wholly owned subsidiary of the acquiror). This will generally be nontaxable to the target, the acquiror and the target’s stockholders who receive only stock of the surviving corporation (excluding “nonqualified preferred stock” as described below), provided that such acquiror stock constitutes at least 40% of the total consideration. For these purposes, stock includes voting and nonvoting stock, both common and preferred. Target shareholders will be taxed on the receipt of any cash or “other property” in an amount equal to the lesser of (1) the amount of cash or other property received and (2) the amount of gain realized in the exchange, *i.e.*, the excess of the total value of the consideration received over the stockholder’s adjusted tax basis in the target stock surrendered. For this purpose, “other property” includes nonqualified preferred stock. Nonqualified preferred stock includes any class of preferred stock that does not participate in corporate growth to any significant extent and: (1) is puttable by the holder within 20 years, (2) is subject to mandatory redemption within 20 years, (3) is callable by the issuer within 20 years and, at issuance, is more likely than not to be called, or (4) pays a variable rate dividend. But, if acquiror nonqualified preferred stock is received in exchange for target nonqualified preferred stock, such nonqualified preferred stock is not treated as “other property.” Any gain recognized generally will be capital gain, although it can, under certain circumstances, be taxed as dividend income.

Treasury regulations permit the parties, in circumstances where the consideration is “fixed” (within the meaning of the regulations), to determine whether the requirement that acquiror stock constitute at least 40% of the total consideration is met by reference to the fair market value of the acquiror stock at signing rather than at closing, adding flexibility and certainty on an issue essential to achieving tax-free treatment. The regulations also clarify that this “signing date rule” is available in certain variable consideration transactions with collars.

2. Forward Triangular Merger

In this structure, the target merges with and into an at least 80% owned (usually wholly owned) direct subsidiary of the acquiror, with the merger subsidiary as the surviving corporation. The requirements for tax-free treatment and the taxation of non-stock consideration (including nonqualified preferred stock) are the same as with a direct merger. But, in order for this transaction to be tax free, there are two additional requirements. First, no stock of the merger subsidiary can be issued in the transaction. Thus, target preferred stock may not be assumed in the merger but must be reissued at the acquiror level or redeemed prior to the merger. Second, the merger subsidiary must acquire “substantially all” of the assets of the target, which generally means at least 90% of net assets and 70% of gross assets. This requirement must be taken into account when considering distributions, redemptions or spin-offs before or after a merger.

3. Reverse Triangular Merger

In this structure, a merger subsidiary formed by the acquiror merges with and into the target, with the target as the surviving corporation. In order for this transaction to be tax free, the acquiror must acquire, in the transaction, at least 80% of all of the target's voting stock and 80% of every other class of target stock in exchange for acquiror voting stock. Thus, target non-voting preferred stock must either be given a vote at the target level and left outstanding at that level, exchanged for acquiror voting stock or redeemed prior to the merger. In addition, the target must retain "substantially all" of its assets after the merger.

4. Section 351 "Double-Dummy" Transaction

An alternative structure is for both the acquiror and the target to be acquired by a new holding company in a transaction intended to qualify as a tax-free exchange under Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code. As a corporate matter, this typically would be achieved by the holding company creating two merger subsidiaries, one of which would merge with and into the acquiror and the other of which would merge with and into the target in two simultaneous reverse triangular mergers. In addition to each merger potentially qualifying as a tax-free reverse triangular merger, shareholders of the acquiror and the target would receive tax-free treatment under Section 351 to the extent that they received holding company stock, which may be common or preferred (other than nonqualified preferred stock), voting or non-voting, provided that the shareholders of the acquiror and the target, in the aggregate, own at least 80% of the voting stock and 80% of each other class of stock (if any) of the holding company immediately after the transaction. Unlike the other transaction forms discussed above, there is no limit on the amount of cash that may be used in this transaction as long as the 80% aggregate ownership test is satisfied. Cash and nonqualified preferred stock received will be taxable up to the amount of gain realized in the transaction.

5. Multi-Step Transaction

A multi-step transaction may also qualify as wholly or partially tax free. Often, an acquiror will launch an exchange offer or tender offer for target stock to be followed by a merger that forces out target shareholders who do not tender into the offer. Because the purchases under the tender offer or exchange offer and the merger are part of an overall plan to make an integrated acquisition, tax law generally views them as one overall transaction. Accordingly, such multi-step transactions can qualify for tax-free treatment if the rules described above are satisfied with respect to the overall transaction. For example, an exchange offer in which a subsidiary of the acquiror acquires target stock for acquiror voting stock followed by a merger of the subsidiary into the target may qualify for tax-free treatment under the "reverse triangular merger" rules described above.

6. Spin-Offs Combined with M&A Transactions

A tax-free spin-off or split-off that satisfies the requirements of Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code can be used in combination with a concurrent M&A transaction, although there are limitations on the type of transactions that can be accomplished in a tax-free manner as described in more detail below. For example, "Morris Trust" and "Reverse Morris Trust" transactions effectively allow a parent corporation to separate a business and combine the parent corporation or the separated business with a third party in a transaction that is tax free to the parent and its

shareholders if certain requirements are met. In a traditional Morris Trust transaction, all of the parent's assets other than those that will be acquired by the third party are transferred to a corporation that is spun off or split off to parent shareholders, and then the parent immediately merges with the acquiror in a transaction that is tax free to parent stockholders (*i.e.*, involving solely stock consideration). By contrast, in a Reverse Morris Trust transaction, all assets to be acquired by the third party are transferred to a corporation that is spun off or split off to parent shareholders, and then the spin-off company immediately merges with the acquiror in a transaction that is tax free to parent stockholders. One non-tax-related advantage of a Reverse Morris Trust structure over a Morris Trust structure is that a Reverse Morris Trust generally does not require approval by the parent shareholders for the spin-off or merger. This is because in a Reverse Morris Trust transaction, the parent approves the combination of the spin-off company and the merger partner at a time when the parent is the sole shareholder of the spin-off company. By contrast, a Morris Trust transaction often requires approval by the parent's shareholders because the merging party (*i.e.*, the parent) is already a public company at the time that the merger is submitted for approval by the parent's shareholders.

To qualify as tax free to parent corporation, the Morris Trust and Reverse Morris Trust structures generally require, among other things, that the merger partner be smaller (*i.e.*, that the shareholders of parent own more than 50% of the stock of the combined entity). A recent Morris Trust transaction involved UTC's spin-offs of Otis and Carrier, followed by UTC's merger with Raytheon. Examples of Reverse Morris Trust transactions include the spin-off by Becton, Dickinson and Company of its Biosciences & Diagnostic Solutions business and combination of the business with Waters, split-off by 3M of its food safety business and combination with Neogen, the spin-off by Pfizer of its Upjohn off-patent branded drugs business and combination with Mylan, the spin-off by CBS Corporation of CBS Radio and the combination of CBS Radio with Entercom Communications Corp., and the spin-off by Hewlett Packard Enterprise of certain software assets and combination with Micro Focus.

A tax-free spin-off also can be combined with a major investment transaction in a so-called "sponsored spin-off." In this type of transaction, the parent distributes the shares of the subsidiary in a tax-free spin-off that is preceded or followed by the acquisition by a sponsor of less than 50% of either the parent or the spin-off company (pre-spin investments in the spin-off company typically are limited to less than 20%). The sponsor's investment allows the parent to raise proceeds in connection with the spin-off without having to first go through an IPO process, and can help demonstrate the value of the relevant business to the market. Sponsored spin-offs raise a number of complexities, including as to valuation, capital structure and governance.

Certain requirements for tax-free treatment under Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code are intended to deny preferential tax treatment to transactions that resemble corporate-level sales. Under current law, a spin-off coupled with a tax-free or taxable acquisition of parent or spin-off company stock will cause the parent to be taxed on any corporate-level gain in the spin-off company's stock if, as part of a plan (or series of related transactions) that includes the spin-off, one or more persons acquire a 50% or greater interest in the parent or the spin-off company.

Acquisitions occurring either within the two years before or within the two years after the spin-off are presumed to be part of such a "plan." Treasury regulations include facts and

circumstances tests and safe harbors for determining whether an acquisition and spin-off are part of a plan. Generally, where there have been no “substantial negotiations” as to the acquisition of the parent or the spin-off company or a “similar acquisition” within two years before the spin-off, a post-spin acquisition of the parent or the spin-off company solely for acquiror stock will not jeopardize the tax-free nature of the spin-off.

Post-spin equity transactions that are part of a “plan” remain viable where the historic shareholders of the parent retain a greater-than-50% interest (by vote and value) in the parent and the spin-off company after the transaction. Where the merger partner is larger than the parent or spin-off company to be acquired, it may be possible to have the merger partner redeem shares or pay an extraordinary distribution to shrink its capitalization prior to the combination.

Additional rules apply where the post-spin-off transaction is taxable to the former parent shareholders (*e.g.*, acquisitions involving cash or other taxable consideration). Because post-spin transactions can cause a spin-off to become taxable to the parent corporation and its shareholders, it is customary for the tax matters agreement entered into in connection with a spin-off to impose restrictions as to such transactions for the two-year period following the spin-off, and to allocate any resulting tax liability to the corporation whose acquisition or other transaction after the spin-off triggered the tax.

7. Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax and Excise Tax on Stock Buybacks

The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 introduced two new taxes, effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 2022, that need to be considered in the M&A context: (1) a 15% corporate alternative minimum tax (“CAMT”) on the “adjusted financial statement income” (“AFSI”) of certain large corporations and (2) a non-deductible 1% excise tax on certain stock buybacks.

The CAMT generally applies to corporations with average annual adjusted financial statement income over a three-year period in excess of \$1 billion (but a lower \$100 million threshold applies to U.S. corporations that are members of a non-U.S. parented group satisfying the \$1 billion threshold). The introduction of a parallel set of tax rules—with broad regulatory authority for the Treasury Department to “carry out the purposes” of the new tax—added significant complexity for large taxpayers. As to many common M&A transactions that qualify for nonrecognition treatment under federal income tax rules, including tax-free mergers, spin-offs, holding company formations and contributions to joint ventures, proposed regulations issued in 2024 generally provide that any financial accounting gain or loss is not taken into account in calculating AFSI for the year of the transaction, provided that the transaction is entirely tax free for federal income tax purposes. The proposed regulations thus provide for a “cliff effect” as a result of which an entire transaction can be subject to the CAMT if any gain or loss is recognized by the transferor corporation for federal income tax purposes. Due to the extremely fact-dependent nature of the proposed regulations, taxpayers that may be subject to the CAMT must carefully analyze the CAMT consequences of proposed M&A transactions.

The 1% excise tax generally applies to the fair market value of stock of publicly traded domestic corporations that is repurchased (taking into account a “netting rule” for stock issued

during the same tax year). Final regulations issued in November 2025 significantly narrowed the universe of transactions to which the excise tax applies as compared to proposed regulations issued in April 2024. The final regulations contain exceptions for nonqualifying consideration issued in acquisitive reorganizations, redemptions of “plain vanilla” preferred stock, and consideration funded by the target in a take-private transaction. The final regulations continue to treat the exchange of parent corporation stock for spin-off company stock in a tax-free split-off as a repurchase of parent stock to which the excise tax applies.

E. Cross-Border Deals

A number of important issues should be considered in advance of any cross-border acquisition or strategic investment, whether the target is within the United States or elsewhere. With advance planning and careful attention to the greater complexity and spectrum of issues that characterize cross-border M&A, such transactions can be accomplished in most circumstances in a way that avoids the pitfalls and misunderstandings that have sometimes characterized cross-cultural business dealings.

1. U.S. Cross-Border Securities Regulation

United States securities regulations apply to acquisitions and other business combinations involving non-U.S. companies with U.S. security holders unless bidders can avoid a jurisdictional nexus with the United States and exclude U.S. security holders. Where a transaction cannot escape U.S. securities regulations in this manner, exemptive relief may be available. Under the current two-tiered exemptive regime, relief from certain U.S. regulatory obligations is available for tender offers that qualify for one of two exemptions—the “Tier I” exemption, where U.S. security holders hold less than 10% of a security subject to a tender offer, and the “Tier II” exemption, where U.S. security holders hold less than 40% of a security subject to the tender offer. Tier I transactions are exempt from almost all of the disclosure, filing and procedural requirements of the U.S. federal tender offer rules, and securities issued in Tier I exchange offers, business combination transactions and rights offerings need not be registered under the Securities Act. Tier II provides narrow relief from specified U.S. tender offer rules that often conflict with non-U.S. law and market practice (such as prompt payment, withdrawal rights, subsequent offering periods, extension of offers, notice of extension and certain equal treatment requirements) but does not exempt the transaction from most of the procedural, disclosure, filing and registration obligations applicable to U.S. transactions or from the registration obligations of the Securities Act. Non-U.S. transactions where U.S. ownership in the target company exceeds 40% are subject to U.S. regulation as if the transaction were entirely domestic. In the absence of Tier I or Tier II relief, the SEC will consider granting no-action relief with respect to certain matters when the federal securities laws conflict with the securities laws of a foreign jurisdiction. Importantly, neither Tier I nor Tier II exemptive relief limits the potential exposure of non-U.S. issuers—in nearly all cases already subject to regulation in their home jurisdiction—to liability under the antifraud, anti-manipulation and civil liability provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws in connection with transactions with U.S. entanglements.

2. Cross-Border Custom and Practice

Understanding the custom and practice of M&A in the target's local jurisdiction is essential. Successful execution is more art than science, and will benefit from early involvement by experienced local advisors. For example, understanding when to respect—and when to challenge—a target's sale “process” may be critical. Knowing how and at what price level to enter the discussions will often determine the success or failure of a proposal. In some situations, it is prudent to start with an offer on the low side, while in other situations, offering a full price at the outset may be essential to achieving a negotiated deal and discouraging competitors, including those who might raise political or regulatory issues. In strategically or politically sensitive transactions, hostile maneuvers may be imprudent; in other cases, unsolicited pressure may be the only way to force a transaction. Similarly, understanding in advance the roles of arbitrageurs, hedge funds, institutional investors, private equity funds, proxy voting advisors and other important market players in the target's market—and their likely views of the anticipated acquisition attempt as well as when they appear and disappear from the scene—can be pivotal to ensuring an optimal outcome.

Where the target is a U.S. public company, the customs and formalities surrounding board of director participation in the M&A process, including the participation of legal and financial advisors, the provision of customary fairness opinions, and the inquiry and analysis surrounding the activities of the board and the financial advisors, can be unfamiliar and potentially confusing to non-U.S. transaction participants and can lead to misunderstandings that threaten to upset delicate transaction negotiations. Non-U.S. participants need to be well-advised as to the role of U.S. public company boards and the legal, regulatory and litigation framework and risks that can constrain or prescribe board action. In particular, the litigation framework should be kept in mind as shareholder litigation often accompanies M&A transactions involving U.S. public companies. The acquiror, its directors, shareholders and offshore reporters and regulators should be conditioned in advance (to the extent possible) to expect litigation and not to necessarily view it as a sign of trouble. In addition, it is important to understand that the U.S. discovery process in litigation is different, and in some contexts more intrusive, than the process in other jurisdictions. Moreover, the choice of governing law and the choice of forum to govern any potential dispute between the parties about the terms or enforceability of the agreement may have a substantial effect on the outcome of any such dispute, or even be outcome determinative. Parties entering into cross-border transactions should consider with care whether to specify the remedies available for breach of the transaction documents and the mechanisms for obtaining or resisting such remedies.

The litigation risk and the other factors mentioned above can affect both tactics and timing of M&A processes and the nature of communications with the target company. Additionally, local takeover regulations often differ from those in the acquiror's home jurisdiction. For example, the mandatory offer concept common in Europe, India and other countries—in which an acquisition of a certain percentage of securities requires the bidder to make an offer for either the balance of the outstanding shares or for an additional percentage—is very different from U.S. practice, as is a regulator-supervised auction of the type the U.K. Takeover Panel imposed as Comcast and 21st Century Fox competed to acquire Sky PLC. Permissible deal-protection structures, pricing requirements and defensive measures available to targets also differ. Sensitivity also must be given to the contours of the target board's fiduciary duties and decision-making obligations in home

jurisdictions, particularly with respect to consideration of stakeholder interests other than those of shareholders and nonfinancial criteria.

In addition to these customs and formalities, participants in a cross-border transaction should focus attention on the practical considerations of dealing with a counterparty that is subject to a foreign legal regime. For example, acknowledging the potential practical constraints around enforcing a remedy in a foreign jurisdiction can significantly change negotiating dynamics and result in alternative deal structures. Escrow deposit structures or letters of credit from U.S. banks have been used a number of times to reduce enforceability risk in transactions with Chinese acquirors and may be instructive in other contexts where enforceability is not assured. The multifaceted overlay of foreign takeover laws and the legal and tactical considerations they present can be particularly complex when a bid for a non-U.S. company may be unwelcome. Careful planning and coordination with foreign counsel are critical in hostile and unsolicited transactions, on both the bidder and target sides.

Companies are also well advised to understand jurisdictional differences in typical M&A contracts and the impact on risk allocation between the parties. For example, U.S. private company acquisition agreements often determine the final purchase price based on the closing cash, debt and net working capital of the target, while U.K. acquisition agreements typically use a “locked box” structure whereby the purchase price is fixed based on financial statements prior to signing (with the date of such financial statements referred to as the “locked box date”) and dividends and other “leakage” are prohibited. While parties to U.S.-style agreements must focus on the net working capital target and negotiate detailed purchase price adjustment mechanics, parties to U.K.-style agreements should be prepared to negotiate what transactions constitute “leakage” of value after the locked box date that reduce the final purchase price. U.K. locked box agreements also sometimes include a daily ticking fee payable by the buyer to the seller for the period between the locked box date and the closing date. The ticking fee may be set based on the expected daily profit of the target business after the locked box date. This structure therefore in a sense shifts economic ownership of the target business from the seller to the buyer at the locked box date (rather than at closing, as with the purchase price adjustment structure), with the risks of decline (and benefit of improvement) in the target’s business following the locked box date borne by the buyer, and the seller being compensated for the risk of regulatory or other delays to closing. Differences between U.S.-style representation and warranty insurance and U.K.-style representation and warranty insurance also affect risk allocation post-closing. While U.K.-style representation and warranty insurance is typically less expensive than U.S.-style insurance, U.K. representation and warranty insurance policies often provide less coverage, such as by excluding from coverage any item in the target’s data room. Parties may insist on using a U.S.-style contract or a U.K.-style contract to take advantage of more favorable risk allocation.

3. Cross-Border Disclosure Regimes

Disclosure obligations may also vary across jurisdictions. How and when an acquiror’s interest in the target is publicly disclosed should be carefully controlled to the extent possible, keeping in mind the various ownership thresholds or other triggers for mandatory disclosure under the law of the jurisdiction of the company being acquired, as well as potential consequences for acquirors once a public disclosure has been made. For example, under the Irish Takeover Panel’s

“put-up or shut-up” (“PUSU”) regime, if a bidder proposing to acquire an Irish public company has been publicly identified, the bidder has 42 days to either announce a formal offer to acquire the company (*i.e.*, “put-up”) or announce it does not intend to make an offer (*i.e.*, “shut-up”), after which time, if the bidder does not announce a formal offer, it will be restricted from making an offer to acquire the company for six months thereafter. The PUSU regime also requires that a target company announcing a potential offer (including in connection with a leak announcement, which may be mandatory in certain circumstances under the Irish Takeover Rules) identify in such announcement all potential offerors that it is in discussions with, which then commences the 42-day clock for all such potential offerors to make an offer. This regime may be useful to a target company that receives an unwanted offer as a takeover defense measure by putting a tight deadline on the hostile bidder’s ability to submit an offer. But, the regime may also consequently chill or impede discussions with a different, “friendly” offeror with whom the company may be having transaction discussions, especially if those discussions were in preliminary stages and the offeror would not be prepared to make a formal, public offer within the 42-day timeframe (and may otherwise hamper the ability to use the veil of confidentiality as a negotiating tool).

4. Cross-Border Due Diligence Considerations

Due diligence also warrants special attention in the cross-border context. Wholesale application of the acquiror’s domestic due diligence standards to the target’s jurisdiction can cause delay, wasted time and resources, or result in the parties missing key transaction issues. Due diligence methods must take account of the target jurisdiction’s legal regime and local norms, including what steps a publicly traded company can take as to disclosing material non-public information to potential bidders and implications for disclosure obligations. Many due diligence requests are best funneled through legal or financial intermediaries as opposed to being made directly to the target company. Due diligence relating to compliance with the sanction regulations overseen by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is essential for U.S. entities acquiring non-U.S. businesses. Similarly, due diligence with respect to risks related to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)—and understanding the DOJ’s guidance for minimizing the risk of inheriting FCPA liability—is critical for U.S. buyers acquiring a company with non-U.S. business activities; even acquisitions of foreign companies that do business in the United States may be scrutinized with respect to FCPA compliance. This point is illustrated by the DOJ’s 2019 prosecution of Technip FMC PLC, a global oil and gas technology and services provider created by the merger of Technip S.A. and FMC Technologies, Inc., for bribery schemes undertaken by both of its pre-merger predecessors. In 2018, the DOJ established guidance expanding its FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy to M&A transactions. As a result, when an acquiring company identifies misconduct through pre-transaction due diligence or post-transaction integration, and then self-reports the relevant conduct, the DOJ is now more likely to decline to prosecute if the company fully cooperates, remediates in a complete and timely fashion and disgorges any ill-gotten gains. This presumption of declination was further broadened by the DOJ’s 2019 revisions to the policy, which provide that an acquiring company may still be eligible for a declination even if the target it acquired presented aggravating circumstances—for example, if the target’s management was complicit in the corruption, the presumption of declination could still apply if the acquiror timely discovered and removed such members of management. This guidance further underscores the importance of careful pre-acquisition due diligence and effective post-closing compliance integration, which will place acquiring companies in the best position to

take advantage of the DOJ's enforcement approach in appropriate cases where misconduct is uncovered.

It is worth noting that in June 2025, Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche announced the awaited new guidelines for prosecutors investigating and enforcing the FCPA. These enforcement guidelines were issued in response to President Trump's Executive Order titled "Pausing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement to Further American Economic and National Security," which directed DOJ to pause certain FCPA investigations while reassessing enforcement priorities and to issue new FCPA enforcement guidelines within 180 days.³⁷⁵ The stated aim of the new policy is to reduce undue burdens on American companies operating abroad and to focus on activities that undermine U.S. national interests. The memorandum announcing the guidelines directs prosecutors to consider the following non-exhaustive factors and confirms that these new guidelines will govern all current and future FCPA investigations and enforcement actions: total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations, safeguarding fair opportunities for U.S. companies, advancing U.S. national security, and prioritizing investigations of serious misconduct. Parties considering transacting abroad should monitor the way these guidelines and procedures abrogate preexisting practice on FCPA enforcement.

Careful attention must also be paid to foreign operations of domestic companies, including joint ventures with foreign parties. The importance of this issue was dramatically illustrated in the failed attempt in 2013 by Apollo Tyre, an Indian company, to acquire Cooper Tire & Rubber, a U.S.-based company with an important joint venture in China. During the pendency of the deal, the Chinese minority partner locked Cooper out of the Chinese factory and made demands about a higher price and the potential clash between Indian and Chinese culture at the plant, which contributed in part to the termination of Cooper's merger agreement with Apollo Tyre.

In the wake of the recent imposition of sanctions, tariffs, import/export prohibitions and other trading restrictions, an acquiror's due diligence process should include a thorough investigation of the impact of such restrictions on the target company's supply and distribution channels, as well as the target company's business operations in affected areas. An understanding of differences in such restrictions between the acquiror's and the target company's jurisdictions may be critical to integration planning as well.

5. Cross-Border Regulatory and Political Considerations

M&A activity, including cross-border transactions, may be subject to review by antitrust and foreign investment authorities in the U.S. (including the new outbound investment security program targeting "countries of concern") and abroad, and parties should carefully prepare for multi-jurisdictional review and notifications. More than 100 jurisdictions have pre-merger antitrust notification regimes, a list that continues to grow, and multiple countries have adopted foreign investment screening regimes in recent years. Multinational transactions (including minority investments, particularly if accompanied by certain governance rights) may require multiple notifications. The proliferation of pre-merger antitrust and foreign investment regimes around the world introduces longer lead times and additional risk exposure between signing and closing, which acquirors then need to consider and factor into valuations, transaction structures, and transaction terms.

Across jurisdictions, many parties and stakeholders have potential leverage (economic, political, regulatory, public relations, etc.), and consequently it is important to develop a plan to address anticipated concerns that may be voiced by these stakeholders in response to the transaction. Moreover, it is essential that a comprehensive communications plan be in place before the announcement of a transaction so that all of the relevant constituencies can be targeted and addressed with the appropriate messages. It is often useful to involve local public relations firms in the planning process at an early stage. Planning for premature leaks is also critical, especially in certain jurisdictions with regimes requiring mandatory disclosure when there are leaks involving takeovers or material information more generally.

Similarly, potential regulatory hurdles require sophisticated advance planning. In addition to securities and antitrust regulations, acquisitions may be subject to foreign investment review (both inbound and outbound), and acquisitions in regulated industries (*e.g.*, energy, public utilities, gaming, insurance, telecommunications and media, financial institutions, transportation, semiconductor and defense contracting) may be subject to additional layers of regulatory approvals. Regulation in these areas is often complex, and political opponents, reluctant targets and competing bidders may seize on any perceived weaknesses in an acquiror's ability to clear regulatory obstacles. Most obstacles to a cross-border deal are best addressed in partnership with local players (including, in particular, the target company's management, where appropriate) whose interests are aligned with those of the acquiror, as local support reduces the appearance of a foreign threat. It is in most cases critical that the likely concerns of national and local government agencies, employees, customers, suppliers, communities and other interested parties be thoroughly considered and, if possible, addressed prior to any acquisition or investment proposal becoming public. Flexibility in transaction structures, especially in strategic or politically sensitive situations, may be helpful in particular circumstances, such as: (i) no-governance or low-governance investments, minority positions or joint ventures, possibly with the right to increase to greater ownership or governance over time (though certain regulatory restrictions may decrease the utility of these structures as tools to avoid regulatory scrutiny in the United States); (ii) when entering a foreign market, making an acquisition in partnership with a local company or management or in collaboration with a local source of financing or co-investor (such as a private equity firm); or (iii) utilizing a controlled or partly controlled local acquisition vehicle, possibly with a board of directors having a substantial number of local citizens and a prominent local figure as a non-executive chairman. Use of preferred securities (rather than ordinary common stock) or structured debt securities should also be considered.

Occasionally, local regulators and constituencies may seek to intervene in global transactions. Ostensibly modest social issues, such as the name of the continuing enterprise and its corporate seat, or the choice of the nominal acquiror in a merger, may affect the perspective of government and labor officials. Depending on the industry involved and the geographic distribution of the workforce, labor unions and "works councils" may be active and play a significant role in the current political environment, and as a result, demand concessions.

6. Cross-Border Acquisition Financing

When devising a financing strategy, potential acquirors in cross-border transactions with access to multiple debt markets (*e.g.*, U.S., Euro, and U.K. markets) should consider whether

accessing one or multiple of such markets will result in better pricing and execution. Acquirors must also consider whether the law of the target’s jurisdiction requires certain specific conditionality provisions (*e.g.*, the “funds certain” requirement in certain European jurisdictions). Similarly, potential acquirors, particularly leveraged acquirors, may want to explore alternative, non-traditional financing sources and structures, including seller paper or, increasingly, direct lenders. Under U.S. law, unlike the laws of some other jurisdictions, non-U.S. acquirors are not prohibited from borrowing from U.S. lenders, and they generally may use the assets of U.S. targets as collateral (although there are some important limitations on using stock of U.S. targets as collateral).

7. Cross-Border Deal Consideration and Transaction Structures

While Sections IV.A–IV.D address many of the structural considerations related to whether the target is a public or private company, as well as the form of consideration paid, another important factor in structuring transactions is the jurisdiction of the parties, particularly when one or more of the parties are organized outside of the U.S. Cross-border deals present their own set of unique challenges and complexities, though workable solutions often can be found.

Although cash remains the predominant form of consideration in cross-border deals, non-cash structures are not uncommon, offering target shareholders the opportunity to participate in the resulting global enterprise. For example, publicly listed acquirors may consider offering existing common shares or depositary receipts (*e.g.*, ADRs) or special consideration (*e.g.*, CVRs). Where target shareholders will obtain a continuing interest in the acquiring corporation, expect heightened focus on the corporate governance and other ownership and structural arrangements of the acquiror in addition to business prospects. Pricing structures must be sensitive to exchange rate and currency risk as well as volatility in international markets. Alternatives to all-cash structures include non-cash currencies, such as depositary receipts, “global shares” and common equity, as well as preferred securities and structured debt.

One of the core challenges of cross-border deals using acquiror stock is the potential “flowback” of liquidity in the acquiror’s stock to the acquiror’s home market. This exodus of shares, prompted by factors ranging from shareholder taxation (*e.g.*, withholding taxes or loss of imputation credits), index inclusion of the issuer or target equity, available liquidity in the newly issued shares and shareholder discomfort with non-local securities, to legal or contractual requirements that certain institutional investors not hold shares issued by a non-local entity or listed on a non-local exchange, can put pressure on the acquiror’s stock price. It may also threaten exemptions from registration requirements that apply to offerings outside the home country of the acquiror.

Understanding the U.S. and non-U.S. tax issues affecting target shareholders and the combined group is critical to structuring any cross-border transaction. In transactions involving the receipt of acquiror stock, the identity of the acquiring entity must be considered carefully. Although some of the U.S. tax law changes enacted in 2017 (*e.g.*, 21% corporate income tax rate and deduction for dividends received from non-U.S. subsidiaries) have ameliorated certain of the adverse tax consequences traditionally associated with being U.S.-parented, others remain or have been exacerbated (*e.g.*, continued application of “controlled foreign corporation” (CFC) rules to

non-U.S. subsidiaries and expansion of those rules to provide for minimum taxation of CFC earnings (GILTI). Where feasible, it often remains preferable for the combined group to be non-U.S.-parented, although this determination requires careful modeling, taking into account the potential application of U.S. and non-U.S. minimum taxes as well as the impact of the new “side-by-side safe harbor” that, effective January 1, 2026, generally eliminates Pillar Two top-up taxes for U.S.-parented multinationals. In transactions involving an exchange of U.S. target stock for non-U.S. acquiror stock, the potential application of “anti-inversion” rules—which could render an otherwise tax-free transaction taxable to exchanging U.S. target shareholders and could result in significant adverse U.S. tax consequences to the combined group—must be evaluated carefully. Combining under a non-U.S. parent corporation frequently is feasible only where shareholders of the U.S. corporation are deemed to receive less than 60% of the stock of the non-U.S. parent corporation, as determined under complex computational rules.

Potential acquirors of U.S. businesses should carefully model the anticipated tax rate of the combined business, taking into account applicable minimum taxes, the ability to expense R&D expenditures and other investments, limitations on the deductibility of net interest expense and related-party payments, and limitations on the utilization of net operating losses, as well as the consequences of owning non-U.S. subsidiaries through an intermediate U.S. entity. Such modeling requires a detailed understanding of existing and planned related-party transactions and payments in the combined group.

a. All-Cash

All-cash transactions are easy for all constituencies to understand and do not present flowback concerns. The cash used in the transaction frequently must be financed through equity or debt issuances that will require careful coordination with the M&A transaction. Where cash constitutes all or part of the acquisition currency, appropriate currency hedging should be considered, given the time necessary to complete a cross-border transaction. Careful planning and consideration should be given to any hedging requirements, which can be expensive and, if they need to be implemented before the announcement of a deal, may create a leak. In addition, parties should be cognizant of financial assistance rules in certain non-U.S. jurisdictions that may limit the ability to use debt financing for an acquisition, as well as tax rules limiting the deductibility of interest expense. Although cash remains the predominant form of consideration in cross border deals, challenging debt markets and elevated interest rates may cause certain acquirors in mega-deals and other large transactions to turn to acquisition financing alternatives (such as the use of direct lenders or seller financing) or, in the case of some private equity buyers, increased equity checks.

b. Equity Consideration

United States securities and corporate governance rules can be problematic for non-U.S. acquirors who will be issuing securities that will become publicly traded in the U.S. as a result of an acquisition. SEC rules, the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts and stock exchange requirements should be evaluated to ensure compatibility with home country rules and to be certain that the non-U.S. acquiror will be able to comply. Rules relating to director independence, internal control reports, and loans to officers and directors, among others, can frequently raise issues for

non-U.S. companies listing in the United States. Similar considerations must be addressed for U.S. acquirors seeking to acquire non-U.S. targets. Governance practices can also be relevant when equity consideration is used in a hostile acquisition. For example, in Mylan's hostile cash and stock offer for Perrigo, Mylan's stockholder-unfriendly governance regime, which was permissible in the Netherlands, was a sticking point for many Perrigo investors, and helped drive Mylan's inability to generate sufficient support for its offer among Perrigo shareholders.

c. Stock and Depositary Receipts

All-stock transactions provide a straightforward structure for a cross-border transaction but may be susceptible to flowback, as some institutional investors prefer not to, or are not permitted to, hold foreign securities. A depositary receipt approach may mitigate flowback, as local institutional investors may be willing to hold the depositary receipts instead of the underlying non-local shares, easing the rate at which shares are sold back into the acquiror's home country market. In the typical depositary receipt program, the depositary receipt holders are free to surrender their receipts to the depositary in exchange for the underlying shares. Once the underlying shares are received, the non-U.S. shareholder is free to trade them back into the acquiror's home market.

d. "Dual Pillar" Structures

A more complex and rarely deployed structure for a cross-border combination is known as the dual-listed company ("DLC") structure. In a DLC structure, each of the publicly traded parent companies retains its separate corporate existence and stock exchange listing (or listings), while equalization of the economic rights of the shareholders of the two companies is achieved through an equalization agreement between the parent companies. Management integration typically is achieved by having identical boards of directors. In recent years, various DLC structures have been "unified" or "simplified." For example, Unilever, which used to be organized under two separately listed British and Dutch parent companies, announced in June 2020 that it would seek shareholder approval to consolidate its DLC structure into a single parent company based in the United Kingdom following a failed attempt to move to a single parent company based in the Netherlands in 2018 that faced criticism from key British shareholders. Unilever's stockholders approved the unification in October 2020 with the support of over 99% of shares voted. Other examples of unifications include RELX (in 2018) and BHP (in 2022). Because DLC structures raise novel and complex tax, accounting, governance and other issues as applied to the U.S., these structures have not been employed in cross-border combinations involving a U.S. parent corporation.

V.

Deal Protection and Deal Certainty

A fundamental tension in the negotiation of a public company merger agreement is the different sense in which the acquiror and seller seek deal certainty. The seller wants as much certainty as possible that the deal will close, while the acquiror wants flexibility to respond to adverse changes relating to the target company and protection from misrepresentations and burdensome regulatory requirements. Meanwhile, when it comes to the possibility of a competing bid and the target company board's ability to respond to such a bid, the seller wants maximum flexibility, while the acquiror wants the deal to be as "tight" as possible.

Merger agreements typically include a variety of provisions that are intended to balance each party's desire to preserve its flexibility to respond to future developments and comply with applicable fiduciary duties, while ensuring that the other party remains obligated to consummate the transaction. The key provisions in this regard are (1) "deal protection" devices intended to address interloper risk and the ability for the target's Board to respond to unforeseen developments; (2) closing conditions, including with respect to giving the acquiror a right to walk away from a transaction without liability if a "material adverse effect" or a material covenant breach occurs; (3) the remedies available in connection with a party's failure to comply with the agreement or otherwise close the transaction, including as a result of a failure to obtain the requisite financing; and (4) regulatory efforts provisions intended to define the scope of the buyer's obligations to take, or not to take, certain actions to obtain regulatory approvals. These provisions can materially influence whether an M&A transaction will be completed, renegotiated or abandoned in the face of a post-signing change in circumstances or regulatory complications.

A. Deal Protection Devices: The Acquiror's Need for Certainty

"Deal protection" devices—such as break-up fees, no-shop clauses, force-the-vote provisions, shareholder voting agreements and information and matching rights—permit bidders "to protect themselves against being used as a stalking horse and [provide] consideration for making target-specific investments of time and resources in particular acquisitions."³⁷⁶ Targets typically agree to provisions of this type to induce value-maximizing bids. Delaware courts have recognized that deal protection devices are permissible so long as the deal protection package as a whole is reasonable under the circumstances.

Courts generally review deal protection devices under the enhanced scrutiny analysis set out in *Unocal* and *Revlon*.³⁷⁷ The reviewing court will closely examine the context of the board's decision to agree to the deal protections to assess the reasonableness of that decision. However, while the context is always relevant, there are a number of deal protections, such as "no-shops" and break-up fees, that are generally accepted by courts and commonplace in public company merger agreements.

1. Break-Up Fees

A common element in the package of deal protection measures is a termination (or "break-up") fee payable by the target to the acquiror in specified circumstances, generally involving the

failure of the merger to occur because of a third-party bid. One rationale for offering bidders break-up fees is to incentivize them to participate in a bidding process, as they compensate a bidder for the risks and costs incurred in signing and announcing a transaction that is not ultimately completed. Of course, termination fees, even more than other deal protection devices, impose an easily calculable cost on interlopers and therefore may, at some levels, deter other potential acquirors from making an acquisition proposal after an agreement has been reached. As discussed below, an “excessive” break-up fee therefore will be viewed critically by a court, and may be invalidated or cited as a factor cutting against the effectiveness of a sale process.³⁷⁸

Break-up fees can be triggered by different events. The most common trigger, which is generally considered unobjectionable by courts, is termination of the merger agreement, either by the target company in favor of a superior proposal or by the acquiror because the target board has withdrawn its recommendation in favor of the transaction. A break-up fee can also be triggered by a transaction during a “tail” period following termination for failure to obtain shareholder approval, or a breach of the merger agreement or failure to close by the “drop dead” date—in each case, in circumstances where an alternative acquisition proposal was made public before the respective triggering event. In such cases, acquirors have argued that targets should be “presumed” to be acting against the deal at hand and in favor of the prospect of the alternative deal, despite covenants prohibiting such actions.

The Delaware Court of Chancery has stated that there is no accepted “customary” level for break-up fees, but that such fees (like all deal protections) should instead be considered contextually and cumulatively:

That analysis will, by necessity, require the Court to consider a number of factors, including without limitation: the overall size of the termination fee, as well as its percentage value; the benefit to shareholders, including a premium (if any) that directors seek to protect; the absolute size of the transaction, as well as the relative size of the partners to the merger; the degree to which a counterparty found such protections to be crucial to the deal, bearing in mind differences in bargaining power; and the preclusive or coercive power of *all* deal protections included in a transaction, taken as a whole. The inquiry, by its very nature fact intensive, cannot be reduced to a mathematical equation.³⁷⁹

In determining the reasonableness of a termination fee, courts do not rigidly adhere to a set threshold percentage. The Delaware Court of Chancery has nevertheless provided useful guidance in considering the quanta of break-up fees, upholding termination fees that have approached, and in some cases exceeded, 4%.³⁸⁰ For example, in the *Dollar Thrifty* case, the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld a 3.9% termination fee and expense reimbursement, stating approvingly that the fee deterred “fractional topping” and actually encouraged an interloper to “dig deep and to put on the table a clearly better offer rather than to emerge with pennies more.”³⁸¹ In the *Topps* case, the Court upheld a two-tiered termination fee of approximately 3% of equity value during the first 40 days, which went up to approximately 4.3% of equity value for termination after the 40-day period elapsed, albeit noting that it was “a bit high in percentage terms.”³⁸² The Court has stated that a termination fee of 4.4% of equity value is “near the upper end of a ‘conventionally accepted’ range.”³⁸³ And in *Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co.*,³⁸⁴ the Court cast doubt on the validity of a 6.3% termination fee (calculated based on the deal value to the seller’s

stockholders), stating in *dicta* that the fee “certainly seems to stretch the definition of range of reasonableness and probably stretches the definition beyond its breaking point.”³⁸⁵ More recently, the Court in *HoldCo Opp. Fund V, L.P. v. Angulo* found that a reciprocal termination fee of roughly 4.7% of the deal’s equity value at announcement was “not oppressive,” that the “costs of breach” or the acquiror’s termination were factors that the target’s board “could consider in its business judgment,” and that the plaintiff could not “show that the deal protections were preclusive or coercive.”³⁸⁶

Whether the denominator used to calculate the proportionality of the termination fee should be equity or enterprise value (*i.e.*, equity value *plus* net debt) of the target will depend on the circumstances. Delaware law generally has “relat[ed] the break-up fee to equity value,” absent a “compelling reason” to deviate from that approach.³⁸⁷ However, Delaware courts have held that in certain contexts, such as highly leveraged transactions, enterprise value may be the more appropriate reference point.³⁸⁸ Courts may also question the appropriate numerator for calculating the relative magnitude of the fee. In the *Comverge* case in 2014, the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss a claim based on the size of the termination fee where, in addition to a traditional termination fee and expense reimbursement, a topping bid would also trigger the conversion into equity of notes that were issued at the time the merger agreement was executed. If the cost of buying the equity into which the bridging loan had been converted was included as part of the fee, the percentage value of the fee would have been as high as 13%.³⁸⁹

A “naked no-vote” termination fee is a fee that is payable by the target contingent solely upon rejection of a transaction by the target’s stockholders, and without a requirement that the vote be followed by acceptance of an alternative transaction.³⁹⁰ Courts have expressed concern about the potential coercive effect that a naked no-vote break-up fee might have on the stockholder vote. As a result, when this mechanic is implemented, the size of a naked no-vote break-up fee relative to the equity value of the target is typically significantly lower than for break-up fees triggered in connection with an alternative offer. In the *Lear* case, the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld a naked no-vote termination fee in which the potential acquiror had the right to receive \$25 million (0.9% of the total deal value) if shareholders rejected the merger for any reason.³⁹¹ Lear’s board had agreed to sell the company to Carl Icahn in an LBO. When faced with substantial shareholder opposition to the transaction, Lear obtained a slightly higher price in exchange for the naked no-vote termination fee. The shareholders rejected the deal and Lear paid the termination fee. The plaintiffs then challenged the fee as a breach of fiduciary duty and argued that it constituted corporate waste amounting to a \$25 million “gift” to the would-be acquiror. Even though the deal was a cash-out LBO that implicated *Revlon*, the court found that Lear’s board did not act in bad faith in approving the fee, holding that even though stockholder approval of the transaction was uncertain, the board was entitled to exercise its business judgment in determining that the revised merger agreement was “an attractive opportunity for the Lear stockholders in light of the company’s future prospects and the absence of another topping bid after a full shopping process.”³⁹² In denying the corporate waste claim, the court noted that it was rational for Icahn to demand such a fee as additional compensation in the event of a “no” vote since he was effectively bidding against himself at that stage of the deal, and that Delaware courts had previously upheld naked no-vote termination fees of up to 1.4% of transaction value.³⁹³ Nevertheless, only a small minority of deals feature naked no-vote termination fees; acquirors are more often entitled to

expense reimbursement up to a specified cap in the event of a no-vote rather than payment of a fixed amount, which typically does not exceed approximately 1% of the transaction value.

Naked no-vote fees and expense reimbursement provisions require special consideration in light of potential M&A-related activism campaigns and the associated risk that activist-fueled opposition results in shareholder rejection of a transaction. Parties should also evaluate whether a naked no-vote fee or expense reimbursement may be appropriate in circumstances where approval of the acquiror's stockholders is required in connection with the issuance of acquiror stock as consideration in the transaction.

2. “No-Shops,” “No-Talks” and “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” Standstills

A “no-shop” provision in a merger agreement provides that a selling company will not encourage, seek, solicit, provide information to or negotiate with third-party bidders following the signing of the merger agreement. “No shop” provisions also require that the selling company cease any ongoing discussions with other bidders and often require that the selling company request that the other bidders who have received confidential information from the selling company either return or destroy such information shortly after the signing of the merger agreement. However, to allow the directors to fulfill their fiduciary duties, the no-shop will generally allow the seller to respond to unsolicited offers that may lead to a superior proposal by supplying confidential information, and to negotiate shop offers.

Delaware courts accept the need for no-shop clauses to enable targets to extract the maximum bids from potential acquirors and have held that it is “critical” that bargained-for contractual provisions be enforced, including by awarding post-closing damages in appropriate cases.³⁹⁴ But Delaware courts are nonetheless willing to police no-shop clauses to ensure that they are not used to deny shareholders the best transaction reasonably available. For example, in *QVC*, the Delaware Supreme Court expressed concern that the highly restrictive no-shop clause of the Viacom/Paramount merger agreement was interpreted by the board of Paramount to prevent directors from even learning the terms and conditions of an unsolicited competing tender offer from QVC, which was initially higher than Viacom's offer by roughly \$1.2 billion.³⁹⁵ The Court concluded that the board invoked the clause to give directors an excuse to refuse to inform themselves about the facts concerning an apparently *bona fide* third-party topping bid, and therefore the directors' process was not reasonable. Accordingly, boards should take care that a no-shop does not also function as a “no-talk”—*i.e.*, a clause that interferes with directors' ability to familiarize themselves with potentially superior bids made by third parties to fulfill their fiduciary duties. In *Phelps Dodge*, the Delaware Court of Chancery stated that “no-talk” clauses that prohibit a board from familiarizing itself with potentially superior third-party bids were “troubling precisely because they prevent a board from meeting its duty to make an informed judgment with respect to even considering whether to negotiate with a third party.”³⁹⁶ Similarly, in *ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp.*, the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to adopt the acquiror's interpretation of the merger agreement's “no talk” provision—under which the target board would have been prevented from engaging with an unsolicited bidder making a substantially higher offer, except in very narrow circumstances—because that interpretation would be at odds with the directors' obligation to fulfill their fiduciary duties.³⁹⁷ Delaware courts have also refused to enforce no-shop provisions where the acquiror secured the deal protection measure through its

own misconduct or where there are “viable claims of aiding and abetting against the holder of third party contract rights.”³⁹⁸

Confidentiality agreements entered into in connection with a potential transaction with a publicly traded company often require bidders to agree to a “standstill” provision that precludes the making of an unsolicited offer outside of the process, placing restrictions on (or instituting an outright prohibition of) acquiring securities of the company or taking other unfriendly actions, subject to limited exceptions. These provisions sometimes include an anti-evasion clause that prohibits the potential bidder from requesting a waiver of the standstill or taking actions that may make the bidder’s interest in the target public. Even private requests for a waiver have often been prohibited by standstill agreements because under certain circumstances, they can lead to disclosure on the part of the target, or simply a leak, thus giving the impression that the target is “in play.”

A number of Delaware decisions have raised questions about the legality, and use, of these so-called “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” provisions. In a 2012 bench ruling in *In re Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litigation*, the Delaware Court of Chancery enjoined a target company from enforcing a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” provision in a “*Revlon* situation.”³⁹⁹ The Court did not object to the bidder being prohibited from publicly requesting a waiver of the standstill (which the Court understood would eviscerate the standstill the bidder had agreed to by putting the target “in play”), but it held that directors have a continuing duty to be informed of all material facts, including whether a rejected bidder is willing to offer a higher price. The Court suggested that a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” provision was analogous to the “no-talk” provision held invalid in *Phelps Dodge* and was therefore “impermissible because it has the same disabling effect as a no-talk clause, although on a bidder-specific basis.”⁴⁰⁰

Less than a month later, however, then-Chancellor Strine’s bench ruling in *In re Ancestry.com Inc. Shareholder Litigation*⁴⁰¹ clarified that there is no *per se* rule against “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” standstill provisions, although it did express the view that they are “potent” provisions that must be used with caution. *Ancestry* recognized the valuable function that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” standstill provisions might play in the process of selling a company as an “auction gavel,” encouraging bidders to put their best offers on the table in the auction process, rather than to leave something in reserve, with the optionality to make a higher bid outside the auction process. But the Court emphasized that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” standstills will be subject to careful judicial review in the *Revlon* context. Then-Chancellor Strine’s ruling expressed the view that the directors of the selling company should be fully informed regarding the use and implications of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” standstill provision, and that stockholders whose votes are sought for the transaction should be informed if prior bidders are contractually prohibited from offering a topping bid. A failure to fully disclose “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” standstill provisions—and the parties’ compliance with those provisions—could result in a finding that the stockholder vote was not fully informed, as the Court of Chancery concluded in a decision refusing to apply the *Corwin* doctrine based on that and other disclosure deficiencies.⁴⁰²

There are good justifications for including a well-crafted “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” provision in a confidentiality agreement where the provision is designed to enhance value for the target. In such cases, it is important to ensure proper consideration and documentation (including

in board minutes, as appropriate) of any decision to include such protections in a confidentiality agreement. In some cases, however, the company may elect to include a “fallaway” provision (which releases bidders in the event of another bid) or a limited “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” provision that permits private bids, but not public ones.

3. Fiduciary Outs, Board Recommendation Changes and “Force-the-Vote” Provisions

Notwithstanding the existence of any restrictions on a board’s ability to “shop” for competing bids or continue discussions with other bidders after entering into a transaction agreement, target company directors continue to owe fiduciary duties during the pendency of the transaction and cannot contractually bargain away in a merger agreement their ability to carry out such fiduciary duties in the event of an improved offer. As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in *QVC*: “[t]o the extent that a contract, or a provision thereof, purports to require a board to act or not act in such a fashion as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is invalid and unenforceable.”⁴⁰³ Therefore, public company merger agreements typically have one or more “fiduciary outs” that permit the target board to take specified actions such as terminating the transaction to accept a superior offer, or withdrawing or changing its recommendation. “Fiduciary outs” attempt to balance target directors’ obligation to continue to comply with their fiduciary duties—particularly in response to new or unforeseen circumstances—with an acquiror’s desire to ensure such provisions are as tightly constrained as the law, and the parties’ relative bargaining positions, will allow.

Public company merger agreements generally include provisions requiring the board of directors of the target (and, if the acquiror’s stockholders will also be voting on the transaction, the board of directors of the acquiror) to recommend that shareholders vote in favor of the merger agreement and not change that recommendation, except in specified circumstances that are negotiated between the parties. Historically, many merger agreements permitted the target’s board to change its recommendation only in the context of a “superior proposal.” However, *dicta* in Delaware cases has questioned the validity of this limitation, because directors’ fiduciary duties require the board to be able to communicate with stockholders with candor, and therefore to change its recommendation for any reason.⁴⁰⁴ In *In re Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litigation*, Vice Chancellor Laster made clear in a bench ruling his view that Delaware boards should retain the right to change their recommendations in compliance with their fiduciary duties, explaining that “fiduciary duty law in this context can’t be overridden by contract” because “it implicates duties to target stockholders to communicate truthfully.”⁴⁰⁵ Similarly, in *In re NYSE Euronext Shareholders Litigation*, then-Chancellor Strine expressed skepticism towards provisions that limit a board’s ability to change its recommendation and described them as “contractual promises to lie in the future.”⁴⁰⁶ He also noted that, although such provisions create litigation and deal risk, some companies accede to them in negotiations to gain a higher price.

In many cases, to balance a buyer’s desire for a committed deal and a seller’s view that its board must be able to change its recommendation, practitioners have sought a middle course (that is yet to be addressed by the Delaware courts): permitting a change in recommendation in the absence of a superior proposal, but only if there has been an “intervening event”—that is, a development that was not known at the time of signing.⁴⁰⁷ Practitioners who choose to include an

“intervening event” concept frequently engage in negotiations over the precise definition of this term (a potential point of contention is whether it should include developments that are known but whose effects were not reasonably foreseeable), and whether the definition should include all new facts or whether certain categories of events (such as changes in the acquiror’s share price in a transaction involving equity consideration) should be excluded. In some circumstances, most typically in the financial institutions space, the target’s board is permitted to change its recommendation for any reason (not just an “intervening event”) so long as it determines it is required to do so in order to comply with its fiduciary duties.

Merger agreements almost always require a target to pay a termination fee if the buyer terminates the merger agreement as a result of a change in the target’s board recommendation to vote for the merger. Unlike a potentially unenforceable provision flatly prohibiting the target board from changing its recommendation based on post-signing events (which can put the board in the awkward position of recommending that stockholders vote for a transaction that the board no longer believes is in their interest), a provision that protects the buyer by providing substantial compensation if the target’s board has a change of view discourages the target board from disavowing its support for a deal lightly, imposes process requirements around a change of recommendation and provides buyers with a useful tool to increase certainty of closing. As noted in the discussion on termination fees above, however, such fees cannot be excessive and are almost always equal to the fee payable on termination to accept a superior proposal.

Aside from the fiduciary obligation that boards must speak candidly to their stockholders, Delaware law also permits a target to agree that a merger agreement will be submitted to its stockholders even if the board, having deemed the merger agreement advisable at the time of execution, later changes its recommendation.⁴⁰⁸ Such a requirement in a merger agreement is referred to as a “force-the-vote” provision. While many merger agreements do not have a “force-the-vote provision,” there are some situations, particularly in stock-for-stock deals (and especially in “mergers of equals”), where a buyer may find such a provision useful. This is usually for one or both of two reasons: first, a buyer may prefer that a target’s stockholders (and not just the board) decide which bid is superior, especially when not all bids are all-cash (bids with a stock component being more difficult to compare than all-cash bids); and second, since a target is not able to execute a competing bid until after the stockholder vote occurs, a force-the-vote provision creates a timing advantage that may serve as a deterrent to competing bids. Given this possible deterrent effect, a force-the-vote provision should be carefully weighed together with the full package of deal protection provisions. Nevertheless, Delaware courts have affirmed that “force-the-vote” provisions are permitted under Delaware law. In a recent decision from the Court of Chancery, Vice Chancellor Zurn explained that “Delaware law has already determined that a fiduciary out that allows a merger party to engage with an unsolicited proposal and change its recommendation enables that party’s board to fulfill its fiduciary duties, even if the other party holds the right to terminate and is entitled to a fee.”⁴⁰⁹

4. Shareholder Commitments

In addition to other deal protections, an acquiror may also seek commitments from major stockholders of the target, whether members of management or otherwise, to support the transaction. Such commitments typically take the form of voting or support agreements entered

into by one or more stockholders concurrently with the execution of the merger or transaction agreement. In addition to delivering the actual support of the shares in question, the visible and up-front support of major stockholders for a transaction can have a signaling effect to other stockholders. This can serve as a substantial deterrent to third-party bids, even where (as is more often the case) the obligation to support the transaction ceases if the board terminates the transaction agreement to accept a superior proposal.

In most cases, the use of voting or support agreements has been upheld, and such agreements are commonly used in situations where a large stockholder supports the transaction in question prior to execution. There have, however, been situations where such agreements have come under judicial scrutiny, including where the combination of a “force-the-vote” provision and a support agreement from a controlling stockholder effectively makes approval of the transaction a *fait accompli*. In 2003 in *Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.*, the Delaware Supreme Court held that no merger agreement that requires a stockholder vote can be fully “locked up,” even at the behest of controlling stockholder(s) and seemingly even at the end of a diligent shopping/auction process.⁴¹⁰ The Court was closely divided, with Chief Justice Veasey noting in his dissenting opinion that by “requiring that there must always be a fiduciary out, the universe of potential bidders who could reasonably be expected to benefit stockholders could shrink or disappear.”⁴¹¹ *Omnicare* was immediately controversial and remains so. The recent amendments to the DGCL Section 144 expressly do not “[l]imit judicial review for purposes of injunctive relief of provisions or devices designed or intended to deter, delay, or preclude a change of control or other transaction,”⁴¹² such as the devices at issue in *Omnicare*.

Even in Delaware, however, the effect of *Omnicare* has been limited by subsequent decisions and practice developments. In *Orman*, a 2004 case, the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld a voting agreement that required the controlling stockholders to vote both *for* the proposed merger and *against* any alternative acquisition proposal within 18 months following the termination of the merger agreement.⁴¹³ The Court identified a number of factual differences from the circumstances presented in *Omnicare*: (1) the controlling stockholders in *Orman* bound themselves to support the merger only as shareholders, but did not restrict their right as members of the board to recommend that public shareholders reject the merger; (2) the *Orman* board negotiated an effective fiduciary out that would allow it to entertain *bona fide* superior offers, while no fiduciary out existed in *Omnicare*; and (3) the deal in *Orman* was expressly subject to approval of a majority of the minority stockholders, which was not a requirement in the deal in *Omnicare*. It should be noted that the fiduciary out in *Orman* was not a right to terminate the merger agreement to accept a superior proposal, but rather consisted of the board’s ability to withdraw its recommendation in favor of the merger coupled with the shareholders’ ability to vote the transaction down. Similarly, in *NetSpend*, a 2013 case, Vice Chancellor Glasscock held that “although the voting agreements appear to lock up approximately 40% of the stock in favor of the [proposed transaction], they are saved by the fiduciary-out clause. Specifically, the voting agreements terminate upon the Board’s termination of the Merger Agreement.”⁴¹⁴ The fiduciary out in *NetSpend* permitted the company to accept a more favorable acquisition proposal from a third party, subject to customary no-shop and termination fee provisions. In response to the restrictions of *Omnicare* and later case law, lock-ups with controlling stockholders are sometimes structured so that a certain “acceptable” percentage less than a majority (*e.g.*, 35%) of the target’s stock is subject to an irrevocable voting commitment, while the controller is relieved of its

obligation to vote the remainder of its shares in favor of the transaction if the target's board withdraws its recommendation in favor of the transaction.⁴¹⁵

After *Omnicare*, practitioners also speculated whether the *Omnicare* analysis would apply only to mergers subject to a traditional vote at a shareholder meeting or whether it would also apply to mergers approved by the written consent of a holder or holders of a majority of shares shortly after signing a merger agreement. Although the Delaware Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, in 2011 in *In re OPENLANE, Inc. Shareholders Litigation*, the Delaware Court of Chancery rejected an argument that a merger was an impermissible *fait accompli* simply because the merger, which did not include a fiduciary out termination right, was approved by a majority of the shareholders by written consent the day after the merger agreement was signed.⁴¹⁶ It should be noted that transactions using a sign-and-consent structure without a robust pre-signing market check may invite heightened scrutiny under the *Revlon* standard, where applicable. Moreover, even when available under a company's governing documents, approving a merger by written consent may present additional complexity whenever the acquiror intends to issue registered stock to the target's stockholders; in those circumstances, the target company insiders who delivered written consents approving the merger must be offered and sold the acquiring company's securities in a valid private offering, and the securities registered on the Form S-4 must be offered and sold only to stockholders not acting by written consent.⁴¹⁷ In these circumstances, a revised structure involving a support agreement with certain large shareholders or insiders to be entered shortly after signing and a consent to be delivered after the effectiveness of the registration statement may be needed instead. A number of public company mergers have utilized the so-called *OPENLANE* structure, including Salesforce's \$8 billion acquisition of Informatica in 2025. In that transaction, Permira and the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, which collectively owned 63% of Informatica's outstanding voting power, delivered a written consent approving the transaction shortly after execution of the definitive merger agreement.

5. Information Rights and Matching Rights

Information rights and matching rights, which provide an acquiror with the opportunity to learn about an interloper's proposal and to improve its bid in response to such a proposal, are nearly universal in public company merger agreements. Specifically, information rights require a target to supply the buyer with information about bids that may appear after the execution of a merger agreement. What are loosely referred to as "matching rights" give the buyer the opportunity to negotiate with the target for a period before the target's board can change its recommendation or terminate the agreement to accept a competing offer under the fiduciary out. A buyer with a match right can match the first competitive bid and, almost universally, can also match any subsequent amended bids.⁴¹⁸ Parties will often debate the proper duration of the match period, with three to five business days being common for an initial match period, and sometimes a shorter period—generally two to three business days—for amended bids.⁴¹⁹

Matching rights have been criticized by a small minority because they can deter subsequent bidders who do not wish to enter into a bidding contest. However, matching rights appear almost universally in public company mergers. Because such rights reduce the uncertainty of consummating the transaction for the initial acquiror, they can be useful in encouraging the

potential acquiror to make the investment required to enter into a merger agreement and reflect the reality that bidding contests cannot be fully prevented in a public company setting.

Delaware courts have routinely upheld information rights and matching rights, noting that “the presence of matching rights in the merger agreement do[es] not act as a serious barrier to any bidder” willing to pay more than the original merger consideration.⁴²⁰ But, in a 2018 appraisal action heard by the Delaware Court of Chancery, *Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Cos.*, the Court indicated that a matching right providing the acquiror four business days to match a superior proposal by a third party and two business days to match any later proposal by the same bidder—a highly customary formulation, but one which the Court characterized as an “unlimited” matching right—was one element of a post-signing market check that “fell far short on many levels.”⁴²¹ In so concluding, the Court noted the “disparity in the sophistication” of the parties and found that the acquiror was “acutely aware of the advantage it secured,” while the target’s board “did not understand what an unlimited match right was much less how that deal protection might work to hinder the go-shop.”⁴²² In a case involving the sale of a significant business unit of a public company, in *In re Sears Hometown & Outlet Stores, Inc. Stockholder Litigation*,⁴²³ Vice Chancellor Laster found that a limited matching right (which permitted a controlling stockholder to match competing bids for such business unit up to a negotiated ceiling) promoted the integrity of a go-shop process and contrasted the limited match right favorably with an “unlimited” matching right, which, per the Court, “lets the incumbent buyer capture all of the surplus that the seller and winning bidder would split under competitive conditions.”⁴²⁴ Practitioners should be aware that while matching rights are generally upheld, certain matching rights in conjunction with an otherwise flawed market check may lead to scrutiny by the Delaware courts, particularly if the target’s board is not fully aware of the potential effects of the provision.

6. Other Less Common Deal Protection Devices

a. Loans and Convertible Loans

Some acquirors provide bridge loans or other commitments to financially distressed targets, which can have the effect of “locking up” the transaction. Courts evaluating such commitments will consider their reasonableness in light of the circumstances. For example, in *In re Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litigation*, the buyer provided \$30 million in bridge financing to a financially unstable target upon the signing of a merger agreement.⁴²⁵ In the event of a topping bid, the buyer could convert the loan into shares, which, if fully drawn, represented approximately 22% of the then-outstanding stock of the target. In refusing to enjoin the transaction, the Court noted that the bridge loan “provided substantial benefit to [the target] in the form of much needed cash to get them through at least most of, and ideally all of, depending on how the future turns out, the transaction process and possibly a little bit beyond.”⁴²⁶ However, the Delaware Court of Chancery subsequently ruled in *Comverge* that a bridge loan made at the same time that a merger agreement was executed might be unreasonable under the circumstances (a transaction at a negative premium to market, and where the cost of buying the equity into which the bridging loan had been converted would have resulted in an effective termination fee as high as 13% of equity value) because it could preclude a topping bid.⁴²⁷

b. Crown Jewels

A “crown-jewel” lock-up, in its basic form, is a device in which the target company grants the acquiror an option to purchase, or otherwise obtain the benefit of, key target assets in the event that the proposed merger does not close. This type of lock-up gives the acquiror assurance that even if the merger is not consummated, it will nevertheless get key pieces of the target’s business. The device may also deter competing bidders, because even with a superior topping bid, the competing bidders may not get all of the assets they are seeking (*i.e.*, they may buy the target but without the crown jewels). Generally, having an independent business purpose for the separate crown-jewel arrangement will increase the likelihood that the lock-up will pass judicial muster. For example, in the 2013 merger between NYSE Euronext and Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (“ICE”), ICE separately agreed with NYSE Euronext to act as the exclusive provider of certain clearing services to NYSE Euronext’s European derivatives business for two years, whether or not the merger took place. The parties extensively detailed the business rationale for this agreement, mostly focusing on NYSE Euronext’s need for clearing services regardless of whether the merger with ICE was consummated. In evaluating that agreement under the *Unocal* standard, the Delaware Court of Chancery noted that there was “no evidence in the record that presents a barrier to any serious acquiror” and that a topping bidder could reach an economic solution with all parties concerned for a relatively small sum.⁴²⁸ Thus, Delaware courts will examine the preclusive effects of such side commercial arrangements on potential topping bidders in evaluating whether they are impermissible crown-jewel lock-ups.

B. Material Adverse Effect Clauses: The Target’s Need for Certainty

Because of the passage of time between the signing and closing of a transaction (whether due to the need for regulatory or shareholder approvals or other reasons), the target company will not be the same at closing as it was on the day the acquiror agreed to buy it. The question becomes how much change is permissible before the acquiror will have the right to refuse to close the transaction. Virtually all U.S. public company merger agreements allow the buyer to refuse to close if there has been a “material adverse effect” on or a “material adverse change” in the target company’s business (although these provisions are less common in acquisition agreements involving European companies). This “MAE” or “MAC” clause is one of the principal mechanisms available to the parties to a transaction to allocate the risk of adverse events transpiring between signing and closing.

An MAE definition usually refers to a “materially adverse effect” on the business in question, and this standard is generally not defined with exacting precision. In addition, by far the largest part of an MAE clause is generally composed of exceptions — in other words, the types of developments and effects that should not be counted toward an MAE determination. Examples of these exceptions include: macroeconomic or industry-wide developments; changes in stock price (but not the underlying causes); changes in law or accounting rules; effects stemming from the announcement of the deal or the identity of the buyer (for example on customers or employees); failure to meet projections (but not the underlying causes); wars, pandemics, and other natural and man-made disasters; and so on. Some of these, for example industry and economic effects, often have exceptions to the exception, namely that to the extent seller is affected more than others in their industry or geography, the disproportionate part of the effect could be considered in

determining whether an MAE has occurred. Parties also often negotiate specific items for inclusion or exclusion, especially when certain facts or trends are known by the parties prior to signing and there is a question of risk allocation with respect to further materially adverse developments. For example, in certain biopharmaceutical transactions, target companies sometimes negotiate for exceptions relating to FDA or other regulatory determinations in respect of their products (thus shifting the risk of such a finding between signing and closing to the acquiror).

MAE definitions are relevant in merger agreements in a variety of ways. In a public company merger agreement, specified representations and warranties are typically subject to materiality qualifiers, including in many cases MAE. These representations will have to be “brought down” to some level of materiality at closing, which in public company deals is often the level of MAE. In fact, most merger agreements contain a specific “catch-all” representation that since a mutually agreed balance sheet date, there has not been an MAE, and the closing conditions may require this representation to be “brought down” to closing. In addition, some merger agreements have a standalone “No MAE” closing condition, providing that since signing the target has not experienced an MAE.

Until the early 2000s, MAE cases were rarely litigated, but the presence of these clauses in merger agreements nonetheless gave buyers leverage to renegotiate deals and were used in many situations to allow parties to reprice deals when the target’s business experienced adversity after signing. Since that time, however, there have been several significant MAE cases in Delaware that have articulated important principles of MAE jurisprudence. A 2001 MAE decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery, *IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods (In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation)*, was the first significant articulation of Delaware court views on MAE clauses. The buyer (Tyson) claimed, among other things, that the target (IBP) had suffered an MAE due to factors including poor financial performance following the execution of the merger agreement, and sought to terminate the merger agreement. The Court, applying New York law, rejected the assertion and ordered Tyson to close the transaction. The Court stressed that a long-term perspective was required when determining if an MAE had occurred, holding that an MAE contemplates developments “that substantially threaten the overall earnings potential of the target in a durationally significant manner. A short-term hiccup in earnings should not suffice; rather the MAE should be material when viewed from the longer-term perspective of a reasonable acquiror.”⁴²⁹ Under this standard, the 64% year-over-year decrease in Tyson’s first quarter earnings was insufficient for an MAE finding.

Another significant case in MAE jurisprudence is *Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp.*,⁴³⁰ decided by the Delaware Court of Chancery in 2008. In *Hexion*, the Court clarified that absent contractual language to the contrary, the party seeking to excuse its performance under the contract has the burden of proof to establish a material adverse effect and that such burden is “heavy.”⁴³¹ Moreover, the Court clarified that the appropriate scale for measuring an MAE “is whether there has been an adverse change in the target’s business that is consequential to the company’s long-term earnings power over a commercially reasonable period, which one would expect to be measured in years rather than months.”⁴³² Applying these rules, the Court ruled that because the target disclaimed in the merger agreement that it was making representations or warranties with respect to the projections that had been submitted to the

acquiror, the acquiror could not claim that the target's failure to meet those projections—even if by a wide margin—should be considered in evaluating whether there had been an MAE.⁴³³ The Court concluded that the actual and expected performance of the target company could only be compared to the performance of the target company in the corresponding periods preceding the signing of the merger agreement. When measured against those historic results, the target company's disappointing performance did not rise to the level of an MAE.

The first judicial finding of an MAE by a Delaware court occurred in 2018 in *Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG*. In *Akorn*, the Court found that the target's business had suffered an MAE and that the merger agreement between the parties allocated the risk of this event to the target, so that the buyer was permitted to terminate the transaction.⁴³⁴ In a 246-page post-trial opinion, the Delaware Court of Chancery presented a highly fact-intensive inquiry that served to confirm much of the existing Delaware jurisprudence regarding MAE clauses, while also providing additional clarity and guidance in certain areas. The Court's finding of an MAE sufficient to prevent the target from obtaining a court order requiring specific performance was summarily upheld in December 2018 by the Delaware Supreme Court. Despite the unprecedented result, *Akorn* was decided consistent with the overriding principle found in past Delaware cases addressing this question; namely, that acquirors face a steep climb when seeking to invoke an MAE and that a court's judgment as to such an argument's merits will be based on a highly fact-intensive inquiry as well as the actual contractual language agreed to by the parties.

The *Akorn* case arose from the proposed acquisition of Akorn, Inc., a U.S.-based pharmaceutical company, by Fresenius Kabi AG, a German drug maker. The parties entered into a merger agreement in April 2017 that contained a "customary" MAE definition.⁴³⁵ However, within months, Akorn's "business performance fell off of a cliff," despite the fact that the company had reaffirmed its guidance for 2017 on the same day that the proposed transaction with Fresenius was announced.⁴³⁶ Eventually, Fresenius notified Akorn that it was terminating their agreement on several different grounds, including that Akorn's business had suffered an MAE.

While the Court ultimately agreed with Fresenius that Akorn had suffered an MAE, it was also careful to reiterate certain key aspects of preexisting MAE jurisprudence. For example, citing *IBP*, the Court reiterated that the burden of proving an MAE rests with the buyer and that an MAE must be a long-term effect rather than a short-term failure to meet earnings targets, stating that "[a] short-term hiccup in earnings should not suffice; rather the Material Adverse Effect should be material when viewed from the longer-term perspective of a reasonable acquiror."⁴³⁷ In other words, the effect on the business should "substantially threaten the overall earnings potential of the target in a durationally-significant manner."⁴³⁸ The Delaware Court of Chancery reaffirmed this principle in *Snow Phipps Group, LLC v. KCAKE Acquisition, Inc.* in 2021 in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, again citing the foregoing principle from *IBP*.⁴³⁹

It should be noted that the facts in *Akorn* were extreme. Parties should continue to assume that it will be exceptionally difficult to prove an MAE in court and thereby escape a deal that is no longer wanted. The Delaware courts have reinforced this principle following *Akorn*, including by rejecting claims in *Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp.* that the falsification of documents that were included in a key FDA approval application constituted an MAE, where the applicable approval was not delayed past the timing anticipated by the parties.⁴⁴⁰

Further, in addition to the difficulty in establishing that a MAE has occurred, parties seeking to invoke MAE clauses have also had difficulty overcoming the long list of exceptions that a typical MAE clause contains reflecting the risks that are allocated to the buyer. In *Genesco v. Finish Line*, the Tennessee Chancery Court in 2007 refused to excuse performance by Finish Line and UBS because the cause of Genesco’s downturn—general economic or industry conditions—had specifically been excluded from the definition of the MAE.⁴⁴¹ And in *AB Stable VIII LLC v. MAPS Hotels and Resorts One LLC*, the Delaware Court of Chancery in 2020 concluded that, even if the downturn in the target’s business resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic would have been sufficient to constitute a MAE, the downturn fell within a carveout to the MAE provision. Even though the cause of the company’s downturn (the Covid-19 pandemic) was not specifically excluded from the definition of the MAE, the Court held that it was captured by the exception for “calamities,” and the Court suggested (but did not hold) that it may be captured by natural disasters as well. The Court also rejected the buyer’s argument that other MAE exceptions, such as general changes in an industry, could not apply because the exceptions exclude only those consequences of specified root causes, finding that the “plain language” of the MAE “does not require a determination of the root cause of the effect.”⁴⁴²

As the Delaware Court of Chancery noted in *Akorn*, in today’s M&A market, public company targets have tended to negotiate long lists of factors—such as economic and industry developments (often to the extent they do not have a disproportionate impact on the adversely affected party)—that are excluded from the definition of an MAE.⁴⁴³ Given the decision in *AB Stable* as well as Delaware’s strong commitment to the freedom of counterparties to allocate risk without judicial interference, parties should carefully choose the language of such exceptions. And in light of the *Akorn* decision, targets should not expect that the acquiror’s knowledge of a risk prior to signing that later causes serious adverse consequences will preclude successfully asserting an MAE unless such an exception is expressly provided in the MAE definition.⁴⁴⁴

In 2022, Elon Musk attempted to walk away from his \$44 billion purchase of Twitter by seeking to terminate the deal by alleging, among other things, that Twitter’s spam accounts exceeded the number that Twitter had publicly disclosed, which he claimed constituted an MAE that should excuse his performance under the merger agreement. Twitter filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery seeking to force Musk to close the deal, and, following three months of high-profile discovery and pre-trial proceedings, Musk relented and the parties consummated the transaction on the originally agreed terms at the end of October 2022. The Twitter proceedings were a powerful reaffirmation of market expectations that buyers seeking to establish an MAE as a basis for terminating a transaction generally must satisfy a very high bar, and that the parties to Delaware merger agreements will be required to comply with their contractual obligations.

C. Ordinary Course Covenants

M&A agreements generally include covenants requiring the target to operate its business in the ordinary course until the closing of the acquisition—and the target’s compliance “in all material respects” with these covenants (similar to other covenants), is a condition to closing. Compared to MAE provisions, buyers have at times been more successful in escaping soured transactions based on claims that targets have failed to sufficiently comply with “ordinary course”

covenants. These covenants are relatively strictly applied, even in cases where the breach arises from circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable or within the control of the target.

In *Cooper Tire & Rubber Company v. Apollo (Mauritius) Holdings Pvt. Ltd.*, the Court of Chancery held that Cooper Tire had not complied with its ordinary course covenants during the pendency of a merger with Apollo when a labor union at one of Cooper Tire’s facilities went on strike in opposition to the merger announcement and Cooper Tire stopped payments to suppliers who continued to ship supplies during the strike.⁴⁴⁵ Similarly, in *AB Stable*, the Court of Chancery rejected a target’s arguments that extraordinary business measures it had taken in response to the pandemic, like temporarily closing hotels, complied with the “ordinary course” provision because they were reasonable under the extraordinary circumstances of the pandemic and did not result in an MAE.⁴⁴⁶ The Court instead held that, regardless of extraordinary circumstances, a target must operate per its routines and “breaches an ordinary course covenant by departing significantly from that routine,” absent the acquiror’s consent.⁴⁴⁷ The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the *AB Stable* ruling, noting that the covenant required the target’s compliance with the covenant to be measured against its own operational history since the covenant required operating in the ordinary course “consistent with past practice” and was not subject to a reasonableness qualifier.⁴⁴⁸

The *AB Stable* case is notable because it held that the ordinary course covenant had been breached by temporarily closing hotels during the Covid pandemic, even though the seller’s course of action arguably was driven by its conflicting obligations in the merger agreement to preserve the business and avoiding departures from the ordinary course. The ruling also allowed the buyer to use a covenant to escape for a reason—the pandemic—that the MAE condition carved out. In general, sellers should seek to subject the ordinary course covenant to an efforts qualifier, rather than having it operate as a “flat” obligation (as in *AB Stable*) and to avoid subjecting the ordinary course obligation to a “consistent with past practice” standard. Sellers should also be cognizant that even if a particular risk is carved out of the MAE definition, actions taken in response to that risk may nonetheless be a basis for a claim that the ordinary course covenant has been breached.

D. Committed Deal Structures and Remedies for Failure to Close

Traditionally, strategic buyers, with their substantial balance sheets, were expected to fully commit to the completion of a cash acquisition whereas financial sponsors, who often depended on borrowing a portion of the purchase price, negotiated for financing conditions that allowed the sponsor to exit the deal in the event that they were unable to obtain financing on the terms contemplated by the financing commitment papers executed at signing.

During the LBO boom of 2005 to 2007, however, sellers were able to negotiate a purportedly seller-friendly package of financing-related provisions from financial buyers that typically included:

No Financing Condition. The elimination of the financing condition left the buyer in breach in the event of a failure to obtain financing.

Reverse Termination Fee. The reverse termination fee required the buyer to pay a fee in the event the buyer failed to close due to an inability to obtain financing (expanded, in some

instances, to a failure to close for any reason). The reverse termination fee often was the seller's sole remedy in the event of a failure to close.

Denial of Specific Performance. The acquisition agreement would often provide that the seller could not obtain specific performance of the buyer's obligation to close, or could obtain such specific performance only in limited circumstances.

Limited Obligations of Financial Sponsor. Because the buyer entity that actually signed the acquisition agreement with the target typically was a shell, the private equity fund would often sign a limited guarantee of the buyer's obligation to pay the reverse termination fee. In addition, the fund typically would sign an equity commitment letter in favor of the buyer to cover the equity portion of the purchase price. This letter usually provided that the funds would become due only if a closing occurred and sometimes, but not always, provided third-party beneficiary rights to the target company.

Although originally intended to increase deal certainty for sellers, the net effect of these features was to create a transaction structure that, depending on the specific terms of the documentation, could resemble an option to buy the target, permitting the buyer to walk away for a fixed cost (*i.e.*, the reverse termination fee).

The financial crisis that began in 2007 put the paradigmatic private equity structure to the test as buyers (and in some cases, lenders) decided to walk away from, or renegotiate, signed deals that had not yet closed. Although many of the troubled deals were resolved consensually (including through price reductions and terminations) rather than through litigation, a number of situations went to court. For example, in *United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc.*, the Delaware Court of Chancery respected provisions denying specific performance and giving the buyer the right to terminate the deal upon payment of the reverse termination fee.⁴⁴⁹ In *Alliance Data Systems Corp. v. Blackstone Capital Partners V L.P.*, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the shell companies formed by a financial sponsor to effect the merger did not have a contractual obligation to cause the sponsor, which was not a party to the merger agreement, to do anything to obtain a regulatory approval that was a condition to the shell companies' obligations to close the merger.⁴⁵⁰ And in *James Cable, LLC v. Millennium Digital Media Systems, L.L.C.*, the Court rejected claims, including for tortious interference, against a financial sponsor arising out of its portfolio company's alleged breach of an asset purchase agreement, to which the sponsor was not a party, since the sponsor did not enter into a written agreement or any other enforceable promises to provide funding for the transaction.⁴⁵¹

These market and judicial developments have influenced private equity transaction structuring in recent decades. Many private equity transactions today chart a middle course, in which a reverse termination fee is payable upon a financing failure—which also generally serves as the seller's sole remedy—but the seller retains a limited specific performance right to require the closing to occur (including the ability to compel a draw-down of the equity financing) if the closing conditions are satisfied and the debt financing is available. The *Snow Phipps* decision discussed in Section V.B above clarified the seller's specific performance right by finding that the buyer's failure to use reasonable best efforts to obtain debt financing was a breach of the agreement, and the buyer was precluded from relying on the unavailability of debt financing to

avoid triggering the seller's right to specific performance.⁴⁵² In its ruling, the Delaware Court of Chancery applied the prevention doctrine, where the nonoccurrence of a condition (in this case, obtaining debt financing) is excused if a party's nonperformance (in this case, using reasonable best efforts to obtain the debt financing) violated contractual provisions and contributed materially to the nonoccurrence of the condition; therefore, the buyer could not rely on the failure of the debt financing condition being met to avoid specific performance, because its contractual breach contributed materially to the buyer's failure to obtain debt financing. In contrast to private equity deals, a majority of strategic transactions continue to employ the traditional "full remedies" model, in which the seller is expressly granted the full right to specific performance and there is no cap on damages against the buyer, which presumably has operating assets and is therefore putting its balance sheet behind its obligations.

Symmetry between target termination fees and reverse termination fees has become less common, with reverse termination fees often being higher because of the greater harm faced by a seller if a transaction does not close and because such fees are not limited by law as are sellers' termination fees. In addition to committing the buyer to pay a termination fee specifically in the event of a financing failure, acquisition agreements governing leveraged private equity transactions also typically obligate the buyer to use efforts to force lenders to fund committed financing, and, in a minority of cases, explicitly require the pursuit of litigation in furtherance of this goal. These are obligations of the buyer, because debt commitment letters usually do not allow targets to seek specific performance directly against lenders or name targets as third-party beneficiaries. Lenders have in most cases sought to include provisions directly in the acquisition agreement that limit or mitigate their own liability (commonly referred to as "Xerox provisions," having been introduced in the Xerox/ACS transaction). These provisions vary, but generally include: (1) requiring that any action against the lenders be governed by New York law; (2) requiring that the buyer and seller waive any right to a jury trial in any action against the lenders; and (3) making the lender a third-party beneficiary of these provisions. Thus, as in *Snow Phipps*, a buyer may have contractual obligations to pursue the funding of a debt commitment even if it prefers for business reasons that the transaction not be consummated.

E. Failure to Close

An important decision related to damages for failing to consummate a transaction is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision in *Consolidated Edison, Inc. v. Northeastern Utilities (Con Ed)*, which held that under New York law, lost shareholder premium could not be collected by the selling company or its shareholders (due to lack of standing) as damages for the buyer's alleged breach of an agreement that disclaimed third-party rights until after the "effective time" of the merger.⁴⁵³ The holding in *Con Ed*, which surprised many practitioners, threatened to potentially leave a target without an adequate remedy for a buyer's breach where specific performance is precluded by the merger agreement or otherwise unavailable. As a result, targets addressed *Con Ed* in various ways: by including language in merger agreements to the effect that damages for the buyer's breach should be calculated based on shareholder losses; by including language granting third-party beneficiary status to stockholders; by making the target company the agent for stockholder's recovery of lost premium; and by choosing Delaware (rather than New York) law to govern the merger agreement because, until recently, the issue had not been addressed under Delaware law.⁴⁵⁴

The Delaware Court of Chancery addressed this issue for the first time in 2023 in *Crispo v. Musk* and called into question whether and how provisions defining damages to include lost profits—not uncommon features in merger agreements attempting to solve for the *Con Ed* problem—might be enforced under Delaware law.⁴⁵⁵ *Crispo* suggested in *dicta* that such a provision could not be enforced by the target because the target company itself does not have the entitlement to receive merger consideration (including the premium), that target stockholders could not enforce such a provision because they lacked standing and that stockholders would be unable to enforce any such provisions (even if they had standing) so long as a claim for specific performance was still available.⁴⁵⁶ These conclusions, even in *dicta*, caused consternation among practitioners, and led to creative structuring designed to ensure target companies could collect so-called *Con Ed* damages. For example, in NuStar Energy L.P.’s \$7.3 billion sale to Sunoco LP in January 2024, NuStar’s general partner adopted an amendment to its limited partnership agreement appointing the general partner as the agent for collecting such damages on behalf of unitholders. In 2024, the Delaware legislature passed a new Section 261(a)(1) of the DGCL, which explicitly permits a merger agreement to provide for “such penalties and consequences as are set forth in the agreement of merger or consolidation,” including an obligation to pay “an amount representing, or based on the loss of, any premium or other economic entitlement the stockholders of such other party would be entitled to receive,” if the transaction had been consummated. Moreover, where a merger agreement expressly entitles a company to receive payment for lost premium from another party, the revised statute allows the company to enforce the other party’s payment obligation itself and does not obligate the company to distribute the payment to its stockholders. Since the *Crispo* decision and corresponding DGCL amendment, we have observed target companies more frequently negotiating for express entitlements to receive payments for lost premium.

F. Allocation of Regulatory Risk

In transactions that can be subject to meaningful regulatory review, the allocation of regulatory risk between the acquiror and the target is often a significant area of negotiation. There are various mechanisms available to allocate regulatory risk between parties.

1. Buyer’s Efforts Obligations

The efforts covenant is the most typical mechanism for allocating regulatory risk between parties. The agreement typically requires the parties to use their “reasonable best efforts” to obtain regulatory approvals.⁴⁵⁷ The covenant often further outlines the scope of the buyer’s obligations to take (or not to take) certain actions to obtain regulatory approvals—*e.g.*, agreeing to behavioral remedies, or agreeing to make divestitures, in many cases up to specific, negotiated limits. The regulatory efforts covenant may also outline what commitments the buyer will take in order to obtain CFIUS or other foreign direct investment approvals.

A “hell or high water” covenant provides the target the most deal certainty and requires the buyer to do whatever is necessary to obtain clearance, including making uncapped divestitures of either party’s assets. As a general matter, financial buyers are more likely than strategic buyers to agree to such strong commitments, in particular when they have no assets in their portfolio likely to create regulatory concerns. Recent examples of transactions with “hell or high water” covenants include Patient Square Capital’s \$2.6 billion acquisition of Premier and Blackstone’s and TPG’s

\$18 billion acquisition of Hologic (although in each transaction the buyer was not required to divest any assets of the fund’s portfolio companies, only those of the target). “Hell or high water” covenants are less common in strategic transactions, though Emerson Electric’s \$8.2 billion acquisition of National Instruments and AstraZeneca’s \$39 billion acquisition of Alexion are notable examples of strategic transaction with such a covenant.

On the other end of the spectrum, an affirmative statement that the buyer is not required to agree to any conduct restrictions or to make any divestitures provides the buyer the most protection, but provides the target little closing certainty if regulatory risk is present. A reverse termination fee, discussed below, may help provide the target additional protection even where the buyer affirmatively eschews divestitures. Amazon’s abandoned \$1.4 billion acquisition of iRobot is one such example, as is Prysmian’s completed \$4 billion acquisition of Encore Wire.

Most public transactions include efforts covenants that fall in between “hell-or-high water” and an affirmative statement that the buyer is not required to agree to any remedies. Often the buyer will commit to take all necessary actions to obtain regulatory approval, including divestitures or other remedies up to (but excluding) some materiality threshold, such as actions that would have a materially adverse effect on either the acquiror’s business or the target’s business (or, alternatively, on the combined businesses). Examples of transactions with a “material adverse effect” remedy threshold include Comerica/Fifth Third (measured against target), Global Payments/FIS (measured against the combined company, as if it were the same size as the target company) and Webster/Santander (measured both against the target and against the the combined company, as if it were the same size as the target company). If the buyer expects significant synergies from a transaction, it may prefer to specify that any remedies taken would not materially impair the expected benefits of the transaction—for example, in Palo Alto Networks’ \$25 billion acquisition of CyberArk, Palo Alto Networks was expressly not required to agree to remedies that would materially reduce the reasonably anticipated benefits to Palo Alto of the acquisition or, more bespoke, remedies that would impact either party in a manner or amount material relative to the value of the target company. The covenant may also specify that no remedies (or only more limited remedies) may apply to the acquiror’s business.

While common, using a “material adverse effect” threshold leaves some ambiguity as to the extent of the buyer’s obligations, and parties may instead prefer to use a specific revenue or EBITDA threshold to limit the divestiture obligation. One such example is Stryker’s \$4.6 billion acquisition of Inari Medical, which used a set revenue threshold (as calculated in a specified fiscal year) to cap Stryker’s divestiture obligation. Parties may also limit the divestiture obligation to specific assets defined in the transaction documentation. Unless the parties intend to offer a remedy to the regulators up-front—*i.e.*, as soon as, or shortly after, the deal announces—limiting remedies to specific assets may provide regulators a roadmap to what the parties perceive as the key regulatory issues and acceptable remedies, potentially increasing the likelihood a remedy is required. For example, in the NxStage/Fresenius transaction, Fresenius agreed to divest only defined assets. NxStage and Fresenius ultimately entered into a consent agreement with the FTC that involved the divestiture of certain NxStage’s assets.⁴⁵⁸

2. Control of Regulatory and Control of Regulatory Strategy and Litigation Commitment

The transaction agreement usually sets forth which party has the right to control the regulatory strategy. Typically the buyer has the right to control, with a good faith obligation to cooperate with the target and take the target's views under consideration. In addition, the target may have consent rights for certain key decisions that impact timing—such as entering into a timing agreement with the regulators, pulling and refileing the HSR Notification Form (restarting the HSR waiting period), or committing to a regulator not to close before a certain date. If the buyer has agreed to remedies—whether capped or uncapped—the transaction agreement will typically prohibit the target from agreeing to any remedies with the regulators without the buyer's prior written consent. In situations where the buyer has not agreed to any remedies, or where the transaction is structured as a merger of equals, both parties may jointly control the regulatory strategy. In joint-control situations, the transaction agreement will often clarify how the parties should resolve disagreements. The agreement will also typically clarify who is responsible for the costs of regulatory filings. Often the buyer is responsible for such costs, but occasionally the parties may agree to share the costs (especially if they have agreed to joint-control). The buyer may also agree to cover some or all of the target's regulatory compliance costs, especially if the parties anticipate an extended investigation.

Parties may also clarify in the agreement their obligations (or lack thereof) to defend the transaction through litigation if the deal is challenged in court by the government, including the extent to which one party can control the litigation strategy. Independent of the divestiture commitment, an obligation to litigate pressures the buyer to accept a remedy package that it might not otherwise agree to if it had the right to walk away. An affirmative statement that the buyer is not required to litigate may weaken the parties' leverage with regulators when attempting to resolve regulatory concerns.

A transaction's outside date can play an important role with respect to regulatory strategy and attendant commitments to litigate regulatory challenges. An outside date of less than 12-15 months is typically not long enough to litigate if the deal is challenged in court by regulators. In recent years, in an environment of heightened regulatory scrutiny and longer investigations (as described in Section I.D), outside dates of 15-18 months, and in some cases up to 24 months, were common in deals that raised potential significant antitrust issues. In the proposed Norfolk Southern/Union Pacific transaction announced July 28, 2025, the parties had a more than two-year outside date, although that is a result of the more bespoke regulatory review process required for railroad mergers, which are reviewed by the U.S. Surface Transportation Board rather than the FTC or DOJ.

3. Regulatory Reverse Termination Fees

The buyer may also agree to pay the target a set amount if the agreement is terminated for failure to obtain required regulatory approvals. Regulatory reverse termination fees typically range from 3–7% of the target's equity value. Since 2021, in public company transactions that had a reverse termination fee, the average fee was approximately six percent. The regulatory reverse termination fee may be part of a broader reverse termination fee to address financing risk,

discussed above, or may be separately negotiated. The regulatory reverse termination fee provides the target with compensation if the transaction does not close due to failure to obtain required regulatory approvals, and creates an incentive for the buyer to commit to remedies necessary to obtain clearance (even if not explicitly outlined in the efforts provision). Regulatory termination fees can be particularly useful in situations where there are no obvious remedies for the regulatory issues raised by the transaction, or where the buyer is unwilling to commit to remedies in the agreement. In Paramount Skydance's pending \$110 billion acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery, for example, Paramount Skydance agreed to pay a \$7 billion reverse break fee if the deal fails to win antitrust clearance, the largest ever regulatory termination fee. Other notable recent examples include Union Pacific's pending \$85 billion merger with Norfolk Southern where Union Pacific agreed to pay a \$2.5 billion reverse termination fee and Palo Alto Networks' \$25 billion acquisition of CyberArk where Palo Alto Networks agreed to pay a \$1 billion antitrust reverse termination fee. Parties occasionally also use ticking fees to address concerns regarding length of regulatory review. For example, Paramount agreed to pay an additional \$0.00277778 in cash for each day after September 30, 2026 that its acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery had not closed. In JetBlue's proposed acquisition of Spirit—which was ultimately mutually terminated after the merger was blocked in federal court on antitrust grounds—JetBlue agreed to a monthly prepayment of \$0.10 per Spirit share beginning approximately six months after the signing of the transaction. L3Harris's completed acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne included a ticking fee that was coupled with a reverse termination fee of 8.7% of equity value. Another flavor of a ticking fee is a reverse termination fee which increases in amount depending on the timing of the termination. This construct was utilized in Capri Holdings' terminated \$8.5 billion sale to Tapestry and in Microsoft's completed acquisition of Activision Blizzard.

Another alternative construct, which is also relatively rare, is a requirement that the acquiror agree to pay an advance on the termination fee prior to the termination of the transaction. For example, in NVIDIA's terminated \$40 billion acquisition of Arm from SoftBank, NVIDIA paid a \$1.25 billion termination fee to SoftBank in connection with signing of the deal, which amount was retained by SoftBank when the agreement was terminated for failure to obtain regulatory approvals.

Lastly, even where there is a reverse termination fee, a target may seek additional damages if it believes the buyer failed to meet its efforts obligations. After a federal judge blocked the Kroger/Albertsons transaction, Albertsons sued Kroger in the Delaware Court of Chancery alleging that Kroger failed to live up to its regulatory efforts obligations under the agreement and seeking damages beyond the agreed upon \$600 million reverse termination fee.⁴⁵⁹ The case ultimately was settled in August 2025. Parties will sometimes negotiate to expressly provide that the reverse termination fee serve as a cap on damages when paid.

VI.

Hostile M&A and Advance Takeover Preparedness

Hostile and unsolicited transactions have been an important part of the M&A market for decades. In 2025, hostile and unsolicited transactions accounted for \$367 billion of deal activity, or approximately 8% of global M&A activity, as compared to \$358 billion and 11%, respectively in 2024, and \$253 billion and 8%, respectively, in 2023. Advance takeover preparedness can improve a corporation's ability to deter coercive or inadequate bids or to secure a high premium in the event of a sale of control of the corporation. Where there are gaps in a company's takeover defenses, the board must balance the desire to foreclose vulnerabilities to unknown future threats against the risk of raising the company's profile with shareholder and governance activists that disfavor takeover defenses.

Advance preparation for defending against a harmful takeover may also be critical to the success of a preferred transaction supported by the board. As discussed in Section II, a decision to enter into a business combination transaction does not necessarily obligate a board to serve as auctioneer. For example, in the case of a merger or acquisition not involving the acquisition of control by a singular stockholder (e.g., an all-stock merger between two public companies resulting in a post-closing parent company with a disperse public stockholder base), the board generally retains the protection of the business judgment rule in pursuing its corporate strategy (such as staying the course with a chosen counterparty in the face of another unsolicited offer).⁴⁶⁰

Preparing to make a hostile bid also requires significant advance planning, as hostile deals present unique challenges for acquirors: bids generally must be made without access to non-public information about the target and historically a large percentage of public hostile or unsolicited bids have ultimately been withdrawn, with the target instead either remaining independent or being sold to a different buyer.

The following defenses should be carefully considered in connection with a company's takeover preparedness.

A. Rights Plans or "Poison Pills"

Rights plans, popularly known as "poison pills," are one of the most effective devices for deterring abusive takeover tactics and inadequate bids by hostile bidders. The rights plan is designed not to interfere with the day-to-day operations of the companies that adopt it. Rights plans do not interfere with negotiated transactions, nor do they preclude unsolicited takeovers. The evidence is clear, however, that rights plans *do* have the desired effect of forcing a would-be acquiror to engage with a target's board before acquiring shares in excess of the threshold level set forth in the applicable rights plan. In this regard, rights plans ultimately may enable a target's board to extract a higher acquisition premium from an acquiror or deter inadequate offers. Economic studies have concluded that, as a general matter, takeover premiums are higher for companies with rights plans in effect than for other companies and that a rights plan or similar protection increases a target's bargaining power. In addition, numerous studies have concluded that the negative impact, if any, of adoption of a rights plan on a company's stock price is not

statistically significant.⁴⁶¹ In 2023, National Instruments adopted a rights plan in response to a public, unsolicited proposal from Emerson, which had acquired about 2% of National Instruments' common stock in advance of launching its public bid. The rights plan gave National Instruments time and flexibility to resist Emerson's initial bid, and to conduct a strategic review. A number of interested parties ultimately participated in a competitive process, with Emerson agreeing to a price per share 25% higher than its initial offer.

Rights plans have long been the subject of active discussion and debate, and they continue to contribute significantly to the structure and outcome of major contests for corporate control. This debate has continued, even as many companies have allowed their rights plans to expire, have affirmatively terminated their rights plans, have modified their rights plans with watered-down protections or have agreed not to implement rights plans going forward absent shareholder approval or ratification within some period of time, generally one year from adoption.

ISS voting guidelines for 2026 provide that ISS will generally vote on a case-by-case basis on management proposals on rights plan ratification, focusing on features of the plan, which should contain: (i) no lower than a 20% trigger, (ii) a term of no more than three years, (iii) no dead hand, slow hand, no hand, or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill, and (iv) a shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause), *i.e.*, if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill. In addition, the rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. In examining the request for the pill, ISS takes into consideration the “company’s existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, and . . . any problematic governance concerns.”⁴⁶² In addition, ISS proxy voting policy guidelines provide that it will generally recommend an “against” or “withhold” vote for all board nominees (except new nominees (*i.e.*, directors who are being presented for election for the first time or who have served for less than one year), who are considered on a “case-by-case basis”⁴⁶³) if (x) the company “has a poison pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature” (which, as discussed below in Section VI.A.3, have been effectively foreclosed by Delaware case law), (y) the board “makes a material adverse modification to an existing pill, including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the trigger, without shareholder approval,” or (z) the company “has a long-term poison pill ([*i.e.*] with a term of over one year) that was not approved by the public shareholders.”⁴⁶⁴ Directors who adopt a rights plan with a term of one year or less without shareholder approval will be evaluated on a “case-by-case” basis, taking into account these factors: (i) the “trigger threshold and other terms of the pill;” (ii) the “disclosed rationale for the adoption;” (iii) the “context in which the pill was adopted (e.g., factors such as the company’s size and stage of development, sudden changes in its market capitalization and extraordinary industry-wide or macroeconomic events);” (iv) a “commitment to put any renewal to a shareholder vote;” (v) the “company’s overall track record on corporate governance and responsiveness to shareholders;” and (vi) “[o]ther factors as relevant.”⁴⁶⁵ ISS also has a general policy of recommending votes in favor of shareholder proposals calling for companies to submit their rights plans to shareholder votes or to redeem their rights plans, subject to certain limited exceptions for companies with existing shareholder-approved rights plans and rights plans adopted by the board in exercise of its fiduciary duties that will be put to a shareholder ratification vote or will expire within 12 months of adoption.⁴⁶⁶

Glass Lewis' policy guidelines for 2026 provide that rights plans are not generally in shareholders' best interests and Glass Lewis will typically recommend that shareholders vote against these plans. In certain limited circumstances, Glass Lewis supports a rights plan that is "limited in scope to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a [rights] plan that contains a reasonable qualifying offer clause" with all of these specified attributes: (i) the "form of offer is not required to be an all-cash transaction;" (ii) the "offer is not required to remain open for more than 90 business days;" (iii) the "offeror is permitted to amend the offer, reduce the offer, or otherwise change the terms;" (iv) "[t]here is no fairness opinion requirement;" and (v) "[t]here is a low to no premium requirement."⁴⁶⁷

Glass Lewis' policy is to recommend that shareholders vote against "[a]ll board members who served at a time when a poison pill with a term of longer than one year was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months."⁴⁶⁸ If it is a classified board and shareholders are unable to vote against all directors in the same year, Glass Lewis will "recommend voting against the remaining directors the next year they are up for a shareholder vote."⁴⁶⁹ If a poison pill "with a term of one year or less was adopted," or if the term of a poison pill was extended "by one year or less in two consecutive years," in each case, "without shareholder approval" and "without adequate justification," Glass Lewis will also "consider recommending that shareholders vote against all members of the governance committee" and "against the entire board," respectively.⁴⁷⁰

Rights plans are less common among large companies today than they were around the turn of the century, when approximately 60% of the S&P 500 had plans in effect, compared to less than 1% as of December 31, 2025. Trends in shareholder activism disfavoring rights plans, as well as the ability of a board to adopt a rights plan on short notice in response to a specific threat, have led to this marked decrease in their prevalence. But rights plans continue to be adopted by small-cap companies that feel vulnerable to opportunistic hostile bids or accumulations of shares, companies responding to unsolicited approaches or accumulations of shares, including by shareholder activists, and, as noted below, companies putting in place so-called "Section 382" rights plans. In addition, many companies have an up-to-date rights plan "on the shelf," which is ready to be quickly adopted if and when warranted.

A rights plan can also be used as a deal protection device in connection with the signing of a merger agreement. Rights plans in such cases may help protect a deal against hostile overbids in the form of a tender offer and could deter activist shareholder efforts to accumulate large numbers of shares and vote down a proposed merger. For example, in February 2019, after Entergis and Versum announced a merger-of-equals-style all-stock merger, and an interloper (Merck) made an all-cash bid for Versum that the Versum board found insufficient, Versum responded by adopting a 12.5% pill. Versum later redeemed this pill after Merck increased its bid to a level the Versum board found to be superior to the all-stock deal.

Despite the decreased prevalence of long-term rights plans, we continue to believe that rights plans—or at least a board's ability to adopt them rapidly when the need arises—remain a crucial component of an effective takeover defense and serve the best interests of shareholders. In particular, a rights plan can afford a target's board more time to formulate a thoughtful response

to an unsolicited bid. Accordingly, boards should generally endeavor to avoid situations where this ability could be lost or significantly curtailed.

Rights plans may also be used to protect a corporation's tax assets. Opportunistic investors who see attractive buying opportunities may present special risks to corporations with net operating losses ("NOLs"), "built-in" losses and other valuable tax assets. Accumulations of significant positions in such a corporation's stock could result in an "ownership change" for purposes of Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code (generally, a change in ownership by 5% shareholders aggregating more than 50 percentage points in any three-year period). If a company experiences such an ownership change, Section 382 generally limits the extent to which pre-change NOLs and "built-in" losses stemming from pre-change declines in value can be used to offset future taxable income. Boards of directors should evaluate the potential risks to these valuable corporate assets and consider possible actions to protect them. In the last five years, 47 U.S. companies with significant tax assets have adopted rights plans designed to deter a Section 382 ownership change.⁴⁷¹ Such rights plans typically incorporate a 4.9% threshold, deterring new shareholders from accumulating a stake of 5% or more, as well as deterring existing five-percent shareholders from increasing their stake in a way that could lead to a Section 382 ownership change. ISS recognizes the unique features of such a rights plan and will consider, on a case-by-case basis (despite the low threshold of such plans), management proposals to adopt them based on certain factors—including, among others, the threshold trigger, the value of the tax assets, other shareholder protection mechanisms and the company's governance structure and responsiveness to shareholders. ISS will oppose any management proposal relating to a Section 382 pill if it has a term that would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOLs.⁴⁷² In 2023, Southwest Gas adopted a rights plan, in respect of different corporate tax considerations, with a 4.9% trigger and the stated goal of preventing an acquisition of a "50 percent or greater interest" in Southwest Gas pursuant to a "plan" (within the meaning of Section 355(e) of the Internal Revenue Code) that includes the planned spin-off of its Centuri business. If Section 355(e) of the Internal Revenue Code were to apply to such spin-off, the distribution would be taxable to Southwest Gas.

Hedge funds and other shareholder activists have in the past used equity swaps and other derivatives to acquire substantial economic interests in a company's shares without the voting or investment power required to have "beneficial ownership" for disclosure purposes under the federal securities laws, though amendments to Schedule 13D discussed in Section VI.F.3 below narrow the ability to conceal such interests. Rights plans can be drafted to cover equity swaps and other derivatives so as to limit the ability of hedge funds to use these devices to facilitate change-of-control efforts, although careful consideration should be given as to whether and how to draft a rights plan in this manner.

1. The Basic Design

The issuance of share purchase rights has no effect on the capital structure of the issuing company. If an acquiror takes action that triggers the rights, however, dramatic changes in the capital structure of the target company can result. The key feature of a rights plan is the "flip-in" provision of the rights, the effect of which is to impose unacceptable levels of dilution on an acquiror in specified circumstances. The risk of dilution, combined with the authority of a target's

board to redeem the rights prior to a triggering event (generally an acquisition of between 10% and 20% of the target's stock, or 5% in the case of a Section 382 rights plan), gives a potential acquiror a powerful incentive to negotiate with the target's board rather than proceeding unilaterally.

A rights plan should also provide that, once the triggering threshold is crossed, the target's board may exchange, in whole or in part, each right held by holders other than the acquiror (whose rights are voided upon triggering the plan) for one share of the target's common stock. This provision avoids the expense of requiring rights holders to exercise their flip-in rights, eliminates any uncertainty as to whether individual holders will in fact exercise the rights and produce the intended dilution, and provides the board additional flexibility in responding to a triggering event. The exchange provision was used by the board of directors of Selectica when that pill was triggered by Trilogy in January 2009, and upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court in October 2010 in response to Trilogy's challenge of that pill.⁴⁷³ In cases where the acquiring person holds less than 50% of a target's stock, the dilution caused by implementation of the exchange feature is substantial and can be roughly comparable to the dilution that would be caused by the flip-in provision, assuming all eligible rights holders exercise their rights.

Some companies have adopted rights plans that do not apply to a cash offer for all of the outstanding shares of the company (referred to as "qualifying offer" exceptions). More recent versions of this exception have limited its scope to cash offers containing a specified premium over the market price of the target's stock. As discussed in the next subsection, an approach some companies have taken is to adopt rights plans with bifurcated triggers (*e.g.*, a higher trigger for Schedule 13G filers (*i.e.*, passive investors) and a lower trigger for Schedule 13D filers) to allow their large, long-term institutional investors to continue to accumulate shares even during an activist situation, while placing a lower ceiling on potential "creeping control" by activists.

2. Basic Case Law Regarding Rights Plans

Rights plans, properly drafted to comply with state law and a company's charter, typically survive judicial challenge.⁴⁷⁴ Furthermore, courts have recognized rights plans as important tools available to boards to protect the interests of a corporation.⁴⁷⁵

One of the most debated issues concerning rights plans focused on whether a board should be required to redeem the rights plan in response to a particular bid. In this respect, courts applying Delaware law have upheld, or refused to enjoin, determinations by boards not to redeem rights in response to two-tier offers, or inadequate 100% cash offers,⁴⁷⁶ as well as to protect an auction or permit a target to explore alternatives.⁴⁷⁷

In a landmark decision in February 2011, the Delaware Court of Chancery reaffirmed the ability of a board of directors, acting in good faith and in accordance with their fiduciary duties, to maintain a poison pill in response to an inadequate all-cash, all-shares tender offer.⁴⁷⁸ Chancellor Chandler's decision in *Airgas* reaffirmed the vitality of the pill and upheld the primacy of the board of directors in matters of corporate control, even after the target company with a staggered board had lost a proxy fight for one-third of the board. The decision reinforces that directors may act to protect the corporation, and all of its shareholders, against the threat of inadequate tender offers,

including the special danger that arises when raiders induce large purchases of shares by arbitrageurs who are focused on a short-term trading profit, and are uninterested in building long-term stockholder value. Essentially, the Court held that a well-informed, independent board may keep the pill in place so long as it has a good faith and reasonable basis for believing the bid undervalues the shareholders' interest in the company. The Court stated that it is up to directors, not raiders or short-term speculators, to decide whether a company should be sold. The board's—and the Court's—decisions were vindicated four years later, when, in 2015, Airgas agreed to be sold to Air Liquide at a price of \$143 per share in cash, more than double Air Products' final \$70 offer, before considering the more than \$9 per share of dividends received by Airgas shareholders in the intervening years. Notably, in an important footnote, the Court urged the Supreme Court to make clear that a well-motivated board that reasonably believes a takeover offer is too low may use a pill to block the bid and require the bidder to convince stockholders to elect a new board that shares its view that the bid is good for the company's stockholders.⁴⁷⁹

A second contested issue concerning rights plans had been whether they may be adopted to prevent accumulations of ownership outside of the context of an outright bid for the company. On this point, the Delaware Court of Chancery has made it clear that the board may act in response to legitimate threats posed by large stockholders. For instance, the adoption of a rights plan to deter acquisitions of substantial stock positions was upheld by the Delaware Court of Chancery in a case involving Ronald Burkle's acquisition of almost 18% of Barnes & Noble.⁴⁸⁰ Then-Vice Chancellor Strine held that the company's adoption of a rights plan with a 20% threshold that grandfathered the founding family's approximately 30% stake was a "reasonable, non-preclusive action to ensure that an activist investor like [Burkle] did not amass, either singularly or in concert with another large stockholder, an effective control bloc that would allow it to make proposals under conditions in which it wielded great leverage to seek advantage for itself at the expense of other investors."⁴⁸¹ In the Barnes & Noble case, the Court upheld the rights plan's prohibitions on "acting in concert" for purposes of a proxy contest and noted that the key question was whether the rights plan "fundamentally restricts" a successful proxy contest. In defining the behavior that might trigger a rights plan, the Court seemed to suggest that triggers should be based on the well-recognized definition of beneficial ownership in Section 13D of the Exchange Act. But this is an unsettled point of law and, in appropriate circumstances, companies are well-advised to consider adopting rights plans that include aggregations of voting or economic interests through synthetic derivatives, which decouple the traditional bundle of rights associated with outright common stock ownership. That said, in a July 2020 bench ruling in *In re Versum Materials, Inc. Stockholder Litigation*, a mootness case, Vice Chancellor Laster awarded the plaintiff \$12 million in fees and noted his concerns with the "truly expansive" "acting in concert" clause in question.⁴⁸²

Additionally, in 2014, the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld a rights plan adopted by the Sotheby's board of directors in response to a rapid accumulation of its stock by activist investor Third Point and other short-term speculators. Notably, the plan adopted by the Sotheby's board had a two-tier trigger structure (setting a 20% trigger for 13G filers and a 10% trigger for 13D filers). Third Point claimed that the "primary purpose" of the board's refusal to waive the lower trigger was to prevent Third Point from prevailing in a proxy context, that the rights plan was "disproportionate" to the threat that Third Point's slate of nominees posed, and that the rights plan was discriminatory because it was allegedly designed to favor the incumbent board. In *Third Point v. Ruprecht*, the Delaware Court of Chancery found sufficient evidence that the threat of

“creeping control” posed by a hedge fund group led by Third Point created a legitimate, objectively reasonable threat and that the adoption of the rights plan was likely a proportionate response to collusive action by a group of hedge funds. In addition, the Court recognized that the board’s refusal to waive the lower trigger was reasonable because Third Point still posed a threat of effective negative control—the ability to “exercise influence sufficient to control certain important corporate actions, such as executive recruitment, despite a lack of actual control or an explicit veto power.”⁴⁸³ Though a very fact-specific decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery’s ruling confirms not only the versatility of the rights plan, but also that activist investors seeking to control the strategic direction of the company can pose a threat against which boards may properly take defensive action.

Rights plans have also been upheld outside of the corporate control context. As noted above, in *Versata Enterprises, Inc. v. Selectica, Inc.*, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected a *Unocal* challenge to the use of a “Section 382” rights plan with a 4.99% trigger designed to protect a company’s NOLs, even when the challenger had exceeded the threshold and suffered the pill’s dilutive effect.⁴⁸⁴ First, the Court concluded that the board had reasonably identified the potential impairment of the NOLs as a threat to Selectica. Second, the Court held that the 4.99% rights plan was not preclusive. Explaining that a defensive measure cannot be preclusive unless it “render[s] a successful proxy contest realistically unattainable given the specific factual context,” the Court credited expert testimony that challengers with under 5% ownership routinely ran successful proxy contests for micro-cap companies. The Court sharply rejected Trilogy’s contention that Selectica’s full battery of defenses was collectively preclusive, holding that “the combination of a classified board and a Rights Plan do[es] not constitute a preclusive defense”—a holding that was important to the Delaware Court of Chancery’s reasoning in *Airgas*, discussed above. The Court held that the adoption, deployment and reloading of the 4.99% pill was a proportionate response to the threat posed to Selectica’s tax assets by Trilogy’s acquisitions.

Directors should remain mindful that poison pills are “situationally specific defenses” that ought to be adopted with “an appropriate culture of caution in the board room.”⁴⁸⁵ For example, in *The Williams Companies Stockholder Litigation*, the Delaware Court of Chancery enjoined a rights plan adopted by The Williams Companies, Inc. in response to Covid-19-related market disruption. The rights plan had “a more extreme combination of features than any pill previously evaluated” by the Delaware Court of Chancery: a 5% ownership trigger (including both beneficial and derivative ownership interests), an expansive definition of “acting in concert” that would capture parallel conduct, and a too limited “passive investor” exception.⁴⁸⁶ At the time of adopting the rights plan, the board had not identified any specific activist threat but was instead “acting preemptively to interdict hypothetical future threats.”⁴⁸⁷ As this decision shows, overbroad plans, not adequately tethered to cognizable challenges to corporate policy, are legally vulnerable. But this decision does not jeopardize tailored plans, adopted on a deliberate record, which remain a key tool for boards looking to defend long-term corporate policy and value.

3. “Dead Hand” Pills

When a board rejects an unsolicited bid and refuses to redeem its poison pill, a tactic of choice for the bidder may be to combine a tender offer with a solicitation of proxies or consents to replace a target’s board with directors committed to considering the dismantling of a rights plan to

permit the tender offer to proceed. The speed with which this objective can be accomplished depends, in large part, upon the target's charter and bylaws and any other defenses that the target has in place. In Delaware, shareholders can act by written consent without a meeting of shareholders unless the certificate of incorporation prohibits such action, and can call a special meeting between annual meetings if permitted under a target's certificate of incorporation and bylaws.

Some companies without staggered boards have adopted rights plans redeemable only by vote of the continuing directors on the board (*i.e.*, the incumbent directors or successors chosen by them)—a so-called “dead hand” pill. This prevents an unwanted acquiror from ousting a majority of the incumbent directors and having the newly elected directors amend or redeem the pill to allow for the acquisition. Variations of this concept come in a variety of forms. These include so-called “nonredemption” or “no hand” provisions, which typically provide that the board cannot redeem the rights plan once the continuing directors no longer constitute a majority of the board, or “limited duration,” “delayed redemption” or “slow hand” provisions, which prevent a poison pill from being amended or redeemed for a specified period of time, typically starting after the continuing directors no longer constitute a majority of the board. The use of dead hand, slow hand, and no hand provisions was effectively foreclosed by Delaware case law over 20 years ago, although courts in Georgia and Pennsylvania have upheld their validity.⁴⁸⁸ Some rights plans adopted during the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic included dead hand or slow hand features in their short-term pills. As noted above, ISS views the inclusion of such a feature in a poison pill (of either a short-term or long-term duration) as a basis for an adverse director recommendation, even if the dead hand or slow hand feature is enacted but expires before the next stockholder vote.

B. Staggered Boards

Section 141(d) of the DGCL allows a corporation's certificate of incorporation or bylaws to divide a board into one, two or three classes of directors that serve staggered terms—a so-called “staggered” or “classified” board. Where a target's charter does not prohibit action by written consent, the target does not have a staggered board and shareholders can fill board vacancies, a bidder for a Delaware corporation generally can launch a combined tender offer/consent solicitation and take over the target's board as soon as consents from the holders of more than 50% of the outstanding shares are obtained. Even if the target's charter prohibits action by written consent and precludes shareholders from calling a special meeting, a target without a staggered board can essentially be taken over in under a year by launching a combined tender offer/proxy fight shortly before the deadline to nominate directors at the target's annual meeting.⁴⁸⁹ In contrast, a target with a staggered board may be able to resist a takeover unless a bidder successfully wages a proxy fight over at least two consecutive annual meetings—a point well-illustrated by Airgas' ultimately successful takeover defense described in Section VI.A.2 above notwithstanding a successful proxy fight by Air Products to elect its nominees for one-third of the Airgas board. The *Airgas* case also illustrates the importance of board deliberations in protecting stockholders. After receiving full information and financial advice as directors, the newly elected directors seated as a result of Air Product's successful proxy fight came to their own fiduciary conclusion that Air Products' offer was inadequate and joined the incumbent directors in using the rights plan to oppose it.

Accordingly, where available, a staggered board continues to be a critical component of an effective takeover defense strategy. Nevertheless, at year-end 2025, approximately 90% of S&P 500 companies did not have staggered boards, and it would be practically infeasible for these companies to classify their boards if a takeover threat materialized because stockholder approval would generally be required to implement a classification.

Hostile bidders can be expected to be creative in attempting to circumvent a staggered board provision and to find any hole in a target's defenses. For example, Air Products tried to reduce the effectiveness of Airgas' staggered board in connection with its 2010 hostile bid. In addition to nominating a slate of three directors to be elected to the Airgas board at the Airgas annual meeting in September 2010, Air Products proposed a bylaw amendment that would accelerate the 2011 Airgas annual meeting to January 2011. Airgas' charter—like the charter provisions of a majority of major Delaware corporations with staggered boards—provided that directors will “be elected to hold office for a term expiring at the annual meeting of stockholders held in the third year following the year of their election.” The bylaw amendment was approved by Airgas shareholders, a substantial portion of which were arbitrageurs. Reversing the Delaware Court of Chancery, the Delaware Supreme Court unanimously held that directors on staggered boards were elected to three-year terms and that the bylaw constituted a *de facto* removal of directors in a manner inconsistent with the Airgas charter.⁴⁹⁰ Under Delaware law, directors on a staggered board can be removed only for cause, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise.⁴⁹¹ Activists have also attempted to circumvent staggered board provisions using novel legal tactics, such as when Elliott submitted a shareholder proposal at Phillips 66 that would require directors to tender their resignations and stand for election annually. The Company argued that if implemented, such a proposal would violate its charter, as it would *de facto* destagger the board without obtaining the appropriate shareholder approval to do so. Shareholders rejected Elliott's proposal by a wide margin, including those institutional shareholders who typically vote in favor of declassification proposals, but hostile bidders and activists may continue to push a version of this idea in the future.

C. Other Defensive Charter and Bylaw Provisions

Defensive charter and bylaw provisions typically do not purport to, and will not, prevent a hostile acquisition. Rather, they provide some measure of protection against certain takeover tactics and allow a board additional negotiating leverage, as well as the opportunity to respond appropriately to proxy and consent solicitations. Defensive charter provisions (in addition to staggered board provisions) include: (1) provisions that eliminate or limit stockholder action by written consent or the right of shareholders to call a special meeting; (2) provisions limiting the ability of shareholders to alter the size of a board or to fill vacancies on the board; (3) “business combination” provisions (which typically provide for supermajority voting in a wide range of business combinations not approved by the company's continuing directors, if the transaction does not meet certain substantive requirements); and “fair price” provisions (which require that shareholders receive equivalent consideration at both ends of a two-step bid, thus deterring coercive two-tier, front-end-loaded offers).

Because certain defenses (such as the elimination of the ability of shareholders to act by written consent) may only be implemented via the certificate of incorporation in the case of

Delaware corporations and therefore require stockholder approval, and due to general institutional investor opposition to such provisions, few companies have put forth new proposals for such provisions in recent years. But bylaws generally can be amended without stockholder approval and can be used to implement some of the structural defenses found in charters, although such defenses, if placed only in the bylaws, would be subject to further amendment by shareholders. Bylaws, as discussed in more detail below, often contain defensive provisions in addition to those found in corporate charters, including: advance notice provisions relating to stockholder business and director nomination proposals, provisions that address the subject matters that may properly be brought before stockholder meetings and provisions establishing director eligibility standards. Bylaw provisions regarding the business to be conducted at, and the manner of presenting proposals for, annual and special meetings, as well as procedures for stockholder action by written consent (for companies that have not eliminated action by written consent in their charter), are helpful in protecting against an unexpected proxy or consent contest for control of the board of directors and can be adopted by a board without stockholder approval. State-of-the-art bylaw procedures can be extremely important in the context of a combined tender offer/proxy contest and in light of the risks of proxy fights and consent solicitations launched by shareholder activists. Such procedures help to ensure that boards have an appropriate period of time to respond in an informed and meaningful manner to stockholder concerns and to prepare and obtain SEC clearance of any related proxy statement disclosure, and when combined with restrictions on the ability of shareholders to call a special meeting or act by written consent, constrain the timing of when a proxy contest can be launched.

ISS has adopted voting guidelines to address bylaws adopted unilaterally without a stockholder vote. ISS will generally recommend that stockholders vote against or withhold votes from directors individually, committee members or the entire board (except new nominees who should be considered case-by-case) if the board “amends the company’s bylaws or charter without stockholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders’ rights or that could adversely impact shareholders,” considering specified factors (such as the “board’s rationale”; “[d]isclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment”; the “level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s unilateral amendment”; the “board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action”; the “company’s ownership structure”; the “company’s existing governance provisions;” and the timing of the amendment “in connection with a significant business development,” among others).⁴⁹² Unless the action is reversed or submitted to a binding stockholder vote, ISS will make voting recommendations on a case-by-case basis on director nominees in subsequent years, and will generally recommend voting against if the directors “classified the board”; “[a]dopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter”; “[e]liminated shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws”; “[a]dopted a fee shifting provision”; or “[a]dopted another provision deemed egregious.”⁴⁹³

Companies should review their bylaws on a regular basis to ensure that they are up to date and consistent with recent case law and SEC developments, and to determine whether modifications may be advisable. The most significant of these bylaw provisions are discussed in detail below.

1. Advance Notice of Nominations and Shareholder Business

These bylaw provisions require shareholders to provide advance notice of business proposed to be brought before, and of nominations of directors to be made at, shareholder meetings, and have become common. These provisions generally set a date by which a shareholder must advise the corporation of the shareholder's intent to seek to take action at a meeting (usually a minimum of 90 to 120 days in advance of the anniversary of the prior year's annual meeting) and fix the contents of the notice, which can include information such as beneficial stock ownership and other information required by Regulation 14A of the federal proxy rules. Failure to deliver proper notice in a timely fashion usually results in exclusion of the proposal from shareholder consideration at the meeting. Bylaw provisions may also require nominees to respond to a questionnaire providing information about the candidate's background and qualifications, address agreements the candidate may have with third parties as to voting or compensation in connection with the candidate's service as a director and other arrangements the candidate may have with the nominating shareholder, and require that the nominee abide by applicable confidentiality, governance, conflicts, stock ownership, trading and other policies of the company. The questionnaires are a useful way for boards of companies that have eligibility requirements for director nominations in their bylaws to have sufficient information to make ineligibility determinations where they are warranted. In light of recent activity by hedge funds and others, companies may also decide to ask for disclosure of derivative and short positions, rather than limit such disclosure to the traditional category of voting securities.

Although the validity of advance notice bylaws has been established in many court decisions, such provisions are not immune from legal challenge. In 2012, for example, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to expedite a claim brought by Carl Icahn alleging that the directors of Amylin Pharmaceuticals had breached their fiduciary duties by enforcing the company's advance notice bylaw provision and refusing to grant Mr. Icahn a waiver to make a nomination following the company's rejection of a third-party merger proposal after the advance notice deadline.⁴⁹⁴ In December 2014, however, the Delaware Court of Chancery alleviated some of the concerns raised by the *Amylin* decision. The Court clarified that, in order to enjoin enforcement of an advance notice provision, a plaintiff must allege "compelling facts" indicating that enforcement of the advance notice provision was inequitable (such as the board taking an action that resulted in a "radical" change between the advance notice deadline and the annual meeting).⁴⁹⁵ Consistent with this decision, in August 2017, Automatic Data Processing refused to accede to Pershing Square's request to extend the advance notice deadline for director nominations so that Pershing Square could have additional time to determine the nominees for its dissident slate. While Delaware law does not call into question the permissibility or appropriateness of advance notice bylaws as to director nominations, shareholder business or other matters, they show that the applicability of such bylaws to *all* shareholder nominations and proposals should be made explicit and that enforcement of such bylaws should be equitable.

In an important decision in January 2020, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the right of a company responding to a shareholder proposal or nomination to insist on strict adherence to the requirements, including deadlines, unambiguously specified in advance notice bylaws, "particularly one that had been adopted on a 'clear day.'"⁴⁹⁶ As recently as October 2021, the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld a board's use of an advance notice bylaw to reject a dissident

slate from running a proxy fight, again reaffirming that Delaware courts will uphold reasonable advance notice bylaws and the enforcement of those bylaws by incumbent boards.⁴⁹⁷ In the context of a contested election, companies should carefully review nominations and submissions for compliance and accuracy, consider appropriate action to enforce bylaw requirements and insist that nominating stockholders and their nominees complete appropriate questionnaires and submit timely, accurate and complete answers to followup inquiries where permitted. An orderly and transparent process, ensuring that the board has all of the information it needs to make an informed recommendation to stockholders, and that investors are apprised of the eligibility and suitability of dissident candidates, benefits the company and all shareholders.

Nevertheless, advance notice bylaws adopted in the face of an imminent proxy fight or that impose onerous requirements on shareholder nominees face greater judicial scrutiny. As the Delaware Court of Chancery has noted, “[t]he clearest set of cases providing support for enjoining an advance notice bylaw involves a scenario where a board, aware of an imminent proxy contest, imposes or applies an advance notice bylaw so as to make compliance impossible or extremely difficult, thereby thwarting the challenger entirely.”⁴⁹⁸ For example, following Politan Capital Management’s disclosure of an 8.4% stake in Masimo Corporation in August 2022, Masimo adopted advance notice bylaws that required the nominating shareholder to disclose, among other things, the identity of and other information regarding all limited partners who hold 5% or more of the nominating stockholder and any investor in a co-investment “sidecar vehicle,” investment holdings of family members of covered persons (which includes 5% or greater limited partners) and any plans of the nominating stockholder or any person acting in concert with such stockholder to nominate directors at any other public company in the next 12 months. After Politan challenged the bylaws in the Delaware Court of Chancery, Masimo amended its bylaws to remove the challenged provisions, which resulted in the court awarding Politan a mootness fee of \$18 million. Masimo’s stockholders also elected two Politan-nominated director candidates at the 2023 annual meeting, and, after another proxy fight the following year, Masimo’s stockholders elected two more Politan-nominated director candidates at the 2024 annual meeting. The Delaware Court of Chancery also recently had invalidated four provisions in an advance notice bylaw in *Kellner v. AIM ImmunoTech Inc.* because they were adopted on a “cloudy day” (*i.e.*, adopted, amended or enforced during an ongoing proxy contest), which demanded a higher level of scrutiny.⁴⁹⁹ On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified that there are two standards of review potentially applicable when reviewing the adoption of advance notice bylaws: (i) review of a facial challenge, in which bylaws are presumed to be valid and for which a plaintiff must show “that the bylaw cannot operate lawfully under any set of circumstances,”⁵⁰⁰ and (ii) an enhanced scrutiny standard to be applied when the bylaws are adopted or amended on a “cloudy day.”⁵⁰¹ The cloudy-day standard requires that the board show that it (a) “faced a threat to an important corporate interest” and (b) responded in way that was not “preclusive or coercive to the stockholder franchise” and “reasonable in relation to the threat posted.”⁵⁰² The Court agreed with the lower court that one provision, which was a “1,099-word single-sentence” and “indecipherable,” was facially invalid and that the other three were facially valid, but inequitable and unenforceable under enhanced scrutiny; nevertheless, the Court upheld the lower court’s rejection of the dissident nomination for failing to comply with other advance notice bylaws.⁵⁰³

To the extent companies are considering updates to their advance notice bylaws, such amendments should be unambiguous and reasonably serve to provide the company and

shareholders with relevant information. Bylaw updates adopted on a “clear day” will receive greater judicial and shareholder deference than changes adopted amid a proxy contest, and should be considered when an opportune period presents itself.

2. Regulation of Shareholder Meetings

Provisions regarding the regulation of meetings play an important role in controlling the timing and frequency of meetings. If, as in Delaware, shareholders can be denied the right to call special meetings,⁵⁰⁴ such a bylaw provision (paired with a restriction on actions by written consent) can delay potential proxy contests to the annual meeting. Where state law does not so permit, corporations should also consider adopting bylaw provisions that regulate the ability of shareholders to call special meetings.

Some bylaws specify a particular date or month for an annual meeting. Such provisions should be amended to provide more flexibility and discretion to the board to set an annual meeting date. A board should be authorized to postpone previously scheduled annual meetings upon public notice given before the scheduled annual meeting date. Section 211 of the DGCL, however, provides that if an annual meeting is not held for thirteen months, the Delaware Court of Chancery may summarily order a meeting to be held upon the application of any stockholder.⁵⁰⁵

The chairperson of the shareholder meeting should be specifically authorized to adjourn or postpone the meeting from time to time regardless of whether a quorum is present. Adjournments and postponements may help prevent premature consideration of a coercive or inadequate bid. The chair should also have express and full authority to control the meeting process, including the ability to require ballots by written consent, select inspectors of elections, and determine whether proposals and/or nominations were properly brought before the meeting.

As a matter of good planning, companies should also be alert to timing issues when undertaking friendly transactions. For instance, if a transaction is signed close in time to an upcoming annual meeting, management may consider putting the merger-related proposals on the agenda of the annual meeting rather than calling a special meeting. However, if an annual meeting must be materially delayed past the one-year anniversary of the prior year’s meeting (*e.g.*, due to an extended SEC comment process in connection with the merger proxy), under many standard notice bylaws, a later deadline for valid submissions of shareholder proposals may be triggered. Once triggered, this could enable a potential interloper to run a proxy contest or otherwise interfere with the shareholder vote or otherwise provide potential activists with a second bite at the nomination window. In many cases, the special meeting approach will be the right choice.

3. Vote Required

To approve a proposal, except for the election of directors (which requires a plurality of the quorum if a company has not adopted a bylaw providing for majority voting), generally the required shareholder vote should not be less than a majority of the shares present and entitled to vote at the meeting (*i.e.*, abstentions should count as “no” votes for shareholder resolutions). For Delaware corporations, Section 216 of the DGCL dictates this result unless the charter or bylaws specify otherwise.⁵⁰⁶ For certain proposals, such as mergers, the DGCL requires a majority of the outstanding shares to approve a proposal. Although as of December 31, 2025, only 82 companies

in the S&P 500 require supermajority approval for mergers, potential acquirors are well advised to review a target's charter and bylaws and the laws of the target's jurisdiction of incorporation to determine whether they contain any relevant provisions that require supermajority stockholder approval.

4. Action by Written Consent

If the corporation's charter does not disallow action by stockholder consent in lieu of a meeting, the bylaws should establish procedures for specifying the record date for the consent process, for the inspection of consents and for the effective time of consents. Delaware courts have closely reviewed procedures unilaterally imposed by a board with respect to the consent process to determine whether their real purpose is to delay and whether the procedures are unreasonable.⁵⁰⁷ Delaware courts have rejected various limitations and procedures established without stockholder approval, including minimum periods of time that a consent solicitation must stay open before a consent action taking effect, permitted time frames for taking such action and the ability of a company to deem a consent action ineffective if legal proceedings have been commenced questioning the validity of such action.⁵⁰⁸

5. Board-Adopted Bylaw Amendments

Although advance takeover preparedness is optimal, it may in some cases be appropriate to act in the face of a takeover threat. Delaware courts have affirmed a board's ability to adopt reasonable bylaw amendments in response to a hostile offer, but such amendments may be subject to heightened scrutiny, as discussed in Section II.D.2.a. The most common forms of such after-the-fact defensive bylaws change the size of the board or change the date of a stockholder meeting in the face of a proxy contest. In a series of decisions, the Delaware courts have generally accepted that boards can delay stockholder meetings (by bylaw amendment or adjournment) where there is "new information" or a change in position by the board, though change of board size may not survive enhanced scrutiny.⁵⁰⁹ For example, in 2016, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued an injunction against a plan adopted by a board of directors that would have reduced the number of directors up for election at the annual meeting in the face of the threat of a proxy contest even though the company's certificate of incorporation authorized the board to increase or decrease the number of seats on the board.⁵¹⁰

In addition to heightened legal scrutiny, boards may face countermeasures from activists aimed at neutralizing defensive bylaw amendments adopted in the shadow of a proxy contest. Activists could, and often do, submit shareholder proposals that provide for the automatic repeal of any board-adopted bylaw amendments enacted after the submission of the activist's slate. These proposals are designed to undo "self-help" measures by allowing shareholders to directly invalidate after-the-fact bylaw changes through the company's own processes.

6. Forum Selection Provisions

In the past decade, many companies have adopted forum selection provisions to help reign in the cost of multiforum shareholder litigation. These forum selection provisions generally cover derivative lawsuits, actions asserting breaches of fiduciary duty, actions arising from the state of

incorporation's business code, and actions asserting claims governed by the internal affairs doctrine.

In *Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.*,⁵¹¹ the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld the validity of forum selection bylaws as a matter of Delaware law. In that case, shareholders of Chevron and FedEx challenged: (1) whether bylaws could regulate the venue for stockholder corporate and derivative litigation as a matter of Delaware law; (2) whether the unilateral adoption of forum selection bylaws by a board of directors was a breach of the board's fiduciary duties; and (3) whether such bylaws could bind shareholders. The Court ultimately concluded that forum selection bylaws were facially valid under the DGCL and that a board's unilateral adoption of bylaws did not render them contractually invalid. The Court noted that Section 109(b) of the DGCL permits the bylaws to "contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees."⁵¹² On the question of the board's fiduciary duties, the Court held that "[j]ust as the board of Household was permitted to adopt the pill to address a future tender offer that might threaten the corporation's best interests, so too do the boards of Chevron and FedEx have the statutory authority to adopt a bylaw to protect against what they claim is a threat to their corporations and stockholders, the potential for duplicative law suits in multiple jurisdictions over single events."⁵¹³ Finally, the Court held that the bylaws were valid as a matter of contract because investors knew when they bought stock of the corporation that the board could unilaterally adopt bylaws that were binding on shareholders.

In 2015, the Delaware General Assembly gave statutory backing to forum selection bylaws by adopting Section 115 of the DGCL, which allows a company, in its certificate of incorporation or bylaws, to provide that "any or all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State."⁵¹⁴ Notably, this provision also provides that a forum selection bylaw may not divest stockholders of the right to bring suit in Delaware, thus overturning the result of *City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc.*, where the Delaware Court of Chancery had ruled that a company could validly adopt a bylaw providing that all litigation must be brought in its non-Delaware headquarters state.⁵¹⁵ Other states have generally enforced forum selection bylaws that provide that shareholder litigation must be conducted in Delaware.⁵¹⁶ The Delaware Court of Chancery, however, has consistently stated that it is reluctant to grant an anti-suit injunction against proceedings in a sister jurisdiction to uphold these bylaws, and instead still requires litigation filed outside of the contractually selected forum to be challenged in that jurisdiction.⁵¹⁷ A federal circuit split has emerged, moreover, regarding the enforceability of exclusive Delaware forum selection bylaws against derivative claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Because the Exchange Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction, such bylaws, if enforced, effectively foreclose derivative Exchange Act claims. In *Seafarers Pension Plan on behalf of Boeing Co. v. Bradley*, the Seventh Circuit declined to enforce a bylaw requiring derivative Exchange Act claims to be brought in Delaware,⁵¹⁸ while the Ninth Circuit enforced such a bylaw in *Lee v. Fisher*,⁵¹⁹ and reaffirmed that opinion *en banc* in June 2023.⁵²⁰ While Section 115 of the DGCL originally applied only to internal corporate claims, in 2025, it was amended to allow a certificate of incorporation or bylaws to prescribe one or more forums for certain non-internal corporate claims as long as stockholders are allowed to bring such claims in at least one court in Delaware with jurisdiction over such claims.

In March 2020, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a 2018 Delaware Chancery Court decision and ruled that exclusive forum provisions in corporate charters that require claims under the Securities Act to be brought in federal court are permissible under Delaware law.⁵²¹ The Court observed that as a matter of Delaware statute, a charter may regulate “intra-corporate” affairs—all matters “defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors and the stockholders,” and that because a Securities Act claim may raise such matters, such a federal forum provision is not necessarily invalid.⁵²² The Court’s reasoning applies to the inclusion of such provisions in bylaws as well. Importantly, the Court’s decision rejected a facial challenge to such federal forum provisions, but did not endorse their application in every circumstance.⁵²³

ISS expressly recognizes the benefits of Delaware choice of forum provisions for Delaware corporations. ISS will “[g]enerally vote for charter or bylaw provisions that specify courts located within the [S]tate of Delaware as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters for Delaware corporations, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.” Similarly, ISS will “[g]enerally vote for federal forum selection provisions in the charter or bylaws that specify ‘the district courts of the United States’ as the exclusive forum for federal securities law matters, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.”⁵²⁴

Glass Lewis’ policy takes a negative view of forum selection provisions, and recommends that shareholders vote against any bylaw or charter amendment seeking to adopt an exclusive forum provision unless the company: “(i) provides a compelling argument on why the provision would directly benefit shareholders; (ii) provides evidence of abuse of legal process in other, non-favored jurisdictions; (iii) narrowly tailors such provision to the risks involved; and (iv) maintains a strong record of good corporate governance practices.”⁵²⁵ If a board “seeks shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal” or if a board adopted a forum selection clause in the prior year without shareholder approval, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against the “chair of the governance committee for bundling disparate proposals into a single proposal.”⁵²⁶ Glass Lewis notes that it will “evaluate the circumstances surrounding the adoption of any forum selection clause as well as the general provisions” contained therein, and “[w]here it can be reasonably determined that a forum selection clause is narrowly crafted to suit the particular circumstances facing the company and/or a reasonable sunset provision is included,” Glass Lewis may make an exception to this policy.⁵²⁷

7. Fee-Shifting Bylaws

Although it is common in some jurisdictions outside the United States for the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s attorneys’ fees and costs, the majority rule in the United States requires each party to pay its own attorneys’ fees and costs, regardless of the outcome of the litigation. The Delaware Supreme Court in *ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund*, held that a board-adopted fee-shifting bylaw that imposed the costs of litigation on a non-prevailing plaintiff in a private non-stock corporation is facially valid under Delaware law.⁵²⁸ Delaware’s General Assembly legislatively cabined the *ATP* decision, however, by amending the DGCL to provide that neither the certificate of incorporation nor the bylaws may contain “any provision that would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection with an internal corporate claim.”⁵²⁹ Although the statutory amendments bar

fee-shifting provisions in stock corporations, they specifically do not apply to non-stock corporations, and thus leave the holding of *ATP* intact. In 2016, the Delaware Court of Chancery struck down a bylaw that purported to shift fees for any stockholder bringing an action in violation of the corporation's forum selection bylaw, thus confirming that Section 109(b) of the DGCL bars even limited fee-shifting bylaws for public corporations.⁵³⁰ ISS and Glass Lewis also look unfavorably on companies that adopt fee-shifting provisions in their bylaws.⁵³¹

D. Change-of-Control Compensation Arrangements

In order to attract and retain executives, many public companies maintain change-of-control compensation arrangements for senior management, including enhanced severance entitlements and accelerated vesting of equity awards that apply upon a qualifying termination of employment within a specified period following a change of control. These arrangements are not defensive devices intended to deter sales or mergers. Instead, they are intended to ensure that management teams can focus on engaging in corporate transactions that are in the best interests of shareholders without the distraction of worrying about the potential adverse effects those transactions may have on management's post-transaction employment. Additionally, such arrangements assist in retaining management through a period of uncertainty during which executives otherwise may have significant incentive to pursue alternative opportunities.

Although there continues to be a great deal of scrutiny of executive compensation arrangements, appropriately structured change-of-control compensation arrangements are both legal and proper. Courts that have addressed the legality of change-of-control agreements and other benefit protections have almost universally found such arrangements to be enforceable and consistent with directors' fiduciary duties so long as such directors do not have a conflict of interest.⁵³² A board's decision to adopt change-of-control compensation arrangements for executives is usually analyzed under the business judgment rule.⁵³³ The scrutiny applied to such arrangements may be heightened if they are adopted during a pending or threatened takeover contest, thereby making careful planning in advance of a merger all the more important. Public companies that do not already maintain reasonable change-of-control protections for senior management should consider implementing them, and companies that already maintain such arrangements should monitor and periodically review them.

Over the years, a generally consistent form of change-of-control compensation arrangement has emerged at U.S. public companies. Typically, the protections of the arrangement become effective only upon a change of control and apply to a qualifying termination of employment within a specified period (generally up to two years) after the change of control. A qualifying termination of employment is generally defined as termination of employment by the employer without cause or by the executive following a specified adverse change in the terms of employment (with such specified adverse changes often referred to as "good reason").

The protections of the arrangement usually include cash severance (expressed as a multiple of base salary or base salary *plus* annual bonus), accelerated vesting of outstanding equity awards, and welfare benefit continuation for a specified period. In determining the type and quantum of benefits to be provided, the compensation committee of the board of directors is usually advised by an independent compensation consultant. Among other things, the consultant provides market

data as one reference point for directors to consider in determining the appropriate terms of the change-of-control compensation arrangement.

Many change-of-control compensation arrangements incorporate provisions to address the impact of Sections 280G and 4999 of the Internal Revenue Code. These so-called “golden parachute” tax rules apply in connection with a change of control of a corporation and subject “excess parachute payments” to a dual penalty: (a) the imposition of a 20% excise tax upon the recipient and (b) non-deductibility by the paying corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes. Excess parachute payments result if the aggregate payments received by “disqualified individuals” (which generally includes the most senior executives) of the company that are treated as “contingent” on a change of control (“parachute payments”) equal or exceed three times the individual’s “base amount” (the average annual taxable compensation of the individual for the five or lesser number of years during which the individual was employed by the corporation preceding the year in which the change of control occurs). If the parachute payments to such an individual equal or exceed three times the individual’s base amount, then the “excess parachute payments” generally equal the excess of (x) the parachute payments over (y) the individual’s base amount. Companies should consider periodically analyzing the impact the golden parachute excise tax would have in the event of a hypothetical change of control. These tax rules, for a variety of reasons, can produce arbitrary and counter-intuitive outcomes that disproportionately penalize new hires, newly promoted employees, employees who do not exercise stock options, and employees who elect to defer compensation, and that disadvantage companies and executives whose equity compensation programs include performance goals. Change-of-control compensation arrangements, particularly at publicly traded companies, commonly include a “better net after-tax” cutback provision pursuant to which parachute payments can be cut back to one dollar below three times the base amount, but only if the result is to give the employee a larger after-tax return than if the payments were not cut back. For private companies only, it is possible to avoid the application of the dual penalty if the potential parachute payments are adequately disclosed to shareholders prior to the change of control and are approved by more than seventy-five percent of the disinterested voting power of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote; in order for such a so-called “cleansing vote” to be effective, the specific requirements set forth in the regulations must be met, including that the vote must determine the right of the disqualified individuals to receive or retain the payments subject to the vote.

In addition to change-of-control compensation arrangements covering senior executives, some companies have adopted change-of-control severance plans for less senior employees, sometimes covering the entire workforce. These severance plans may formalize existing company practices or provide enhanced severance in the event of a layoff occurring within a limited period (such as one or two years) after a change of control. Because of the large number of employees involved, careful attention should be paid to the potential cost of such arrangements and their effect on potential transactions, but well-designed broad-based severance arrangements can help ensure stability across a company’s workforce at a time when the company is otherwise vulnerable to attrition.

Companies should also review the potential impact of a change of control on their outstanding equity compensation awards. As described above, change-of-control compensation arrangements may provide for accelerated vesting upon a qualifying termination of employment

within a specified period following a change of control (so called “double trigger” acceleration); this protection may be provided only to senior management, or it may be provided to a broader group of equity award holders or to all holders. Alternatively, the equity plan (or applicable award agreements thereunder) may include provisions for the acceleration of vesting of equity compensation awards upon a change of control (so called “single trigger” acceleration), but this has become a minority practice and is generally disfavored by shareholder advisory groups and institutional investors. Single trigger or double trigger acceleration may be included in the equity plan document or applicable award agreements thereunder, and, in some cases, double trigger acceleration may be documented in a separate change-of-control severance plan or agreement. Additionally, companies should confirm that their equity compensation plans include adjustment clauses authorizing the company to make appropriate modifications to awards in connection with a transaction—e.g., conversion of target awards into acquiror awards.

Companies can expect continuing stockholder scrutiny of change-of-control compensation arrangements. The application of these arrangements to named executive officers generally receives attention in connection with the non-binding “say-on-pay” shareholder advisory vote in the annual proxy statement. Heightened disclosure requirements regarding change-of-control compensation arrangements for executive officers are triggered where shareholders are asked to approve a merger or other change-of-control transaction and the disclosed payments and benefits for named executive officers, which are required to be quantified in the disclosure separately for each officer, are subject to a “say on golden parachute” shareholder advisory vote included in the transaction proxy statement. Furthermore, ISS and other shareholder advisory groups continue to criticize certain change-of-control practices that they view to be excessive or problematic. Notwithstanding this increased scrutiny, companies should assess these and other executive compensation arrangements in light of company-specific needs, rather than broad policy mandates.

E. “Poison Puts”

Debt instruments may include provisions, sometimes known as “poison puts,” that allow debtholders to sell or “put” their bonds back to the issuing corporation at a predetermined price, typically at par or slightly above par value, if a defined “change-of-control” event occurs. Poison puts began to appear in bond indentures during the LBO boom of the 1980s in response to acquirors’ practice of leveraging up targets with new debt, which in turn led to ratings downgrades and a decline in the prices of the targets’ existing bonds. The inclusion of these protections, which generally cover mergers, asset sales and other change-of-control transactions, as well as changes in a majority of the board that are not approved by the existing directors (the latter being sometimes referred to as a “proxy put”), is generally bargained for by debtholders and therefore is assumed to lead to better terms (such as lower pricing) for the borrower.

Proxy puts have come under fire in Delaware courts because of their perceived use as an entrenchment device. In 2009, in *San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the board has the power, and so long as it is complying with the contractual implied duty of good faith and fair dealing to the debtholders, also the right, to “approve” a dissident slate of director nominees for purposes of a proxy put in the company’s bond indenture, even while the board is conducting a public campaign against them.⁵³⁴ An indenture that precluded the board from deciding whether or not to “approve”

the slate (known as a “dead hand proxy put”) would have “an eviscerating effect on the stockholder franchise” and would “raise grave concerns” about the board’s fiduciary duties in agreeing to such a provision.⁵³⁵ The Court also clarified that the board is “under absolutely *no* obligation to consider the interests of the noteholders” in determining whether to approve the dissident slate.⁵³⁶

In its 2013 decision in *Kallick v. SandRidge Energy, Inc.*, the Delaware Court of Chancery cast further doubt on the effectiveness of proxy puts. *SandRidge* applied *Unocal*’s intermediate standard of review both to a board’s decision to agree to poison put provisions in the first place and its subsequent conduct with respect to such clauses.⁵³⁷ Citing *Amylin*, then-Chancellor Strine held that a board must approve a dissident slate for purposes of a proxy put unless “the board determines that passing control to the slate would constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty, in particular, because the proposed slate poses a danger that the company would not honor its legal duty to repay its creditors.”⁵³⁸ According to then-Chancellor Strine, a board may only decline to approve dissident nominees where the board can “identify that there is a specific and substantial risk to the corporation or its creditors posed by the rival slate” (such as by showing the nominees “lack the integrity, character, and basic competence to serve in office,” or where the dissident slate has announced plans that might affect the company’s ability to “repay its creditors”).⁵³⁹ Thus, even though the SandRidge board believed itself to be better qualified and prepared to run the company than the dissident nominees, the Court enjoined the incumbent directors from opposing a control contest until they approved their rivals so as to satisfy the put.⁵⁴⁰

In 2014, the Delaware Court of Chancery, in *Pontiac General Employees Retirement v. Ballantine* (also known as “*Healthways*”), expressed further skepticism that proxy puts could be employed in a manner consistent with a board’s fiduciary duties. In *Healthways*, a company entered into restated credit and term loan agreement with a dead hand proxy put. Two years later, an 11% stockholder, North Tide Capital, sent a critical letter to the board and threatened to wage a proxy fight, which was ultimately settled when the company agreed to nominate three North Tide candidates to the board.⁵⁴¹ The board was then sued by stockholders, who argued that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by approving a credit agreement with a dead hand proxy put. Because the proxy fight with North Tide Capital had settled, the defendants argued that there was no present risk that the poison put would trigger and that therefore the case was not ripe.⁵⁴² Vice Chancellor Laster disagreed. He concluded that dead hand proxy puts have a deterrent effect and since “[a] truly effective deterrent is never triggered,”⁵⁴³ the poison put could chill stockholder action even without an actual proxy contest underway.⁵⁴⁴ The Court thus concluded that approving a dead hand proxy put could subject directors to personal liability for breaching their fiduciary duty of loyalty, and could open up financing sources to liability for aiding and abetting the breach.⁵⁴⁵ Unsurprisingly, class actions alleging breaches of directors’ fiduciary duties on the basis of proxy put provisions are on the rise nationwide.⁵⁴⁶

Because of the case law described above, the Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2015 pronouncement that a proxy put might be so difficult to use that it is akin to a “toothless bulldog” rings true.⁵⁴⁷ Indeed, when the *Healthways* case was later settled, the credit agreement was amended to eliminate the proxy put (without any payment to the lenders for agreeing to the amendment), and the company agreed to pay up to \$1.2 million in attorneys’ fees.

Boards considering adoption of poison puts, and possibly other change-of-control agreements such as including payouts to management in the event a proxy contest for some directors is successful, should be aware that the adoption itself, as well as a board's decisions with respect to such instruments, may be challenged and reviewed by a skeptical court. Courts recognize, of course, that lenders may legitimately demand these positions and that companies may benefit from their use. But because courts may view poison puts as having an entrenching effect, the board should weigh the appearance of entrenchment against the needs of the lender and document carefully the process it followed. It is not unprecedented for a board of directors to pre-approve the dissident's slate of nominees as continuing directors, so as not to trigger the change-of-control covenants in the company's notes.

F. Planning an Unsolicited Offer

For would-be unsolicited bidders, a variety of tactical and strategic considerations must be carefully balanced at every stage of planning and implementing a transaction. It is important for bidders not to underestimate the time and effort that will be required to succeed (and the significant distraction that comes with a pending unsolicited offer), nor to overestimate the chance of success—year in and year out, a large percentage of announced unsolicited transactions are either withdrawn or culminate with the target entering into a deal with a different third party.

Note, the discussion in this Section VI generally proceeds from the assumption that a hostile approach arises in a deal-free environment, where the board's defensive posture and advance preparedness measures are not constrained by the terms of an existing transaction. Unsolicited bids may, however, arise in other contexts that involve a fundamentally different calculus, such as a topping bid following the announcement of a definitive agreement or in the aftermath of a failed auction or negotiation process where the board declined to enter into a definitive agreement. In those circumstances, the scope of defensive tools available to a board may be shaped by the terms of the existing transaction documents, if any, or confidentiality agreement, including provisions relating to standstills, no-shop periods, matching rights, termination fees and efforts covenants, requiring a re-evaluation of the considerations discussed herein. Additional issues specific to topping bids, such as the scope of competing and superior proposal provisions, notice and information rights, matching mechanics, and the structure of other deal protections are discussed further in Section V.A.

1. Private Versus Public Forms of Approach

Because of the difficulty of acquiring control of a target without the support of its board, initial takeover approaches tend to be made privately and indicate a desire to agree to a negotiated transaction. Acquirors generally begin their approach either: (i) with a "casual pass" where a member of the acquiror's management will contact a senior executive or director of the target and indicate the desire to discuss a transaction; or (ii) through a private bear-hug letter. Bear-hug letters come in various forms and levels of specificity but generally are viewed as a formal proposal to the target to engage in a transaction.

A key tactical consideration for an acquiror in this context is whether to suggest, implicitly or explicitly, that the acquiror is willing to take the proposal directly to the target's stockholders if

a negotiated deal is not reached. On the one hand, from the acquiror's perspective, a public approach may be advantageous in maximizing stockholder and public pressure on the target board to enter into negotiations. In this context, it may be difficult in practice for a target board to refuse to engage, regardless of how strong the target's structural takeover defenses may be.

On the other hand, a public approach or leak may disadvantage the bidder in a number of ways: it will typically cause the target's stock price to increase, potentially making the acquisition more costly; it may decrease the likelihood of receiving due diligence access and otherwise reaching a negotiated transaction, which, among other things, makes obtaining regulatory approvals more challenging; it may distract or strain the target's management, employees and business relationships in ways that decrease value; it may attract other suitors for the target; and it may negatively affect the bidder's own stock price, decreasing the value or increasing the dilutive effect of any consideration proposed to be paid in bidder stock.

2. Other Considerations

In considering whether and how to make an unsolicited approach, an acquiror must carefully review the target's structural takeover defenses, including an assessment of the target's charter and bylaws and any "interested stockholder" or other anti-takeover statutes that may be applicable in the target's jurisdiction of incorporation. These takeover statutes could be implicated not only by the potential acquiror acquiring shares in the target, but also by the potential acquiror teaming up with an existing shareholder. Among other things, acquirors that may seek stockholder approval of proposals to facilitate the acquisition must be mindful of the advance notice deadlines for submitting board nominees and stockholder proposals at the target's annual meeting, especially in cases where the target does not permit stockholders to act by written consent or call a special meeting. As a proxy fight (or, more often, the threat thereof) remains the key pressure tactic to encourage a reluctant target board to engage with an unsolicited acquiror, a hostile approach ideally should be made at a time in the target's meeting cycle when a proxy fight is a credible, near-term threat. Potential acquirors considering running a proxy fight should understand that it requires considerable effort and lead time to recruit an attractive slate of nominees to challenge an incumbent board.

A thorough understanding of the target's stockholder base is also critical. For example, overlapping shareholders may be important proponents of a transaction, while a high level of insider ownership at the target could make it more difficult to apply pressure to engage. The presence of shareholder activists in the target's stock may be a double-edged sword, as they can be both instigators of engagement by the target but may also press the acquiror to raise its price in order to obtain their support. Similarly, acquirors should consider the extent to which the target's institutional stockholder base consists of index funds rather than active managers. Index funds may be less likely to tender into a hostile tender or exchange offer. If a hostile approach develops into a proxy fight, index funds generally have different criteria than active managers in determining whether to vote for the acquiror's director slate, including a focus on governance issues and the need to replicate but not necessarily beat the index, that may not be relevant to active managers who are more focused on price.

Acquirors must also consider the potential unintended consequences of making a takeover approach, especially one that becomes public. The target may launch an aggressive public relations campaign questioning the merits, or even the legality of the combination or the acquiror's tactics in pursuing it (*e.g.*, from an antitrust, securities or state corporate law perspective) and commence litigation in that regard. If the acquiror proposes to use its stock as transaction consideration, targets also often publicly question the acquiror's accounting practices, growth prospects, synergies from the proposed combination or the sustainability of the acquiror's business. Finally, hostile acquirors may themselves become the subject of takeover interest from third parties—or even from the target itself.

3. Disclosure Issues for 13D Filers

Schedule 13D is generally required to be filed by 5% shareholders of U.S. public companies, other than passive institutional investors and pre-IPO owners. The schedule requires disclosure of the purposes of the filer's acquisition, including any plans or proposals relating to certain matters involving the target, and any material changes to its previous 13D disclosures.

Acquirors that are existing large shareholders of the target and subject to the SEC's 13D reporting requirements must carefully evaluate the point at which any plans or proposals should be publicly disclosed. Historically, such acquirors often only filed 13D amendments upon signing of a merger agreement (in a friendly transaction) or when the acquiror otherwise decided for strategic reasons to publicly announce a bid/proposal. But in recent years, the SEC has charged directors, officers and major shareholders of issuers for failing timely to disclose in Schedule 13Ds steps taken to take the issuers private, resulting in cease-and-desist orders and payment of civil penalties.⁵⁴⁸ In May 2024, the SEC charged activist HG Vora Capital Management for failing to make timely 13D disclosures in connection with its unsolicited proposal to acquire Ryder System in 2022. The SEC pointed to the fact that HG Vora began drafting an offer letter to Ryder with a placeholder offer price of \$85 per share on April 26, 2022, several weeks before it publicly disclosed its proposal to acquire Ryder. The SEC order indicated that HG Vora had a "control" purpose with respect to Ryder no later than the date of the draft offer letter, and therefore a Schedule 13D filing was required at that time. In January 2025, the SEC sued Elon Musk, alleging that he failed to timely file a Schedule 13D (or Schedule 13G) after acquiring beneficial ownership of more than five percent of the outstanding shares of Twitter in March 2022, arguing Musk saved at least \$150 million at the expense of Twitter shareholders by failing to make such a filing. In February 2026, a court denied Musk's motion to dismiss the lawsuit. The SEC moved to settle the case in May 2026. A trust in Musk's name agreed to pay a \$1.5 million civil penalty over the delayed disclosure of his Twitter stake, without Musk admitting wrongdoing, and the SEC said that it would dismiss the case if the court approves the settlement. Under the settlement, Musk would not have to repay the roughly \$150 million that the SEC had claimed he saved by filing late. The settlement is awaiting court approval as of this writing. The SEC actions indicate that the SEC has increasingly focused on 13D compliance in the going-private context and acquirors should carefully evaluate when 13D disclosure is warranted in each situation. Acquirors subject to Schedule 13D reporting requirements or close to the 5% threshold should also be cognizant of SEC rules regarding Schedule 13D that were adopted in October 2023. As discussed elsewhere in this outline, these rules, among other things, shorten the Schedule 13D filing deadline from ten calendar days to five business days, set an amendment deadline of two business days after a

material change, and require expanded disclosure of activity in derivatives, including cash-settled derivative securities.⁵⁴⁹ With respect to passive investors, new Schedule 13G rules also became effective in September 2024, similarly shortening filing deadlines and shifting initial and amended filings to a quarterly rather than an annual schedule.

G. Responding to an Unsolicited Offer—Preliminary Considerations

Takeover preparedness remains critical in today’s M&A environment. Failure to prepare for a takeover attempt exposes potential targets to pressure tactics and reduces the target’s ability to control its own destiny. Further, while takeover defense is more art than science, there are some generally applicable principles to which companies should typically adhere.

1. Disclosure of Takeover Approaches and Preliminary Negotiations

When a takeover approach is made, keeping the situation private is generally preferable as it is much easier to defeat an unsolicited bid if it never becomes public. Once a takeover approach becomes public, a target company’s options narrow dramatically because arbitrageurs and hedge funds often take positions in its stock, changing its stockholder base. These short-term investors’ objectives will tend to conflict with the company’s pursuit of a standing, long-term plan and they will oftentimes apply pressure to the board to accept a bid, with less regard to its adequacy. Because there are a limited number of ways to acquire control of a target without the support of its board—*i.e.*, through a tender offer, a stock purchase, or a combined tender offer and proxy contest—and each available hostile acquisition method is riskier and provides less certainty for the potential acquiror than a negotiated transaction, including because the target board may resist each of these methods, most initial takeover approaches are made privately and indicate a desire to agree to a friendly transaction.

Determining if disclosure is required in response to a private takeover approach or preliminary merger negotiations is a factually driven inquiry. The two guiding factors in this inquiry are: (i) whether information about the acquisition proposal is material and (ii) whether the target has a duty to disclose the approach. The materiality of speculative events such as preliminary merger negotiations is determined based on the particular facts of each case by applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s test in *Basic v. Levinson*: whether, balancing the probability that the transaction will be completed and the magnitude of the transaction’s effect on the issuer’s securities, there is a substantial likelihood that the disclosure would be viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information.⁵⁵⁰ To assess probability, companies must look at the “indicia of interest in the transaction at the highest corporate levels” considering, among other things, board resolutions, instructions to investment bankers, and actual negotiations between the parties. The magnitude of the transaction on the issuer’s securities is determined by reference to the size of the two corporate entities and the potential premium over market value. But “[n]o particular event or factor short of closing the transaction need be either necessary or sufficient by itself to render merger discussions material.”⁵⁵¹

Even if preliminary merger negotiations are material, no disclosure is required absent an affirmative disclosure duty.⁵⁵² A corporation is not required to disclose a fact merely because reasonable investors would like to know it.⁵⁵³ But an acquiror’s acquisition of a toehold position

in the target's stock or rumors regarding a potential transaction may occasionally lead to inquiries directed at the target. Disclosure duties most commonly arise in three situations: (a) when later factual developments occur that make the issuer's previous statements misleading, (b) when leaks and market rumors are attributable to the issuer or (c) when one of the parties wishes to engage in a securities transaction such as share repurchases or securities offerings. Issuers should also be cognizant of Regulation FD, which generally prohibits an issuer's selective disclosure of material nonpublic information and requires prompt corrective action and disclosures when a violation has occurred. Therefore, selective disclosures by investment relations personnel in response to inquiries regarding market rumors can also trigger the duty to disclose. In a 2018 decision, the Tenth Circuit held that a party engaged in merger discussions had no duty to disclose such discussions when it had not made any statements that were "inconsistent" with the existence of such discussions. In addition, it found that such discussions were not material under the *Basic v. Levinson* test "in the absence of a serious commitment to consummate the transaction."⁵⁵⁴

As a general matter, a company is not required to disclose approaches and negotiations in response to inquiries.⁵⁵⁵ But if a target elects to speak publicly about mergers or acquisitions, it must speak truthfully and completely.⁵⁵⁶ Therefore, in most situations, the best response is a "no comment" posture, and many companies maintain a policy of not commenting on market rumors or takeover speculation so as to provide a principled basis for a decision not to comment. A "no comment" response may not be appropriate if the issuer had previously made a statement that has been rendered materially false or misleading due to subsequent events.⁵⁵⁷

Similarly, a company cannot reply "no comment" in response to inquiries about unusual market activity or rumors if the leak is attributable to the company.⁵⁵⁸ If, however, the leak is not attributable to the company, there is no duty to correct the market or verify the rumor.⁵⁵⁹ Market rumors and leaks are attributed to a company if it has "sufficiently entangled itself" with the disclosure of information giving rise to the rumor.⁵⁶⁰ In *State Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor*,⁵⁶¹ Fluor, a construction company, was awarded a \$1 billion contract to build a coal gasification plant in South Africa and, prior to publicly disclosing the award of the contract, its share price surged and daily trading volume increased threefold. Fluor received several inquiries from market analysts and reporters regarding rumors of the contract award but Fluor declined to comment due to contractual restrictions.⁵⁶² The Second Circuit held that the company's decision not to confirm the rumors could not give rise to liability because there was no indication that the leak was attributable to the company or its employees.⁵⁶³ Although courts have not required disclosure in response to rumors and leaks that are not attributable to the company, stock exchange rules, subject to certain exceptions, do impose prompt disclosure duties to combat unusual market activity.⁵⁶⁴

2. Other Considerations

In addition to keeping the situation private, all communications from and to an acquiror should be directed through the CEO unless otherwise decided by the board. Acquirors often will attempt to contact individual board members directly to undermine the target's ability to present a unified negotiating front or to learn information. Additionally, maintaining board unity is essential to producing the best outcome, whether the goal is independence or negotiating the best possible sale price. In this regard, the CEO should keep the board informed of developments, consult the

board and solicit its advice. Honest and open debate should be encouraged but kept within the boardroom.

During a takeover defense, every decision is tactical and must align with the target's defensive strategy. No conversation with a hostile bidder should be assumed to be off the record and any signs of encouragement, self-criticism or dissension within the board can be used against the company. Consequently, the board should carefully craft a formal response. Except in the case of a publicly disclosed tender offer, there is no defined period in which a company must respond to an offer. And, there is no duty to negotiate, even in the face of a premium bid.

H. Defending against an Unsolicited Offer

1. “Just Say No”

Unless the target has otherwise subjected itself to *Revlon* duties (e.g., by having previously agreed to enter into an acquisition involving a change-of-control, as in *QVC*), it is clear that the target may, if it meets the relevant standard, “just say no” to an acquisition proposal.

Targets of unsolicited offers have been successful in rejecting such proposals in order to follow their own strategic plans. In response to a hostile bid by Moore, Wallace Computer Services relied on its rights plan and long-term strategy, rather than seeking a friendly buyer, initiating a share repurchase program or electing another “active” response to Moore's offer. When Moore challenged the rights plan in Delaware federal district court, Wallace was able to support its refusal to redeem the pill under the *Unocal* standard. Although 73% of Wallace's stockholders tendered into Moore's offer, the Court found that the Wallace board had sustained its burden of demonstrating a “good faith belief, made after reasonable investigation, that the Moore offer posed a legally cognizable threat” to Wallace. The evidence showed that the favorable results from a recently adopted capital expenditure plan were “beginning to be translated into financial results, which even surpass management and financial analyst projections.”⁵⁶⁵ As the *Moore* decision illustrates, where the target of a hostile bid wishes to consider rejecting the bid and remaining independent, it is critical that the board follow the correct process, including having a thorough record of its deliberations in its board minutes, and have the advice of an experienced investment banker and legal counsel.

The ability of a board to reject an unsolicited offer by relying on its rights plan was reaffirmed in *Airgas*, as discussed in Sections II.D.2 and VI.A.2. The *Airgas* board rejected a series of increasing tender offers from Air Products because it found the price to be inadequate, and the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld the primacy of the board's determination, even though *Airgas* had lost a proxy fight to Air Products for one-third of the company's staggered board.⁵⁶⁶

Although a rights plan is often the most useful tool for staving off a hostile bid, it is not necessary to adopt a rights plan in every situation in order to successfully “just say no.” What is typically necessary—and what a rights plan is designed to protect—is a thoughtful long-term plan that was developed by a board and management whom long-term shareholders trust to deliver value.

This proposition was on full display in Perrigo’s 2015 defense of Mylan’s \$35.6 billion takeover bid—the largest hostile takeover battle in history to go to the tender offer deadline. In April 2015, Mylan made an exchange offer to acquire Perrigo (which had inverted from Michigan to Ireland). Perrigo’s board rejected the bid because it believed it undervalued the company. As an Irish company, Perrigo was prevented from adopting typical, U.S.-style defenses, such as a rights plan, by a prohibition under the Irish Takeover Rules on the taking of “frustrating actions” in response to a bid. Consequently, Perrigo’s best defense was to convince its shareholders that the value of a stand-alone Perrigo exceeded the value of a combined Mylan/Perrigo *plus* the offer’s cash consideration and that the risk of owning Mylan shares—from a valuation and governance perspective—was significant. Ultimately, more than 60% of Perrigo’s stockholders rejected Mylan’s bid, which resulted in the failure to satisfy the minimum tender condition and defeated the takeover attempt.

While Mylan’s bid was outstanding, there was considerable speculation about whether merger arbitrageurs seeking short-term gains, who had acquired almost 25% of Perrigo’s shares, would be able to deliver Perrigo into Mylan’s hands. Much was also made of the fact that Perrigo did not agree to sell to a friendly buyer or do a large acquisition of its own, raising questions about whether a premium offer, even a questionable one, had put Perrigo on a “shot clock” to do the least bad deal that it could find. It did not. The Perrigo situation shows that a target company can win a takeover battle and defeat short-term pressures by pursuing a shareholder-focused stand-alone strategy, especially where it fights for and wins the backing of its long-term shareholders.

2. White Knights and White Squires

A “white knight” transaction, namely a merger or acquisition transaction by the target with a friendly acquiror in the face of a hostile takeover bid, can be a successful strategy where the white knight transaction provides greater economic value to target company stockholders than the initial hostile offer. In some contexts, however, white knight transactions are more difficult to accomplish because of required regulatory approvals and related procedures. For example, a white knight will usually require the same regulatory approvals as are required by the hostile acquiror and, to the extent that the white knight commences the approval process after the hostile acquiror does, the white knight may suffer a timing disadvantage. If a target has defended itself against the hostile acquiror by arguing that the industry is highly concentrated and the deal is subject to antitrust risk, such arguments may be used against a proposed combination between the target and a white knight in the same industry as well. Certain target companies may also be constrained by a scarcity of available acquirors, depending upon applicable regulatory restrictions and antitrust considerations.

Allergan’s response to a 2014 hostile takeover offer by Valeant and Pershing Square illustrates the viability of a white knight strategy. Pershing Square teamed up as a purported “co-offering person” with Valeant and sought to avoid the securities laws designed to prevent secret accumulation of stock as well as the Hart-Scott-Rodino notification requirements. The pair formed a purchasing vehicle (funded primarily by Pershing Square) to purchase a large block in Allergan using stock options instead of shares of common stock to avoid triggering Hart-Scott-Rodino notification. They also took advantage of the 10-day reporting window to acquire more stock until they held nearly 10% of the outstanding shares and then simultaneously announced both their

combined ownership stake and a proposed merger between Valeant and Allergan. Soon thereafter, Allergan's board adopted a rights plan and rejected Valeant's undervalued bid and cost-cutting strategy. Several months later Valeant launched an exchange offer for Allergan's shares that Allergan's board rejected as "grossly inadequate." After several months, Allergan announced that it would be acquired by Actavis at a much higher premium. Serious questions have been raised about the "co-offer person" structure employed by Valeant and Pershing Square.⁵⁶⁷ In a tentative ruling in December 2017 in a lawsuit brought by Allergan shareholders who had sold shares while Pershing Square was secretly acquiring its stakeholding position, a federal court concluded that Pershing Square and Valeant could be liable for damages for insider trading in violation of federal securities laws. Pershing Square and Valeant agreed to pay approximately \$290 million to settle the insider trading claims.

A "white squire" defense, which involves placing a block of voting stock in friendly hands, may be more quickly implemented. This defense has been successfully employed in a handful of instances, and the Delaware Court of Chancery has upheld the validity of this defense under the right circumstances.⁵⁶⁸ Such sales to "friendly" parties should be carefully structured to avoid an unintended subsequent takeover bid by the former "friend." Voting and standstill agreements are critical components in this context.

Importantly, friendly must mean a party whose interests are aligned with the best interests of the company and its stockholders. Judicial scrutiny of a "friend" whose interests are arguably in conflict with those of the stockholders, but aligned with company management, will be close, and when boards have been perceived as doing an alternative transaction, as in *Revlon*, solely to prevent another party from prevailing, they have had their agreements enjoined as unreasonable.

Note also that where a company is the target of a tender offer, Schedule 14d-9 requires enhanced disclosures relating to its pursuit of alternative transactions to the tender offer, such as when the target is pursuing a white knight or white squire defense. Targets of a tender offer must disclose whether they are "undertaking or engaged in any negotiations in response to the tender offer that relate to . . . [a] tender offer or other acquisition of the [target] company's securities" as well as "any transaction, board resolution, agreement in principle, or signed contract that is entered into in response to the tender offer that relates to" such undertaking or negotiations in response to the tender offer.⁵⁶⁹ These disclosure obligations risk making certain negotiations public before the target has a fully negotiated transaction with a third party. Accordingly, these disclosure obligations need to be carefully reviewed and managed where a tender offer target is considering alternative transactions as a takeover defense.

3. Restructuring Defenses

Restructurings may be driven in part by the threat of hostile takeovers. The failure of a company's stock price to fully reflect the value of its various businesses has provided opportunities for acquirors to profit by acquiring a company, breaking it up and selling the separate pieces for substantially more than was paid for the entire company. A primary goal of any restructuring is to cause the value of a company's various businesses to be better understood and, ultimately, to be better reflected in its stock price.

Like many forms of takeover defenses, a restructuring is best initiated well before a company is actually facing a bid. In most cases, a restructuring will only be possible if there has been careful advance preparation. Arranging for a friendly buyer of a particular asset and restructuring a business to accommodate the loss of the asset are time-consuming, costly and complicated endeavors and are difficult to effect in the midst of a takeover battle.

Nonetheless, restructuring defenses have been attempted or implemented in a number of prominent transactions. For example, during the course of BHP Billiton's effort to acquire global mining giant Rio Tinto, Rio Tinto announced in late 2007 its decision to divest its aluminum products business (Alcan Engineered Products) and instead focus on its upstream mining businesses. BHP ultimately dropped its bid for Rio Tinto in November 2008, although it publicly attributed this decision to turmoil in the financial markets, uncertainty about the global economic outlook and regulatory concerns.

In addition to asset sales, a stock repurchase plan, such as that pursued by Unitrin in response to American General's unsolicited bid, may be an effective response to a takeover threat. Buybacks at or slightly above the current market price allow shareholders to lock in current market values. Companies may also initiate such buybacks when they choose not to pursue other publicly announced acquisitions in order to prevent a deterioration in the stock price and/or to reduce vulnerability to unsolicited offers. A principal benefit of stock buybacks is that they may be quickly implemented, typically through either a self-tender offer or an open market buyback program.

4. Acquisitions and the "Pac-Man" Defense

Companies can fend off an unwanted suitor by acquiring another company using either stock consideration or issuing new debt. Acquiring a company with stock consideration has the effect of diluting the suitor's ownership interest if it has purchased a toehold in the target. An acquisition can also make the cost of a transaction much higher.

The "Pac-Man" defense involves a target company countering an unwanted acquisition proposal by making its own proposal to acquire the would-be acquiror.⁵⁷⁰ The Pac-Man defense recognizes that a transaction is appropriate while challenging which party should control the combined entity. This tactic first arose in the 1980s when Martin Marietta was the target of a hostile takeover bid by Bendix and launched its own hostile bid for Bendix. Men's Warehouse also employed the Pac-Man defense in late 2013 to reverse an offer by Jos. A. Bank in a move that resulted in Men's Warehouse buying Jos. A. Bank in 2014.

In the face of a premium offer, however, the Pac-Man defense can be an uphill battle, as the initial target is effectively tasked with convincing its shareholders that control of the combined company by the initial target's management will create more value for them than the proposed premium. At the same time, companies considering making public or private unsolicited acquisition proposals, especially for a larger or comparably sized target, need to be cognizant that the proposal could ultimately result in a combination of the companies on very different terms than originally proposed, including as to the identity of the surviving company. For example, in 2017, PENN Entertainment (f/k/a Penn National Gaming) successfully acquired Pinnacle Entertainment

in a cash and stock transaction following an initial private unsolicited acquisition proposal from Pinnacle to acquire PENN for all cash.

5. Corporate Spin-Offs, Split-Offs and Split-Ups

Companies have used spin-offs, split-offs and similar transactions to enhance stockholder value and, in some cases, to frustrate hostile acquisition attempts. One means of focusing stock market attention on a company's underlying assets is to place desirable assets in a corporation and exchange shares of the new company for shares of the parent company (known as a "split-off"), which usually is done after issuing some shares of the new company in an initial public offering. Another method, known as a "spin-off," is to distribute all the shares of the new company to the parent company's stockholders as a dividend. The Delaware Court of Chancery has ruled that in a spin-off, barring exceptional circumstances, a company will be able to make a clean break between the two entities, and release liabilities between the entities.⁵⁷¹ Another means of boosting the share price of a company is to "split up" (*i.e.*, to sell off businesses that no longer fit the company's strategic plans or split the company into logically separate units). In all of these cases, a company tries to focus the market's attention on its individual businesses which, when viewed separately, may enjoy a higher market valuation than when viewed together.

In addition to potentially increasing target company valuations, spin-offs and similar structures may produce tax consequences that discourage takeover attempts for a limited period.

6. Litigation Defenses

As shown by the litigation between Vulcan and Martin Marietta, discussed previously in Section III.A.1, a successful litigation strategy can delay, if not eliminate, a hostile threat. As a remedy for Martin Marietta's breach of two binding confidentiality agreements, the Delaware Court of Chancery enjoined Martin Marietta from prosecuting a proxy contest, making an exchange offer, or otherwise seeking to acquire Vulcan assets for a period of four months. In light of Vulcan's staggered board, the ruling had the practical effect of delaying Martin Marietta's ability to win a proxy fight (and thereby seating directors more likely to favor a combination of the two companies) by an entire year. Although Delaware courts do not regularly enjoin transactions, they are able and willing to do so when there is a clear record and a compelling legal theory to support such a decision.

The potential merit of a litigation defense was again shown in *Depomed Inc. v. Horizon Pharma, PLC*⁵⁷² in 2015, when a California court preliminarily enjoined a hostile bidder on the ground that it misused information in violation of a confidentiality agreement, effectively ending the hostile takeover attempt, as discussed previously in Section III.A.1. Both cases illustrate that a company faced with a takeover threat should closely analyze its prior contractual dealings with the hostile acquiror and other entities and not shy away from using courts to enforce its rights. Acquirors are well advised to carefully review confidentiality agreements and consider whether a use restriction can be used as a basis to enjoin the potential acquiror's offer or proxy fight once the standstill expires or is terminated.

7. Regulatory and Political Defenses

Targets of unsolicited takeover approaches have sometimes raised concerns regarding a bidder's ability to obtain the required antitrust or other regulatory approvals to close a transaction as a means of defending against an unwanted approach. Antitrust concerns are commonly raised in this context, as Syngenta did in rejecting Monsanto's 2015 takeover approach and United Technologies did in rejecting Honeywell's 2016 takeover approach. In addition, especially in the cross-border M&A context, companies in industries that are politically sensitive or that are otherwise thought of as "national champions," have at times attempted to rally political and public opposition to unwanted takeover approaches. A notable example of this approach was taken by Qualcomm in response to Broadcom's unsolicited proposal in 2017, resulting in the White House blocking Broadcom from proceeding with its bid on CFIUS grounds. Because these types of regulatory and political defenses can be difficult to reverse once they have been rolled out, practitioners generally consider them to be a "scorched earth" defense strategy that should only be employed in situations where the target is highly confident that it does not, and will not, wish to transact with the bidder.

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² *Alcaarez v. Akorn, Inc.*, 99 F.4th 368, 377 (7th Cir. 2024).

³ *Id.* at 373.

⁴ *Id.* at 377.

⁵ *Id.*; *In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig.*, 339 A.3d 1, 19-20 (Del. 2025).

⁶ *In re Match Grp., Inc. Derivative Litig.*, 315 A.3d 446 (Del. 2024).

⁷ *Id.* at 473.

⁸ *Anchorage Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Adolf*, C.A. No. 2024-0354-KSJM, 2025 WL 1000153 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2025).

⁹ Sam Nolloedo et al., Glass Lewis, *The State of U.S. Reincorporation in 2025: The Growing Threat and Reality of “DEXIT,”* (Oct. 9, 2025), <https://www.glasslewis.com/article/state-of-us-reincorporation-2025-growing-threat-reality-dexit>.

¹⁰ *Desktop Metal, Inc. v. Nano Dimension Ltd.*, C.A. No. 2024-1303-KSJM, 2025 WL 904521, at *2, *23 (Del. Ch. Mar. 24, 2025).

¹¹ Barclays Shareholder Advisory Group, *2025 Review of Shareholder Activism* (Jan. 9, 2026), <https://www.ib.barclays/content/dam/barclaysmicrosites/ibpublic/documents/ourinsights/Q4-2025-Shareholder-Activism/Barclays%202025%20Review%20of%20Shareholder%20Activism.pdf>.

¹² *Id.*

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ Lazard, *2025 Review of Shareholder Activism* (Jan. 5, 2026), <https://www.lazard.com/research-insights/annual-review-of-shareholder-activism-2025/>.

¹⁵ Protecting American Investors from Foreign-Owned and Politically-Motivated Proxy Advisors, Exec. Order No. 14,366, 90 Fed. Reg. 58503, 58503 (Dec. 11, 2025).

¹⁶ Martin Lipton, International Business Council of the World Economic Forum, *The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth* (2016),

<https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.25960.16.pdf>; *see also* The British Academy, *Policy and Practice for Purposeful Business* (2021), <https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/documents/3462/Policy-and-Practice-for-Purposeful-Business-The-British-Academy.pdf>.

¹⁷ ISS, *Statement Regarding Consideration of Diversity Factors in U.S. Director Election Assessment* (Feb. 11, 2025), <https://insights.issgovernance.com/posts/statement-regarding-consideration-of-diversity-factors-in-u-s-director-election-assessments/>.

¹⁸ Glass Lewis, *Supplemental Statement on Diversity Considerations at U.S. Companies* (Mar. 2025), <https://resources.glasslewis.com/hubfs/Supplementary%20Guidance/2025%20Supplemental%20Statement%20on%20Diversity%20Consideration%20at%20US%20Companies.pdf>.

¹⁹ Ensuring Accountability for All Agencies, Exec. Order No. 14,215, 90 Fed. Reg. 10447, 10447 (Feb. 18, 2025).

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²¹ *Chamber of Commerce v. FTC*, No. 6:25-cv-9-JDK, 2026 WL 402498 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2026).

²² Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636, 2174-2207 (2018).

²³ *Id.*, 132 Stat. at 2185.

²⁴ *Id.*, 132 Stat. at 2218-19.

²⁵ *See Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. (Time-Warner)*, 571 A.2d 1140, 1142, 1150, 1151 (Del. 1990).

²⁶ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e).

²⁷ *RBC Cap. Mkts., LLC v. Jervis*, 129 A.3d 816, 865 n.191 (Del. 2015).

²⁸ *Smith v. Van Gorkom (Trans Union)*, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (holding that in the context of a proposed merger, directors must inform themselves of all “information . . . reasonably available to [them] and relevant to their decision” to recommend the merger); *see also Aronson v. Lewis*, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[U]nder the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”).

²⁹ *In re Kraft Heinz Demand Refused Derivative S'holder Litig.*, Cons. C.A. No. 2022-0398-LWW, 2024 WL 3493957, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2024) (quoting *McPadden v. Sidhu*, 964 A.2d

1262, 1274 (Del. Ch. 2008)).

³⁰ Under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, section 102(b)(7), a Delaware corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, either limit or eliminate entirely the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders, and of an officer to the corporation's stockholders, for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty, but such provisions may not eliminate or limit the liability of a director or officer for, among other things, (1) breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders or (2) acts or omissions not in good faith or that involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law. Many Delaware corporations have either eliminated or limited director and officer liability to the extent permitted by law. The Delaware Supreme Court has ruled that the typical Delaware corporation charter provision exculpating directors from monetary damages in certain cases applies to claims relating to disclosure issues in general and protects directors from monetary liability for good faith omissions. *See Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc.*, 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994). Similar provisions have been adopted in most states. The limitation on personal liability does not affect the availability of injunctive relief.

³¹ *Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter*, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).

³² *In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.*, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).

³³ *See Amirsaleh v. Bd. of Trade of City of New York, Inc.*, C.A. No. 2822-CC, 2009 WL 3756700, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2009); *Liberty Prop. L.P. v. 25 Mass. Ave. Prop. LLC*, C.A. No. 3027-VCS, 2009 WL 224904, at *5 & n.21 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2009), *aff'd sub nom. 25 Mass. Ave. Prop. LLC v. Liberty Prop. Ltd. P'ship*, 970 A.2d 258 (Del. 2009).

³⁴ *Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan*, 970 A.2d 235, 244 (Del. 2009).

³⁵ *In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. S'holder Litig.*, 115 A.3d 1173 (Del. 2015).

³⁶ *See Guth v. Loft, Inc.*, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17); *see also Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc.*, 673 A.2d 148, 155 (Del. 1996) (stating that a director "may not take a business opportunity for his own if: (1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity; (2) the opportunity is within the corporation's line of business; (3) the corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and (4) by taking the opportunity for his own, the [director] will thereby be placed in a position inimicable to his duties to the corporation," but that a director "may take a corporate opportunity if: (1) the opportunity is presented to the director . . . in his individual and not his corporate capacity; (2) the opportunity is not essential to the corporation; (3) the corporation holds no interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and (4) the director or officer has not wrongfully employed the resources of the corporation in pursuing or exploiting the opportunity").

³⁷ *See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.*, 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987); *In re PNB Holding Co. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (reviewing under the entire fairness standard a transaction in which most public stockholders

were cashed out but some stockholders, including the directors, continued as stockholders of the recapitalized company); *Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp.*, 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that actions by the board after a consent solicitation had begun that were designed to thwart the dissident stockholder’s goal of obtaining majority representation on the board, violated the board’s fiduciary duty); *AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.*, 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“[W]here a self-interested corporate fiduciary has set the terms of a transaction and caused its effectuation, it will be required to establish the entire fairness of the transaction to a reviewing court’s satisfaction.”).

38 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)-(c).

39 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(d)(5).

40 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 144(e)(2).

41 *E.g.*, *In re W. Nat’l Corp. S’holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000) (holding at summary judgment that a 46% stockholder was not a controller because there were no facts showing that the stockholder took steps to dominate or interfere with the board of directors’ oversight of the company); *In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig.*, Cons. C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG, 2023 WL 3408772, at *20 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2023) (finding after trial that the company’s Chief Technology Officer and Executive Chairman of its board of directors was not a controller despite being the company’s founder, “visionary leader,” and largest shareholder, whose votes were “indispensable to reelecting incumbent outside directors,” and noting that although the founder “could have exerted control” with respect to the challenged transaction, he did not); *In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig.*, 101 A.3d 980, 983 (Del. Ch. 2014) (declining to hold that an entity hired by a corporation to manage its “day-to-day operations” was the corporation’s controlling stockholder), *aff’d sub nom. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC*, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015); *In re Zhongpin Inc. S’holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 7393-VCN, 2014 WL 6735457, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2014) (accepting pleadings stage inference that a stockholder possessed material authority in light of statements in the company’s public filings that their CEO could “exercise significant influence over our company” through his stockholdings), *rev’d on other grounds sub nom. In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., S’holder Litig.*, 115 A.3d 1173 (Del. 2015).

42 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(e)(1).

43 *Sheldon v. Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P.*, 220 A.3d 245, 251-52 (Del. 2019) (citation omitted).

44 *In re Hansen Med., Inc. S’holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 12316-VCMR, 2018 WL 3025525, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2018).

45 *Sheldon*, 220 A.3d at 252 (internal quotation marks omitted).

46 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(d)(5).

47 J. Travis Laster, *Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It Means*, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 26-27 (2013) (discussing the distinction between standards of

conduct and standards of review).

⁴⁸ This chapter focuses on how transactions are evaluated under the laws of Delaware, the most ubiquitous state of incorporation in the United States. Other states, particularly Texas and Nevada, have recently introduced amendments to their corporate law frameworks in an attempt to compete with Delaware. The corporate law framework of these jurisdictions may therefore be of some increasing relevance to corporate planners. For example, Texas and Nevada have both codified a version of the business judgment rule; stockholder plaintiffs therefore face a significantly higher burden when challenging director or officer decisions. *See* TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.419; NRS 78.138(7). The courts in Texas and Nevada have not yet opined in any significant way on their amended corporate laws.

⁴⁹ *In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *23 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (quoting *In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig.*, 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009)).

⁵⁰ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).

⁵¹ *E.g., In re Crimson Expl. Inc. S'holder Litig.*, No. CIV.A. 8541-VCP, 2014 WL 5449419, at *21-22 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2014) (applying the business judgment rule where “four members of the Board—a majority—were independent and disinterested in approving the Merger”).

⁵² *See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis*, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 & n.6 (Del. 1984).

⁵³ *Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp.*, 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (quoting *Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.*, 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)).

⁵⁴ *In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, 879 A.2d 604, 615 (Del. Ch. 2005).

⁵⁵ *E.g., Orman v. Cullman*, 794 A.2d 5, 20 (Del. Ch. 2002).

⁵⁶ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1).

⁵⁷ *Id.*

⁵⁸ *Id.*

⁵⁹ *Id.*

⁶⁰ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a).

⁶¹ *See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor I)*, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), *decision modified on reargument*, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).

⁶² DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2).

⁶³ See, e.g., *In re Lukens Inc. S'holders Litig.*, 757 A.2d 720, 737 (Del. Ch. 1999), *aff'd sub nom. Walker v. Lukens, Inc.*, 757 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000); *Schiff v. RKO Pictures Corp.*, 104 A.2d 267, 270-72 (Del. Ch. 1954).

⁶⁴ *Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC*, 125 A.3d 304, 305-06 (Del. 2015).

⁶⁵ *Id.* at 309-11 & n.19 (distinguishing *Gantler v. Stephens*, 965 A.2d 695, 713-14 (Del. 2009)).

⁶⁶ *In re Volcano Corp. S'holder Litig.*, 143 A.3d 727, 747 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“I conclude that the acceptance of a first-step tender offer by fully informed, disinterested, uncoerced stockholders representing a majority of a corporation’s outstanding shares in a two-step merger under Section 251(h) has the same cleansing effect under *Corwin* as a vote in favor of a merger by a fully informed, disinterested, uncoerced stockholder majority.”), *aff'd*, 156 A.3d 697 (Del. 2017) (table); see also *Larkin v. Shah*, C.A. No. 10918-VCS, 2016 WL 4485447, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016) (applying *Corwin* to tender offer under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(h)).

⁶⁷ *Singh v. Attenborough*, 137 A.3d 151, 151-52 (Del. 2016).

⁶⁸ *Id.* at 152.

⁶⁹ E.g., *id.* at 152-53; *In re Volcano*, 143 A.3d at 750 (“summarily dismiss[ing]” aiding and abetting claim predicated on alleged breaches of fiduciary duty that were cleansed under *Corwin*); *In re Rouse Props., Inc.*, No. CV 12194-VCS, 2018 WL 1226015, at *25 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2018). The statutory safe harbors, however, do not “[l]imit or eliminate the right of any person to seek relief on the grounds that a stockholder or other person knowingly aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty by 1 or more of the directors of the corporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(d)(6)(c).

⁷⁰ *In re Solera Holdings, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 11524-CB, 2017 WL 57839, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2017); see also *Morrison v. Berry*, 191 A.3d 268, 282 n.60 (Del. 2018) (endorsing framework).

⁷¹ *In re Solera*, 2017 WL 57839, at *7.

⁷² See *Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC*, 125 A.3d 304, 312 (Del. 2015) (“[I]f troubling facts regarding director behavior were not disclosed that would have been material to a voting stockholder, then the business judgment rule is not invoked.”). The materiality standard required under *Corwin* is the same standard applied elsewhere under Delaware law, which tracks the federal securities laws. See *In re Solera*, 2017 WL 57839, at *9.

⁷³ *City of Dearborn Police & Fire Revised Ret. Sys. v. Brookfield Asset Mgmt. Inc.*, 314 A.3d 1108, 1131 (Del. 2024) (quoting *Morrison v. Berry*, 191 A.3d 268, 282-83 (Del. 2018)).

⁷⁴ *Morrison v. Berry*, 191 A.3d 268 284-88 (Del. 2018).

75 *Id.* at 272.

76 *Appel v. Berkman*, 180 A.3d 1055 (Del. 2018).

77 *In re Xura, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 12698-VCS, 2018 WL 6498677, at *12 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 2018).

78 *Chester Cnty. Emps.' Ret. Fund v. KCG Holdings, Inc.*, C.A. No. 2017-0421-KSJM, 2019 WL 2564093, at *12 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2019).

79 *In re USG Corp. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 2018-0602-SG, 2020 WL 5126671, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2020), *aff'd sub nom. Anderson v. Leer*, 265 A.3d 995 (Del. 2021) (table).

80 *In re Anaplan, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 2022-1073-NAC, 2024 WL 3086013, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2024), *aff'd*, 339 A.3d 694 (Del. 2025).

81 *Id.* at *10 (citation omitted).

82 *Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp.*, C.A. No. 11418-VCG, 2017 WL 2352152, at *17-18, *21-22 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017).

83 *Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC*, 288 A.3d 692, 721 (Del. Ch. 2023).

84 *Id.* at 721-22.

85 *In re Anaplan*, 2024 WL 3086013, at *9.

86 *In re Saba Software, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 10697-VCS, 2017 WL 1201108, at *15-16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2017, *revised* Apr. 11, 2017).

87 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(e)(6).

88 *Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault*, 51 A.3d 1213, 1243 (Del. 2012).

89 *Id.* at 1244.

90 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(b).

91 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(e)(3).

92 *In re Match Grp., Inc. Derivative Litig.*, 315 A.3d 446 (Del. 2024).

93 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1), (b)(1).

94 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(b)(1).

⁹⁵ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1), (b)(1).

⁹⁶ See *Kahn v. Tremont Corp.*, 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997); *Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc.*, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); *Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co.*, 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985).

⁹⁷ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a), (b).

⁹⁸ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(e)(4).

⁹⁹ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(d)(2).

¹⁰⁰ *Id.*

¹⁰¹ *Del. Cnty. Emps.' Ret. Fund v. Sanchez*, 124 A.3d 1017, 1019 (Del. 2015).

¹⁰² See *Orman v. Cullman*, C.A. No. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004).

¹⁰³ Cf. *Kahn v. Tremont Corp.*, 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997) (reversing trial court's decision to place burden of proving unfairness on plaintiffs in part on the Delaware Supreme Court's finding that three members of the special committee had previous affiliations with the buyer and received financial compensation or influential positions from the buyer).

¹⁰⁴ See, e.g., *In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2004) (analyzing the independence of a member of a special committee because he was a paid consultant of an affiliate of the controlling stockholder).

¹⁰⁵ See, e.g., *Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga*, 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999); see also *Mizel v. Connelly*, C.A. No. 16638, 1999 WL 550369, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 1999) (stating that close familial ties should "go a long (if not the whole) way toward creating a reasonable doubt" as to independence).

¹⁰⁶ See, e.g., *Del. Cnty. Emps.' Ret. Fund*, 124 A.3d at 1019 (finding that allegations that a director had "a close friendship of over half a century with the interested party" and that "the director's primary employment . . . was as an executive of a company over which the interested party had substantial influence" adequately raised a doubt that the director was not independent); *Sandys v. Pincus*, 152 A.3d 124, 135 (Del. 2016) (holding that a director lacked independence from an interested party because the director and her husband co-owned a private plane with the interested party, suggesting an unusually close relationship); *Cumming v. Edens*, C.A. No. 13007-VCS, 2018 WL 992877, at *14-16 (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 2018) (finding that one director lacked independence from an interested party because of her employment in a leadership position at a charity where the interested party's wife served on the board of directors and to which the interested party had made significant financial contributions, and another director lacked independence from the same interested party because that director had been invited by the interested party to join an ownership group of a professional basketball team); *In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig.*, C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG, 2018 WL 1381331, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018) (holding at the pleading stage that a director lacked independence from the company's founder

and 28% stockholder, who was also the Chief Technology Officer and Executive Chairman of the board of directors, based on the director’s “multiple layers of business connections with Oracle,” including being “affiliated with two venture capital firms that operate in areas dominated by Oracle” combined with the “rather lucrative” director fees that would be jeopardized if the director sued the founder, were sufficient to discredit the director’s independence).

¹⁰⁷ *In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig.*, Cons. C.A. No. 12711-VCS, 2022 WL 1237185, at *30 n.378 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2022), *aff’d*, 298 A.3d 667 (Del. 2023).

¹⁰⁸ *See In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S’holder Litig.*, 906 A.2d 808 (Del. Ch. 2005) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims that the acquiror “overpaid” for the target because claims were derivative and therefore could not survive if a majority of the acquiror’s board was independent, and concluding that the overwhelming majority of directors were in fact independent, despite directors’ various business relationships with the acquiror and (in some cases) leadership positions held by directors of charitable institutions that were alleged to be major recipients of the acquiror’s corporate giving), *aff’d*, 906 A.2d 766 (Del. 2006). In *Yucaipa American Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio*, the Delaware Court of Chancery found a director independent despite her having previously served as an executive under the company’s founder and former CEO 10 years prior. *Yucaipa Am. All. Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio*, 1 A.3d 310 (Del. Ch. 2010), *aff’d*, 15 A.3d 218 (Del. 2011).

¹⁰⁹ *In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig.*, 101 A.3d 980, 997 (Del. Ch. 2014).

¹¹⁰ *Harrison Metal Cap. III, L.P. v. Mathé*, C.A. No. 2022-0261-PAF, 2024 WL 1299579, at *12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2024).

¹¹¹ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(d)(3).

¹¹² *Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.*, 88 A.3d 635, 639, 649 (Del. 2014).

¹¹³ *In re Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. S’holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 1909124, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2013) (quoting *Gesoff v. IIC Indus. Inc.*, 902 A.2d 1130, 1145 (Del. Ch. 2006)).

¹¹⁴ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(b)(1), (c)(1). *See also Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc.*, 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994) (suggesting that even where a special committee obtains independent legal and financial advice and negotiates diligently, the requisite degree of independence may still be lacking if the committee and controlling stockholder fail to establish that the committee has the power to negotiate independently).

¹¹⁵ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(b)(1), (c)(1).

¹¹⁶ *In re Dole Food Co. S’holder Litig.*, C.A. Nos. 8703-VCL, 9079-VCL, 2015 WL 5052214, at *29-30 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (quoting *Kahn v. Tremont Corp.*, C.A. No. 12339, 1996 WL 145452, at *16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 1996), *rev’d*, 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997)).

- 117 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § (b)(1), (c)(1).
- 118 *ACP Master, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp.*, C.A. Nos. 8508-VCL, 9042-VCL, 2017 WL 3421142, at *22 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2017); *see also In re Dole Food Co.*, 2015 WL 5052214, at *29.
- 119 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(b)(1), (c)(1); *see also Gesoff v. IIC Indus. Inc.*, 902 A.2d 1130, 1150 (Del. Ch. 2006).
- 120 *In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig.*, 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011).
- 121 Tr. of Oral Arg. and the Ct.'s Ruling on Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 61:6-63:20, *Giffuni v. Cornerstone Bldg. Brands, Inc. (In re Cornerstone Bldg. Brands, Inc., S'holder Litig.)*, C.A. No. 2023-0092-JTL (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2024).
- 122 *Id.* at 67:15-68:16.
- 123 *See, e.g., In re Rural Metro Corp. S'holders Litig.*, 88 A.3d 54, 90 (Del. Ch. 2014), *aff'd sub nom. RBC Cap. Mkts., LLC v. Jervis*, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015).
- 124 *See, e.g., In re El Paso Pipeline Partners, L.P. Derivative Litig.*, C.A. No. 7141-VCL, 2015 WL 1815846 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2015).
- 125 *Rales v. Blasband*, 634 A.2d 927, 935 n.10 (Del. 1993) (noting that failure to use Section 220 “as an information-gathering tool” has resulted in “a plethora of superficial complaints that could not be sustained”); *Mizel v. Connelly*, C.A. No. 16638, 1999 WL 550369, at *5 n.5 (Del. Ch. July 22, 1999) (“After the repeated admonitions of the Supreme Court to use the ‘tools at hand,’ lawyers who fail to use those tools to craft their pleadings do so at some peril.” (citation omitted)).
- 126 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(a)(1).
- 127 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b)(3).
- 128 *Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.*, 559 A.2d 1261, 1279-80 (Del. 1989).
- 129 *In re Tele-Comm'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 16470, 2005 WL 3642727, at *10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2005, revised Jan. 10, 2006).
- 130 *Gesoff v. IIC Indus. Inc.*, 902 A.2d 1130 (Del. Ch. 2006).
- 131 *In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *32 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2004).
- 132 *See, e.g., RBC Cap. Mkts., LLC v. Jervis*, 129 A.3d 816, 864 (Del. 2015); *Firefighters' Pension Sys. of City of Kansas City v. Found. Bldg. Materials, Inc.*, 318 A.3d 1105, 1174 (Del. Ch. 2024) (sustaining aiding and abetting claims against financial advisor whose contingent fee

arrangement incentivized them to pursue a transaction that would trigger an early termination payment to the controller).

¹³³ See *City of Dearborn Police & Fire Revised Ret. Sys. v. Brookfield Asset Mgmt., Inc.*, 314 A.3d 1108 (Del. 2024); *City of Sarasota Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc.*, 319 A.3d 271 (Del. 2024).

¹³⁴ See *City of Sarasota Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings Inc.*, C.A. No. 2022-0698-KSJM, 2025 WL 1642064, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2025) (denying motion to dismiss under *Cornerstone* on remand for disclosure breaches that were reasonably conceivably made in bad faith).

¹³⁵ *Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.*, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).

¹³⁶ *Unocal*, 493 A.2d 946.

¹³⁷ *Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp.*, 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011).

¹³⁸ *RBC Cap. Mkts., LLC v. Jervis*, 129 A.3d 816, 857 (Del. 2015).

¹³⁹ *Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings, LLC*, 125 A.3d 304, 312 (Del. 2015).

¹⁴⁰ See, e.g., *id.* at 308-14; but cf. *id.* at 311 n.20 (declining to rule on the continued vitality of *In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S'holder Litig.*, 669 A.2d 59, 68 (Del. 1995), in which the court did not apply the business judgment rule to the Santa Fe board's decision to adopt defensive measures to ward off a hostile approach from Union Pacific, on the ground that "the stockholders of Santa Fe merely voted in favor of the merger [with Burlington] and not the defensive measures").

¹⁴¹ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(d)(6)(b).

¹⁴² On a motion for preliminary injunction, Vice Chancellor Parsons "conclude[d] that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their argument that the approximately 50% cash and 50% stock consideration here triggers *Revlon*." *In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011).

¹⁴³ *Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.*, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).

¹⁴⁴ *Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc.*, 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).

¹⁴⁵ *Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (QVC)*, 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994).

¹⁴⁶ *C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.' & Sanitation Emps.' Ret. Tr.*, 107 A.3d 1049, 1053 (Del. 2014).

¹⁴⁷ *Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan*, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009).

148 *Id.*

149 *See Gantler v. Stephens*, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) (*Unocal* review not required where the plaintiff challenged the board's decision to reject the offers of three suitors and pursue a recapitalization instead); *TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp.*, C.A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (*Revlon* not triggered by an unsolicited offer to negotiate a friendly deal).

150 *Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. (Time-Warner)*, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).

151 *QVC*, 637 A.2d 34.

152 Tr. of Ruling of the Ct. on Pls.' Mot. For a Prelim. Inj. at 6-7, *Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson*, C.A. No. 5878-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2011) (“[I]t’s just not worth having the dance on the head of a pin as to whether it’s 49 percent cash or 51 percent cash or where the line is. This is the only chance that Occam stockholders have to extract a premium, both in the sense of maximizing cash now, and in the sense of maximizing their relative share of the future entity’s control premium. This is it. So I think it makes complete sense that you would apply a reasonableness review, enhanced scrutiny to this type of transaction.”).

153 *See Time-Warner*, 571 A.2d at 1154; accord *In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 13587, 1995 WL 334258, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 31, 1995) (holding that although a “bidding contest” did occur, *Revlon* duties not triggered where board did not initiate bidding and sought strategic stock-for-stock merger), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part*, 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).

154 *Time-Warner*, 571 A.2d at 1150; see also *id.* at 1154 (“The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate goals.”); accord *Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc.*, 650 A.2d 1270, 1289-90 (Del. 1994).

155 Transactions in which a controller cashes or squeezes out the minority are often subject to entire fairness review, discussed *infra* Section II.C.

156 *In re Synthes, Inc. S’holder Litig.*, 50 A.3d 1022, 1047-48 (Del. Ch. 2012); *In re NCS Healthcare, Inc., S’holders Litig.*, 825 A.2d 240, 254-55 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“The situation presented on this motion does not involve a change-of-control. On the contrary, this case can be seen as the obverse of a typical *Revlon* case. Before the transaction . . . is completed, [the seller] remains controlled by the [controlling stockholder]. The record shows that, as a result of the proposed [] merger, [the seller’s] stockholders will become stockholders in a company that has no controlling stockholder or group. Instead, they will be stockholders in a company subject to an open and fluid market for control.”), *rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Omni Care, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.*, 822 A.2d 397 (Del. 2002).

157 *Firefighters’ Pension Sys. of City of Kansas City, Mo. Tr. v. Presidio, Inc.*, 251 A.3d 212, 266 (Del. Ch. 2021).

158 *See In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig.*, 669 A.2d 59, 70-71 (Del. 1995) (holding

that *Revlon* did not apply to a transaction in which cash represented 33% of the consideration); *In re Synthes, Inc.*, 50 A.3d at 1047-9 (holding that *Revlon* did not apply to a transaction in which cash represented 35% of the consideration); *Flannery v. Genomic Health, Inc.*, C.A. No. 2020-0492-JRS, 2021 WL 3615540 at *19-22 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2021) (holding that *Revlon* did not apply to a transaction in which cash represented 42% of the consideration).

¹⁵⁹ *In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011).

¹⁶⁰ *Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan*, 970 A.2d 235, 241 (Del. 2009).

¹⁶¹ *In re Rural Metro Corp. S'holders Litig.*, 88 A.3d 54, 89-96 (Del. Ch. 2014), *aff'd sub nom. RBC Cap. Mkts., LLC v. Jervis*, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015).

¹⁶² *Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (QVC)*, 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994).

¹⁶³ *Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allan*, C.A. No. 16301, 1998 WL 892631, at *16 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1998); *accord In re MONY Grp. Inc. S'holder Litig.*, 852 A.2d 9, 15 (Del. Ch. 2004).

¹⁶⁴ *QVC*, 637 A.2d at 44.

¹⁶⁵ *In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig.*, 14 A.3d 573 (Del. Ch. 2010).

¹⁶⁶ *Id.* at 578.

¹⁶⁷ *Id.* at 595-96.

¹⁶⁸ *In re Family Dollar Stores, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 9985-CB, 2014 WL 7246436 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2014).

¹⁶⁹ *Id.* at *16.

¹⁷⁰ Tr. of Telephonic Oral Arg. and Rulings of the Ct. on Pl's' Mot. for a TRO, *Pfizer Inc. v. Metsera, Inc.*, C.A. No. 2025-1259-MTZ (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2025).

¹⁷¹ *Teamsters Local 677 Health Servs. & Ins. Plan v. Martell*, C.A. No. 2021-1075-NAC, 2023 WL 1370852 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2023); *see also In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, 7 A.3d 487, 512 (Del. Ch. 2010).

¹⁷² *C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.' & Sanitation Emps.' Ret. Tr.*, 107 A.3d 1049, 1053 (Del. 2014).

¹⁷³ *Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan*, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009).

¹⁷⁴ *Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.*, 559 A.2d 1261, 1286 (Del. 1989); *Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc.*, 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).

175 *Macmillan*, 559 A.2d at 1287.

176 *In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig.*, 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005).

177 *In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076, at *17, *18, *22 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011).

178 *In re Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. S’holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 1909124, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

179 *C&J Energy Servs.*, 107 A.3d at 1067-68.

180 *Id.* at 1070.

181 *In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig.*, 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007) (entering injunction requiring waiver of standstill agreement with potential bidder during go-shop period to allow potential bidder to make an offer).

182 *See, e.g., In re Cogent, Inc. S’holders Litig.*, 7 A.3d 487, 497-98 (Del. Ch. 2010).

183 *In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig.*, 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007); *see also* Tr. of Oral Arg. on Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 14, 20, *Forgo v. Health Grades, Inc.*, C.A. No. 5716-VCS, 2010 WL 9036904 (Del. Ch. Sept. 3, 2010) (criticizing the target’s board for failing to “sift through possible . . . buyers and make a judgment about whether there might be someone who would be interested” and create “any record that it really segmented the market or considered whether there was a likely buyer”).

184 *Netsmart*, 924 A.2d at 198-99.

185 *Id.* at 209.

186 *Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc.*, C.A. No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013).

187 While *Revlon* claims are typically brought as pre-closing claims for injunctive relief, the Court of Chancery recently issued two post-trial decisions finding breaches of fiduciary duty under *Revlon*, underscoring the fact that such claims may proceed beyond the injunctive relief stage and remain relevant post-closing. In *In re Mindbody, Inc., Stockholder Litigation*, the Court applied *Revlon* and held that a CEO breached his fiduciary duties where he tilted the sale process in favor of one bidder for personal reasons and withheld critical information from the full board of directors. C.A. No. 2019-0442-KSJM, 2023 WL 2518149 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2023), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part*, 332 A.3d 349 (Del. 2024). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed those holdings, despite “some misgivings about the thinness of the evidence” regarding damages (although, as discussed in Section II.F below, it reversed a separate holding that the bidder was liable for aiding and abetting disclosure violations). 332 A.3d 349, 407 (Del. 2024). Similarly, in *In re Columbia Pipeline Group, Merger Litigation*, the Court of Chancery held under *Revlon* that the CEO and

CFO breached their fiduciary duties by favoring one bidder during the negotiations, including by making a counteroffer to that bidder without involving the board, because of their desire to close a transaction that would allow them to retire with change-of-control benefits. 299 A.3d 393, 460-68 (Del. Ch. 2023), *rev'd*, 342 A.3d 324 (Del. 2025). The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery's decision in *Columbia Pipeline* because it disagreed with the trial court's findings with respect to aiding and abetting liability (citing the Delaware Supreme Court's *Mindbody* holding, discussed above, which had not yet been issued at the time of the trial court's decision), but the decision's *Revlon* holdings remains instructive.

¹⁸⁸ *RBC Cap. Mkts., LLC v. Jervis*, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015).

¹⁸⁹ *Id.* at 830-31.

¹⁹⁰ *In re Rural Metro Corp. S'holders Litig.*, 88 A.3d 54, 94 (Del. Ch. 2014), *aff'd sub nom. RBC Cap. Mkts.*, 129 A.3d 816.

¹⁹¹ *In re Rural/Metro Corp. S'holders Litig.*, 102 A.3d 205, 224 (Del. Ch. 2014), *aff'd sub nom. RBC Cap. Mkts.*, 129 A.3d 816.

¹⁹² *RBC Cap. Mkts.*, 129 A.3d at 860; *see also In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig.*, 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011) (finding implied *Revlon* violation due to board's failure to oversee conduct of financial advisors).

¹⁹³ *In re PLX Tech. Inc. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 9880-VCL, 2018 WL 5018535 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018), *aff'd*, 211 A.3d 137 (Del. 2019).

¹⁹⁴ *Id.* at *33, *42.

¹⁹⁵ *Id.* at *47.

¹⁹⁶ *Id.* at *45-47.

¹⁹⁷ *Id.* at *47.

¹⁹⁸ *See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (QVC)*, 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994); *Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc.*, 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989). Two subsequent Delaware Supreme Court decisions confirm that board actions subject to review under *Unocal* in the context of an active takeover defense will in other circumstances need to satisfy only the standard business judgment analysis. In *Williams v. Geier*, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996), the Delaware Supreme Court reiterated that adoption of a defensive measure approved by stockholder vote would not be subjected to *Unocal* scrutiny, since it would not constitute unilateral board action. In *Kahn ex rel. DeKalb Genetics Corp. v. Roberts*, 679 A.2d 460 (Del. 1996), the Delaware Supreme Court refused to apply *Unocal*'s enhanced scrutiny to a share repurchase program, because that program was not initiated in response to any perceived threat.

- ¹⁹⁹ *Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp.*, 651 A.2d 1361, 1373, 1388 (Del. 1995).
- ²⁰⁰ The Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in *Santa Fe*, which concluded that the adoption of a “discriminatory” rights plan to defend against a third-party unsolicited, all-cash all-shares offer was a reasonable measure under *Unocal*, again recognizes the board’s discretion in preserving a strategic plan. *In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 13587, 1995 WL 334258, at *9-10 (Del. Ch. May 31, 1995), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part*, 669 A.2d 59, 71-72 (Del. 1995).
- ²⁰¹ *Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore*, 771 A.2d 293, 344 (Del. Ch. 2000).
- ²⁰² *Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.*, 16 A.3d 48, 129 (Del. Ch. 2011).
- ²⁰³ *Id.*
- ²⁰⁴ *HoldCo Opportunities Fund V, L.P. v. Angulo*, C.A. No. 2025-1360-MTZ, 2026 WL 194419 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2026).
- ²⁰⁵ *ACE Ltd. v. Cap. Re Corp.*, 747 A.2d 95, 108 (Del. Ch. 1999); *see also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co.*, C.A. Nos. 17398, 17383, 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999); *La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford*, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Nor may plaintiffs rely upon some naturally- occurring rate or combination of deal protection measures, the existence of which will invoke the judicial blue pencil. Rather, plaintiffs must specifically demonstrate how a given set of deal protections operate in an unreasonable, preclusive, or coercive manner, under the standards of this Court’s *Unocal* jurisprudence, to inequitably harm shareholders.”).
- ²⁰⁶ *Crawford*, 918 A.2d at 1181 n.10 (emphasis omitted).
- ²⁰⁷ *Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. (Time-Warner)*, 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990).
- ²⁰⁸ *Compare Gilbert v. El Paso Co.*, 575 A.2d 1131, 1143-44 (Del. 1990) (holding that because all of the board’s actions were in response to an unsolicited tender offer seeking control of company, *Unocal* standard applied throughout), *with In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 13587, 1995 WL 334258, at *9 n.7 (Del. Ch. May 31, 1995) (holding that the board’s decision to enter into original stock-for-stock merger was subject to business judgment review, but altered transaction in response to unsolicited third-party offer must be subjected to enhanced scrutiny under *Unocal*), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part*, 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995); *Time-Warner*, 571 A.2d at 1151 n.14 (holding that original plan of merger entered into as part of corporate strategy subject to business judgment rule, while later actions in response to hostile tender offer are subject to enhanced *Unocal* standard).
- ²⁰⁹ *In re Edgio, Inc. S’holders Litig.*, Cons. C.A. No. 2022-0624-MTZ, 2023 WL 3167648, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 1, 2023).

210 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(d)(6).

211 *Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp.*, 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).

212 *MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.*, 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003).

213 *Id.* at 1132 (invalidating addition of two board seats for the purpose of impeding stockholder franchise in a contested election by diminishing influence of stockholder’s nominees).

214 *Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc.*, 929 A.2d 786, 808 (Del. Ch. 2007).

215 *MM Cos.*, 813 A.2d at 1131; *Stroud v. Grace*, 606 A.2d 75, 91 (Del. 1992); *see also Pell v. Kill*, 135 A.3d 764, 785 & n.9, 787 n.14 (Del. Ch. 2016).

216 *Coster v. UIP Cos., Inc.*, 300 A.3d 656, 672-73 (Del. 2023); *see also Mercier*, 929 A.2d at 809-10; *Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore*, 771 A.2d 293, 323 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“[I]t may be optimal simply for Delaware courts to infuse our *Unocal* analyses with the spirit animating *Blasius* and not hesitate to use our remedial powers where an inequitable distortion of corporate democracy has occurred.”).

217 *Vejseli v. Duffy*, C.A. No. 2025-0232-BWD, 2025 WL 1452842 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2025).

218 *Id.* at *10-11.

219 *Encite LLC v. Soni*, C.A. No. 2476-VCG, 2011 WL 5920896, at *20 (Del. Ch. Nov. 28, 2011) (citation omitted).

220 *Emerald Partners v. Berlin*, 787 A.2d 85, 92 (Del. 2001).

221 *In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig.*, 919 A.2d 563, 596 (Del. Ch. 2007).

222 *N.J. Carpenters Pension Fund v. infoGROUP, Inc.*, C.A. No. 5334-VCN, 2011 WL 4825888, at *11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2011).

223 *Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault*, 51 A.3d 1213, 1240 (Del. 2012); *see also* DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)-(c), (e)(3).

224 *In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. S’holder Litig.*, Cons. C.A. No. 11202-VCS, 2017 WL 3568089, at *11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2017) (noting that a controller not standing on both sides of the transaction “can nonetheless ‘compete’ with the minority by leveraging its controller status to cause the acquiror to divert consideration to the controller that would otherwise be paid into the deal”); *In re Match Grp., Inc. Derivative Litig.*, 315 A.3d 446, 463-64 (Del. 2024) (holding that “the conflict problem . . . invariably arises” from a parent-subsidiary relationship because the parent, by virtue of its control of the subsidiary, “can cause the subsidiary to confer a non-ratable benefit on the controlling parent to the detriment of the minority stockholders,” and applying this holding to a transaction that did not involve a freeze out merger (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted)); *see also* DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(b)-(c)

225 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(e)(4).

226 *See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Transworld Healthcare, Inc.*, 745 A.2d 902, 913 (Del. Ch. 1999).

227 *See, e.g., Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga*, 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999).

228 *See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp.*, 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997).

229 *GB-SP Holdings, LLC v. Walker*, 2024 WL 4799490, at *39 (Del. Ch. Nov. 15, 2024) (reviewing under the entire fairness standard a transaction by which directors negotiated to obtain indemnity from purchaser for substantial and specific liability risk).

230 *In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig.*, 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013).

231 *See Solomon v. Armstrong*, 747 A.2d 1098, 1118 (Del. Ch. 1999), *aff'd*, 746 A.2d 277 (Del. 2000); *In re Gen. Motors Class H S'holders Litig.*, 734 A.2d 611, 617 (Del. Ch. 1999); *see also LC Cap. Master Fund, Ltd. v. James*, 990 A.2d 435, 451 (Del. Ch. 2010).

232 *In re MultiPlan Corp. S'holders Litig.*, 268 A.3d 784, 809-13 (Del. Ch. 2022); *Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC*, 288 A.3d 692, 713-23 (Del. Ch. 2023); *see also Laidlaw v. GigAcquisitions2, LLC*, C.A. No. 2021-0821-LWW, 2023 WL 2292488, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2023).

233 *Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor II)*, 663 A.2d 1134, 1153 (Del. Ch. 1994) (internal citations omitted), *aff'd*, *Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor III)*, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).

234 *In re Digex, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, 789 A.2d 1176 (Del. Ch. 2000).

235 *McMullin v. Beran*, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000).

236 *Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.*, 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983); *accord Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc.*, 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994) (quoting *Weinberger*, 457 A.2d at 711). *See also Roofers Local 149 Pension Fund ex. rel. F&G Annuities & Life, Inc. v. Fid. Nat'l Fin., Inc.*, C.A. No. 2024-0562-LWW, 2025 WL 1354973, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2025) (dismissing a claim subject to entire fairness review because the plaintiff failed to plead “‘some facts’ that, if true, would make the Transaction terms unfair.” (citation omitted)).

237 *Weinberger*, 457 A.2d at 711.

238 *ACP Master, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp.*, C.A. Nos. 8508-VCL, 9042-VCL, 2017 WL 3421142 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2017).

239 *Id.* at *29.

- 240 *Id.*
- 241 *In re BGC Partners, Inc. Derivative Litig.*, Cons. C.A. No. 2018-0722-LWW, 2022 WL 3581641, at *18 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2022), *aff'd*, 303 A.3d 337 (Del. 2023).
- 242 *Technicolor II*, 663 A.2d at 1143.
- 243 *Encite LLC v. Soni*, C.A. No. 2476-VCG, 2011 WL 5920896, at *20 (Del. Ch. Nov. 28, 2011) (citation omitted).
- 244 *In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, Cons. C.A. No. 12711-VCS, 2022 WL 1237185, at *30, *48 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2022), *aff'd*, 298 A.3d 667 (Del. 2023).
- 245 *BGC Partners*, 2022 WL 3581641, at *1.
- 246 *Jacobs v. Akademos, Inc.*, 326 A.3d 711, 760 (Del. Ch. 2024), *aff'd*, 342 A.3d 1165 (Del. 2025) [table].
- 247 *Id.*; *BGC Partners*, 2022 WL 3581641, at *29; *Tesla*, 2022 WL 1237185, at *31.
- 248 *In re Hennessy Cap. Acquisition Corp. IV S'holder Litig.*, 318 A.3d 306, 319 (Del. Ch. 2024), *aff'd*, 337 A.3d 1214 (Del. 2024) (table).
- 249 *Id.* at 320.
- 250 *Id.* at 318-28.
- 251 *In re Sears Hometown & Outlet Stores, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, 309 A.3d 474, 539 (Del. Ch. 2024).
- 252 *Id.* at 519-34.
- 253 *Id.* at 535-38.
- 254 *Manti Holdings, LLC v. Carlyle Grp., Inc.*, C.A. No. 2020-0657-SG, 2025 WL 39810 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 2025), *aff'd*, 350 A.3d 1222 (Del. 2025).
- 255 *E.g.*, *In re BGC Partners, Inc. Derivative Litig.*, Cons. C.A. No. 2018-0722-LWW, 2022 WL 3581641, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2022); *In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, Cons. C.A. No. 12711-VCS, 2022 WL 1237185, at *26 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2022), *aff'd*, 298 A.3d 667 (Del. 2023); *In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig.*, C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG, 2018 WL 1381331, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018); *In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig.*, 52 A.3d 761, 766 (Del. Ch. 2011), *aff'd sub nom. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault*, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012).
- 256 *See Brookfield Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Rosson*, 261 A.3d 1251, 1263 (Del. 2021).

257 *United Food & Com. Workers Union & Participating Food Indus. Emps. Tri-State Pension Fund v. Zuckerberg*, 262 A.3d 1034, 1049 (Del. 2021).

258 *Id.*

259 *Id. at* 1058.

260 *See, e.g., BGC Partners*, 2022 WL 3581641, at *13 (considering demand futility in the context of a controlling stockholder transaction).

261 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(d)(6)(C).

262 *Morgan v. Cash*, C.A. No. 5053-VCS, 2010 WL 2803746, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 16, 2010).

263 *In re Comverge, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, No. CV 7368-VCP, 2014 WL 6686570, at *19 (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2014).

264 *In re Mindbody, Inc., S'holder Litig.*, 332 A.3d 349, 391 (Del. 2024); *In re Columbia Pipeline Grp., Inc. Merger Litig.*, 342 A.3d 324, 356 (Del. 2025).

265 *In re Comverge*, 2014 WL 6686570, at *19.

266 *Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co.*, 56 A.3d 1072 (Del. Ch. 2012), *aff'd*, 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012).

267 *Order, Depomed Inc. v. Horizon Pharma, PLC*, No. 1-15-CV-283834, 2014 WL 7433326 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015).

268 *Id. at* *2-3.

269 *See RAA Mgmt., LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc.*, 45 A.3d 107 (Del. 2012).

270 *C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.' & Sanitation Emps.' Ret. Tr.*, 107 A.3d 1049, 1067 (Del. 2014) (quoting *Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc.*, 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989)); *Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (QVC)*, 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994).

271 *Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan*, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009).

272 *In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holders Litig.*, 924 A.2d 171, 192 (Del. Ch. 2007).

273 *In re Fort Howard Corp. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 9991, 1988 WL 83147 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988).

274 *In re Columbia Pipeline Grp., Merger Litig.*, 299 A.3d 393 (Del. Ch. 2023).

275 *See, e.g., In re MONY Grp. Inc. S'holder Litig.*, 852 A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. 2004) (denying shareholder plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief based upon allegations that the MONY board

of directors, having decided to put the company up for sale, failed to fulfill their fiduciary duties by foregoing an auction in favor of entering into a merger agreement with a single bidder and allowing for a post-signing market check).

²⁷⁶ *In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076, at *19 n.133 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011).

²⁷⁷ *Fort Howard*, 1988 WL 83147; see *C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.' & Sanitation Emps.' Ret. Tr.*, 107 A.3d 1049, 1070 (Del. 2014) (“In prior cases like *In re Fort Howard Corporation Shareholders Litigation*, this sort of passive market check was deemed sufficient to satisfy *Revlon*.”).

²⁷⁸ *Fort Howard*, 1988 WL 83147, at *13.

²⁷⁹ *In re Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL1909124, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2013) (citing *In re Pennaco Energy, Inc.*, 787 A.2d 691, 707 (Del. Ch. 2001)).

²⁸⁰ *Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc.*, C.A. No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013).

²⁸¹ *Id.* at *19.

²⁸² *Id.* at *20.

²⁸³ *In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig.*, 926 A.2d 58, 86-87 (Del. Ch. 2007); see also *In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig.*, 926 A.2d 94, 119-20 (Del. Ch. 2007).

²⁸⁴ *Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor II)*, 663 A.2d 1134, 1142 (Del. Ch. 1994), *aff'd*, *Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor III)*, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).

²⁸⁵ See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., *Documenting the Deal: How Quality Control and Candor Can Improve Boardroom Decision-Making and Reduce the Litigation Target Zone*, 70 BUS. LAW. 679 (May 2015).

²⁸⁶ See, e.g., *Smith v. Van Gorkom (Trans Union)*, 488 A.2d 858, 876-77 (Del. 1985).

²⁸⁷ *Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp.*, 888 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 2018); see also *In re Finjan Holdings, Inc.*, 58 F.4th 1048, 1058 (9th Cir. 2023).

²⁸⁸ *In re PLX Tech. Inc. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 9880-VCL, 2018 WL 5018535 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018), *aff'd*, 211 A.3d 137 (Del. 2019).

²⁸⁹ *Id.*

²⁹⁰ *In re Trulia, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016).

²⁹¹ *Scott v. DST Sys., Inc.*, C.A. Nos. 18-cv-00286-RGA, 18-cv-00322-RGA, 2019 WL

3997097 (D. Del. Aug. 23, 2019); *see also Anderson v. Magellan Health, Inc.*, 298 A.3d 734 (Del. Ch. 2023); *Alvarez v. Akorn, Inc.*, 99 F.4th 368 (7th Cir. 2024).

²⁹² *See* Tr. of Ruling of the Ct. on Pls.’ Mot. For a Prelim. Inj. at 15, *Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson*, C.A. No. 5878-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2011) (ordering disclosure concerning, among other things, “what appear to be longitudinal changes from previous Jefferies’ books that resulted in the final book making the deal look better than it would have had the same metrics been used that were used in prior books”).

²⁹³ *See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig.*, 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012).

²⁹⁴ *See* Self-Regulatory Organizations, SEC Release No. 34-56645, 91 SEC Docket 2216 (Oct. 11, 2007).

²⁹⁵ *See* FINRA Manual, FINRA Rule 5150.

²⁹⁶ *In re Tele-Comm’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 16470, 2005 WL 3642727, at *10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2005, revised Jan. 10, 2006).

²⁹⁷ *Firefighters’ Pension Sys. of City of Kansas City v. Found. Bldg. Materials, Inc.*, 318 A.3d 1105, 1174 (Del. Ch. 2024)

²⁹⁸ *In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig.*, 877 A.2d 975, 1005 (Del. Ch. 2005).

²⁹⁹ *Id.*

³⁰⁰ *Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC*, 288 A.3d 692, 721 (Del. Ch. 2023).

³⁰¹ *Id.* at 727.

³⁰² *In re Multiplan Corp. S’holders Litig.*, 268 A.3d 784 (Del. Ch. 2022).

³⁰³ *In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig.*, 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011).

³⁰⁴ *Id.* at 835 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

³⁰⁵ *In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig.*, 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014), *aff’d sub nom. RBC Cap. Mkts., LLC v. Jervis*, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015).

³⁰⁶ *Id.* at 100.

³⁰⁷ *RBC Cap. Mkts., LLC v. Jervis*, 129 A.3d 816, 865 (Del. 2015).

³⁰⁸ *Id.* at 866.

³⁰⁹ *Id.* at 855 n.129.

310 *Id.* at 856.

311 *Firefighters' Pension Sys. of City of Kansas City, Mo. Tr. v. Presidio, Inc.*, 251 A.3d 212, 267 (Del. Ch. 2021).

312 *Id.* at 267-68.

313 *Id.* at 272.

314 *Id.* at 269.

315 *See, e.g., In re Zale Corp. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 9388-VCP, 2015 WL 6551418 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2015); *Singh v. Attenborough*, 137 A.3d 151 (Del. 2016).

316 *Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC*, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).

317 *Singh*, 137 A.3d at 151-52.

318 *In re Volcano Corp. S'holder Litig.*, 143 A.3d 727, 750 (Del. Ch. 2016); *aff'd*, 156 A.3d 697 (Del. 2017).

319 *Buttonwood Tree Value Partners L.P. v. R.L. Polk & Co.*, C.A. No. 9250-VCG, 2017 WL 3172722, at *10 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2017).

320 *Id.* at *11.

321 *Singh*, 137 A.3d at 153.

322 *In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig.*, 25 A.3d 813, 832 (Del. Ch. 2011).

323 *Vento v. Curry*, C.A. No. 2017-0157-AGB, 2017 WL 1076725, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2017).

324 *Id.*; *cf. Order, In re Columbia Pipeline Grp., Inc. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 12152-VCL, 2017 WL 898382, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 2017) (citing *In re Micromet, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 7197-VCP, 2012 WL 681785 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2012), as dispositive authority that disclosure of a sell-side investment advisor's financial interest in the buyer in its Form 13F (and not in the merger proxy statement) is sufficient disclosure, particularly where the balance of the investment advisor's ownership does not create an economic conflict).

325 *Firefighters' Pension Sys. of City of Kansas City, Mo. Tr. v. Presidio, Inc.*, 251 A.3d 212, 260-63 (Del. Ch. 2021).

326 *English v. Narang*, C.A. No. 2018-0221-AGB, 2019 WL 1300855 (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 2019).

327 *In re Rouse Props., Inc.*, Cons. C.A. No. 12194-VCS, 2018 WL 1226015 (Del. Ch. Mar.

9, 2018).

³²⁸ *City of Dearborn Police & Fire Revised Ret. Sys. v. Brookfield Asset Mgmt., Inc.*, 314 A.3d 1108, 1131 (Del. 2024) (citation omitted).

³²⁹ *City of Sarasota Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc.*, 319 A.3d 271 (Del. 2024).

³³⁰ *Id.* at 293-95.

³³¹ *Id.* at 297.

³³² 17 C.F.R. § 229.1015(b).

³³³ SEC Div. of Corporation Fin., Corporation Finance Interpretations: Tender Offer Rules and Schedules, Questions and Answers of General Applicability (last updated Feb. 11, 2026), <https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cdi-tender-offers-and-schedules.htm>.

³³⁴ *See In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holders Litig.*, 924 A.2d 171, 177 (Del. Ch. 2007); *see also Maric Cap. Master Fund, Ltd. v. PLATO Learning, Inc.*, 11 A.3d 1175, 1178 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]n my view, management’s best estimate of the future cash flow of a corporation that is proposed to be sold in a cash merger is clearly material information.”).

³³⁵ *In re 3Com S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 5067-CC, 2009 WL 5173804, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009) (holding that plaintiffs have failed to show how disclosure of full projections, instead of the summary provided by the financial advisors, would have altered the “total mix of available information”); *see also In re CheckFree Corp. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 3193-CC, 2007 WL 3262188 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2007).

³³⁶ *See David P. Simonetti Rollover IRA v. Margolis*, C.A. No. 3694-VCN, 2008 WL 5048692, at *10 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008) (explaining that “Delaware law requires that directors disclose the substance of the investment banker’s work, which usually depends in part upon management’s best estimates,” and holding that a proxy statement that discloses projections that “reflected management’s best estimates at the time” instead of “lower-probability projections” meets the requirement to disclose projections that “would have been considered material by the reasonable stockholder”).

³³⁷ *In re Micromet, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 7197-VCP, 2012 WL 681785, at *13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2012) (quoting *Globis Partners, L.P. v. Plumtree Software, Inc.*, C.A. No. 1577-VCP, 2007 WL 4292024, at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2007)) (holding that there is no legal requirement to disclose projections that present “overly optimistic ‘what-ifs’”).

³³⁸ Tr. of Oral Arg. on Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. and Rulings of the Ct. at 24-28, *In re BEA Sys., Inc. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 3298-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 26, 2008).

339 *Id.* at 94.

340 *In re Saba Software, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 10697-VCS, 2017 WL 1201108, at *25 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2017, revised Apr. 11, 2017).

341 *In re Cyan, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 11027-CB, 2017 WL 1956955, at *17 (Del. Ch. May 11, 2017), *aff'd*, 211 A.3d 137 (Del. 2019).

342 *In re PLX Tech. Inc. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 9880-VCL, 2018 WL 5018535 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018), *aff'd*, 211 A.3d 137 (Del. 2019).

343 *English v. Narang*, C.A. No. 2018-0221-AGB, 2019 WL 1300855, at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 2019).

344 SEC Div. of Corporation Fin., Corporation Finance Interpretations: Non-GAAP Financial Measures (last updated Dec. 13, 2022), <https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/nongaapinterp.htm>.

345 *Id.*

346 Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, and Projections, SEC Release Nos. 33-11265, 34-99418 (Feb. 26, 2024).

347 *Id.*

348 *West Palm Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Moelis & Co.*, 311 A.3d 809 (Del. Ch. 2024).

349 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(18).

350 *See* Am. Bar Ass'n, *Private Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study* 121 (Dec. 19, 2025); Euclid Transactional, *Global Representations & Warranties Insurance Claims Study 2025* (Jan. 2026); SRS Acquiom, *2025 M&A Deal Terms Study* (2025); Euclid Transactional, *Global Representations & Warranties Insurance Claims Study 2024* (Oct. 2024); SRS Acquiom, *2024 M&A Deal Terms Study* (2024).

351 While R&W insurance claims span the waterfront of representation breaches, the most common types of R&W insurance claims generally relate to breaches of representations related to financial statements, compliance with law, material contract matters, taxes, and employment matters. *See* Euclid Transactional, *Global Representations & Warranties Insurance Claims Study 2025* (Jan. 2026); Euclid Transactional, *Global Representations & Warranties Insurance Claims Study 2024* (Oct. 2024); Fasken, *Trends in Representations and Warranties Insurance (RWI) in North American Private M&A* (Oct. 2, 2025); Willis Towers Watson, *2025 Mid-Year RWI Claims Update* (Aug. 2025).

352 In addition, R&W insurers exclude all representation and warranty breaches known by the

acquiror's "deal team" (typically around three key members of the acquiror's due diligence team) at the time of binding coverage (typically the signing of the transaction), even if such items were not included in the disclosure schedule to the transaction agreement. Knowledge is typically defined as actual conscious awareness both of a particular fact and that the fact constitutes a breach, and typically does not include imputed or constructive knowledge or a duty of inquiry.

³⁵³ When the risks associated with Covid were pervasive and the impact on operations was unknown, R&W insurers typically included an automatic Covid-based exclusion in R&W insurance policies. Similarly, after Russia invaded Ukraine, R&W insurers often included an exclusion related to business operations or employees located in Russia and Ukraine.

³⁵⁴ Of course, if an R&W insurer interposes an exclusion in an R&W insurance policy, the buyer might still be able to negotiate a specific indemnity from the sellers.

³⁵⁵ See Igor Kirman, Ian Boczek & Nicholas C.E. Walters, *The Next Frontier for Representations and Warranties Insurance: Public M&A Deals?*, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. (Oct. 24, 2020), <https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/24/the-next-frontier-for-representations-and-warranties-insurance-public-ma-deals/>.

³⁵⁶ For a discussion of the impact of transaction forms on anti-assignment and change-in-control provisions, see generally, *Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH*, 62 A.3d 62, 86-88 (Del. Ch. 2013).

³⁵⁷ See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(h) and § 253 (2010).

³⁵⁸ 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a).

³⁵⁹ Office of Mergers & Acquisitions, Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Exemptive Order for Tender Offers for Equity Securities (Apr. 16, 2026).

³⁶⁰ See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(h) (2013).

³⁶¹ *In re Volcano Corp. S'holder Litig.*, 143 A.3d 727 (Del. Ch. 2016), *aff'd*, 156 A.3d 697 (Del. 2017).

³⁶² *Id.* at 744.

³⁶³ SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Corporation Finance Interpretations, Going Private Transactions, Exchange Act Rule 13e-3 and Schedule 13E-3, Section 201.05 (last updated Jan. 26, 2009), <https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/13e-3-interps.htm>.

³⁶⁴ See *NYSE Listed Company Manual*, Rule 312.03; *Nasdaq Stock Market Rules*, Rule 5635(a). See also *Nasdaq Stock Market Rules, FAQs - Listings*, FAQ 182, 244.

³⁶⁵ See, e.g., *Smith v. Van Gorkom (Trans Union)*, 488 A.2d 858, 875 (Del. 1985).

³⁶⁶ *Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (QVC)*, 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994).

³⁶⁷ *Trans Union*, 488 A.2d at 876 (pointing to evidence that members of Trans Union's Board "knew that the market had consistently undervalued the worth of Trans Union's stock, despite steady increases in the Company's operating income in the seven years preceding the merger").

³⁶⁸ *Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. (Time-Warner)*, 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del. 1990).

³⁶⁹ *Id.* at 1150; *see also id.* at 1154 ("Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy."); *Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp.*, C.A. No. CV 12108-VCL, 2017 WL 1437308, at *18-19 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017) ("[T]he fiduciary relationship requires that the directors act prudently, loyally, and in good faith to maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the benefit of the providers of presumptively permanent equity capital, as warranted for an entity with a presumptively perpetual life in which the residual claimants have locked in their investment. The fact that some holders of shares might be market participants who are eager to sell and would prefer a higher near-term market price likewise does not alter the presumptively long-term fiduciary focus.").

³⁷⁰ *Time-Warner*, 571 A.2d at 1153.

³⁷¹ *See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.*, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); *Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.*, C.A. No. 10168, 1988 WL 108332 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 1988), *rev'd on other grounds*, 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989). In the *Macmillan* case, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that it was legitimate for a board to consider the "effect on the various constituencies" of a corporation, the companies' long-term strategic plans and "any special factors bearing on stockholder and public interests" in reviewing merger offers. 559 A.2d at 1285 n.35.

³⁷² MD. CODE CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-104(b)(9) (permitting corporations to adopt a charter provision that allows the board of directors "in considering a potential acquisition of control of the corporation, to consider the effect of the potential acquisition of control on" other constituencies, including "employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors," and "[c]ommunities" in which the corporation's offices are located); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357 (permitting directors to consider the social, legal and economic effects on constituencies other than shareholders "[w]hen evaluating any offer of another party to make a tender or exchange offer for any equity security of the corporation, or any proposal to merge or consolidate the corporation with another corporation or to purchase or otherwise acquire all or substantially all the properties and assets of the corporation").

³⁷³ *See, e.g., Tr., Norfolk S. Corp. v. Conrail Inc.*, C.A. No. 96-CV-7167 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1996) (concluding that Pennsylvania's constituency statute "provides that in considering the best interests of the corporation or the effects of any action, the directors are not required to consider the interests of any group, obviously including shareholders, as a dominant or controlling factor. . ."); *Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp.*, 727 F. Supp. 31, 33 (D. Me. 1989)

(justifying use of a poison pill in response to a cash tender offer partly on the basis of Maine's other constituency statute).

³⁷⁴ See *Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.*, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 234978 (Oct. 13, 1988) (indicating that the following factors will be considered by the SEC to conclude that a CVR is not a security: (1) the CVR to be granted to the selling shareholders is an integral part of the consideration to be received in the proposed merger; (2) the holders of the CVR will have no rights common to stockholders, such as voting and dividend rights, nor will they bear a stated rate of interest; (3) the CVRs will not be assignable or transferable, except by operation of law; and (4) the CVRs will not be represented by any form of certificate or instrument).

³⁷⁵ Pausing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement to Further American Economic and National Security, Exec. Order 14,209, 90 Fed. Reg. 9587 (Feb. 10, 2025).

³⁷⁶ *NACCO Indus., Inc. v. applica Inc.*, 997 A.2d 1, 19 (Del. Ch. 2009).

³⁷⁷ *Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.*, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); *Unocal*, 493 A.2d 946; see also *supra* Section II.D.2.

³⁷⁸ *In re Toys "R" Us, Inc., S'holder Litig.*, 877 A.2d 975, 1021 (Del. Ch. 2005).

³⁷⁹ *La. Mun. Police Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Crawford*, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2007).

³⁸⁰ *Vintage Rodeo Parent, LLC v. Rent-a-Ctr., Inc.*, 2019 WL 1223026, at *1 n.1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 14, 2019) (“[T]his Court has generally found termination fees of around 3% to be reasonable, subject to deal-specific factors.” (collecting cases))

³⁸¹ *In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig.*, 14 A.3d 573, 575 (Del. Ch. 2010).

³⁸² *In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig.*, 926 A.2d 58, 86 (Del. Ch. 2007).

³⁸³ *In re Answers Corp. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 6170-VCN, 2011 WL 1366780, at *4 n.52 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2011) (noting that, in the context of a relatively small transaction, a “somewhat higher than midpoint on the ‘range’ is not atypical”).

³⁸⁴ *Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co.*, C.A. Nos. 17398, 17383, 17427, 1999 WL 1054255 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999).

³⁸⁵ *Id.* at *2.

³⁸⁶ *HoldCo Opp. Fund V, L.P. v. Angulo*, C.A. No. 2025-1360-MTZ, 2026 WL 194419, at *7, *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2026).

³⁸⁷ *In re Answers Corp.*, 2011 WL 1366780, at *4 n.52.

³⁸⁸ See, e.g., *In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, 7 A.3d 487, 503-04 (Del. Ch. 2010) (citing *In*

re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 120 (Del. Ch. 2007)) (observing that the decision whether to view a termination fee's preclusive effect in terms of equity value or enterprise value will depend on the factual circumstances existing in a given case).

³⁸⁹ *In re Comverge, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, Cons. C.A. No. 7368-VCP, 2014 WL 6686570, at *15-17 (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2014).

³⁹⁰ *In re Rouse Props., Inc.*, Cons. C.A. No. 12194-VCS, 2018 WL 1226015, at *7 n.70 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2018) (quoting *In re Lear Corp. S'holders Litig.*, 967 A.2d 640, 656-57 (Del. Ch. 2008)); *In re Toys "r" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, 2005 WL 5756357, at *19 (Del. Ch. June 24, 2005).

³⁹¹ *In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig.*, 967 A.2d 640, 656-57 (Del. Ch. 2008).

³⁹² *Id.* at 655. The merger agreement also included a force the vote provision that required the Lear board to call a stockholder meeting to approve the merger, even if it had ultimately withdrawn its recommendation, unless the agreement had been validly terminated in accordance with its terms.

³⁹³ *See H.F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp.*, C.A. No. 15650, 1997 WL 305824 (Del. Ch. June 3, 1997).

³⁹⁴ *NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applicia Inc.*, 997 A.2d 1, 19 (Del. Ch. 2009). This principle also comes into play when a party claims that a target should be required to take actions in contravention of its obligations under a no-shop. In *C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. City of Miami General Employees' & Sanitation Employees' Retirement Trust*, A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014), the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the grant of a mandatory preliminary injunction that required the target company to shop itself in violation of a contractually bargained no-shop provision. The Delaware Court of Chancery had ruled that the board of the selling company had violated its fiduciary duties and enjoined the stockholder vote for 30 days while the selling company could undertake an active market check. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the judicial waiver of the no-shop clause was an error because the buyer was an "innocent third party" and, even on facts determined after trial, "a judicial decision holding a party to its contractual obligations while stripping it of bargained-for benefits should only be undertaken on the basis that the party ordered to perform was fairly required to do so, because it had, for example, aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty." *Id.* at 1054, 1072.

³⁹⁵ *Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (QVC)*, 637 A.2d 34, 47-48 (Del. 1994).

³⁹⁶ *Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co.*, C.A. Nos. 17398, 17383, 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999).

³⁹⁷ *ACE Ltd. v. Cap. Re Corp.*, 747 A.2d 95, 108-09 (Del. Ch. 1999).

³⁹⁸ *C&J Energy Servs.*, 107 A.3d at 1072 n.110 (quoting *OTK Assocs. LLC v. Friedman*, 85 A.3d 696, 720 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2014)).

399 Tr. of Telephonic Oral Arg. and Ruling of the Ct., *In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S'holder Litig. (Genomics II)*, C.A. No. 7888-VCL, 2012 WL 9989212 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012).

400 *Id.* at 18.

401 Tr. of Ruling of the Ct., *In re Ancestry.com Inc. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012).

402 *In re Columbia Pipeline Grp., Inc.*, Cons. C.A. No. 2018-0484-JTL, 2021 WL 772562, at *33 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2021).

403 *Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (QVC)*, 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1993).

404 *See Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp.*, C.A. No. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027, at *27 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005) (“The Merger Agreement, of course, was not an ordinary contract. Before the Merger could occur, the shareholders of Holly had to approve it. The directors of Holly were under continuing fiduciary duties to the shareholders to evaluate the proposed transaction. The Merger Agreement accommodated those duties by allowing, under certain circumstances, the board of directors to withdraw or change its recommendation to the shareholders that they vote for the Merger.”).

405 Tr. of Telephonic Ruling of the Ct. at 18, *In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S'holder Litig. (Genomics I)*, C.A. No. 7888-VCL, 2012 WL 9989211 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2012).

406 Tr. of Oral Arg. at 133, *In re NYSE Euronext S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 8136-CS (Del. Ch. May 10, 2013).

407 While the Delaware Court of Chancery has yet to address a direct challenge to an intervening events clause, it did discuss one such provision in the context of an appraisal proceeding, ultimately finding that the sale process (including the board’s right modify its recommendation pursuant to a intervening event clause) was reliable, so deal price was a persuasive indicator of fair value. *See In re Stillwater Mining Co.*, No. CV 2017-0385-JTL, 2019 WL 3943851, at *42 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2019), *aff’d sub nom. Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures Fund Ltd. v. Stillwater Mining Co.*, 240 A.3d 3 (Del. 2020).

408 *See* DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 146 (2011).

409 *HoldCo Opp. Fund V, L.P. v. Angulo*, C.A. No. 2025-1360-MTZ, 2026 WL 194419, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2026).

410 *Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.*, 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).

411 *Id.* at 946.

412 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(d)(6)(b).

⁴¹³ See *Orman v. Cullman*, C.A. No. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004); see also *Majority Shareholders' Voting Agreement Not Impermissible Lock-Up, Del. Court Says*, 7 M&A L. REP. 863 (Nov. 8, 2004).

⁴¹⁴ *Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc.*, C.A. No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at *17 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013).

⁴¹⁵ Examples of such structures include: The Hillshire Brands Company's terminated acquisition of Pinnacle Foods Inc. (2014), Martin Marietta Materials, Inc.'s acquisition of Texas Industries, Inc. (2014), and Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc.'s acquisition of Seventy Seven Energy Inc. (2017).

⁴¹⁶ *In re OPENLANE, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011); see also *Optima Int'l of Miami, Inc. v. WCI Steel, Inc.*, C.A. No. 3833-VCL, 2008 WL 3822429 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2008) (distinguishing *Omnicare* and rejecting an argument that a stockholder's written consent, which was received within a day of the target board's approval of the merger agreement, was impermissible under the *Omnicare* analysis).

⁴¹⁷ See SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Corporation Finance Interpretations: Securities Act Sections, Questions and Answers of General Applicability, Securities Act Section 239.13 (last updated Jan. 23, 2026), <https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/sasinterp.htm>.

⁴¹⁸ A study of public target transactions completed in 2024 found that 94.1% of public merger agreements included match rights, and over 99% of public deals with match rights included continuous match rights. Am. Bar Ass'n, *2024 ABA Public Target Deal Points Study* (2024).

⁴¹⁹ *Id.*

⁴²⁰ *In re BioClinica, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 8272-VCG, 2013 WL 5631233, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013); *In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, 877 A.2d 975, 980 (Del. Ch. 2005).

⁴²¹ *Blueblade Cap. Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Cos.*, C.A. No. 11184-VCS, 2018 WL 3602940, at *25 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2018).

⁴²² *Id.* at *22.

⁴²³ *In re Sears Hometown & Outlet Stores, Inc. S'Holder Litig.*, 309 A.3d 474 (Del. Ch. 2024), *modified*, 2024 WL 3555781 (Del. Ch. July 2, 2024).

⁴²⁴ *Id.* at 524.

⁴²⁵ Tr. of Telephonic Ruling of the Ct., *In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S'holder Litig. (Genomics I)*, C.A. No. 7888-VCL, 2012 WL 9989211 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2012); Tr. of Telephonic Oral Arg. and Ruling of the Ct., *In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S'holder Litig. (Genomics II)*, C.A. No. 7888-VCL, 2012 WL 9989212 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012).

426 Tr. of Telephonic Ruling of the Ct. at 16, *Genomics I, In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S'holder Litig. (Genomics I)*, C.A. No. 7888-VCL, 2012 WL 9989211 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2012).

427 *In re Comverge, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, Cons. C.A. No. 7368-VCP, 2014 WL 6686570, at *15-17 (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2014).

428 Tr. of Oral Arg. at 106, *In re NYSE Euronext S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 8136-CS (Del. Ch. May 10, 2013).

429 *IBP Inc. v. Tyson Foods (In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig.)*, 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001).

430 *Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp.*, 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008).

431 *Id.* at 738-39.

432 *Id.* at 738.

433 *Id.* at 740.

434 *Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG*, C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018).

435 *Id.* at *50.

436 *Id.* at *1.

437 *Id.* at *53 (citing *In re IBP, Inc.*, 789 A.2d at 68 (footnote omitted)). In *Ameristar Casinos, Inc. v. Resorts International Holdings, LLC*, the Court accepted the premise, although did not decide, that an MAE had occurred where there was a 248% increase in the property tax assessment on the target asset, which translated to a tax liability of \$18 million per year for an asset generating \$30 million per year in net income. C.A. No. 3685-VCS, 2010 WL 1875631 (Del. Ch. May 11, 2010). In 2017, the Court of Chancery extended the heavy burden in finding an MAE from the acquisition context to a license agreement between Mrs. Fields and Interbake and applied the test from *IBP* in assessing whether the standard for termination had been achieved. *Mrs. Fields Brand, Inc. v. Interbake Foods LLC*, C.A. No. 12201-CB, 2017 WL 2729860 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2017). Notably, the license agreement did not use a defined MAE or MAC term and instead referred to a “change . . . that is . . . materially adverse to . . . the business,” which the Court equated with a traditional MAE/MAC standard. *Id.* at *21-23. The Court even extended the *IBP* test to a termination right in the license agreement that did not use “material adverse” language but instead allowed for termination if the licensor materially damaged the brand in a way that “renders the performance of [the] Agreement by Licensee commercially unviable.” *Id.* at *20. The Court found that despite no use of “material adverse” language, the magnitude and duration of a loss must meet MAE-like significance before a party could terminate. *Id.* at *25-27.

438 *Akorn*, 2018 WL 4719347, at *53.

- 439 *Snow Phipps Group, LLC v. KCAKE Acquisition, Inc.*, C.A. No. 2020-0282-KSJM, 2021 WL 1714202 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2021).
- 440 *Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp.*, No. 2018-0673-AGB, 2019 WL 6896462 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019).
- 441 *Genesco, Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc.*, No. 07-2137-II(III), 2007 WL 4698244 (Tenn. Ch. Dec. 27, 2007).
- 442 *AB Stable VIII LLC v. Maps Hotels and Resorts One LLC*, C.A. No. 2020-0310-JTL, 2020 WL 7024929 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020), *aff'd*, 268 A.3d 198 (Del. 2021).
- 443 *Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG*, C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347, at *49 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018).
- 444 *Id.* at *61.
- 445 *Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Apollo (Mauritius) Holdings Pvt. Ltd.*, 2014 WL 5654305, at *15-17 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2014).
- 446 *AB Stable VIII LLC v. Maps Hotels and Resorts One LLC*, C.A. No. 2020-0310-JTL, 2020 WL 7024929, at *70, *73 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020).
- 447 *Id.* at *73.
- 448 *AB Stable VIII LLC*, 268 A.3d at 211-13.
- 449 *United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc.*, 937 A.2d 810 (Del. Ch. 2007).
- 450 *All. Data Sys. Corp. v. Blackstone Cap. Partners V L.P.*, 963 A.2d 746 (Del. Ch. 2009), *aff'd*, 976 A.2d 170 (Del. 2009) (table).
- 451 *James Cable, LLC v. Millennium Dig. Media Sys., L.L.C.*, C.A. No. 3637-VCL, 2009 WL 1638634, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 11, 2009).
- 452 *Snow Phipps Group, LLC v. KCAKE Acquisition, Inc.*, C.A. No. 2020-0282-KSJM, 2021 WL 1714202 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2021).
- 453 *Consol. Edison, Inc. v. Ne. Utils.*, 426 F.3d 524 (2d Cir. 2005).
- 454 For a discussion of sample contract language, see Ryan Thomas & Russell Stair, *Revisiting Consolidated Edison—A Second Look at the Case That Has Many Questioning Traditional Assumptions Regarding the Availability of Shareholder Damages in Public Company Mergers*, 64 BUS. LAW. 329, 349-57 (2009). *Cf. Amirsaleh v. Bd. of Trade of New York, Inc.*, C.A. No. 2822-CC, 2008 WL 4182998 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 2008) (holding that stockholder who received late election form had standing to sue for his preferred form of consideration after the merger was

consummated).

455 *Crispo v. Musk*, 304 A.3d 567, 584-86 (Del. Ch. 2023).

456 *Id.*

457 This reasonable best efforts standard was interpreted in *Williams Cos. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P.* to mean the party must “take all reasonable actions to complete the merger” and that the burden is on the alleged breaching party to prove it has not breached its covenant and failed to satisfy a closing condition. 159 A.3d 264, 273 (Del. 2017). In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court found that Energy Transfer Equity had not breached its covenant when its tax counsel did not deliver a tax opinion that was a required closing condition. *Id.* at 274.

458 See Decision and Order, *In the Matter of Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co. KGaA and NxStage Medical, Inc.*, Dkt. No. C-4671 (F.T.C. Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1710227_fresenius-nxstage_decision_and_order-4919.pdf.

459 Compl., *Albertsons Companies, Inc. v. Kroger Co.*, C.A. No. 2024-1276-LWW (Del. Ch. Dec. 14, 2024).

460 See *Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. (Time-Warner)*, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).

461 See, e.g., Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, *On the Use of Poison Pills and Defensive Payouts by Takeover Targets*, 79 J. BUS. 1783 (2006); Carmen S. Pinnell, *IRRC Governance Research Service, 2004 Background Report E: Poison Pills*, INV. RESPONSIBILITY RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 2004) (on file with authors); John Laide, *Poison Pill M&A Premiums*, SHARKREPELLENT.NET (Aug. 30, 2005) (on file with authors).

462 ISS, *United States Proxy Voting Guidelines: Benchmark Policy Recommendations 31* (Dec. 2025), <https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf> (*hereinafter* “ISS Guidelines”).

463 *Id.* at 9.

464 *Id.* at 14.

465 *Id.*

466 *Id.* at 30.

467 Glass Lewis, *2026 Benchmark Policy Guidelines – United States 71-72* (Dec. 2025), <https://resources.glasslewis.com/hubfs/2026%20Guidelines/Benchmark/Benchmark%20Policy%20Guidelines%202026%20-%20United%20States.pdf> (*hereinafter* “Glass Lewis Guidelines”).

468 *Id.* at 34.

469 *Id.*

470 *Id.*

471 Deal Point Data, Corporate Governance Dataset, Dec. 31, 2020 to Dec. 31, 2025, <https://www.dealpointdata.com>.

472 ISS Guidelines at 31.

473 *Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc.*, 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010).

474 *See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.*, 500 A.2d 1346, 1346 (Del. 1985); *Leonard Loventhal Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp.*, C.A. No. 17803, 2000 WL 1528909 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2000), *aff'd*, 780 A.2d 245 (Del. 2001).

475 *See Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black*, 844 A.2d 1022, 1085-88 (Del. Ch. 2004) (upholding the adoption of a rights plan in the context of a company's ongoing process of exploring strategic alternatives, where the court found that the controlling stockholder seeking to sell its control bloc had breached fiduciary duties and contractual obligations to the company, such that the normal power of a majority stockholder to sell its stock without sharing the opportunity with minority holders could not be used to further these breaches).

476 *See Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp.*, 686 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Ill. 1988); *BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co.*, 683 F. Supp. 458, 474-75 (D. Del. 1988); *Moore Corp. v. Wallace Comput. Servs. Inc.*, 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995); *Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.*, 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).

477 *CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc.*, 683 F. Supp. 422, 438-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (refusing to enjoin discriminatory application of rights plan during auction); *MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Comput., Inc.*, C.A. No. 10428, 1988 WL 140221 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988); *In re Holly Farms Corp. S'holders Litig.*, C.A. No. 10350, 1988 WL 143010 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988).

478 *Airgas*, 16 A.3d 48.

479 *Id.* at 122 n.480.

480 *Yucaipa Am. All. Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio*, 1 A.3d 310 (Del. Ch. 2010), *aff'd*, 15 A.3d 218 (Del. 2011); *see also In re BioClinica, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. 8272-VCG, 2013 WL 673736 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 2013).

481 *Yucaipa*, 1 A.3d at 350.

482 Tr. of Telephonic Oral Arg. and Rulings of the Ct. at 51, *In re Versum Materials, Inc.*

S'holder Litig., Cons. C.A. No. 2019-0206-JTL (Del. Ch. July 16, 2020).

483 *Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht*, C.A. Nos. 9496-VCP, 9497-VCP, 9508-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *17, *22 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).

484 *Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc.*, 5 A.3d 586, 586 (Del. 2010).

485 *Williams Cos. S'holder Litig.*, C.A. No. 2020-0707-KSJM, 2021 WL 754593, at *34 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2021).

486 *Id.* at *12.

487 *Id.* at *24.

488 In the case of *Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro*, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that dead hand and no hand provisions—even of limited duration—are invalid. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). The Court held that the dead hand feature of the rights plan, which barred a newly elected board from redeeming the pill for six months, ran afoul of Section 141(a) of the DGCL, which empowers the board with the statutory authority to manage the corporation. The Court also criticized dead hand provisions because they would prevent a newly elected board “from completely discharging its fundamental management duties to the corporation and its stockholders for six months” by restricting the board’s power to negotiate a sale of the corporation. *Id.* at 1291 (emphasis omitted). The reasoning behind the *Quickturn* holding, together with that of the 1998 decision in *Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc.* (which dealt with a pure dead hand pill rather than a no hand pill), leaves little room for dead hand provisions of any type in Delaware. *Carmody v. Toll Bros.*, 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998). In contrast to Delaware, courts in both Georgia and Pennsylvania have upheld the validity of dead hand and no hand provisions. See *Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs. Inc.*, 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997); *AMP Inc. v. Allied Signal, Inc.*, C.A. Nos. 98-4405, 98-4058, 98-4109, 1998 WL 778348 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1998), *partial summary judgment granted*, 1998 WL 967579 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 1998), *rev’d and remanded*, 168 F.3d 649 (3d Cir. 1999).

489 Another incrementally advantageous defensive aspect of staggered boards is that Section 141(k) of the DGCL permits corporations with staggered boards to limit stockholders’ right to remove directors to removal “for cause”—a very high bar and a limitation that is not available for corporations without staggered boards

490 *Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc.*, 8 A.3d 1182, 1185 (Del. 2010).

491 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1).

492 ISS Guidelines at 15.

493 *Id.* at 16.

494 *Icahn Partners LP v. Amylin Pharm., Inc.*, C.A. No. 7404-VCN, 2012 WL 1526814 (Del.

Ch. Apr. 20, 2012). The case was voluntarily dismissed, however, before the Court could rule on the merits of Mr. Icahn's request to enjoin enforcement of the advance notice provision.

⁴⁹⁵ *AB Value Partners, LP v. Kreisler Mfg. Corp.*, C.A. No. 10434-VCP, 2014 WL 7150465, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2014). In 2018, a New York trial court applying New York law enjoined Xerox's Board from enforcing the company's advance notice bylaw provision where the company announced a strategic transaction following the notice date, reasoning that a waiver of the notice provision was warranted because Xerox had undergone "a material change in circumstances" after the deadline. *In re Xerox Corp. Consol. S'holder Litig.*, 76 N.Y.S.3d 759 (Sup. Ct. 2018), *rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Deason v. Fujifilm Holdings Corp.*, 86 N.Y.S.3d 28 (1st Dep't 2018).

⁴⁹⁶ *BlackRock Credit Allocation Income Tr. v. Saba Cap. Master Fund, Ltd.*, 224 A.3d 964, 980 (Del. 2020).

⁴⁹⁷ *Rosenbaum v. CytoDyn Inc.*, C.A. No. 2021-0728-JRS, 2021 WL 4890876 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2021).

⁴⁹⁸ *AB Value Partners, LP*, 2014 WL 7150465, at *3.

⁴⁹⁹ *Kellner v. AIM ImmunoTech Inc.*, 307 A.3d 998, 1027-29 (Del. Ch. 2023), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part*, 320 A.3d 239 (Del. 2024).

⁵⁰⁰ *Kellner v. AIM ImmunoTech Inc.*, 320 A.3d 239, 258 (Del. 2024).

⁵⁰¹ *Id.* at 259-60.

⁵⁰² *Id.* at 60 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

⁵⁰³ *Id.* at 263-267.

⁵⁰⁴ *See* DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d).

⁵⁰⁵ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c).

⁵⁰⁶ *See Licht v. Storage Tech. Corp.*, C.A. No. 524-N, 2005 WL 1252355 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2005) (holding that, as a default matter, when the shareholders of a corporation vote on matters other than the election of directors (and barring the application of a more specific voting standard under another Delaware statute), abstentions are properly counted as negative votes).

⁵⁰⁷ *See, e.g., Allen v. Prime Comput., Inc.*, 540 A.2d 417 (Del. 1988); *Edelman v. Authorized Distribution Network, Inc.*, C.A. No. 11104, 1989 WL 133625 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 1989); *Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp.*, C.A. Nos. 10173, 10189, 1988 WL 383667 (Del. Ch. Sept. 20, 1988).

⁵⁰⁸ *See, e.g., Allen*, 540 A.2d 417; *Edelman*, 1989 WL 133625; *Nomad Acquisition*, 1988 WL 383667; *Plaza Sec. Co. v. O'Kelley*, C.A. No. 7932, 1985 WL 11539 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 1985), *aff'd*

sub nom. Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Sec. Co., 496 A.2d 1031 (Del. 1985).

⁵⁰⁹ See, e.g., *Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore*, 674 A.2d 483 (Del. Ch.), *aff'd*, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995); *Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc.*, C.A. No. 11510, 1990 WL 114222 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1990).

⁵¹⁰ *Pell v. Kill*, 135 A.3d 764 (Del. Ch. 2016).

⁵¹¹ *Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp.*, 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).

⁵¹² *Id.* at 950.

⁵¹³ *Id.* at 953 (referring to *Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.*, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)).

⁵¹⁴ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115.

⁵¹⁵ *City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc.*, 99 A.3d 229 (Del. Ch. 2014).

⁵¹⁶ E.g., *In re CytRX Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig.*, No. CV-14-6414, 2015 WL 9871275 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2015); Order, *Brewerton v. Oplink Commc'ns, Inc.*, No. RG14-750111, 2014 WL 10920491 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2014); Order, *Groen v. Safeway, Inc.*, No. RG14-716651, 2014 WL 3405752 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 14, 2014); Order, *Miller v. Beam, Inc.*, No. 2014 CH 00932, 2014 WL 2727089 (Ill. Ch. Ct. Mar. 5, 2014); Order, *Genoud v. Edgen Grp., Inc.*, No. 625,244, 2014 WL 2782221 (La. Dist. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014); Order, *Collins v. Santoro*, No. 154140/2014, 2014 WL 5872604 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 10, 2014); Order, *HEMG Inc. v. Aspen Univ.*, C.A. No. 650457/13, 2013 WL 5958388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 14, 2013); *North v. McNamara*, 47 F. Supp. 3d 635 (S.D. Ohio 2014); *Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc.*, 358 Or. 413, 415 (2015) (en banc); see also *City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares*, 99 A.3d 229 (Del. Ch. 2014) (enforcing a North Carolina forum-selection bylaw).

⁵¹⁷ Order, *Centene Corp. v. Elstein*, C.A. No. 11589-VCL, 2015 WL 5897988 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 2015); Tr. of Tel. Hr'g on Pl.'s Mots. for Expedited Proc. & for TRO & Rulings of the Ct., *Edgen Grp. Inc. v. Genoud*, C.A. No. 9055-VCL, 2013 WL 6409517 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2013).

⁵¹⁸ *Seafarers Pension Plan ex rel. Boeing Co. v. Bradway*, 23 F.4th 714 (7th Cir. 2022).

⁵¹⁹ *Lee v. Fisher*, 34 F.4th 777, 782 (9th Cir.), *reh'g en banc granted, op. vacated sub nom. Lee ex rel. The Gap, Inc v. Fisher*, 54 F.4th 608 (9th Cir. 2022).

⁵²⁰ *Lee v. Fisher*, 70 F.4th 1129, 1137-38, 1150-51, 1158 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc).

⁵²¹ *Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi*, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020).

⁵²² *Id.* at 113-14 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1)).

⁵²³ *Id.*

524 ISS Guidelines at 29.

525 Glass Lewis Guidelines at 77.

526 *Id.* at 77.

527 *Id.* at 26.

528 *ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund*, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).

529 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(f); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b).

530 *Solak v. Sarowitz*, C.A. No. 12299-CB, 2016 WL 7468070 (Del. Ch. Dec. 27, 2016).

531 Glass Lewis Guidelines at 77; ISS Guidelines at 29-30.

532 *See, e.g., Moore Corp. v. Wallace Comput. Servs. Inc.*, 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995); *Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp.*, 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio 1987), *aff'd*, 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987).

533 *See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.*, 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner*, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); *Grimes v. Donald*, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996); *Worth v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc.*, 540 N.E.2d 249 (Ohio 1989).

534 *San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharm., Inc.*, 983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch. 2009), *aff'd*, 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009).

535 *Id.* at 315.

536 *Id.* at 316 n.37.

537 *Kallick v. SandRidge Energy, Inc.*, 68 A.3d 242 (Del. Ch. 2013).

538 *Id.* at 260.

539 *Id.* at 255-60.

540 *Id.* at 264.

541 Tr. of Oral Arg. on Defs.' Mots. to Dismiss and Rulings of the Ct. at 70, *Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Ballantine*, No. 9789-VCL, 2014 WL 6388645 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2014).

542 *Id.* at 13-15.

543 *Id.* at 72-73.

⁵⁴⁴ *Id.* at 74; *see Carmody v. Toll Bros.*, 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998).

⁵⁴⁵ Tr. of Oral Arg. on Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss and Rulings of the Ct. at 78-79, *Pontiac*, 2014 WL 6388645.

⁵⁴⁶ *See, e.g., van der Gracht de Rommerswael v. Speese*, No. 4:17-cv-227, 2017 WL 4545929 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2017) (denying motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims against directors who approved a proxy put provision where the complaint alleged that the board (a) did not obtain extra consideration from lenders for including the provision, (b) could have obtained the financing without the provision, and (c) should have known the provision’s risks); *Gilbert v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Co.*, No. 2:15-cv-2854, 2016 WL 4159682 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2016) (settlement of breach of fiduciary duty claims against directors who had approved dead hand proxy puts included (a) removal of the proxy put provisions, (b) a \$167,000 payment to class counsel but no payment to the class, and (c) resolutions requiring board approval for any future debt instruments that contain dead hand proxy puts).

⁵⁴⁷ Tr. of Telephonic Bench Ruling of the Ct. on Pl.’s Application for an Order to Dismiss the Action as Moot and for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses at 8, *Fire & Police Pension Fund, San Antonio v. Stanzone*, C.A. No. 10078-VCG, 2015 WL 1359410 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 2015).

⁵⁴⁸ *See* Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order, *In the Matter of WACAS Management Corp.*, SEC Release No. 89914 (Sept. 7, 2020), <https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2020/34-89914.pdf>; Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order, *In the Matter of FP Resources USA Inc. and Lobster Point Holdings Ltd.*, SEC Release No. 83626 (July 13, 2018), <https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/34-83626.pdf>; Press Release, SEC, *Corporate Insiders Charged for Failing to Update Disclosures Involving “Going Private” Transactions* (Mar. 13, 2015), <https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-47.html>.

⁵⁴⁹ 5% or greater shareholders considering a potential unsolicited proposal should further consider the overlay of the SEC’s rules for Rule 13e-3 transactions, which require significantly heightened disclosure in connection with “going private” transactions involving affiliates of an issuer.

⁵⁵⁰ *Basic Inc. v. Levinson*, 485 U.S. 224, 239 (1988); *see also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.*, 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976) (setting forth the basic test for materiality under the securities laws).

⁵⁵¹ *Basic*, 485 U.S. at 239-41.

⁵⁵² Targets only must disclose a potential transaction if (i) such disclosure is affirmatively required by SEC rules, (ii) the target or a corporate insider desires to trade on the basis of material non-public information (the “disclose or abstain rule”), or (iii) disclosure is required to make prior

statements not misleading. *Vladimir v. Bioenvision Inc.*, 606 F. Supp. 2d 473, 484-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), *aff'd sub nom. Thesling v. Bioenvision, Inc.*, 374 Fed. App'x 141 (2d Cir. 2010); *SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur*, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968); *see also* Exchange Act Rule 14e-3 (prohibiting trading in the context of tender offers on the basis of material non-public information). Disclosure is only required by SEC rules in limited situations and Item 1.01 of Form 8-K does not require disclosure of mergers until a formal agreement is signed. Further, the SEC staff takes the position that although Item 303 of Regulation S-K could be read to require companies to address pending talks as “likely to have material effects on future financial condition or results of operations,” where disclosure is not otherwise required, a company’s management’s discussion and analysis need not contain a discussion of the impact of negotiations where inclusion of such information would jeopardize the completion of the transaction. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, SEC Release No. 33-6835 (May 18, 1989); 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.

⁵⁵³ “The duty of a corporation and its officers to disclose is limited. To that end, ‘a corporation is not required to disclose a fact merely because a reasonable investor would very much like to know that fact. Rather an omission is actionable under the securities laws only when the corporation is subject to a duty to disclose the omitted facts.’” *Vladimir*, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 484 (quoting *In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993)); *see also Basic*, 485 U.S. at 239 n.17.

⁵⁵⁴ *Emps. Ret. Sys. of R.I. v. Williams Cos.*, 889 F.3d 1153, 1168 (10th Cir. 2018).

⁵⁵⁵ However, the NYSE takes the position that “[n]egotiations leading to mergers and acquisitions . . . are the type of developments where the risk of untimely and inadvertent disclosure of corporate plans are most likely to occur. If unusual market activity should arise, the company should be prepared to make an immediate public announcement of the matter. A sound corporate disclosure policy is essential to the maintenance of a fair and orderly securities market. It should minimize the occasions where the [NYSE] finds it necessary to temporarily halt trading in a security due to information leaks or rumors in connection with significant corporate transactions.” *NYSE Listed Company Manual*, Rule 202.01. Similarly, Nasdaq imposes a duty on listed companies to promptly disclose, except in unusual circumstances, any material information which would reasonably be expected to affect the value of their securities or influence investors’ decisions. *Nasdaq Stock Market Rules*, Rule 5250(b)(1). Nasdaq defines unusual circumstances as, among other things, “where it is possible to maintain confidentiality of those events and immediate public disclosure would prejudice the ability of the Company to pursue its legitimate corporate objectives.” *Nasdaq Stock Market Rules*, Rule IM 5250-1.

⁵⁵⁶ *See, e.g., In re MCI Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 93 F. Supp. 2d 276, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that a disclosure duty arose only after the company affirmatively denied merger negotiations); *In re Columbia Sec. Litig.*, 747 F. Supp. 237, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (concluding that the plaintiff sufficiently pled that affirmative denial of merger negotiations during ongoing merger negotiations was materially misleading).

⁵⁵⁷ *In the Matter of Carnation Co.*, SEC Release No. 34-22214 (July 8, 1985).

⁵⁵⁸ *Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp.*, 113 F.3d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Obviously a corporation has no duty to correct rumors planted by third parties.”); *Carnation Co.*, SEC Release No. 34-22214. Additionally, there may be a duty to make corrective disclosure where there is evidence that market rumors stem from trading by insiders in the company’s shares. *In re Sharon Steel Corp.*, SEC Release No. 34-18271 (Nov. 19, 1981).

⁵⁵⁹ *State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor*, 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981); *see also Eisenstadt*, 113 F.3d at 744; *In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 9 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 1993); *Holstein v. Armstrong*, 751 F. Supp. 746, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1990).

⁵⁶⁰ The test of whether a leak or rumor is attributable to an issuer mirrors the test for whether a company is liable for analyst statements and forecasts—that is, whether the company has “sufficiently entangled” itself with the disclosure of information giving rise to the rumor. “Sufficient entanglement” can occur either explicitly by leaking information or implicitly if the company reviews information and represents that it is accurate or comports with the company’s views. *Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.*, 635 F.2d 156, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1980).

⁵⁶¹ *Fluor*, 654 F.2d 843.

⁵⁶² *Id.* at 846-49.

⁵⁶³ *Id.* at 851.

⁵⁶⁴ For example, Nasdaq notes that “Whenever unusual market activity takes place in a Nasdaq Company’s securities, the Company normally should determine whether there is material information or news which should be disclosed. If rumors or unusual market activity indicate that information on impending developments has become known to the investing public, or if information from a source other than the Company becomes known to the investing public, a clear public announcement may be required as to the state of negotiations or development of Company plans. Such an announcement may be required, even though the Company may not have previously been advised of such information or the matter has not yet been presented to the Company’s Board of Directors for consideration. In certain circumstances, it may also be appropriate to publicly deny false or inaccurate rumors, which are likely to have, or have had, an effect on the trading in its securities or would likely have an influence on investment decisions.” *Nasdaq Stock Market Rule*, Rule IM 5250-1. *See also supra* note 552.

⁵⁶⁵ *Moore Corp. v. Wallace Comput. Servs. Inc.*, 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1558, 1560 (D. Del. 1995).

⁵⁶⁶ *Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.*, 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).

⁵⁶⁷ *See Allergan, Inc. v. Valeant Pharm. Int’l, Inc.*, No. SACV 14-1214 DOC(ANx), 2014 WL 5604539 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2014).

⁵⁶⁸ The technique of a white squire defense combined with a self-tender offer at market or a slight premium to market was used defensively by Diamond Shamrock and Phillips-Van Heusen in 1987. In neither of those instances, however, did the would-be acquiror challenge the defense. In 1989, the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld the issuance of convertible preferred stock by Polaroid Corporation to Corporate Partners in the face of an all-cash, all-shares tender offer, marks the most significant legal test of the white squire defense. *See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp.*, 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989). The Polaroid decision confirmed the prevailing line of cases upholding the issuance of stock to a white squire as a defensive measure when the result was not to consolidate voting control in management or employee hands.

⁵⁶⁹ *See* 17 CFR § 240.14d-101, Item 7 of Schedule 14D (calling for disclosure pursuant to, among other items, Item 1006(d)).

⁵⁷⁰ *Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.*, 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 n.6 (Del. 1985).

⁵⁷¹ *In re AbbVie S'holder Derivative Litig.*, Cons. C.A. No. 9983-VCG, 2015 WL 4464505 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2015).

⁵⁷² Order, *Depomed Inc. v. Horizon Pharma, PLC*, No. 1-15-CV-283834, 2015 WL 7433326 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015).