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Leo E. Strine, Jr., is Of Counsel in the Corporate Department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. Prior to joining the firm, he was the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court from early 2014 through late 2019. Before becoming the Chief Justice, he served on the Delaware Court of Chancery as Chancellor since June 22, 2011, and as a Vice Chancellor since November 9, 1998.

In his judicial positions, Mr. Strine wrote hundreds of opinions in the areas of corporate law, contract law, trusts and estates, criminal law, administrative law, and constitutional law. Notably, he authored the lead decision in the Delaware Supreme Court case holding that Delaware's death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it did not require the key findings necessary to impose a death sentence to be made by a unanimous jury.

For a generation, Mr. Strine taught various corporate law courses at the Harvard and University of Pennsylvania law schools, and now serves as the Michael L. Wachter Distinguished Fellow in Law and Policy at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School and a Senior Fellow of the Harvard Program on Corporate Governance. From 2006 to 2019, Mr. Strine served as the special judicial consultant to the

ABA's Committee on Corporate Laws. He also was the special judicial consultant to the ABA's Committee on Mergers & Acquisitions from 2014 to 2019. He is a member of the American Law Institute.

Mr. Strine speaks and writes frequently on the subjects of corporate and public law, and particularly the impact of business on society, and his articles have been published in *The University of Chicago Law Review*, *Columbia Law Review*, *Cornell Law Review*, *Duke Law Journal*, *Harvard Law Review*, *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, and *Stanford Law Review*, among others. On several occasions, his articles were selected as among the Best Corporate and Securities Articles of the year, based on the choices of law professors.

Before becoming a judge in 1998, Strine served as Counsel and Policy Director to Governor Thomas R. Carper, and had also worked as a corporate litigator at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom from 1990 to 1992. He was law clerk to Judge Walter K. Stapleton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and Chief Judge John F. Gerry of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Mr. Strine graduated *magna cum laude* from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1988, and was a member of the Order of the Coif. In 1985, he received his Bachelor's Degree *summa cum laude* from the University of Delaware and was a member of Phi Beta Kappa and a Truman Scholar.

In 2000, Governor Carper awarded Mr. Strine the Order of the First State. In 2002, President David Roselle of the University of Delaware presented him with the University's Presidential Citation for Outstanding Achievement. In 2006, he was selected as a Henry Crown Fellow at the Aspen Institute. In 2019, he was awarded an honorary degree from Washington College in Chestertown, Maryland.

**Admitted in Delaware.

Clerkships

Honorable Walter K. Stapleton, United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 1989-1990

Honorable John F. Gerry, United States District Court, District of New Jersey, 1988-1989

Recent Publications

[Stakeholder Capitalism's Greatest Challenge: Reshaping a Public Consensus to Govern a Global Economy](#), in Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, July 20, 2023

[Good Corporate Citizenship We Can All Get Behind?: Toward A Principled, Non-Ideological Approach To Making Money The Right Way](#), in 78 Bus. Law. 329 (2023).

[It's Time to Focus on the "G" in ESG](#), in Harvard Business Review, November 18, 2022.

[Optimizing the World's Leading Corporate Law: A Twenty-Year Retrospective and Look Ahead](#), in 77 Bus. Law. 321 (2022).

[Board Practices in the Digital Era](#), forthcoming, in Directors & Boards Magazine, and [Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance](#), May 10, 2022.

[Corporate Leadership's Indispensable Role in Promoting Equality](#), in Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, April 7, 2022.

[The Win-Win That Wasn't: Managing to the Stock Market's Negative Effects on American Workers and Other Corporate Stakeholders](#), in Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance Discussion Paper No. 2021-3. This paper is also available as University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 940, University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 22-01, [1 U. Chi. B. L. Rev. 307 \(2022\)](#) and [SSRN](#).

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[Corporate Political Spending Is Bad Business](#), in Harvard Business Review, January-February 2022 and [Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance](#), January 11, 2022.

[Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy - A Reply to Professor Rock](#), in 76 Bus. Law. 397 (2021).

[Lifting Labor's Voice: A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice and Power Within American Corporate Governance](#), in Columbia Law School's Center for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 643, February 24, 2021. This paper is also available as University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 21-09, Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance Discussion Paper No. 2021-3, on [Notice and Comment: A Blog from the Yale Journal on Regulation and ABA Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice](#), March 2, 2021, [SSRN](#), and Minn. L. Rev.

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[Toward Racial Equality: The Most Important Things the Business Community Can Do](#), in Columbia Law School's Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets, November 2, 2020.

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[Caremark And ESG, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach To Implementing An Integrated, Efficient, And Effective Caremark And EESG Strategy](#), in 106 Iowa L. Rev. 1885 (2021).

[Development on a Cracked Foundation: How the Incomplete Nature of New Deal Labor Reform Presaged Its Ultimate Decline: A Response to Cueller, Levi, and Weingast](#), in 57 Harv. J. on Leg. 67 (2020).

[Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans' Savings for Corporate Political Spending](#), in 97 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1007 (2020).

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